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

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


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
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CIVIL WARS AND MONARCHY

IN FRANCE,

IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES:

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A HISTORY OF FRANCE

PRINCIPALLY DURING THAT PERIOD.

BY LEOPOLD RANKE,

AUTHOR OF 'A HISTORY OF THE POPES IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES.'

TRANSLATED BY M. A. GARVEY

NEW YORK:

HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,

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THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

As a German I venture to say a word upon the History of France.

Great peoples and states have a double character—one national, and the other belonging to the destinies of the world. Their history, in a similar manner, presents a twofold aspect. So far as it forms an essential feature in the development of humanity generally, or records a prevailing influence exercised upon that development, it awakens a curiosity which extends far beyond the limits of nationality; it attracts the attention and becomes an object of study even to those who are not natives of the lands whose story is narrated.

Perhaps the difference between the Greek authors who have treated on the history of ancient Rome in its flourishing period, and the Romans themselves, consists in the fact that the Greeks have regarded the subject as it affected the whole world, while the Romans have looked at it nationally. The object is the same: the writers differ in the positions from which they view it, but together they inform posterity.

Among modern nations none has exercised a more

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manifold and enduring influence upon others than the French. It is not wonderful to hear men say that the history of France—that at least of modern ages—is the history of Europe. I am myself very far from sharing this opinion. France has by no means shut herself up from the impulses springing out of the four great civilized nations of Europe by which she is surrounded. From Italy she has received literary and artistic culture. The chief founders of her monarchy in the seventeenth century took Spain for their model. The tendencies to religious reformation were derived from Germany; those to political regeneration from the example of England.

It is, however, unquestionable that general fermentations, at least throughout the Continent, have for a long period taken their rise principally in France. The French have always taken the liveliest interest in the great problem of the State and the Church, and expounded it to all others with peculiar power of utterance: it has ever been their manner to centralize the free efforts of intellect—to give to a theory, once conceived, a practical application. But the realm of opinion is not the only one in which they have sought to rule. Ambitious, warlike, and incited by feelings of national pride, they have kept their neighbors in a state of constant excitement and armed exercise, for causes springing from the claims of their system, or even without them—now assuming an attitude defiant and aggressive, now one of defense against actual or imaginary dangers; sometimes liberating the oppressed, still more frequently oppressing the free. Epochs have occasionally arisen in which the national history of France has, through the importance of the

events whose occurrence it details, and the extent of their operation, acquired in itself a universal character.

Such an epoch is that which I have undertaken to depict in the following pages.

Characters like those of Francis I., Catherine de' Medici and her sons, the Admiral Coligny, the two Guises, the great Bourbon Henry IV., Mary de' Medici, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV., belong as well to universal history as to that of France. All these personages, distinguished whether by great and good qualities or by the opposite, derive their distinctive character from their connection with the politico-religious contest which extended generally over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This contest did not arise so much from the antagonism of the two systems of doctrine, for within the boundaries of France, neither on the one side nor the other, was there much addition made, as it did from the relations in which those who struggled for ascendancy stood to the State and to parties. The supreme authority was often disputed, and nearly overwhelmed, limited less by law than by insubordinate threatenings, until at length by inconceivable efforts it secured and fortified itself, and the kingship arose from amidst all the storms which assailed it in a fullness of power such as royalty had never before attained in any Romanized German nation. The phenomenon of unlimited monarchy in itself—the desire of imitation it excited—its pretensions and enterprises—as well as the resistance it called forth, made France for a long period the central point of the movements which agitated Europe and the world.

Much has been written upon the history of this

epoch, but to me it appears that the appropriate conception of the times has scarcely been attained. The contemporary writings carry in their vivid coloring the impress of the moment in which each originated; they are for the most part imbued with the peculiar views of parties or of private individuals. Of the traditional history which has been formed since Mezeray's times, and the manner in which Sismondi has extended it, learned Frenchmen have long since remarked how insecure the foundation is upon which it is based. In a few instances this traditional authority has been departed from, but it has been on the whole submitted to.

For a closer examination of the truth of facts, the original documentary matter published in France during the last ten years, as well as that which has appeared in the Netherlands and in Italy, none of which has ever before been used, I have found of the greatest value. I have, in the process of the work, had opportunities of drawing my information from a vast number of unprinted documents:—Italian relations from the Venetian Embassadors and the Papal Nuncios at Paris, to their respective courts, extending over the whole period; Spanish and English correspondence relating to some of the most important years, the former having reference to the sixteenth, the latter to the seventeenth century; letters and proclamations of French kings and statesmen; rolls of the Estates, and records of the parliamentary debates; diplomatic communications, and many other original sources of information, much of which deserves to be published in its entire extent. These documents have given me valuable information at all times, and

have not unfrequently decided my historical convictions. I may take another opportunity of giving a detailed account of them. They are to be found, not in the French and English libraries alone, but also in the archives of Italy, Germany, and Belgium—for all took an interest in that which affected all.

I have not desired, even had I the ability, to produce a history arranged according to the models of the ancient and modern masters of narrative; for such a work it would require a whole life devoted to the uninterrupted study of the archives of France and neighboring countries.

It will be sufficient for me if, unaffected by the reciprocal complaints of the contemporary writers of the age, and avoiding the frequently limited conceptions of later authors, I may flatter myself with having, through authentic and credible information, succeeded in placing before the reader the great and true features of the facts accomplished.

I have not devoted much space to less significant events; but this has enabled me to pay the greater attention to those whose importance is of world-wide extent.

Finally, I am of opinion that the internal arrangement of an historical work should accord with the object of the author, and with the nature of the problem proposed for solution.

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BOOK I.

THE EARLIER EPOCHS OF FRENCH
HISTORY.

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HISTORY OF FRANCE.

CHAPTER I.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE FRENCH NATION.

THERE are many kinds of war, and many degrees of heroic renown, but the highest praise is due to those who, by their victorious arms, have opened new scenes for the civilization of mankind, and overcome barbarism in some important portion of the world. Under this point of view Julius Cæsar has earned for himself one of the greatest of names, and, as regards the West, unquestionably the greatest of all. It is impossible to mention any wars which have had a greater and more enduring influence upon the extension and consolidation of the general civilization of the world than his campaigns in transalpine Gaul.

It may appear surprising that we should comprehend the tribes of Iberian, and especially of Celtic race, which held possession of that territory, under the designation of barbarians. In fact, the products of their manual skill, which have been brought to light out of their tombs, attest their acquaintance with various arts. They were in possession of municipal institutions and other elements of society. A peculiar system of opinions extended over their social state, of which it is to be regretted that no authentic monument gives us a nearer view. But at the same time we find in their manners traces of a savage—rather than merely rude—condition, which, sustained by a religion that consecrated human sacrifices, and by an hereditary arrogance which despised every thing in comparison with itself, would hardly have permitted a free participation in the progress of the human race to arise among

them. However doubtful this may seem from an ethnographical point of view, it is not so historically. The ancient Celts made their appearance as the most formidable enemies of the civilized nations on whose confines they dwelt, and whom for centuries they threatened with destruction. Their sole occupation was war, which, repelled by no natural boundaries, they waged, as an inborn passion for adventure suggested, in vast masses and with irresistible force. They overflowed upper and middle Italy, and conquered Rome. They scattered the hitherto invincible phalanx of the Macedonians, and carried to Tolosa the treasures of the Delphic temple. They seized the ships which were to have prevented them from crossing over into Asia, and by their means effected the passage, and for a time the ancient Ilion was their stronghold. It became a vital necessity for the polished nations of the ancient world to free themselves from these enemies.

When, after long and severe conflicts, this had been effected, Julius Cæsar sought them out in their own homes, and subdued them in those memorable campaigns.

By these means not only were the two great peninsulas of the Mediterranean and the adjacent islands and coasts, upon which the Greek and Roman culture unfolded itself, for a long period at least, secured against all danger from the interior of the European continent, but at the same time in the very midst of it new abodes were prepared for civilization. Tribes of an inexhaustible vital energy, brave and ingenious, were drawn within its circle and subjected to its ideas. After their defeat the Gauls begin for the first time the general cultivation of their native land,* and to enjoy the advantages which its geographical position afforded for peaceful occupations. The Romans filled the country with those great works which every where indicate their presence—amphitheatres, baths, aqueducts, and military roads; which last, as they traversed the land in various directions, were the chief cause of the progress of the Gauls, for they brought every portion into immediate connection with the principal centres of Ro-

* Strabo, iv. 1, 2: *νῦν δὲ ἀναγκάζονται γεωργεῖν, καταβήμενοι τὰ ὄπλα.*

man influence. Lyons became the transalpine Rome. It were to be wished that a computation could be made of the number of persons of Latin or Italian extraction who settled in Gaul: the first centuries were characterized by a colonizing and civilizing activity which produced here an entirely new world; but there is no doubt that the native inhabitants united with the new comers with joyful alacrity. From the blending of the tribes and races which had hitherto inhabited the land with the colonies of the conquerors, there arose a new people—a great and distinct Romanic nation. In the second century Gaul was the most populous, and in the fourth, one of the most civilized of the Roman provinces, although in the interior many national peculiarities were still preserved. Wherever the peculiar genius of the native races came in contact with some branch of the Latin culture, they attained at once to a remarkable degree of perfection. For a long time there were no schools more frequented than those in Gaul; Romans themselves learned Latin eloquence, in the acceptance of the age, on the banks of the Garonne. The most important operation of this change was its effect upon the religion of the primitive races. It has been remarked that the religion of the Gallic Druids was the only one whose peculiarities the Romans did not tolerate; wherever altars are found on which the Celtic gods are represented, together with those of Greece and Rome, they appear simply as idols, without any reference to nationality or polity; the human sacrifices had to disappear. This prohibition can not be regarded, however, as a mere political transaction. The Emperor Claudius, who destroyed the Druidical system, was, without knowing it, an ally of the universal religion of humanity, which even then was beginning to appear in another place. When Christianity then made more and more progress in its contest with the various systems of Pagan idolatry, the Romanized Gauls, among others, were most deeply interested in its doctrines, and in the questions to which it gave rise. They accounted it an honor that the house of the Roman emperors which, in the contest between the various religions, gave the decision in favor of Christianity, had its chief abode in Gaul; it was there, it was said, that Constantine had

placed the sign of the Christian faith upon the Labarum. Some time elapsed, however, before the people were converted. It was not till the second half of the fourth century that the Pannonian warrior, St. Martin, appeared, who, exposing his own person, destroyed before the eyes of the people the objects of their worship—the conic monuments and sacred trees of the native gods, as well as the temples and statues of the Roman deities—for both had stood, and now both fell together—and erected Christian churches on their ruins. He founded the great Minster at Tours, which was succeeded by many other monkish institutions, both in the interior of the land and on the neighboring islands, seminaries alike for theological studies and for the service of the Church, which gave bishops to the cities, and missionaries to the rural districts. Thus complete was the incorporation of the Gauls in the system of the Roman Empire, in the progress and decline of its civilization, and in the alteration which took place in its religion. The external changes which the Empire experienced must, therefore, of necessity have affected them immediately, and with full force.

In the earlier times, if ever the conquered made an attempt at insurrection, they were reprov'd by being informed that the supremacy of Rome guaranteed them from the hostility of neighboring states, and prevented a universal war of nations; but after the lapse of a few centuries, the Empire no longer possessed the power to occupy the proud position of defender of the obedient, and repeller of their enemies. The boundaries of the province ceased to extend themselves into the territories of the neighboring tribes, and were soon after overstepped by them in turn. The expedient of taking German troops into pay for the defense of the frontiers brought but a momentary respite. They were of necessity impelled and driven forward by the inundating motions of a still seminomadic world behind them, and at the same time being involved in the disputes of the Roman governors, they took a decided and hostile direction toward the interior provinces; so that the elements which had been at first repelled with all power, now pressed forward as if by the force of necessity, into the Gallo-Roman territory.

In Southern Gaul, the troops which had been brought in for the defense of the land settled themselves down as its lords and proprietors. The Burgundians compelled the chiefs of the Roman provincials to grant them possessions in the Sequanian and Lugdunian districts, and it is believed that the remains of their settlements, in the mountain regions, may still be discerned, the plains and cities have remained with their ancient possessors. The West-Goths, in conflict with the highest powers of the State, sought to obtain settlements in the very centre of the empire, and then, desisting from the attempt, fixed themselves in Aquitanian Gaul. The confusion was already so great, that even the regulations which they ordained on taking forcible possession of that region, were less oppressive to the native inhabitants than the burden of tribute which they had been compelled to bear previously.

In Northern Gaul, where some efforts for independence had formerly been made, there was raised at the same time, upon the ruins of the fallen Empire, a very irregular power, in which, if we do not err, the influence of German ideas is discernible. It was a kind of Romano-Gallic monarchy, but incapable of coping with the aggressive power of the neighboring Frankish kings, which was far more firmly grounded in the hereditary customs and ideas of their subjects. Clovis entirely destroyed it in one pitched battle, and made himself master of its territories. Other portions of the intruding people disappeared again; and we see the Germans who were once expelled by Cæsar from the Gallic soil, nearly the only strangers who remained and became citizens of the country. An earlier possession would have been of less importance to the history of the world, since they would have united with barbarous or semi-barbarous people only; now it was of eminent consequence, because the Gauls had become Romanized, and therefore, by a union with them, the Germans entered into relations with the civilized world, which could not again be interrupted.

If we ask what it was that subjected the conquests to a fixed rule, and put a stop to the popular flood, which at one time pushed on gradually, at another rushed on vio-

lently; the answer must be, first, the idea of the Empire, which was acknowledged by the Germans, and entered into their ideas; and secondly, and with far greater force, religion in the ecclesiastic form—for, although we can not say with certainty in what manner it was generally effected, Christianity had now taken throughout Gaul the form of a hierarchical system.

The adoption of Christianity by Clovis and his followers was not perhaps an event proceeding from any lofty spiritual impulse; but it was one of incalculable historical importance, not only to Gaul, but to the whole world; for this warlike confederacy immediately spread the faith among their kindred races, the Franks and other German tribes, up to the Rhine, and even beyond that river, and thus put an end to the ancient enmity of the German people against the Romans and the Gauls. Had not this occurred, a complete Germanizing of the people, such as took place in the valley of the Rhine, the Netherlands, and Britain, could not have been prevented on the banks of the Marne and Seine. Religion, as its mission is, smoothed down the most stubborn national contrarieties. The Franks could no longer wish to destroy the places where they worshiped; on the contrary, they united with their teachers, and gave themselves up with vigorous zeal to the form of faith and worship which these had communicated to them. The strife between the Catholic and Arian creeds was not yet terminated. The latter, to which the West-Goths and Burgundians adhered obtained an accession of power in Gaul, through the immigration of these peoples, to the deep dissatisfaction of the orthodox bishops. But they found assistance among the Franks, with whom many of them had long stood in close alliance. St. Remigius, who received Clovis and his people into the bosom of the Church at Rheims was renowned, not only as a destroyer of idols, but also as a successful antagonist of the Arians. The ambition of the Frankish military monarch, and the religious zeal of the Romish bishops, entered into the closest union. Supported by the population of the land, Clovis and his sons overturned, throughout Gaul, the power of the German kings, who were Arians,

and obtained the mastery in all the provinces, as they also extended their dominion far toward the interior of Germany. They accomplished what the Roman Empire had no longer power to effect; they averted from Gaul the pressure of the colonizing Germans, and suppressed the varying sects in the interior; the conquerors protected the Romanized nationality, and the unity of the Catholic church; and when the Roman Empire failed in force of arms, the common ruin was prevented by the converted barbarians.

Many of the yellow-haired kings appeared, as it were, and voluntarily did so, as priests of God. They bestowed large treasures upon the Church, for the manifest purpose of increasing the pomp of its external ceremonies; but at the same time their generosity had reference to the conquered people. The chroniclers of the age record that one of the chief motives to the endowment of the Church was that it might have the means of being liberal to the poor, so that those who possessed nothing might not be left altogether without a resource. The decree of the Council of Orleans is well known—according to which a portion of the income arising from the lands bestowed by the king was to be devoted to the support of the poor, and to the redemption of captives. The Church brought the very lowest class, which had been hitherto totally neglected, with its necessities, into relation with the conqueror.

A deliberate and systematic destruction of the Roman system no longer lay within the range of possibility. Romanized persons were in the immediate service of the kings, and appear to have been throughout the most distinguished and wealthy proprietors of the soil. The Frankish kings, like the Roman emperors, claimed obedience and duty from their subjects. They preserved the old finance system as nearly as possible in its integrity: the ancient tribute was levied on landed property as well as the person, which includes a continuance of the former state of things in general. We even hear that the games of the Circus were revived under the Merovingian kings. The Roman royal prerogative was brought into operation, and men might have believed that they still lived under the old empire. Notwithstanding all this, however, an unexampled change had taken place, not only in the material

condition, but in the very thoughts of men : its extent may be conceived from the fact (if great changes can be described in few words) that the supreme power was regarded as a personal possession, which might be transferred and divided by gift or inheritance. The old kings insisted upon an unconditional hereditary right ; and, in ordinary cases, we hear nothing of an election, nor of any part taken either by the populace or the aristocracy in the elevation of the monarch to the throne. The great officers of the state, both Romanic and German, swore fealty to the person of the king, and he rewarded them with fiefs from the lands of the Crown. The government was intimately connected with the palace, and the majordomo of the royal house was also the chief officer of the kingdom ; but since that office and the emoluments connected with it were also in their turn regarded as personal and irrevocable possessions, the whole system had a tendency to individual independency and arbitrary power. We soon hear the kings complaining : some that all their honors had passed over to the bishops of the cities ; others, that the temporal princes had deprived them of both property and power. They saw themselves surrounded by independent nobles, who claimed, as a reward for the share they might have taken in the erection of the new kingdom, a participation in the enjoyment of power. The principle of personal power, when once it had been transferred to others, rebelled against the prince, who regarded it as his own peculiar property. It seemed almost as if the old Gallic spirit of clientship under the chiefs of the tribes, and of subjection to the priesthood—which had vanished before the dominion of the Romans—were now again emerging from the deep, and renewing itself in this power of the bishops and of the great nobles ; even the native peculiarities began to make their appearance once more. \\\

At all events Gaul, under the successors of Clovis, attained a far greater variety of social life than it had exhibited under the Romans. Power was every where free, and developed itself in distinct forms by means of the division of principalities, which were held together, and at the same time kept separate, by the dynasty. This however had the effect of enfeebling that social union and subordination without which

the idea of a state is inconceivable. The violent attempts made from time to time by the kings to enforce their authority only served to display their weakness, and it soon became doubtful whether the Frankish kingdom would be able to maintain itself ; for there were other powers, of a totally different character, better knit together, or depending upon the more free exercise of masculine bravery—powers which regarded the world as an open arena for the conquest of dominion.

Bursting forth from the wildernesses of Arabia, the might of the successors of Mohammed rolled on with resistless arms ; subdued the Romano-Greek territories, Syria, Egypt, and Africa ; overthrew in its rapid course the advanced Germanic kingdom in Spain, and already, in alliance with the natives, had obtained a footing on the hither side of the Pyrenees. How could it be expected that the Merovingians, whose power of action was dead, and whose authority was paralyzed by intestine divisions, would be able to withstand the threatening storm ? It appeared indeed as if what had happened in Spain was about to take place in Gaul also. \\\

It is the merit of the house, afterward called the Carlovigian, that at the head of their warlike Austrasian followers they met and withstood the irruption, and saved the Christian Frankish nation from the utter destruction that seemed to hang over it. Every power that will rise must be grounded upon some great service ; for every great service secures authority and power. It was to this defense of Gaul against the Arabians that the Carlovigians were indebted for their elevation to the royal dignity. The race of weaklings vanished before a succession of great men. \\\

The Carlovigians were also in alliance with the Church ; not however with the Gallic branch, which was then chiefly intent upon increasing its possessions, and obtaining an independent position, and upon which they imposed the severest duties of obedience, but with the general Church of the West, which had just separated from that of the East, and which had a thorough conception of the danger with which Islam threatened the Christian name. In that respect, as in its strife with the Eastern Church, it needed the assistance of this

powerful race, and was not ungrateful for it. The power of the Carolingians depended not alone upon its victorious arms, but also upon the sanction of the Church.

In this struggle Frankish Gaul received a fresh accession of German energy through the armies which chiefly fought her battles, and which, being afterward retained for the defense of the country against the foe, and for the preservation of order, finally settled down here. The nation thus attained a greater and stronger form. The union with Germany gave it a warlike, that with Italy an intellectual and philosophical impulse. Every one felt conscious, whether willingly or unwillingly, that he belonged to an all-embracing religious and political whole—the established Empire—and was bound to it in his whole personality. As in former times, war was again the sole occupation; but it no longer depended upon the irregular impulses of the people or their leaders, and did not threaten civilization: the idea of war was penetrated with that of the defense of religion, and of the extension of a great monarchy, upon which was grounded an organization which was all-pervading, and which required unconditional obedience.

Meanwhile, however well-constructed the empire of the Carolingians may appear, it wanted the very key-stone of its constitution. The question concerning the continuance of the supreme power in the ruling house was not yet determined. Powerful also as the monarchy might be, its power was not equal to its pretensions. On the firm land it had subdued every foe, and within its well-fortified frontiers it had scarcely anything to fear, but it was deficient in that which constitutes the half of all national strength—the marine power.

It appears sometimes as if whole generations were smitten with blindness, for while they are contending among themselves, they are preparing the way for the common enemy. While the successors of Charlemagne were at discord about the inheritance of the monarchy, the peoples became again disunited; the powerful militia which had been called out for the defense of the country dissolved away; the great and influential men of the kingdom took different sides, and a struggle commenced which engrossed all their attention and

all their power. Meanwhile, the sea-ruling Germans of the north, among whom heathenism, expelled from the rest of Europe, had once more concentrated its entire energy, spread themselves over all the maritime territories of the kingdom from the mouth of the Elbe to the mouth of the Garonne. ||

The peculiar geographical advantages which the western provinces possess over the eastern, the French over the German, consists in the diversified course of their rivers, which bring the land into connection with the sea in various directions; but from this very circumstance now arose their greatest danger. The Northmen seized the mouths and islands of the rivers, and the adjacent shores. The Somme conducted them to Amiens, the Seine to Paris, the Loire up to Tours and Amboise, and the Garonne up to Toulouse. The land between the rivers was laid waste far and wide, and here and there the inhabitants apostatized from Christianity, and associated themselves with the invaders. ||

The Carolingians were not in a position to check this evil. The German territories on which their power rested were scarcely in a state to defend themselves from similar attacks, and possessed neither the power nor the organization which would have enabled them to lend assistance to distant allies. The supreme power was again united in one hand, but that was the most incapable. It may be regarded as the last act of the undisputed dominion of the Carolingians, that Charles, surnamed the Gross, when with a great body of both tongues—the Latin and the German—he had encountered the united Northmen before Paris, did not venture to give them battle; on the contrary, he ceded to them for the winter a portion of territory lying higher and more remote in the kingdom, and in addition pledged himself to pay them a considerable sum in money.* At last, it appeared inevitable that the Northmen must be received into the kingdom, or rather that the settlements they had made there by force must be acknowledged: this was done under the stipulation—as it is

* Abbo De Bellis Paris, i. 2. 338: clearer than the annalists, "annuiturque feris licitum Senones adeundi," etc.; which agrees with the 'Annales Sancti Columbæ Senonensis,' in the year 886, "2 kal. Dec. ascenderunt Nortmanni Sennis a Parisiis," etc.

called in an ancient treaty—that they should now defend the realm. Soon after this they became Christians, and exceeded all others in zeal; and upon this conversion, rather than upon the promise they had given, depended that protection which they lent the kingdom against any further attacks from the heathen sea-kings.

How powerful and decisive for the progress of the world appears the idea of religion in this event also! The collective development of the West depended upon the fact that Gaul did not also fall under the dominion of the Saracens, whose yoke the Spaniards were compelled to bear for so many centuries. But those enemies whom the Gauls would never have been able to drive back by force were won by conversion, and entered the communion of the Church, which made necessary at least a conditional support of the State; and their influence diffused with the faith also the need of peace among their distant kindred tribes. What seas and frontier forts could not effect, religion accomplished; a dominion of security. As far as can be discerned by the eye which surveys the history of the world, nothing is to be perceived which, opposed to the existing fundamental condition of Gaul, could have done it injury.

It is remarkable how many different popular elements met together in Gaul, in consequence of these events. The basis of the population throughout the land was still the Romanic race, nearly related in speech, traditions, and peculiar institutions, with the Italian and the Spanish, which still preserved itself under foreign domination; next to them appear the relics of the ancient Celtic race in Brittany, which, being strengthened by immigrations from Britain, took pleasure in mocking at every thing like law and subjection; of the Iberian, in the Basques, whose subjection was always doubtful, and from time to time was interrupted by violent outbreaks of hostility. The German settlers, on the other hand, had heartily embraced the ideas of Church and State. Their descent might still for the most part be discerned. The Goths themselves renewed their race and name on the borders of the Spanish frontier. The Frankish and Romanic elements most thoroughly interpenetrated each other on the Middle

Seine, where the Merovingian kings had had their favorite residence, and where a powerful dukedom now arose, called France, comprehending the territory round Paris. The Latinized Franks separated themselves but slowly from the Germans, with whom they harmonized in customs, manner of thinking, and the principles of political order. Finally, the Northmen had appeared, and brought the French coasts into connection with the distant North.

The aboriginal population of Western Europe, the Romanic world, which still held possession of so large a portion of it, and the Germanic race, which has obtained the dominion of the world by land and sea, met together on this soil and within its boundaries.

The history of the formation of peoples has something in it of the history of the earth—it bears, one may say, a geologic character—the formations of the different epochs may be distinguished; but in the history of men and of peoples there is nothing inanimate: all that are included within common limits operate ceaselessly upon one another, striving continually after an organic union in an entirety. The attention of history is now called to the manner in which these men, descended from such various races, dwelt together, and united with one another.

B

CHAPTER II.

ORIGIN OF A FRENCH KINGDOM.

As yet Gaul had never constituted a distinct political whole. The ancient population of the country belonged to several races, and the tribes from which it had been collected together stood in doubtful association with one another. The Romans united them all, but it was by making them a province of that universal Empire which stretched alike over the East and the West. When the Merovingian royalty arose in the Gallic territory, it was unable to effect a permanent union; it embraced besides a large portion of Germany, whence it had originally proceeded. It was upon this German portion that the Carolingian monarchy was principally grounded; but its tendency was far more comprehensive—it contained in itself the idea of the renovation of the Roman Empire in the West.

In the ninth century it was clearly seen that this kingdom would hardly be able to preserve its unity. If the victories over the Saracens had been one of the most important foundations of the Carolingian power, it must now have been deeply shaken by the circumstance of its incapacity to lend any aid against the Northmen. Still this was not followed by the origination of another political power extending over Gaul; the diversified composition of the different provinces rather tended to raise up so many independent dominions.

The origin of a new organization embracing the whole land may be dated from the moment when, under the influence of the ancient German hereditary right, the idea of a separate West-Frankish kingdom by the side of the Empire, which was afterward gradually realized, began to be entertained. The frontiers had long been determined, which separated it from

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the East Franco-Germanic monarchy, to which both Lorraine and the Empire then belonged. Powerful also as the dukes and great feudatories who were masters of the provinces might have been, such a monarchy was indispensable to their existence, for it united finally in itself all the legal authority which had passed from the Romans to the Merovingians, and from these to the Carolingians. Each single vassal derived his power from the monarchy by concession or by recognition. They needed a king, or else each of them must have declared himself king and even emperor.

Just at the very time when the warlike power of the Carolingians showed itself so feeble against the Northmen, and when all other countries more or less openly and unreservedly withdrew themselves from it, a few West-Frankish nobles, laymen, but chiefly clergy, who thought they could by their consecration supply the defect of birth, made an attempt to elevate a native race to the place of the Carolingians. It was a race which, it appears, had not long since immigrated from Germany,* and, through an alliance with the royal house, as well as by valiant deeds and great possessions, raised itself to a position of predominant authority. It can not be said that it could boast of heroes like Charles Martel, King Pepin, or Charlemagne, upon whose conduct depended the destiny of the world; but it produced highly endowed and great-minded men, who in the confusion of a ruinous war preserved lands, and cities, and churches from destruction. The ancestor of this race in France was Robert of Anjou, surnamed the Brave, who distinguished himself against the Northmen in the second half of the ninth century. A monkish chronicler, who knew no more exalted illustration, compares him to Judas Maccabæus for his deeds in defense of his faith and of his country. His death, which happened in

* The genealogical combination by which the male line of this race is united with the Carolingians can not be maintained. If the elder genealogies rejected the Saxon origin, it happened chiefly because they found it first in Aimoinus, and that for the name of Wittekind they found no other authority than that of the author of the "Chronicon Uspergense" (compare *Le Gendre*, 'Des Antiquités de la Maison de France,' p. 49). This objection is now, however, removed, for we find the same legend authenticated by Richer, an author of the tenth century.

battle, while fighting gallantly, was regarded as a token of Divine wrath against the land. At the defense of Paris his son Odo earned the highest praise; he was especially renowned for the animating influence his presence exercised upon the exhausted warriors—that fortunate gift of personal superiority by which he could calm the alarm of his followers. He knew the right moment at which to gather them all around him, and thus often with thousands defeated tens of thousands. This Odo, the West-Franks, who were destitute of a leader at a time of imminent danger, elected for their king.

But ancient dynasties are not so easily overturned, and new ones founded, in Europe—not even in those violent times; Odo was not able to unite the forces of the whole country, nor to master the enemy, however frequently and bravely he fought with them. After him the Carlovingsians were once more acknowledged.

A period then followed, during which these Robertinians, as they may be called, remained in possession of the dukedom of France and other territories, sometimes waging war against the descendants of Charlemagne, sometimes favoring and supporting them, but they were always powerful. There were now in fact two rival powers in France. The nephew of Odo, son of a Robert, who had also worn the crown—Hugh the Great, by the grace of God, Duke of the Franks, as he styled himself, but who was designated by others as Duke of the United Gauls, or simply as The Duke—was only restrained by a peculiar religious awe from setting the crown upon his own head. But of his son Hugh, surnamed Capet, already might the eventful sentence have been repeated—he was king in fact, while the Carlovingsian king Lothaire had only the name.

I would not, however, assert that the Carlovingsians were in the same condition that the Merovingians had been. The Carlovingsians had not, like these, delivered over their whole power to a new authority which took their place; they still firmly maintained all their claims. They were by no means so degenerate in power and action; they undertook too much, rather than too little, as their ill-planned attempt to annih-

late the power of the Northmen, among others, sufficiently proves.

It was precisely the union in them of personal ambition and immeasurable pretensions, as opposed to a multitude of great nobles who possessed the land, that was totally destructive of their power in a conjuncture of unfavorable circumstances.

King Lothaire died, and soon afterward his son Louis—surnamed, with great injustice, if the title indicate moral blamé, *Le Fainéant*, for he died in consequence of a fall from his horse before he could undertake any enterprise. The right of succession passed to his uncle Charles, who then administered the duchy of Lower Lorraine, in the East Frankish kingdom, under the emperors of the Saxon line; for on the accession of Lothaire the earlier Carlovingsian custom was so far altered that this Charles was not assigned any portion of the power or wealth of his ancestors; and now the question arose, Should he who had been thus excluded and insulted be called to the throne? Various objections were raised against this course in the assembly of the French nobles, which was held immediately after the death of young Louis. Duke Charles, it was said, was a vassal of the German Emperor, and married to a consort who was not equal to him in birth, and whom the powerful nobles could not therefore honor as their queen; he was of a violent disposition, surrounded by a crew who only thirsted after wickedness and crime; in short, he was unworthy of the crown, and would bring misfortune upon the land if he were elected. And did it not indeed behove them to take care, lest, surrounded as he was by a number of warriors, attached to his person and ready to engage in any act of violence, he should be desirous of re-establishing in all their fullness those indefinite prerogatives of the Carlovingsians which were limited by acts rather than by law? The chief opponent to the calling in of Charles was Adalbero, Archbishop of Rheims: who had been personally threatened by the last king, and just freed from the necessity of justifying himself by Hugh, Duke of France, and moreover the tendency of the clerical leaders was then to exalt the right obtained by election and consecration above that of inherit-

ance. He declared, before the assembled nobles, that the laws of inheritance were not unconditionally binding. * He appealed to the change of emperors in ancient Rome—a fact which is doubly remarkable as taking place in the tenth century. Should they, however, decide upon postponing the hereditary right, upon whom could they cast their eyes, except upon the possessor of the most important authority? Adalbero recommended to the assembly his friend Hugh Capet, who was dangerous to no one, and who would devote himself to the conservation of the rights won by them all, as well as of those of the state; * more than one king might be counted among Hugh's ancestors; he himself stood well, personally, with the most powerful of the nobility, and the possession of some great abbeys gave him at the same time considerable ecclesiastical influence. Without considering the scruples which had prevented his father from seizing it, he took the crown that was offered to him, and afterward obtained possession of all the remaining territories of the Carolingians by formal conquest. Still it was not the intention to change France into an elective monarchy; it was considered, on the contrary, that such an alteration would indubitably lead to the greatest embarrassment and confusion. What, if the newly-elected king should die during a campaign like that in which they were actually engaged? the army would not know whom it was to follow, contentions would break out among the leaders, and the monarchy would incur danger. After some opposition from the Archbishop, the son of the newly elected king was the same year appointed his successor. †

Thus did the kingdom of the Western Franks, within its frontiers as already defined, "from the Maes to the Ocean," pass over to a new race. Motives of the most diverse kinds conspired to bring about the event—the actual power of this house and its traditions; the close alliance of Hugh himself

* Speech of Adalbero, Archbishop of Rheims, Richer, iv. 11: "*Legimus clarissimi generis imperatoribus . . . alios modo pares modo impares successisse. Promovete ducem, actu nobilitatum, copiis clarissimum, quem non solum reipublice, sed et privatarum rerum tutorem invenietis.*"

† Hugh urged it on the ground "*ut heredem certum in regno relinqueret.*"—Richer, iv. 12.

with the great leading dignitaries of the Church; the analogy of his power, which still remained ducal, with that of others; and especially the security to all existing conditions which he gave reason to expect as the consequence of his election.

There was nothing in this that indicated hostility to the German Emperor, although the claims of a prince had been rejected, who belonged to the Empire, and would have drawn his military power from one of its provinces; on the contrary, a restoration of the vigorous Carolingian dominion would have been formidable to him. A still more perfect emancipation from the connection with Germany, however, is unquestionably discoverable in this event. The Western kingdom now attained a condition of complete independence, when a native race, which possessed no authority or source of power beyond its confines, acceded to the throne. The change of dynasty involved an alteration in the entire position of the realm.

The Carolingians, however hampered by circumstances and events, still possessed, through their origin and the ancient sanction of the Church, a general claim upon the Western kingdom, and even upon Germany and the Empire, while they demanded nothing less than unconditional obedience from the West-Franks. The Capetians, as the Robertinians were afterward designated, could make only an exclusively West-Frankish claim, and here it rested altogether upon the consent of the nobles. The sons could not be associated with the fathers, except by a free resolution, after the manner of the German monarchy.

It was no newly founded power that was transferred to them, but the old West-Frankish monarchy formed by the course of centuries, necessarily limited by the manner in which it was bestowed, and depending on the assent of the nobility.* For a long time the new monarchy bore the appearance of a dominion which encroached but slightly, only holding together the various districts by the bond of feudality. †

Whoever desires to investigate the history of the nation, must seek particularly for its traces in the territories of the

* Hugh Capet once said this explicitly.

great vassals who had set the king over themselves. As there the personal distinctions, resting upon national extraction, vanished gradually, and in their stead arose those provincial peculiarities attributable to the character of the climate and soil, and the mingling of the blood of different races, the language developed itself into two nearly related, and yet very distinct, idioms; the system of chivalry sprang up and obtained especial centres in the courts of the great vassals in Normandy, Champagne, Burgundy, and Flanders, as well as in the South, at Toulouse, Poitiers, and Clermont. The native nobility joined with them in relations similar to those which they themselves had formed with the king: equal to whom in descent, and but little controlled by legal subordination, they attempted various foreign enterprises, which, whether successful or unsuccessful, set all Europe in a state of fermentation.

Odo II., Count of Blois and Champagne, undertook to enforce the right of his consort to the kingdom of Burgundy—nay, he aimed still higher, even at the dominion of Italy, and the seat of the emperor at Aix-la-Chapelle;* but he met a powerful opponent in the first Salic emperor, by whom he was defeated, and the Capetian King had no ground upon which he could deny the right of the Emperor to pursue his victory over one of his vassals even on the French soil. On the other hand, the Duke of Normandy succeeded in making one of the most important conquests which has ever been recorded. England, which had constantly withstood the attacks of the ancient Danes and Northmen, was subjected by him to the Romanized Norman nobility. The whole of the inhabitants of the French sea-board took part in the enterprise, and a multitude of other persons from more distant regions: a Count Odo of Champagne, grandson of Odo II., makes his appearance shortly after as Earl of York. And while these Normans pressed forward toward Northumberland and the Scottish border, or carried on the unfinished struggle of the Anglo-Saxons with Wales, their kinsmen were fighting with the Greeks on the Neapolitan

* Hugo Flaviniacensis, 1037: "Sumpta tyrannide ad regnum cœpit aspirare." Annalista Saxo, 1037: "Corde elato Aquisgrani palatium invadere decrevit." Glaber Rodolphus, iii. 9: "Præstolabantur legati ex Italia directe deferentes ei aram principatus totius Italiæ."

waters, and renewing the opposition of the Christian name to the Saracens in Sicily. Meanwhile the nobles and gentry of Aquitaine associated themselves together under the banner of the King of Castile and Aragon, and fought by the side of the Cid. A young count of Burgundy won the hand of a daughter of the Castilian king, and with it a territory on the sea-coast, out of which Portugal has since arisen.

All these, however, were separate undertakings, which contributed nothing to the union of the nation; to this end it was of the highest of importance that at last an enterprise was undertaken in which all could join. In the present disposition of the nation, and the bias of men's minds, it only required that the old idea of rescuing the Holy Sepulchre from the power of the Saracens should be openly propounded in order to carry all away with it.

This idea had its origin in the common feeling of western Christendom. It had no special relation to the West-Frankish kingdom, but it made the most vivid impression on the people speaking the French tongue; and the chief leader of the movement to which it gave rise belonged to the house of Boulogne, which had also recently taken part in the conquest of England. The others were French, from Normandy or Champagne, from Flanders, and even from the France of the Capets itself. The most powerful of all was the prince of Aquitanian Gaul, Raymond of Toulouse, to whom, the chronicle says, flowed all the people between the Alps and the Pyrenees, and to whom the Papal legate himself appealed for protection. How many new sovereignties were grounded in the course of time by this movement! Syria was immediately brought into the closest relationship with France; and in later times the French name extended itself over Greece and all the islands of the Mediterranean, for the ages of immigration were followed by those of expansion. These enterprises were the first actions of the nation, formed out of so many mixtures of races and by so many popular struggles, and united by a great idea. In these expeditions, which rested on a general impulse and individual free resolution, with their forms, which united independence with subordination, the nation at that time appears to have found an expression which satisfied all its vital impulses.

These were the times in which Northern French and Provençal song developed itself, the groundwork of modern philosophy and theology was laid, and the architecture of the Middle Ages produced those marvelous works which still awaken our admiration. All the tendencies of the nation displayed a living power and energy. Among them we now meet with an idea of more national importance than the rest, which had its foundation in a pressing need of the interior of France, which now first came to light.

Amidst so much that was splendid, the individual and uncontrolled exercise of power by all the great barons gave rise to ceaseless intestine war and the oppression of the feeble, and was followed by the most monstrous and intolerable evils. The Church sought to check this frightful system by preaching and announcing every where the "Peace of God," or the "Truce of God;" but although in the first warmth of feeling these proposals were received with alacrity, they were very far from fulfilling the intended object.*

In the immediate territories of the King freedom and property were least secure; private wars and oppression, without the slightest respect for law or authority, were the order of the day. The dangerous state of the times may be learned from the complaints of Fulbert, Bishop of Chartres, against the violence of one of his knightly neighbors, who not only repaired a castle that had been razed by the King, but also built a new one, so that the bishop was now attacked and harassed on both sides.† He had hitherto in vain sought assistance from the King and his son. He now wrote again to him, entreating his help, and stating that if it were not accorded to him he would forsake his bishopric and the kingdom, and perhaps carry his complaints to some foreign king, or to the Emperor himself, whom he would inform that the King of France either had not the will or did not possess the power to defend the Church.†

Thus did the Church, which would willingly have favored the monarchy of the Capets, in order that with its increase

* Compare Glaber Rodolphus, iv. 5.

† Fulbert's letter to the King, in Duchesne, iv. 172: he describes his antagonist as a man "qui nec Deum nec potestatem vestram se revereri satis superque indicat."

she might herself grow strong, and obtain that immunity from the common disorders which she could no longer purchase with her wealth, now in the extremity of her distress cry for help to the royal authority. No one could well doubt the right and the duty of the supreme power to protect the oppressed; but their existence was nearly forgotten, they had lain so long unexercised; it was necessary that men should feel anew that there was a supreme power over them, nay it must be itself reminded anew of its existence and its duties.

At the same time with Abelard, the master of philosophical speculation, and St. Bernard, the father of the mysticism of positive belief, appeared a practical brother of the cloister, the Abbot Suger, of St. Denis, who, from the study of the ancient imperial laws, which were not neglected in the cloisters, had thoroughly imbued himself with the idea of the peculiar vocation of the supreme power, and formed in his mind a strong conception of law and of justice, of their connection with the royal power, and of the duty of the government to devote itself to their administration.‖ He found no difficulty in filling with these opinions the energetic mind of the prince, who was his personal friend. It was he who incited Louis VI. to his efforts "for the good of the kingdom and for the public interests," and it was through him chiefly that they were crowned with success. He afterward recorded them with that vividness which a personal participation communicated.* This enterprise arose from a quarrel of the monastery with a fierce and powerful neighbor, Bouchard de Montmorency. Bouchard had refused to submit to the judgment which had been, in all form, pronounced against him, and the king determined to compel him by force, and thus, on the boundaries between the Abbot and the Baron, was the authority of the king renewed. All the other barons soon experienced the same treatment as Bouchard, who was the most considerable among them. The barons who were tenants *in capite*, in the ancient dukedom, were without exception reduced to obedience. What the

* E. g. De Vita Ludovici Grossi, c. 1, "Ecclesiarum utilitatibus providebat; aratorum, laboratorum, et pauperum quieti studebat." C. 8: "Regni administrationi et reipublice, sicut se rei opportunitas offerebat, sagaciter providere, recalcitrantes perdomare, castella et fortalitia occupare, . . . strenue satagebat."

father had begun the son carried forward, and under the same influence. The letter is generally known, in which Abbot Suger summons Louis VII. to return from the crusade in which he was engaged, and conjures him by the oath which he had taken at his coronation, of reciprocal duty between the prince and his subjects, "not to leave the flock any longer in the power of the wolf." In the towns men sought defense by uniting in sworn associations; and when the Crown recognized these associations and took them into its protection, it only did that which expressed the growing consciousness of its proper duty, for the universal violence that prevailed throughout the realm must have been put an end to, either by the royal authority or by some foreign power. The kings proclaimed the public peace, and succeeded in maintaining it fully, without respect of persons, although it cost them many strenuous efforts.

In the former generations of this house, before its accession to the throne, we find merely men of a brave and aspiring nature; after them followed others, who, disposed to peace, through their habits of thought, and through their position, bore almost a priestly character*—their royalty was rather a dignity than a power. Now, under altered circumstances, appear men of the same race, who unite the impulse of universal ideas with activity.

After they had established the authority of the supreme power and of the law in the several provinces, a far more extensive and important field for their active energy was opened by the inevitable course of events. The power of the great vassals, which had been limited by the monarchy, and which, according to the meaning and intent of that institution, must have been limited by it, received in the twelfth century an unexampled extension by the sudden union of several rights of inheritance in one race: so vast was the power thus acquired, that the kings found it intolerable, and were compelled to venture upon a contest against it. A few words on these well-known events may be permitted here.

* Ivonis Carnotensis Epistola ad Regem: "Decet regiam majestatem, ut pactum pacis, quod Deo inspirante in regno vestro confirmari fecistis, nulla lenocinante amicitia vel fallente desidia rideri permittatis."

The male line of William the Conqueror had become extinct. His grand-daughter, who appears in the chronicles as an empress, "L'Emperreïs Mahault," for she was the widow of a German emperor, had married, a second time, the Count of Anjou and Maine. Her son by this marriage, the first of the Plantagenets, having ascended the English throne, united these rich and favorably situated provinces with England and Normandy. He then married Eleanor of Aquitaine, the richest heiress in the then known world, and thus to his sons came seven important provinces in the south of France. They moreover laid claim to Savoy, and their authority over Brittany grew to be a complete and absolute dominion. It has been computed that more than half of the modern France was in their hands, while scarcely a fourth part, we will not say obeyed, but merely adhered to the King. This power created a new centre for the greatest part of France: the splendor of the monarchy grew dim before it, and would have been thrust aside altogether, had it not at its head an able prince, who, in the very midst of the contest, found means to raise the country to a higher degree of united development than it had previously attained.

The father of Philip Augustus had had only female children before his birth, and it was said that this son was granted in answer to his prayers and those of the whole land. Philip came to the throne very early: his mind was formed by business. Chiefly from the poetry of his time, which was inexhaustible in wonderful invention, he learned that Charlemagne, who was popularly spoken of as King of France, had been master of the whole land, as well in the north as in the south. to the summit of the Pyrenees, and to become like him in this respect was now the object to which he directed all his efforts. In the midst of men who placed happiness and honor in an extravagant mode of living at court, he showed himself economical. He held the warlike multitudes who won his victories for him in control, and deprived them of their booty. He undertook one thing after another, for too many objects at the same time would have distracted his mind. He appeared, as the lines of a poet depict him, terrible as a lion and vehement as a bird of prey, but mild and forbearing,

once he had established peace; his whole being breathes discretion and energy.

In the struggle which was now going on among the Plantagenets themselves, it happened that Arthur of Brittany, the nephew of King John, was taken prisoner in a war which he was carrying on against his uncle, with French assistance, and, according to the expression of the writer who is most gentle on the subject, disappeared in prison. The estates of Brittany, in the first assembly recorded to have taken place among them, did not hesitate to declare John guilty of the murder of Arthur, and demanded justice from the French king. John objected, not without reason, that he was at the same time King of England; and to answer a charge of murder would be a derogation of his dignity. Philip Augustus replied that the King of France could not lose his rights in consequence of one of his vassals obtaining power; that he felt it his duty not to suffer any one, either in his own immediate dominions, or in those which were united under his suzerainty, who might be able to do so, to withdraw himself from his jurisdiction. In this he had the common voice, and especially that of the other magnates of the kingdom, on his side. This occasion, on which the peers, in their relation to the French crown, appeared as the equals of John, was, it is believed, the first on which they assembled as a great judicial tribunal.* John was formally summoned before their court, and as he did not appear, was condemned, and all his possessions on the French side of the Channel declared forfeited. The King swore by the patron saints of France to execute the sentence of his barons.

In this he found little difficulty. After he had once conquered Normandy, neither Anjou, Touraine, nor Poitou was able to make any resistance. The submission of the people every where outran even his determination. The fundamental ground of the power of the vassals lay in the diversity of the character of the land, and of the races by which it was inhabited, who were desirous of maintaining their several

* Bengnot, *Les Olim.* t. i. preface xlv. Here also, as far as I can see, the rule adopted in later times was observed, viz., that even if a few peers only sat in the court, it was sufficient.

peculiarities under the rule of distinct chiefs. What then was the meaning of provinces, differing from one another most widely, being under the common authority of a prince who was not even their king? They felt the immediate power exercised over them so oppressive, that the establishment of a supreme authority was for them an act of emancipation.

John was not, however, without friends; in the universal prevalence of the party distinctions of the time, he found means to bring about a sort of coalition, which had for its object the repression of the growing power of the King, and even a partition of the French territory; but the Barons and the Commons emulated each other in their support of the King, who thus remained stronger than his opponents, and was able to repel the attack of the confederates on the battlefield of Bouvines.

We are not introducing any foreign element into these remote times, when we maintain that the first movements of a common national feeling in France were associated with these events. In all the different territories of the land, to its most distant borders, says a contemporary, the joy of this victory was felt with like vivid emotion—in every town and village, in every castle and rural district: what belonged to all each made his own, and a single victory gave occasion for a thousand triumphs.

To the great advantage thus obtained by the Crown, was speedily added a second and not much less important acquisition, of a somewhat different character. In the enterprise of the Pope and his Legate against Raymond VI. of Toulouse, it was by no means their object to augment the power of the French Crown; they wished to destroy the Albigenses, with their doctrines, whom Raymond protected, and therefore bestowed the conquered land upon Simon de Montfort, the most zealous leader of their army, because he alone appeared capable of upholding the strictest Catholicism in its integrity. They therefore held, that since the King of France had done so little toward the conquest of the land, he had no right to assume any authority over it.* But the Montforts were far from possessing the substantial power necessary to realize

* Bzovius, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, 1215, no. 9.

their newly-acquired title, and of their own accord transferred their rights to the King of France. The nobles of the kingdom, in their assembly at Paris, consisting of five-and-twenty temporal lords and seventeen archbishops and bishops, recommended the King to accept the offer, and for that purpose promised him especial obedience and assistance.* As in the Anglo-Norman affair, so also in this of the Albigenses, the nobility of France promoted the advantage of the monarchy; yet the latter case was of a different character, for it was on a spiritual sentence that the proceedings rested, and the King assumed the claims of a prince appointed by a Council. Philip Augustus hesitated to accept it: his son, Louis VIII., who had resolved on it, was slain in the struggle; his widow, Blanche, a Spanish princess, upon whom the regency of the kingdom devolved, as well as the conduct of the war, found herself in circumstances of great peril, but, being well counseled and supported, she had the ability at last to bring all things into order. The Count of Toulouse was compelled to abdicate, which, to follow the observations of a Roman writer, was a circumstance as favorable to the Church and the Crown as if he had been taken prisoner in open battle. Two-thirds of the territory passed into the immediate possession of the Crown; the Count himself held the remaining part for life; but he conveyed the exclusive right of succession to his daughter, who was to marry Blanche's third son.

Thus did the West-Frankish crown succeed in establishing its authority throughout the whole of its territories. These two enterprises—the one to execute a temporal and the other a spiritual sentence of deposition—gave to the supreme power a superiority in the realm such as it had not possessed since the death of Charlemagne. Louis IX., Blanche's son, after the tumultuous changes which had characterized recent times, sought to bring about a condition of things regulated according to law, and corresponding with the moral and religious notions with which his own mind was imbued. In regard to the South of France, he entered into a convention

* "Propter amorem Jesu Christi et fidei Christianæ nec non et honorem carissimi domini nostri Ludovici regis Francorum illustris."—*Preuves de l'Histoire de Languedoc*, iii. no. 161.

with the King of Aragon, who was descended from the ancient Counts of Barcelona, by which the relations of the two kingdoms were regulated and their boundaries ascertained. It was not, however, without the opposition of his Council that he restored to the King of England some of the provinces of which he had been formerly deprived;* but by doing so, he obtained the advantage of bringing the English monarch to Paris (1259), where he accepted these provinces as fiefs, and in return formally renounced his rights to Normandy, Anjou, Tours, and Poitou. Normandy was permanently united to the French crown; and from that time the power of the kings of France rested upon their immediate government of France and Normandy.

The old forms of the feudal monarchy remained unchanged: but as in the earlier times division and the arbitrary exercise of private power prevailed, so now order and obedience had the ascendancy. It was not without its value, to the general comprehension of the people, that the mother of Louis VIII. derived her birth from the Carolingians, and expressly from Charles of Lower Lorraine, whose right of inheritance she was judged to have brought to the Capetians: by this means every thing assumed the appearance of legitimacy.

The dukes and counts of Burgundy, Brittany, Anjou, Poitou, Toulouse, and Artois belonged all of them to the family of the King. Eight dynasties are reckoned to have arisen from this stock.† The King appeared as the natural head of all these races.

This very circumstance constituted one of the motives which actuated Louis IX. in enfeoffing the King of England, for he also belonged to the relatives of the King's blood. This genealogic connection of the members of the royal house exercised a combining influence on the State. Even in the twelfth century the notion of an elective monarchy was entertained. In the thirteenth, it was no longer spoken of: all submitted to the authority of the King, and, in an especial manner, to his jurisdiction.

* Tillemont, *Vie de St. Louis*, iv. 163.

† Compare Mignet's "*Essai sur la Formation Territoriale*," etc., *Notices*, ii. 172.

The law-books of the time continue to acknowledge a certain degree of juridical independence in the separate territories of the great barons; but the King, they add, is sovereign over all, for to him belongs the common care of the kingdom: no one is so great that he may not be brought before the judgment-seat of the King. //

As tradition had associated with the name of Queen Blanche the revival of the Roman law in France, so did it regard her son, Louis IX., as the most distinguished founder of an orderly legal system, in which character he is chiefly remembered. The administration of justice was esteemed by him as the highest duty of a prince, and one expressly enjoined by religion. The King's court of justice had been regarded of old as the supreme tribunal of the realm; but its importance and influence were now greatly increased, not alone by the extension of the royal power so far beyond its former limits, but also and chiefly because this augmentation of authority had been acquired by the execution of judicial sentences. The great jurisdictional institution of the kingdom, the Parliament, separated itself gradually from the King's court (as its composition proves, being constituted of peers of the kingdom, a few officers of the court, and a number of spiritual and temporal lords), but it was not totally disconnected from that political institution: although in a position essentially distinct, the chief difference between the two consisted in the circumstance that the numerous lawyers belonging to the spiritual order which were in it soon obtained the ascendancy in the Parliament. Their discussions show what a powerful ally the common authority of the kingdom had gained in them.* The courts of justice of the different provinces in union with the Crown appeared almost as mere delegations from the supreme tribunal of the King. The services and eminence of its members, and the uprightness of the King, who inculcated the consideration of foreign rights as well as his own, obtained for it a universal acceptance.

* Beugnot, Preface to the *Olim*. vol. i. lxxxix. collects from them "que la cour royale était pleinement entrée (sous Louis IX.) dans une voie de conquêtes successives, d'empiétements lents, mais assurés, sur l'autorité seigneuriale."

It is well known, however, that the King was by no means thereby lord and master of the collective judicial system; many of his own purposes indeed remained unaccomplished with respect to it. Louis IX. had not in general broken up the feudal system; on the contrary, while he controlled the extravagant exercise of the arbitrary power of individuals which had characterized it, he succeeded in giving it a form compatible with the unconditional necessity of social order.

While in all other countries the flames of feudal strife were burning, peace reigned undisturbed in his dominions, and France increased both in population and in progressive civilization. That a peaceful and moderate man, who was chiefly concerned for the salvation of his soul, and who was never very persevering or industrious, should be able to hold in check so many powerful princes and warlike vassals, presented to the world at that time an object of universal admiration.

Louis IX. did not hesitate to withstand even the clergy and the Papal see itself when he considered their demands unjust; but otherwise he lived altogether in the idea of the unity of Christendom, and in ecclesiastical obedience; even in his last will he recommended his son rather to yield something to the Church than to contend with her. He avoided taking any part in the struggle between the Popes and the Hohenstaufens, but he was always ready to exert himself on behalf of Constantinople and the Holy Land.* His aid to the crusaders was frequent and valuable; he himself took the cross twice, and each time with unfortunate and fatal results. In Egypt he was taken prisoner, and he lost his life before Tunis; even in his last moments his thoughts were occupied with the extension of the faith.

* As Pope Urban IV. describes his disposition, 1262: "Ad ea quæ Christianæ fidei exaltationem et ipsius Romanæ ecclesiæ respiciunt, totis conatur viribus, . . . proximi læsionem abhorret . . . metuit animæ hinc peccatum."

CHAPTER III.

EPOCH OF THE ENGLISH WARS.

THERE is a twofold conception of supreme authority discernible in those who possess it. There are kings who regard the possession of their crowns, and even the existence of their kingdoms, as subordinate to higher purposes—the maintenance of a divinely appointed order of things, the promotion of civilization, the administration of justice, the consummation of the idea of the Church, and the extension of religion. There are others, on the contrary, who consider themselves as the administrators of the peculiar interests of their own country; the extension of their power appears to them a dignified aim in itself; they attack foreign states without scruple, whenever such a step appears to them to be advantageous; the consolidation of the inward strength and of the exterior greatness of their dominions seems to them at the same time their mission and their renown. The former are by nature personally elevated, gentle, and religious, to whom a legal limitation is rather grateful than distasteful; the latter are men of native energy of will, partial views, and not unfrequently of severe temperament, who scoff at all real limitation. The first may be said to belong rather to the Middle Ages, the second to modern times, yet both make their appearance at all periods.

After the Capetian race had produced, in Louis IX., a prince who might have been regarded as an original and model for all religious kings, there arose from the same line a character of a different description. Philip the Fair is distinguished from all his ancestors by a violent recklessness of character. The earlier kings had, like him, extended their power, but, as a German chronicler expresses it, it was within the limits assigned to them: they lived in peace and friendship with the

German empire, which had acquired long since, with the crown of Arles, a few provinces in southeastern Gaul. Philip the Fair was the first who, with determined ambition, broke through these boundaries, and seized possession of territories on the further side: as to the hostility of the German empire, which he had thereby excited, and the treaties he had violated, he did not trouble himself—he knew or felt that he was in alliance with the nature of things. When he took possession of Lyons, he laid the foundation of a connection which extended of itself. The power once formed drew to itself, with the irresistible force of nature, all the regions related to one another by speech.

The earlier kings had maintained a union with the Papedom, and each power had promoted the other by mutual services; Philip the Fair made no conscience of destroying this ancient alliance. His quarrel with Boniface VIII. arose from subordinate differences, but very soon embraced the most important questions concerning the temporal rights of Rome, which this Pope struggled for with the fiercest zeal. The King even laid something like an anathema upon any of his successors who should ever acknowledge any power upon earth as superior to theirs in temporal things, and caused the bull to be burned in which the Pope had set up his claim in opposition. Boniface ere long experienced the truth of what one of the King's lawyers had told him, that claim without true power signified nothing.

For centuries the nation had directed its chief strength toward the East, but without the slightest result: Jerusalem had long since fallen again into the hands of the Saracens; even Constantinople was unable to maintain itself. The enterprises of St. Louis, and the plans of his blood-relation Charles of Anjou, King of Naples, had foundered, and at length Ptolemais was attacked by the Sultan Al-Aschraf. King Philip the Fair refused to do any thing for the defense of that city,* but looked on calmly while it fell into the enemy's hands; for these expeditions against the East were not merely indifferent to him, they were hateful.

* "Consideratis negotiis quæ incumbunt, et rebus ut nunc se habentibus"—Letter of Pope Nicholas IV., in Reinaldus, 1290, 9.

The most powerful and the bravest of all the orders of knighthood, which had been established expressly to carry on the war with the unbelievers, and with the existence of which a hope was yet associated of the reconquest of the Holy Sepulchre, was annihilated by him in the most violent manner. We do not inquire into the truth of his charges against the Templars, nor into the justice of his proceedings; it is enough for us to observe the alteration of ideas. There was a legend that every year, on the anniversary night of the abolition, there appeared an armed figure issuing from the Templars' tomb, wearing the red cross on the white mantle, and crying, "Who will liberate the Holy Sepulchre?" to which it was answered from the vault, "No one! no one! for the Temple is destroyed."*

The times which had been animated with the idea of a common Christendom had passed away; the estates, whose incomes were intended to sustain the efforts for the reconquest of Jerusalem, were withdrawn from that purpose and made subservient to the uses of the monarchy.

The great objects of inquiry respecting all men of active energy is wherein the sum of their thoughts lies. St. Louis lived in the idea of Christendom. With Philip the Fair the thoughts of the crown and of the kingdom were superior to all others; through his whole being there breathes the decided air of modern times. The vast number of concessions, in which he united the judicial, the legislative, and the executive power,† is astonishing; he brought the idea of the royal power into connection with all the relations of life. From the Parliament an all-embracing tribunal separated itself. Things were no longer regarded from a religious point of view: the rights of majesty form the chief topics of consultation—taxes, characters of revenue, the granting of imposts, even the primary right of the Crown to all the gold and silver in the kingdom, whose value it might settle as it thought proper; the independence of the temporal power, and even of its authority in spiritual matters; the assemblies of the States, and those of

* This tradition is derived from a communication of Augustin Thierry. Martin, *Histoire de France*, v. 199.

† Guizot, *Cours de Histoire Moderne*, tome v.

the towns; the natural freedom of all men, and the emancipation of the serfs.

The character of this prince may be conceived from the circumstance that Dante, the great poet of the epoch, who lived only in the contemplation of universal freedom and in the consciousness of higher laws, felt an antipathy toward him, which breaks out into loud reproaches, while modern times salute his reign as the dawn of their own day.

This position of an isolated policy, regardless of other lands, and directed toward the French state system only, was hardly attained however, when an event occurred which threw the whole realm into confusion, and cast it entirely on its own resources.

In the line of the Capets the royal dignity had hitherto descended regularly from father to son. Philip the Fair left a blooming family, but none of his three sons left any male issue. After the death of the last of them, Edward III., King of England, who was the son of his daughter, claimed the French crown as his inheritance.

In virtue of this same right, the feudal principalities in France, the crowns of the Pyrenean Peninsula, and the English crown itself had been inherited. Edward III. caused his claim to be investigated by the English lawyers, and, fortified by their opinion, undertook to make it good by force of arms.*

On the other hand, the male line had always succeeded in the German principalities, in consequence of the union of official power with the possession of the land; and the same rule of succession had been observed in France, on the late occasions, in which the crown had passed from one brother to another, to the exclusion of the daughters of the former; yet this took place rather in consequence of a treaty, which stipulated a compensation for the daughters, than by any

* As "*causa fontalis*" of the wars, Henry V. sets forth:—"Progenitorum nostrum ac nostræ hereditatis et jurium ad coronam Franciæ detentionem injustam, quam profecto causam progenitor noster inclytissime memoriæ Eduardus per se et maximum consilium suum, magnæ conscientiæ viros in jure divino et humano summe instructos, penes quos maxima sapientia vixit et quibus factum recens erat et ad oculum patuit, iterum atque iterum examinari jussit, ac omni remoto scrupulo pro parte sua didicit fore justam."—*Lettres des Rois*, ed. Champollion, ii. 360.

legal recognition of the right; and besides, whether the son might not succeed his mother, and whether any right existed to transfer the crown from the reigning branch of the royal family to a collateral line, was still open to dispute.

But the political bearing of the question engaged much more attention than its legal character. Men did not inquire whether the royal authority was more an inheritance or a power pertaining to the office; it was simply, whether the claims upon the French crown made by the prince of a foreign nation should be admitted. The most distinguished of the French nobility, the peers and barons, were firmly resolved not to allow themselves to be brought under the power of the English.* They held in this case firmly by the German rule of succession, which they designated as the Salic law; it was to them a security for their independence, and they therefore acknowledged Philip of Valois the next collateral relative; but they were not able to give effect to their decision without a sanguinary struggle.

When Edward reached his majority, and resolved to enforce his right, how ruinous was the blow which he gave to the nobility and gentry of France, who had scorned his dominion! In the battle of Cressy there fell eleven princes, eighty nobles, and twelve hundred knights. In the battle of Poitiers, King John, the second of the house of Valois—whose father, in dying had enjoined him not to draw back from the war, which was carried on for a good cause—was taken prisoner by his enemies, fighting gallantly. There were few distinguished houses in the kingdom which had not either to lament for some one slain, or to ransom some one from captivity. The English remained victors also in a great sea-fight: they conquered Calais, and constituted it an English colony. Not only was the predominant and aggressive position which France had hitherto occupied before the world altered by these events, but the war and its results exercised a decomposing influence upon the interior of the kingdom itself. To these circumstances also it may be attributed that a new power in the state—the power of the towns, which

* Continuator Guilielmi de Nangiac, "Non æquanimitè ferentes subdregimini Anglicorum," ii. 83.

had been growing silently, sustained by all the popular elements which were at work in the depth of the nation—was completely unfolded, raised to a political position, and took its station beside the barons and nobility.

It is an error of the earlier representations to ascribe the rise of the civic communities in France to the royal power: the movement from which they sprang was original and spontaneous, in the north of France as well as in Italy and the Netherlands. But the kings of France had from the beginning taken these communities into their peace and protection, and confirmed to them the freedom they had of themselves acquired. The towns, in return, fought the battles of the kings, and always took their side in their contests with the nobles. St. Louis, in his later years, used to relate with pleasure how once, during his minority, when he was on a journey to Paris, and had nearly reached that city, he was assailed by the insurgent barons, and how the population of Paris rushed from within their walls and defended him from all danger. The towns assisted Philip the Fair in his wars with large sums of money: not only did they allow him to tax consumable articles, but they also granted him an income-tax, which produced an important revenue. Philip was glad to see them about him in separate assemblies; and in his noted contest with the Pope, when it was his object to oppose the voice of the united nation to the Romish claims, he brought them into the Diet of the Estates, where they supported him with decisive declarations. Their ambition led them to take part with him, who was striving for the complete independence of the kingdom.

When, soon after, in the reaction of the provinces against the ascendancy of the Crown, which commenced after the death of Philip the Fair, it became necessary to make no inconsiderable concessions to the proprietors and nobles in the shape of provincial charters, the towns also acquired a great privilege—the right to arm themselves for the defense of their own rights, as well as those of the King.

In the fourteenth century we find in general the two elements of our states, the feudal-hierarchic power and the popular power of the towns and cities, standing opposed to each

other and armed for battle, in France as throughout the whole Continent; and this great party division became now connected with the contest of the succession.

It was chiefly through the gentry and nobility that the house of Valois had acquired the crown; its members therefore always took part with the aristocracy, or stood at its head. One of the first enterprises of the new King was to march to the assistance of the Count of Flanders, in his struggle with his towns: his deliberate object in doing so was to prevent the civic movement, which was every where fermenting, from penetrating into France.* Edward III., on the other hand took part with the Flemish towns, by whom he was chiefly urged to make good his claims upon the crown of France. The defeats which he gave the French had a twofold result: they excited discontent among the people against the government and its conduct, to which they attributed these misfortunes, and they weakened the nobility, on which it depended, personally by the slaughter of its members. After the battle of Poitiers, which cast a doubt even upon the bravery of the nobility, a division commenced in France which, properly speaking, was never again healed up.

In the Assembly of the Estates of the north of France, which was convened for the purpose of finding means for carrying on the war and for ransoming the King, a committee was appointed, in which the representatives of the burgher class were as numerous as the other two estates taken together, and strove with all their power to alter the government. The extent of the rights which the Estates under the leading of the committee demanded is worthy of special remark—a right not only to take part in the raising of the imposts which they had granted, but also in dispensing the funds which they produced; the privilege of assembling upon an appointed day without being summoned; the force of law for the resolutions which they should adopt; and a partici-

* *Chronicon Comitum Flandriæ*, in Smet. *Collection de Chroniques Belges inédites*, i. 203: "Consilium fuit omnium, quod rex illuc exercitum mitteret in adiutorium comitis Flandriæ ad domandos rebelles, ne si terminos suos exirent attrahere sibi possent communitates alias Picardiæ et Franciæ, et sic magnam confusionem facerent nobilibus atque regno."

pation of their committee in the deliberations relating to war or a suspension of arms. So complete and comprehensive was the idea of a government by Estates, which it was sought to realize in France, under a popular impulse, in the fourteenth century. But neither the time and circumstances, nor the disposition of the nation, nor even the leaders themselves, were calculated to accomplish any thing.

The behavior of Robert Lecoq, the most distinguished chief of the party, was of a thoroughly factious character;* his object was to make another prince of the blood, Charles of Navarre, who was just then asserting a title to the crown, King of France, in order that, at his side, as Chancellor, he might take the power into his own hands. Lecoq had already declared that it was competent for the Estates to depose a king and to change the succession; he afterward gave free course to the most violent attempts against the existing government. A large portion of the councilors of Parliament were expelled, the chamber of revenue altered, and two marshals, the most distinguished counselors of the Dauphin, who acted as regent, were murdered before his eyes by an excited mob, who broke into the palace under the leading of Stephen Marcel, the chief magistrate of the city. It is not to be denied that the towns had just grievances to complain of; but their violent and lawless conduct stood, itself, in the way of their efforts for redress, and aroused in the breasts of their opponents a consciousness that they were contending for a good cause.

As the attack was directed at the same time against the authority of the Crown and the prerogatives of the gentry and nobility, it caused an intimate union between both. The Dauphin, supported by the nobility, obtained the victory, and the former mode of government was re-established. To him alone is it to be attributed that a fearful vengeance was not at once exacted. Soon after the peace of Bretigny, the stipulations of which corresponded with the ill success of the war and the internal confusion of the kingdom, transferring as they did to Edward III. a third part of the territory of

* *Articles contre Robert le Coq*, communicated by Drouet d'Arq. *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, ii. 378, art. 82.

France, the Dauphin himself ascended the throne, under the title of Charles V. All his thoughts were now devoted to the recovery of what had been lost; but this was impossible without internal peace. He understood thoroughly the art of bringing over to his side the opposed parties—not only the nobility and the military leaders, but also the towns: to many of them he gave charters of civic freedom; several of them went over to him, not a single one fell off from him. The wisdom of the King, and the greatness of the object in which all were interested, and which proceeded successfully, suppressed all party strife as long as he lived.

Charles V. of France was a man who, at that time of life which is usually the period of manly vigor, saw a speedy death before his eyes, and never took the field in person, for he could not even have wielded a sword. But his mind was reflective and his genius brilliant and witty, as his sayings prove, which are still remembered. He was a man also who thoroughly understood how to maintain the ascendancy of patriotic opinions. No sooner had his peaceful influence disappeared, than the ancient hostilities, excited by the general disposition of the age, broke out once more with the fiercest animosity. The latter decades of the fourteenth century, and the first of the fifteenth, were marked by continual fluctuations in the struggle between the public power and the public spirit.

The question concerning which the contest was renewed was by no means without significance; on the contrary it had a meaning of the most essential kind in reference to the internal constitution of all European nations—it was how far it was requisite for the Estates to make the grant of supplies periodical; for with this all the other rights of the Assembly were closely connected. The French of those times took up the question with the liveliest interest. Paris and the other municipalities opposed the levy of taxes without the grant of the Estates; and the discontent of the people broke out into an insurrection, in which all the passions of the time took fire, and the property of individuals was endangered.

The nobility of France, which ranged itself around the throne, were not altogether badly advised when they turned

their arms first against Flanders, for a distinguished merchant had there deprived the Count of the government, and become the leader of the entire movement. The danger that threatened the nobility from this quarter was unquestionably great; had it fared with the French chivalry as it did with the Austro-Swabian at Morgarten, it is possible that the north of France would have become a republic. The population of Paris were already thinking of demolishing the fortress of the Louvre, and the Bastille, which was then in progress of erection.

The decision of arms in Flanders happened, however, to be in favor of the nobility; they gained a complete victory at Roesbeke (November 23, 1382), and brought the land into subjection to its sovereign. At the beginning of the battle, just as the banner of the kingdom was unfolded, the thick clouds suddenly opened, and the sun shone forth: the nobility believed it to be an immediate token of divine protection; they brought back the banner to St. Denis with great solemnity and devotion, and then directed their efforts against Paris. Here the population had entirely lost courage; the citizens came out to meet the King with tokens of honor, but he would not accept their congratulations—they had too deeply injured the royal house. The barriers were torn down, the gates taken off their hinges, and the iron chains with which the streets were closed up at night removed. The people were compelled to deliver up all their weapons, and the building of the Bastille was finished, the civic privileges, especially the right to elect the *Prévôt des Marchands* and his *Echevins*, with all the judicial authority, were resumed. The old taxes on consumable articles were proclaimed once more with the sound of trumpets, and no one ventured to oppose their levy. The opinion was even broached that the King had a right to deal with the taxes in as uncontrolled a manner as he did with his own domains; and, although no one dared to utter the thought boldly, yet it was held that no new grant of the revenue was necessary to the King.* For a long series of years subsequently the Estates General did not again assemble.

* The '*Chronica Caroli Sexti*' (*Chronique des Religieux de St. Denys*), the chief authority for this, does not express itself altogether clearly, i. p. 242: "*Quæ (subsidia) quamvis occasione sopiendæm,*

In the Assembly of the Estates, held in 1357, the towns predominated, and took measures to obtain possession of the entire government; in the year 1382 they were deprived of even their municipal privileges. As the events, so did opinions fluctuate.

Then the doctrine had been occasionally propounded that a government could do nothing without the consent of the people;* soon after, the contrary opinion was maintained, that, owing to the original distinction of the Estates, it was necessary to limit each to its peculiar sphere. For a long time it was held lawful to kill tyrants; afterward the most distinguished promulgator of that notion was himself condemned; and then occurred another change of opinion, which brought the first theory into repute once more.

The questions in dispute had their influence also upon the division between Orleans and Burgundy, although in itself it originated from totally different causes. The house of Orleans and the Armagnacs were at the head of the knightly class, which had finally triumphed. The Duke of Burgundy, who was now also Count of Flanders, took up the cause of civic privileges. Under his influence the municipal rights of the capital were restored in 1409; the citizens were once more permitted to arm themselves, and to elect their own magistrates; a militia, which consisted chiefly of the hereditary proprietors of a great manufactory, sustained the authority of the house of Burgundy, and the faction which had at that time obtained the ascendancy in the city. The Court sought to free itself from both, but the attempt was immediately followed by an insurrection, in which the opinions which had been suppressed thirty years before, sprang into activity

guerrarem, et reparatione edificiorum regionum, forent nuper introducta, hucusque a tempore Caroli defuncti sine populari consensu ut antiquitus fiebat persoluta. Quidam ipsa subsidia non modo iterum repetenda, sed et deinceps sicut merum dominium et coram regis iudicibus dignum ducebant tractanda." I might lay greater stress upon the words "non modo repetenda," than *e. g.* Félibien, 'Histoire de Paris,' i. 699, who had this passage before him; it was intended not only to renew the old taxes, but also to increase them—a measure which would easily have excited a general insurrection.

* "Reges regnant suffragio populorum."

once more. An ordinance was hastily drawn up, which, among other principles, insisted upon that of election in the judicial system, limited the right of chase, and especially demanded that the several branches of the public service should be re-organized in accordance with the wishes of the people. The King and the princes were compelled to adopt the white hat, which was the badge of the party, to proceed to the Palace of Justice, and there publish the ordinance as law. The change of circumstances appears at times also in the case of subordinate persons. A man who had been present at the murder of the marshals in 1357, was executed for that crime in the year 1382. In the year 1413, an old physician appeared at the head of the adherents of Burgundy, of whom it was said that he had in his boyhood taken part in that first insurrection. The white hat was the sign of revolt in Flanders, whence it had been adopted by the Parisians in 1382. The Armagnacs retained possession of the authority for some time, and exercised it with great violence; at length the citizens rose against them, in the year 1418, and took frightful vengeance on them. The dead bodies of the rulers, whom the people were heretofore compelled to obey, were bound together and publicly exposed, that they might feed their eyes upon the terrible sight.

Meanwhile, the English war had broken out afresh, and there was a time when all these questions, however little they had in common originally, merged in one another. The chivalry of France suffered once more one of those murderous defeats, which the English were in this war accustomed to inflict upon the stormy, rushing armies of France: eight thousand gentlemen at least must have been slain at Agincourt. The rage of faction burned more fiercely than ever between the princes of the blood. When Duke John of Burgundy was slain in the presence of the Dauphin on the bridge of Montereau, the son of the murdered Prince held himself justified in renouncing his connection with the Dauphin, and effecting the treaty of Troyes, according to which, Henry V., of England, was recognized as future King of France, and at the same time as Regent of that kingdom. Under the influence of the Duke, the city of Paris did not scruple to accept

the terms of this treaty: they were adopted by the members of Parliament, the University, the clergy, and especially by the civic magistracy, with loud acclamations, in a solemn assembly. Never, since the days of Philip Augustus, had a king been better received in Paris than was Henry V.: on his entrance into that city, the people greeted him with the most tumultuous joy; even the assembled Estates adopted the treaty and subjected themselves to new taxes, in order to supply him with money.* The French believed that the privileges of their Estates and municipalities could be secured only by their union with England; they did not bestow a thought upon their political independence. The Dauphin, by a kind of legal process, was declared to have forfeited all his rights to the crown.

When the intelligence was brought to him, he answered that he would appeal from that judgment to the point of his sword. It was something gained, thus to depend upon himself. Yet the sword, as he then wielded it, could hardly have saved him: it was necessary, if he were in reality to become king of France, that he should first separate himself from the blood-stained faction of the Armagnacs, which then surrounded him. For the accomplishment of his purpose he found assistance of the most diversified character.

The first was given him by the nobility, who gradually reunited themselves with their king. They were the Count of Anjou and Provence, with whom the King had entered into affinity; the Duke of Brittany and his gallant brother, Richemont; and, finally, the Duke of Burgundy, whose accession to the English party had gained Henry the kingdom, and whose renunciation of it was therefore likely to deprive him of it again. They were all by degrees made conscious that it would be more advantageous to them to have a native king than a foreign one and his deputy. The sons of those who had fallen at Agincourt were now also come to maturity, and attached themselves to their natural king, in order to avenge the death of their fathers, and to reconquer the towns that had been lost.

* "Comme si le monde eut du offre sont renouvelé et estably en perpetuelle et permanente félicité."—Chastellain, Chron. du Duc Phil. 64.

Finally, there appeared from the humblest class—the cultivators of the soil—one of the most marvelous phenomena which the world had yet seen—the Maid of Orleans. In order to understand the character of this singular being properly, it is necessary to call to mind how the French royal family, the *Royaux de France*, and the crown of lilies were invested with a traditional reverence. In the territory of the Archbishopric of Rheims, where so many churches were dedicated to St. Remigius, in one of which the Maid herself was baptized, the right of the anointed Kings of France was regarded as an institution immediately originating from the Divinity. Joan of Arc aroused this national religious feeling in the masses; yet she knew well that the conviction of the King's right was not sufficient. The objection was once made to her, that, if God desired to free the land from its enemies, he was able to effect it without the assistance of soldiers—to which she answered with appropriate spirit, "The warriors must fight, and God will then give the victory."

The inhabitants of Paris had long been weary of the English rule, and after the falling off of Burgundy from that party they immediately returned to the cause of their hereditary king. It was magnanimous conduct on the part of Charles VII., that when he again became master of the city he took no vengeance upon his ancient opponents. For a whole century, the alternate triumph of parties had filled the capital and the provinces with mutual slaughter; on this occasion care was taken that one party should not be expelled as heretofore by the other, and deeds of violence enacted which might have conjured up anew the ancient storms. While the internal divisions caused by the operation of the English war had become in the highest degree dangerous to the integrity of the kingdom, the reconciliation thus effected by Charles had the result of strengthening the antipathy to the English dominion. All classes, from the highest to the lowest, worked together, in order to re-establish the monarchy, so that now, from the deepest ruin, it arose once more, all-protecting and all-comprehending.

We pause a moment, to contemplate the circumstances that marked this great and saving conjuncture, in which the French

monarchy, while struggling for its very existence, acquired at the same time, and as the result of the struggle, a firmer organization. The expedients adopted to carry on the contest grew, as in other important cases, to national institutions.

The Pragmatic Sanction, in which the King and the clergy then joined, must not be regarded as merely an act of spiritual jurisdiction—it was rather the perfecting of those earlier measures by which the King, and the clergy who adhered to him, sought to counteract the influence of the Pope, who favored the English and Burgundians. "Experience showed us," said King Charles VII.,* "that Pope Martin bestowed the episcopal sees and other important benefices of our kingdom either upon foreigners or upon such as were attached to the party of our opponent. We have therefore ordained, with the advice of an assembly of prelates, clergy, and distinguished laymen, that no one shall succeed to a benefice in our kingdom except such as have been born in the same and are well-affected to us. The holy father who succeeded (Eugenius IV.) has also day after day conferred the benefices of our kingdom upon men unknown to us, who are not natives of the realm, and who belong to the party of our enemy." It could not have effected much, simply to repeat this determination. In order therefore to uproot the evil thoroughly, the King made his appearance at the Council of Bâle, which was then assembled, whose decisions in favor of national churches entirely corresponded with his wishes, and satisfied all the necessities of the case. In a great assembly at Bourges, in the year 1438, at which there were present five archbishops, twenty-five bishops, and a great number of clergy of inferior rank, the decrees of the Council of Bâle were adopted, with some slight alterations, and formed into a statute, which has been designated by the solemn title of the Pragmatic Sanction. The French Church by this recovered the important right of free election;† and in the present temper of the nation there

* Lettres de Charles VII., par lesquelles il ordonne, que nul ne sera reçu aux bénéfices ecclésiastiques, s'il n'est du royaume, et affectionné au Roy. March 10, 1431-2: Ordonnances, xiii. 178.

† It is the Decretum de Electionibus, twelfth session of the Council of Bâle.

was no reason to fear that it would fall upon the opponents of the King or the adherents of his enemies. The denial of the demands for money made by the Roman Curia, which Philip the Fair had once the boldness to make, could now for the first time be carried out thoroughly on the authority of a general decree of the assembly of the Church. To Rome there could be nothing more offensive than thus to settle ecclesiastical affairs without the interference of the Pope. Just as the contest in which men were engaged demanded it, all gathered themselves round the King.

The revival of the Parliament stood in intimate connection with the establishment of the clergy in a Gallican character. The Parliament of Paris, which properly had been established by the Duke of Burgundy, and which had taken the oath of allegiance to the English king, had never been recognized by Charles VII. He had constituted his Parliament at Poitiers of such members of that at Paris as had fled to him and remained true to their allegiance, and after he had triumphed over his foe he led them back to the capital. In this he saw "the strong arm of his justice;" and as this now renewed the ancient fundamental maxims of the French administration of justice in all respects, so did it maintain the rights in reference to spiritual affairs with which it had been invested ever since the times of Philip the Fair, and assume an attitude of defiance against the claims of the Romish Court. "The Bishop of Rome," said Pius II., "whose diocese is the world, has no more jurisdiction in France than what the Parliament is pleased to allow him; it even believes that it has the power to forbid the entrance of spiritual censures into the kingdom."

Meanwhile it appeared urgently necessary to organize in some measure the royal administration, and the pecuniary economy of the Government. The domains of the Crown had for the most part fallen into the possession of private persons, or had been granted away, so that they no longer produced any revenue, and therefore the building of fortresses could not be sustained from that source.* The taxes which the former kings had levied Charles VII. was compelled to

* Préface aux Ordonnances, tome xiii. p. 70.

dispense with, otherwise he might have lost the popular favor, for the English and Burgundian party had not demanded them. He was thus obliged to fall back upon the sparing and insecure grants of the Estates, which still remained faithful to him. From this state of financial disorder and the want of money originated the independent power of the free companies of warriors which filled the land. The captains who fought on the King's side frequently refused obedience to the commands of his marshals, and behind the walls of their fortresses practiced the most licentious and contemptuous violence: sometimes it was found necessary to expel them altogether from the kingdom, in order that they might do real service to be re-admitted.

Charles VII. sought as soon as possible to put an end to their plundering by appointing to them, in the several districts which they occupied, either a settled amount of income or provisions in kind for man and horse. It was like a forced contribution; the otherwise inevitable evils of war had been purchased off by a regular tribute.

In the year 1439 the King had brought the whole kingdom into a state of harmonious arrangement, and at the same time to a position of high political importance. In an assembly held at Orleans in the year 1439, at which the delegates of the Dukes of Orleans, Burgundy, and Brittany, and those of the Count of Armagnac and of the city of Paris, were present, the conviction universally prevailed that it would be impossible to control the troops required for the continuance of the war, unless they were regularly paid and placed in subordination to the commands of a single chief. It indicated an unexampled change, that an ordinance could have issued on the counsel, as it is stated in the original document, of the princes and barons, the prelates and clergy, the gentry and people of the good towns, which established this regulation.* Those nobles who had become nearly independent did, it is true, disclaim the authority of the ordinance which forbade the raising and maintaining of troops without the license of the King, and claimed for themselves the exclusive right to

* Lettres de Charles VII., pour obvier aux pilleries et vexations de gens de guerre, Nov. 2, 1439. (Ordonn. des Rois de France, xiii. 306.)

appoint the captains, who should be held responsible to them for every unlawful act committed by their respective companies. They consented however to be prohibited from laying tallages upon their subjects by their own mere authority, or from increasing those which should be laid on by the King. It was the great object of the King to be allowed to raise a general tax for the pay of troops from the subjects of the great nobles, as well as in his own immediate territories. It may be regarded as certain that the most considerable of the great barons were not moved to this concession without the assurance of a pecuniary indemnity, and even then they voted only for a small amount of tallage, out of all proportion with the number of the troops.*

The revenue system obtained by these means a totally different form. The King assumed that as the army was to be permanent the grant should be perpetual; and then commenced a strong and thorough system of administrative regulations. An assembly of the three Estates had, immediately after the victory, accorded the re-establishment of the taxes. The place of the *élus* of the Commons, who had hitherto been intrusted with the assessment of the imposts, was taken by royal officers, who also bore that name. The Treasurers of France—the produce of the domain was the original treasure—who were charged with the duty of recovering what the Crown had lost, occupied a very comprehensive sphere of action.†

Charles VII. considered the case of the provinces separately, with respect both to their peculiar circumstances and the services they had rendered to his cause, and did not enforce his system with uniform severity. From the province of Languedoc, which had given him the most energetic support, he accepted an equivalent for the taxes, and also granted it a separate Parliament at Toulouse, on account of the difference of the law which prevailed there. It appeared to him suffi-

* Comines asserts it expressly, i. 384. The Venetian ambassador Zrevisan, to his account of the amount of the revenue in 1502, adds the words: "Di quel danaro il Re paga la pension ordinaria di signori, come ordinò Henrico VII." (a mistake for Carlo).

† Lettres portant règlement sur les fonctions et pouvoirs des trésoriers de France. August 12, 1445: Ordonnances, xiii. 444.

cient to renew the ancient privileges here and there; and therefore, when he was requested to summon the States General, he did not accede, for he had been informed by men of high authority that it would only give occasion for unnecessary expense—that it was not the desire of the country, which was content with the present state of things. I find, in an English author of the seventeenth century,* the remark, that the Estates of France would have obtained greater importance if they had attached themselves to the throne in this war. Although it was not without the participation of the Assemblies of the Estates, yet it happened chiefly in consequence of the conquest, and the necessities produced thereby, that the monarchic institutions predominated in the founding of a comprehensive administration, which depended solely upon the will of the King, and of a regularly paid military power.

After some pecuniary means had been obtained, a thorough purification of the army took place: those only were retained who had conducted themselves well; they were separated into companies, and measures were adopted for securing them regular pay. This was the first instance of a standing army in modern Europe. Few in number as were these *Compagnies d'Ordonnance*—there were originally only fifteen, each constituted of one hundred lances, and each lance of six men—they formed the nucleus of an army, round which the feudal troops, which had been brought into better order, and an infantry raised in return for an exemption from the imposts, grouped themselves.† Jacques Cœur, a wealthy merchant of Bourges, who had enriched himself by the Syro-Egyptian commerce, provided the extraordinary pecuniary means which were necessary in order to place the new war-like power—that of the artillery, which first produced any great effects during this century—in a proper condition; for standing armies, imposts, and loans all originated together.

* James Harrington, the "Oceana."

† *Lettres de Charles VII.*, April 23, 1446, pour l'institution des *Francs Archers*. The intention was to carry on the war against the English, "sans ce qu'il soit besoing de nous aider d'autres, que de nos dits subjects."—*Ordonn.* xiv. 1.

An army now appeared in the field, from whose advances the ruin of the provinces which it was to occupy was not, as formerly, to be apprehended, and whose discipline was more complete than that of any other which Gaul had seen since the ancient Roman times. Before this host the English were unable to maintain themselves either in Normandy or Guienne, and the world was astonished when the French banner was not only waving in Normandy, but also when the English were forced to quit Aquitaine, of which they had held possession for a century, and were deprived of all their continental possessions except Calais.

As great an advantage perhaps for the conquered as for the conquerors, for the two nations must have separated, if each was to develop itself according to its own proper nature and genius.

BOOK II.

POLITICS AND WAR FROM 1450 TO 1550.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CROWN AND THE GREAT VASSALS.

IN the Italian arsenals they call the great central beam, round which the smaller pieces of wood are laid to form a mast, the Soul; in the Dutch dock-yards it is named the King. True kingship consists in the power which holds together the people and the Estates, which maintains their equilibrium and supports them through the storm.

It may be safely asserted that the royal house of France, notwithstanding many weaknesses, had, in raising itself to a position of such high importance, been of signal advantage to the French nation. At a period of the greatest confusion in the internal organization, when the conflict of parties was fiercest, it was chosen as the embodiment of the idea of legal power—at least of that idea which had been formed of legal power amidst the strife of the age—and at length the time arrived when that idea might be fully realized through the accomplishment of its fundamental objects. The principle of monarchy caused it to penetrate all the popular elements, and hold them together. A war then broke out, which appeared at one period as if it must force the nation into an unnatural union with another, whose development, although somewhat related to its own, was grounded upon essentially different principles: this war fortunately brought the Valois branch of the Capetian line to the throne, and both Estates and nation preserved their proper position.

All these provinces, so variously composed, and the Estates, at discord among themselves, united again with the Crown, in whose power alone they felt lay their safety and freedom. Not that all internal disputes had been determined and dropped: the collection of ungranted imposts met with great opposition, especially in the provinces most recently recovered

from England. An historical writer of the time* gives the opposite arguments with which the inhabitants of the provinces and the royal officials met each other; but the imposts were moderate, and they were paid. The unity was not by any means either oppressive or arbitrary. Justice was administered every where in the name of the King, but through the instrumentality of great, well-organized corporations, which were not in the slightest degree dependent upon momentary caprice. The clergy also gave in their adhesion to the Throne, principally, however, in order that they might be maintained by it in their independence. The paid troops were not numerous, and could not therefore detract from the military importance of the nobility. The great vassals still laid claim to the right of being present at the consultations concerning the general circumstances of the kingdom, and when the claim was formally discussed, Charles VII. did not venture positively to reject it.† His son, Louis XI., as Dauphin, took up the cause of the barons against his father, and his brother, the Duke of Berry, did the same against Louis himself.

Still, however, these provincial sovereigns had a position in France not much less important than that of the nobles of the same rank in Germany, who were hereditary princes. The Dukes of Brittany could refuse to accept the Pragmatic Sanction, and even entered into an alliance against it with the Pope: in defiance of the King, they styled themselves "dukes by the grace of God," and founded a university by their own authority. The Counts of Anjou and Provence had not yet forgotten their claims upon Syria and Jerusalem, which gave them a place among the independent powers of the world. To many a traveler their castle at Angers, where they held their court, and which had more than twenty towers, appeared to be the strongest fortress in the world; they had here collected and arranged, in caverns and grottoes, all kinds of remarkable objects, both natural and artificial, from every quarter of the globe. The court of the Dukes of Orleans, at Blois, was the most distinguished spot in Europe for knightly

* Amelgardus, whose work well deserves to be printed.

† Arguments for and against, in Monstrelet.

accomplishments; one of the last of them, who possessed an admirable talent for poetry, had there given a peculiar tone to society, and numbers of men, whose names have been renowned in history, assembled round him. The court of the Dukes of Burgundy was, however, by far more splendid, and more numerous frequented than any of these; foreigners were astonished at the vast number of knights, counts, and even of princes, that crowded in troops round Philip the Good, and still more so at the treasures he allowed to be exhibited to them—"a hundred thousand quintals of coined gold, besides an infinite quantity of the most costly jewels."*

We have already mentioned the party efforts of the House of Burgundy; now for the first time, however, it entered upon a course which was of importance to the history of the world, and exercised a decisive influence upon both the external power and the internal development of France: it arose from the relationship of the great nobles to the chief of the state.

When the earlier kings conferred vacant fiefs upon the members of the royal house, they did so in the belief that they were thereby increasing its strength. King John might have been actuated by this motive when, in 1363, he bestowed the dukedom of Burgundy upon the youngest and most valiant of his sons, who accompanied him in his captivity. The vigorous offshoot which he had thus planted flourished in the most rapid manner: in a few generations it had acquired Flanders, with those cities which constantly exercised so powerful an influence upon northern France; the neighboring territory of Brabant; the warlike Walloon provinces, Artois, Hennegau, Namur, Luxemburg; the lands on the German sea-coast, which had been won from the ocean with obstinate industry—territories stretching far beyond the boundaries of the French feudal sovereignty. At a time of universal division and faction, it was impossible that the elevation of a branch of the royal house to a position of independent power could conduce to the advantage of either the head of the house or of the nation. We have noticed the

* Journey of the Bohemian noble, Leo von Rozmital; in the Library of the Literary Union at Stuttgart, vii. p. 161, *et seq.*

union of Burgundy with England. When Philip the Good broke off from it, and joined the interests of the crown of France once more, he did not do so without obtaining the greatest advantages—he stipulated for the extension of his territories to the banks of the Somme.

The Duke of Burgundy was the first peer of France, and all the efforts of the great vassals found in him a natural support. How splendid was his appearance at the coronation of Louis XI., at Rheims! He had given him an asylum in his dominions, and he now had brought him back. The modest figure of the young King vanished in the blaze of splendor with which the Duke was surrounded. When he came to Paris, immediately afterward, he was received with so many indications of attachment to the house of Burgundy, that it was not impossible to believe that the city would have been still more rejoiced to have greeted him as king.

Between a vassal such as this, and a monarchy occupied with the project of increasing its power, no enduring alliance could exist, however personally friendly their relations might be.

When Louis XI. desired to take advantage of the right to restore the cities of the Somme to the Crown, by paying an equivalent, which the treaty of Arras had guaranteed to him, he aroused the hostility of the youthful heir of Burgundy, who soon after became duke, and who asserted that the contrary had been promised to himself personally. After a short time it came to a conflict immediately between Burgundy and the Crown; but one in which all who felt for their own independence took part with the claims of Burgundy.

In the year 1465 all the great vassals were seen once more united against the Crown; Armagnacs and Burgundians fought in the same camp, and Louis XI., after the loss of a pitched battle, was forced to a peace. In the articles of this peace, he was obliged to relinquish his claims upon the cities of the Somme, and not only so, but to submit to humiliating conditions. A commission, composed of thirty-six notables, from the clergy, the nobility, and the lawyers, was to take into consideration the reforms which were deemed most urgent in the kingdom, and especially those relating to the

privileges of the Estates, concerning which their determinations were to be final.

A few years afterward, when Louis had incautiously placed himself in the power of Duke Charles, it was a matter of consultation whether they should not call in the Duke of Berry, brother to the King, and, under the authority of the next prince of the blood, establish regulations to the advantage of the great vassals of the kingdom. The King would then have been held in strict restraint, and a government of the great lords have been set up. But it was the good fortune of the King that his antagonists were not much interested in the contemplated regulations. The Duke of Brittany protested against the commission, as derogatory to the rights of his dukedom; and the Duke of Burgundy was contented when the King promised to give him military assistance against the city of Liege, which was then under the protection of Louis himself.

The circumstances of the French Crown were now fraught with peril, had Charles the Bold been able to accomplish his designs, by extending his power over the Netherlands, Lorraine and Alsace, to the borders of Switzerland. It was even mooted in the Estates at Dijon that the time had arrived for Burgundy to renew its ancient independence on the Crown. In case of the vacancy of Provence, which appeared likely to take place soon, the Duke hoped to obtain possession of that province also. A new kingdom, embracing Lorraine and Burgundy, would thus have been established in the east and south of France, while on the north and west it would have been narrowed by the independence of Brittany and by the English, whose claims the Duke of Burgundy stirred up anew. France, in short, would have become a petty power in the world.

Historical philosophy often flatters itself with being able to point out the unbroken continuity of a system that has commenced growing as if it proceeded from an inner necessity. We confess, however, that all the reunions which appear so pompous in catalogues, even the constitutional foundations of power, were only of a preparatory nature, and would have had but little significance if such a principality had been es-

tablished by the side of the throne; it would have allied itself with all the tendencies of internal independence.

If we ask whether the Crown had in itself the power to obviate this danger, we must acknowledge that the affirmative can not be maintained. Was it not under obligation to the great vassals, who had rendered it such essential service in the war with the English? and would not these carry with them a large portion of the nobility over whom they naturally had great influence? The attempt to form a native French infantry had not succeeded. It can not indeed be doubted that the general voice of the nation was in favor of the royal cause. An author, otherwise well disposed toward the Burgundian party, has described the complaints which were made in every direction, concerning the conduct of Duke Charles: it was thought horrible that the subject and vassal should attack his king, and seek to tyrannize over him by means of his own power, rather than with foreign assistance. An Assembly of the States, which was summoned in 1467 by the King, took up his cause with decision, at least against the Duke of Brittany and against his own brother. But were they either able or inclined to direct the arms of France against the Duke of Burgundy, and to cast him down from his position? The general aspect of things does not make this impression.

As Duke Charles, however, was now striving to obtain the standing of a European power, it was quite certain that the King would obtain assistance in his struggle with him from allies out of his kingdom.

The Duke of Burgundy, in his progress, came especially into collision with the union formed in the high German regions between powerful cities and a gallant peasantry, the Swiss Confederation. King Louis XI. offered them his alliance.

The French government is distinguished from all the other powers of that period by the circumstances that it was legitimate and firm, and at the same time possessed the pecuniary resources necessary for carrying out its purposes freely. Louis XI. increased those ungranted imposts upon which his father had grounded the new condition of the state; not so

much however of his own will, as under the pressure of necessity. As to the claims of the great vassals to a portion of the revenue arising from these imposts, he did not give them any attention. He gathered money with the most extreme severity; but then he spent it with a certain generosity, and without reserve.

In the autumn of the year 1474 that treaty was completed which was fraught with the most eventful consequences to the Swiss Confederates, not less than to the French monarchy—by virtue of which it was stipulated that, in return for the payment of a considerable sum of money, the King could reckon at all times upon the aid of Swiss auxiliary troops. Treaties were also entered into with the separate cantons; and as they would have to bear the taxes and expense of the Confederation, the King assigned to them a certain annual sum, to be paid out of his treasuries in Languedoc and Languedoil, so long as the troops should remain in his service.*

This was not a common or usual alliance; but its most extraordinary feature was that the leaders of a powerful republican union should find it to their personal interest to make their own the cause of the supreme power in France, whose most distinguished authority consisted in the right to raise money.

The Swiss constituted still the only considerable infantry

* I give the words of the security given to Zurich (May 4, 1475), from the Zurich State Archives, Loys, etc.: "Sçavoir faisons que nous, considérant les grans alliances et confédérations, prises et accordées entre nous et les villes et pays de l'ancienne Ligue de la haulte Allemagne, et que pour icelles entretenir on ensuivant les poincts et articles contenue ds dites aliances et confédérations conviendra faire plusieurs grands frais mises et dépenses à aucune des bonnes villes des dictes hautes Allemagnes et autres particuliers des dits pays, pour eux entretenir en nostre service au fait de nos guerres et autrement, à icelles bonnes villes et autres particuliers des dits hautes Allemagnes, pour ces causes et considérations et autres à ce mouvantes, et mesment pour leur aider à supporter les dits grands frais mises et dépenses que à ces causes faire soutenir et supporter leur conviendra pour notre dite service, avons ordonné et ordonnons certaine somme de deniers: c'est à sçavoir, aux gouverneurs de la communauté de Zurich la somme 11 milles livres tournois, à icelle avoir et prandre dorénavant par chaquin an par manière de pension, tant qu'ils s'entretiendront en nostre dit service," etc.

in the West of Europe; it was therefore an inestimable advantage to the French King to be able at any time to call out these warlike and disciplined troops for the purposes of defense against foreign hostility, or for the suppression of disaffection within the kingdom. They speedily decided the great contest with Charles the Bold. His brilliant army was dispersed before the firm ranks of the sons of the mountains; all his far-reaching plans, embracing France, Germany, and Italy, were demolished, and he himself was slain. As all political dangers centred in him, it is easy to conceive the impression which his overthrow made upon the King; not only did he see all his calculations crowned with success, but the relief it gave him must have been such as he would have felt on being freed from a pressure which impeded his respiration.

There was now no doubt that the province of Guienne, which had been conferred on the Duke of Berry, but which had after his death reverted to the Crown, would now remain united to it permanently: this Charles the Bold would never have suffered. Provence also, upon which the Duke had formed designs, but upon which Louis XI. possessed legitimate claims, derived from his mother, might now, when it happened to be vacant, be drawn into connection with the Crown without difficulty. Of the ancient suzerainty of the German Empire no one took any account: it appeared to the French sufficient respect paid to that power, when, as they expressed it, they annexed Provence to the Crown, instead of reuniting it. But what an inestimable accession did this union bring to the monarchy! The designs of Philip the Fair were carried out to their full-consummation. The West-Frankish crown extended its immediate dominion over the whole southern coast, and Marseilles became for the first time a French haven.

The death of Louis's opponent brought the Burgundian possessions in Picardy, concerning which the contest had originated, back to the Crown without further difficulty. But that which constituted the extreme object of the King's policy at first could not now satisfy him; he seized the occasion to reclaim Burgundy, although in the original enfeoff-

ment there was no mention made of its being limited to the male line of the succession, yet the King, taking advantage of his position, declared that such was the rule, and accordingly took possession of the territory.

Had the notion of provincial independence retained any deep root in the minds of the people, it is highly probable that this acquisition of the province by the Crown would have met with invincible opposition; but French nationality had already developed itself to a universal feeling, which no longer permitted the idea of partition. As the lands which had recognized another feudal sovereign were thus easily brought into the royal possession, much easier still was the task of recovering those which for ages had revered the King as their supreme head.

Louis XI. took care to content whatever remained of provincial spirit, by establishing institutions of the Estates of the several provinces; and his government is remarkable for the fact that it favored these institutions. We find, under Louis XI., meetings of the three Estates in Champagne and Brie, Dauphiné, Périgord, and Quercy, the Bassa Marcha de Rovergue, Guienne, and in regular uninterrupted activity in Normandy and Languedoc. The King urged them frequently for grants of money, but he showed confidence in them, listened to their complaints, and sought to remedy their grievances.* The Estates of the newly acquired provinces, therefore, adhered the more readily to him. To those of Provence he promised to maintain their privileges and customs, and especially the authority of their written laws. He gave the Burgundians an express assurance that he would never lay a tax upon them without their consent. He favored the provincial constitutions which could do no prejudice to his personal supremacy in political affairs. In one of his treaties, the ratification was reserved to the French Estates; but it is probable that the King did not mean by this the States General, who would previously have had charge of such matters, but the forty-seven distinct assemblies of the provincial Estates. Connected with this is the fact that, following the previous course and example of his father, he caused a col-

* J. Paquet, *Institutiones Provinciales*, 124.

lection of the customary laws to be made, and gave the several provinces supreme courts of justice. Between 1444 and 1501, Languedoc, Dauphiné, Burgundy, Guienne, and Provence obtained their parliaments; and this was of all the greater importance, as Louis XI. was the first monarch who decidedly recognized the fundamental doctrine that the officers of justice were not removable at pleasure. It is very remarkable that this prince, with whose name is associated the idea of tyrannical power, was a friend of the civic population, and showed much favor to the towns; he confirmed their privileges, and, where he found none, bestowed them. A multitude of charters are in existence, in which he confers upon the towns the right of freely electing their magistrates, and connected with the administration of these offices the acquisition of nobility. He willingly permitted general assemblies of the burghers, for he cherished a natural predilection for the people, and hated the nobles. When, in his war with the princes, his cause appeared in the greatest peril, he returned to Paris, and was received by the inhabitants with the most joyful acclamations, a circumstance by which they completely won his favor. No other prince perhaps ever did so much for the prosperity of Paris as Louis XI. He bestowed upon the city both jurisdictional and mercantile prerogatives; he facilitated the conveyance to it of provisions; he especially favored the concourse of foreigners to Paris, which was almost regarded as an asylum for them. The city increased rapidly in the number of its inhabitants, and the burghers were taught to bear arms.* Louis thoroughly comprehended how important it was to his authority over the rest of the kingdom that it should be respected in Paris, and the superiority of the capital was of essential consequence in bringing over the towns of Picardy.

It is easy to perceive a correspondence and unity of purpose in the depression of the great vassals, and the favor bestowed upon the provincial and even popular elements. The former

* The old "*Choppin de Moribus et Institutis Parisiensium*" extols the privileges granted by Louis XI. Félibien contains the greatest number, but not the whole. Félibien, calculating from the number of the armed, reckons the population of Paris at 300,000; Dulaure will not agree that it was more than 150,000.

demanding a participation in the exercise of the supreme power; the latter were content with the privileges proper to a subordinate existence. Over both towered the monarchic idea, commanding peace, compelling obedience, concentrating in itself all the interests of the nation, terrible from the suddenness with which it punished, every where present, taking counsel from no one, firmly established in itself. The world was awed at the aspect of monarchy under such a prince as this. Louis XI. was a man in whom the most opposite peculiarities of character were united—generosity and avarice; imprudent confidence and a mistrust which never slept; anxious terror in distress, and in prosperity unbounded reliance on its continuance. In him all respect for individuals vanished before the care of the general interests; justice and cruelty were blended together. The great conception that royalty was an office, and to be administered in that sense, was traversed and disturbed by certain trifling views arising from personal passion. Insidious policy and romantic devotion touch each other. It sometimes appears as if the King, feeling himself straitened at the same time by the powers of heaven and those of the earth, thought of appeasing the one, while directly or indirectly he made himself master of the other. For what he had done toward the promoting the peaceful progress of France, and securing its position in the world—for what would have been the result if his opponents had held out?—Louis XI. has no rival in merit, yet no one has expressed gratitude to him; no one felt at ease under him; nay, he himself had not one single moment of life in which he could enjoy the consciousness of fortune, and power, and content. The reason was, he was destitute of all moral elevation; he had made a monarchy great, but without any proper greatness of his own.

Notwithstanding his success, it can not be said that he accomplished all his purposes; his intention had been to break up entirely that political union between Burgundy and the Netherlands, which had threatened him with such danger.* The lands in the French dominions he wished to unite with

* Comines: "*Estoit enclin à deffaire et destruire cette maison en tous points, et en départir les seigneuries en plusieurs mains.*" 301.

the Crown, the Walloon provinces he intended to confer upon French nobles, whom he had already nominated, and the German upon one or other of his friends among the German princes. The provinces, however, united themselves round the heiress of Burgundy, who, through her marriage with an Archduke of Austria who afterward became emperor, renewed the race, and raised it to still higher consideration in Europe, and to loftier expectations. No negotiations to induce the house of Burgundy to relinquish its claims, had the slightest success. On the Spanish frontier, also, the state of possession was not secured by any substantial treaty, though the possibility of an outbreak of hostility in that quarter was very remote. On the whole, Louis left the kingdom so strong that it was able to maintain itself during a minority, which has ever been a time of great danger in France.

It is curious to mark the proceedings in the Estates of Tours which were occasioned by this minority in the year 1484 (Charles VIII.), and to notice how the political views which prevailed in that age, as in all ages, stood, in opposition to one another.

A distinguished deputy from Burgundy, an old friend of Philip the Good, unfolded the popular ideas, which had received fresh confirmation from the recently-awakened knowledge of antiquity. He showed how royalty, which had originally risen from election, by no means included in itself the fullness of political power, but, in all its transactions, required the approval of the people. He maintained that, should the King, through infancy or incapacity, be unfit to administer the duties of his office personally, the power, by the mere fact, returned to the people who had conferred it.* The Chancellor of France contended, on the other side, for the hereditary claims of the royal family, which came into operation in the case of a minority like the present; the people had once for all submitted to authority; whoever sought

* "Imprimis vobis probatum esse velim republicam rem populi esse, et regibus ab eis traditam, et eos qui vi vel alias nullo populi consensu eam habuere tyrannos creditos et alienæ rei invasores; oportet propterea, ut ad populum redeat, hujus rei donatorem, qui eam quidem resumat." 148.

to cast that off, was a contumacious and refractory person, and showed an inconsiderate passion for freedom which could only lead to slavery. The Chancellor had yet another contest with the deputies of Normandy, respecting the taxes imposed. The deputies contended strenuously for the principle of private property in its strictest sense, and thence concluded that no man, without his own consent, ought to be compelled to contribute from his possessions; the Chancellor answered these arguments with the question, "Wherein then does the royal authority consist, if the King is to have no power of compulsion?"

While the Estates were endeavoring to purge the administration of the hated officials who had been appointed under Louis XI., they embraced the idea of a government which should receive its authority from themselves, rather than from the King. The proposal was made, that the administration of the royal domains and revenue in each province should be committed to the province itself, and a calculation entered into of how much more they would produce under such an arrangement. The *taille*, which had increased fourfold under Louis XI., it was hoped, might, without difficulty, be reduced to the original amount. The right of granting the taxes was one of those which the Estates insisted on with the greatest determination; for the purpose of thus giving their consent they required to be summoned to assemble every two years. Had these proposals been adopted, the centre of gravity of the government would have been laid in the States General, an assembly then under the influence of popular excitement.

These are the principles which have forever been in conflict in the Romano-German States. The thorough consummation of the principle of hereditary monarchy, and of absolute power, would have induced universal slavery; the principle of a system of government by Estates, and of individual freedom, would, in its complete application, have resulted in a republic or an elective monarchy. In the antagonistic operation of both principles, and their mutual limitation, consists the essential character of the present political constitutions.

It almost appears as if this was felt by the Assembly at Tours: both parties finally apologized for having gone some-

what too far in their words. The popular harangues were received by the Assembly with the greatest applause during their delivery, but the result was different when it came to the vote. The deputation from Paris, among others, was on the side of the royal power.*

The Dukes of Orleans and Brittany, the most powerful of the great nobles who yet remained, were discontented with the arrangements established by the Estates, and took up arms once more against the power of the Crown. It required all the energy and talent of the daughter of Louis XI., who represented her father far more completely than her brother did, to suppress them; and, for this purpose, she also availed herself of the arms of the Swiss. These republicans were the means of firmly establishing the power of the Crown throughout every corner of France. - Destiny itself seemed to lend its aid to policy and arms for the accomplishment of this object—the chief cause being that the great princely families were gradually becoming extinct. In a short time we find the Duke of Orleans king, and the heiress of Brittany queen, of France. Not only did the Crown depress the houses of the provincial principalities, but they themselves died out to its advantage.

In general, the authority of the Crown was preserved as it had been embodied in great institutions under Charles VII., and developed under Louis XI., to the actual possession of the supreme power in the state. We find one minister, Marshal Gyé, of the house of Rohan, who enjoyed the entire confidence of Louis XI., in the highest degree powerful and influential during the whole reign of Charles VIII., and the first eight years of that of Louis XII. The rough operation of the collective organization was gradually less felt, and the advantages of order and mutual dependency began to be experienced. The constitution of France attained under Louis XII. a form which was approved of by the enlightened spirits of the age. It is worth while to notice how the politically experienced Italians comprehended it.

Well acquainted and disgusted with the storms of republicanism,

* Compare Bernier, *Journal des Etats Généraux de France tenus à Tours en 1484.*

licanism, they decided that the elected presidents of a community, who were responsible to it, or even a numerous aristocracy, had not such power to suppress the disorders in a state as a single supreme chief. With lively sympathy, they took into consideration how the Crown, through conquests, deaths, marriages, accessions to the throne themselves, when the new sovereign incorporated his ancient possessions with the kingdom, had become such a power that now no one could make any serious opposition to it, and that many of the great nobles did not even wish to do so, lest they should damage their own claims to its future possession. Thus was the hereditary monarchy immovably established; in the very land where men had taken so much pains to prevent any foreign prince from ever succeeding to its possession that was the best form for the government of the state. The objection that the King might be personally incapable of discharging the duties of his office, or that he might be led away by a natural propensity to disorder and violence, was removed by the excellent laws through which the exercise of the royal power was limited in France. The Chamber of Accounts had authority to check the excessive operation of the laws which had been enacted for the advantage of the royal revenue, which proved of essential service to the income of the Crown. Of still greater value was the institution of Parliaments, which charged their members with the duty of examining the royal rescripts, in order to ascertain whether they were in accordance with law and equity. Had the King interfered irregularly in criminal processes, it would not have been long endured; even arbitrary dismissals were not altogether possible: in such cases, those who should succeed to the vacant offices were sure to be punished afterward. Absolute power was bridled by the Parliament. "If it were more absolute," they asserted, "it would be less perfect." They find even the gradation of the states worthy of commendation: the nobility exempt from direct taxation, having the privilege of carrying arms, spending part of the year at the court, and then returning to their estates to conduct the affairs of their households; from them were selected the persons who filled the offices connected with the court and the army, and who were charged with the duties

of bailiffs and seneschals. The King acknowledged a distinction of rank between the different houses, yet he did not hesitate to bring the vassals of even the most powerful before his tribunal of justice. Next to the nobility stood the estate of the higher burgher class, to which belonged all the gain of commerce, as well as the innumerable judicial and financial offices, of which France possessed a greater number than all the rest of Christendom. To many it appeared that the middle class had attained a position of greater importance than even the nobility. Lastly came the estate of the lower burgher class, which was still capable of the less important offices, and enjoyed personal freedom, protected by the judicial administration, and from which men could easily, by their own efforts, rise to the higher burgher estate. In order to attain nobility, the royal grace and privilege were necessary, yet, even these were not difficult. "Innumerable are the persons," says Lodovico Canossa, "whom we see every day rise from the third class to the second, and from the second to the first; were this not the case, it would be soon followed by an insurrection of the lower classes." These Italians are astonished that the great nobles of the court exhibit so little jealousy of the clergy, who often, through merit alone, rose from the lowest condition to an equality with them, and even to a superiority. They left to them the conduct of affairs, satisfied with having the execution in their own hands. Canossa, who addressed his writing, in the year 1515, to Francis I., on his accession to the throne, counsels the King to protect these relations; to uphold in its integrity the right of free election among the clergy; not to allow the nobility to be purchased out of their estates by members of the middle class who had become rich; to defend the people from the blood-sucking system of the financiers; for, from the equilibrium of the Estates the obedience of each and all to the crown would result.*

The grateful memory in which the name of Louis XII. is preserved rests upon the remembrance of this state of things. He gave free course to the election of the clergy: the chapters elected their bishops, the monks their abbots; he would

* Il vescovo di Bajusa al re Francisco I., 1515. MS. Rom.

not tolerate the interference of the seneschals with the ecclesiastical elections, or with the administration of justice in the inferior courts. It is quite true that he made concessions to the Parliaments, concerning which his successor complained bitterly; he confirmed their claim to the patronage in general of the open situations which arose from them: perhaps they never had a more splendid period. If ordinances which they dissented from were sometimes recorded in their books, observations which they wrote in the margin had the effect that afterward people cared little for these ordinances. Before they registered a financial ordinance—relating, for example, to the sale of domains—they first thoroughly examined the treasurer, in order to convince themselves that the sale was necessary. The magistracy was still animated by a spirit of earnestness. The president of the Parliament, De la Vacquerie, could never be induced to accept even an invitation to dinner at the court of the Duke of Angoulême, the father of Francis I., who greatly esteemed him. He would not cultivate any intimacy with the Prince, lest he should seek to exercise a personal influence upon the judgments of the judicial tribunal, or cast a false appearance of having done so upon its independent judgments. "The Prince," said he, "it is true, has no process before the Parliament, but he may have one at a future time." It can not be said of Louis XII. that he sought to depress the princes of the blood; he brought forward Alençon, Vendôme, Dunois, the heroic and chivalrous Foix, one of the most brilliant figures of the time; he gave them personal instruction and advice, and inculcated upon them the necessity of taking care of their own interests. The campaigns in Italy were half festivals, in this period of general culture and intellectual superiority of the Italians, and of the revived chivalry of the French nobles, every one of whom endeavored to earn personal honor under the eyes of the King. The ladies also, began now, for the first time, to frequent the court. Their domestic life in their castles has been depicted to us—how they occupied themselves in skillful embroidery; in reading the romances of chivalry that then issued from the press; or how they devoted themselves to the education of their children, and to

the administration of their gentle dominion over their dependents, whom they ruled with kindness and affability. King Louis XII. enjoyed also the confidence of the great mass of the people. They knew that he kept a strict account of his income and expenditure, and occasionally they saw greedy finance officers punished for their exactions. The *taille* was once more reduced to nearly its original amount. There was in the nature of the King something open, benevolent, and unsuspecting, which gained him the hearts of both small and great. Once at a ball he rose from the elevated chair on which he was sitting, seized the halbert of a Swiss porter, and cleared a place for the dancers. He conducted himself among his servants as if he had been one of their companions, and if ever he got in a passion he was immediately again appeased; yet no one might thence ever think to govern him. He made it a rule never to confer a favor upon any one who had solicited it himself.

Louis XII. was one of those happily organized persons who know what suits themselves, but allow others differently constituted to live also, and do not torment them with selfish regulations. The people looked upon him with pleasure as, in his latter years, somewhat bowed with age, he rode upon his mule to the Court of Parliament. He gave dignity to the judicial tribunal, and yet never interfered with its decisions. A Venetian ambassador, who was often near the King, describes him as a child of nature. The public voice gave him the title of Father of the People.*

It was now evident, however, that this condition of things, so peaceful and agreeable to men's minds, rested upon a dangerous foundation in relation to the rest of Europe. Before a judgment can be formed concerning the times of Louis XII., it is necessary to cast at least one glance upon the progress of the foreign undertakings.

The Italian wars which were undertaken by Charles VIII. and Louis XII. originated less from the idea of extending the French kingdom and state, which had occupied the previous

* "Cujus sacrosancta apud nos memoria etiam nunc in animis hominum viget," says Thuanus, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, speaking of the year 1559. 452.

generation, than from the desire to enforce the hereditary claims of the royal house on the further side of the Alps. Charles VIII. insisted upon his rights to Naples as the successor of the Counts of Anjou and Provence, who for centuries had played so important a part in Italy. Louis XII. enforced in Milan the rights of the Visconti, from whom his grandmother, Valentina, was descended. They carried on their campaigns chiefly with the surplusage of the French power, without expecting any especial assistance from the nation. In the manifold changes of the times, the power of the French Crown had its period of good fortune. Louis XII. established himself in Milan, as Duke and Sovereign; the Senate of that state was an imitation of the French provincial parliaments. He conquered Genoa, and caused the imperial privileges, in which that city prided itself, to be burned. He defeated the Venetians in a great battle, and compelled them to restore to Milan a great part of their acquisitions on *terra firma*; and so decisive was the superiority of his power, that even they themselves afterward considered that in him lay their surest support. The ruling party in Florence were in a state of dependence upon the French, and the cities of the Ecclesiastical States gladly bore the lilies in their armorial insignia. The old Angevin faction among the Neapolitan nobility did not yield obedience to the King of Spain, until he had concluded a treaty with France. It should never be forgotten that this concurrence with the civilization of Italy constitutes an essential point in the history of French intellect; for France, as a power, its superiority in higher and middle Italy was of inestimable value, and Louis XII. possessed for a time the authority of the first prince in Christendom.

It lies, however, in the very nature of European political relations, that when one power strives to obtain the superiority, it arouses the strong opposition of the others. It was owing to this that the union between Austria and Burgundy, in opposition to France, was extended over Spain also. The son of Charles the Bold's daughter and Maximilian the Emperor married the heiress of Castile, Aragon, and the Indies; from this marriage sprang a prince in whom all these hereditary titles were united, and who, on account of the relations of

both of his grandfathers to Italy, was implicated in the disputes concerning that country also. The first indications of this combination, though it was still distant, placed France, which stood fully invested with the superior power in Italy, in an embarrassed position.

Louis XII. also, like so many of his predecessors, left no male issue. His consort, who was filled with dynastical ambition, and disliked the young duke Francis of Angoulême, heir-presumptive to the throne, and his family, was inclined to give her eldest daughter in marriage to the Prince of Burgundy, to whom in that case would fall not only the Italian conquests, but also the ancient feudal possessions of his ancestors in France, besides Brittany and the family property of the house of Orleans. We need scarcely observe that this would have made the Burgundian prince the most powerful noble in the kingdom, and have shaken the French throne to its very foundations. It was the merit of Marshal Gyé to have opposed this plan with decision, and to have frustrated it, regardless of the displeasure of the Queen, which fell upon him.

Louis XII. excited another enemy in Italy itself, and one by far more dangerous: it was no less a personage than the Pope who then occupied the See of Rome—a pontiff who, from the design of uniting the States of the Church, which he in great part accomplished, proceeded to carry into execution a plan for driving the foreigners—or, as he expressed himself, the barbarians—and especially the French, out of Italy. Julius II. regarded the Cardinal d'Amboise, the most confidential minister of Louis XII., who was himself looking forward to the tiara, as his personal enemy. Clerical contentions, having especial regard to the Pragmatic Sanction, mixed themselves up with disputes of a temporal character, and at last a war broke out, in which the King took up the so-called spiritual weapons, and summoned an anti-papal council at Pisa, while the Pope, on the other hand, excited all the powers of Christendom to a war against the schismatical monarch. He saw nothing to disapprove of in the conduct of Ferdinand the Catholic, who took the opportunity to make himself master of Navarre, on the Spanish side of

the Puertos, merely because the King of Navarre was an ally of Louis XII. He not only revived the claims of the House of Burgundy against the French, but even the obsolete claims of England, and succeeded in bringing about a spiritual and temporal confederation against the King of France. It was of decisive importance to the event that he also succeeded in securing the assistance of the Swiss. They had been of infinite service to Louis XII., not only for the suppression of domestic enemies, but also in his foreign enterprises; in his interests, still more than their own, they had maintained a war against their neighbors in Germany, and even against the Emperor himself; and it was by their means chiefly that he had conquered Milan. But the King felt himself, by degrees, strong enough to dispense with their assistance; their factions, and especially their demands for money, had become burdensome to him; he was sparing by nature, and economical even with the property of the nation. He ceased therefore to pay to the Swiss chiefs the usual yearly sum, allowed the contract with them to expire, and even opposed their ambition and gave offense to their pride. Upon this they concluded an alliance with the Pope, whom a considerable territory, as well as the contributions of Christendom, furnished with the means of compensating them for the loss of the French annual pension; and who was not disposed to spare money. Under a banner which had been consecrated by the Pope, they marched through the Tyrol with the permission of the Emperor, deprived the French of Milan, and maintained it in a desperate pitched battle, in the year 1513, against them and the troops which they had raised in other parts. After this reverse, Genoa also revolted from France; in the middle and smaller Italian states the anti-French party obtained the sovereignty also. Not only did France thus lose her superiority in Europe, but a hostile army crossed the French frontiers, which was with difficulty resisted and compelled to retreat.

Such was the condition of France when Louis XII. died. It was a condition of internal prosperity, but at the same time one of external danger. The monarchical power, which had grown with the nation itself, and been confirmed in the fierce

storms through which it had passed, held all together; it had been moderated through law and usage, and was not very oppressive to the subject; every one revered it, and many were affectionately attached to it. The name and fame of Louis XII. rest on the fact of his having furthered and maintained this condition, and at the same time gratified his foreign ambition, and obtained a predominant influence in Europe. Now, however, he was driven from this position, and engaged in an arduous conflict with the as yet unbroken authority of the Papacy, united with an emperor who, though of little power, was infinitely active and indefatigable, and a warlike and excited nation. The future of France rested mainly on the possibility of her maintaining her internal prosperity, and at the same time reconquering her position in relation to foreign states.

CHAPTER V.

FRANCIS THE FIRST.

THE crown devolved upon young Francis of Angoulême, of a second line of the house of Orleans.

It was related that he was not at all pleased when Louis XII. married again; in a short time, however, he was assured that no children would ever spring from this marriage. He called his friends together on the receipt of this intelligence, and entertained them with a tournament, in which he himself with seven captains maintained the lists. Soon after Louis XII. died, on the 1st of January, 1515, and Francis I. hailed his royal dignity as a splendid new year's gift, for he regarded it as a personal possession.

As successors to thrones are accustomed to do, he directed his attention chiefly to the defects of the preceding system of administration. His mother, Louisa of Savoy, who guided his youth, was a woman of vigorous temperament, with great intellect and eagerness for dominion, and stood in professed and open opposition to the Court. They were both convinced that Louis XII. had resigned too many of the rights of the Crown. They were in the highest degree dissatisfied with his pliability toward the Parliament, and especially with his manner of transacting ecclesiastical affairs; for even the corporation system has its defects, and various abuses were connected with the self-government of the clergy. There were men in the magistracy itself also who urged an alteration of that system, and who adhered closely to the house of Angoulême. The first act of authority performed by Francis I. was the nomination to the chancellorship of the kingdom of the most distinguished among them, Antoine Duprat, who once, in the presence of Louis XII., exchanged high words with the then Chancellor, in a dispute which arose on this very subject.

His attention was next directed to foreign affairs, and especially to the conduct of the campaign against Milan, for which his predecessor, not, however, without tightening the reins with unwonted rigor, had already made every preparation. "I will come," said Francis I. to the Venetians, who at that time desired nothing more ardently than his appearance in Milan—"I will come, and I will either conquer or die." He led his troops over the Alps by a path which no army before had trodden. The divisions that had broken out among the Swiss, it is true, were very favorable to his undertaking, for the change of sovereigns in France had produced an alteration in the disposition of the Swiss councils; but it is equally true that, as concerned the others who held firmly by the alliance with the Pope, and were led by a resolute party chief, heroic efforts had become necessary. The young King had made up his mind to cover himself with the glory of personal bravery in this the first military action of his reign. Who knows not how he slept in complete armor on the carriage of a piece of artillery the night which interrupted the battle of Marignano, having removed his helmet only; how he quenched his thirst, like the others, with water taken from the ditches and mingled with blood; and how on the following morning he continued the battle with renewed courage, and concluded it with renown? I know not whether it can be said that he broke through the Swiss order of battle, but they gave way before him for the first time, and left him master of the field. The result was the reconquest of Lombardy; and it has been asserted that it rested with Francis alone whether or not he would make himself master of all Italy.

Such was not his intention, however, for the present. He stopped short in the midst of his career, and left without assistance the Florentines, who expected that he would liberate them from the sovereignty of the Medici. On the contrary, he hastened to Bologna, in order to conclude with the head of that house, Pope Leo, a treaty concerning spiritual as well as temporal differences. He restored also to the Swiss the annual payment in money, and entered into a permanent alliance with them, regardless of its expense, the greatest possible

reduction of which was an essential feature of the previous government. It did not, in short, by any means suit his disposition to carry out the intentions of his predecessor, or to renew his party position, but rather to found permanent and secure relations.

The negotiation with the Pope was the more significant as it affected a fundamental law of the state. It was thought in France that the King, as a conqueror, would finally bring the Pope to acknowledge the Pragmatic Sanction. Whether this was possible, however, is very doubtful. That law had been repeatedly condemned by the Popes, and the Gallican Church had not even thought fit to institute a defense of it at the last Council of Lateran, because it would have been condemned without question. Would Leo now, in consequence of the defeat of his allies, and in the momentary distress arising from that event, submit himself to the King, in contradiction to the conduct of his predecessors, to a Council of the Church devoted to the Romish See, and against the interest of the Curia? Among those who attended the King it was confidently asserted that the Pope would rather declare France schismatic anew, summon all the powers of Christendom against the French, and throw obstacles in the way of their return to their own country.* Now, however, the King himself had become an opponent to the Pragmatic Sanction, and intentionally committed the negotiation to his new Chancellor, who also rejected it.

And thus it came to pass that the consultations resulted, not in the confirmation of this law, as men expected, but in its abolition. The political necessity of concluding an enduring peace with the Pope, accorded with the King's desire to effect a thorough alteration in the interior arrangements of the kingdom. The agreement decided upon—the Concordat of 1516—was advantageous to the Papacy both theoretically and practically—in the one respect, because it put an end to the claims of councils to an authority superior to that of Rome, as it had been confirmed in the Council of Bâle; and in the other, because it restored to the Pope the supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the enjoyment of the ancient

* Discours du Chancelier Duprat, in Isambert, xiv. 114

revenue, such as the *annates*; but it brought a still greater accession of authority to the Crown. France then reckoned ten archbishoprics, eighty-three bishoprics, five hundred and twenty-seven abbeys; the King acquired the authority, under insignificant limitations, to nominate to all these places.*

The Pragmatic Sanction accorded with the system of moderate monarchy and the freedom of election and consultation which prevailed in France. Men were proud of the privileges which the law secured to them, and which included many corporate as well as private prerogatives. It was natural therefore that the intelligence of the abolition of that law should be received with general disapproval. The clergy, the University, and the Parliament opposed it. The King referred the clergy to the Pope, with whom he said they were at liberty to dispute the matter if they were so inclined. To the Parliament he declared that he would have no Venetian senate about him; that the laws and regulations upon which it insisted derived their power from the will of his predecessors, and that he possessed the same authority as they did, and might use it to ordain the contrary. When the Parliament resolved to register the Concordat, they gave it to be understood that they had consented to take that step only in order to avoid a greater evil. When they had yielded, the opposition of the University was of no account.

The Crown, in accepting the Concordat, completely abandoned the course it had hitherto pursued. It renounced those ecclesiastical maxims which it had adopted eighty years before, on a great occasion, and steadily maintained ever since, and to which the kingdom of France had become accustomed; it made a gigantic stride in its progress toward unlimited authority. Louis XI. had already contemplated this step, but Francis I. ventured to take it because the necessity of reconciling himself with the Pope furnished him at the same time with the opportunity and its apology.† It was a

* Giustinian, 1535: "Questa denominazione gli dà una grandissima servitù ed obediencia da prelati e laici per lo desiderio che hanno de' benefici."

† James Bacon, in his "Life and Times of Francis I." London, 1830, ii. Appendix 14, describes a manuscript in the British Museum, of this purport.

reaction—probably an inevitable one—of the external relations of the kingdom upon its internal constitution.

Thus did Francis I., in the beginning of his reign, acquire an unexampled degree of authority in his own dominions, and at the same time a brilliant position in the eyes of Europe. He received public honors as a hero, and conducted himself with pretensions to a renown which very far exceeded his merits. Dialogues were composed between Cæsar, the first subjugator of the Helvetians, and King Francis, the second Cæsar, conqueror and tamer of the Swiss. "I went," said his mother Louisa of Savoy, "on foot to our Lady of the Fountains, to recommend him to her—him whom I love better than myself—my son, the glorious and triumphant Cæsar, subjugator of the Helvetians."

When the vacancy of the Imperial throne occurred in 1519, his whole soul thirsted for the possession of that dignity, the name of which was associated with these reminiscences; and here it was that he was destined to meet, for the first time, the antagonist of his life. This was the Burgundian Prince Charles, who was grandson of the Archduke of Austria and of the King of Spain, and at the same time heir to Charles the Bold, and in whose name all their territories, consisting of German, French, Italian, and Spanish provinces, were governed; to all this the Electoral Princes of the Empire added the Imperial Crown, but while they did so a great and universal struggle became inevitable.

It was impossible that so powerful a Prince as the new Emperor would be content to leave the French in possession of the Imperial appanages Milan and Genoa, without making some inquiry concerning the rights of the Empire. It was also brought to memory that the Archbishop of Trèves did not bear the title of Chancellor of Arles without a meaning, and Dauphiné and Provence,* the provinces thus designated, did not appear to be yet permanently united with the French kingdom. His own personal rights were, however, the actuating motives of Charles V. to a contest with France. He laid

* "Le dict roi de France usurpe induement au dict St. Empire le Dauphiné,"—Le Grand Chancelier, in the Conférences de Calais, 1521: Pap. d'Etat de Granvelle, i. 218.

Part
on
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sanction

claim to the Dukedom of Burgundy and to the district on the Somme, both of which had been most unjustly taken possession of by Louis XI. The hostilities between France and Burgundy were only interrupted forty years ago: now for the first time they must be determined by arms, and that when they extended over a far wider space than they did originally.

The Italians joined their power to that of the Emperor, and the Pope, who did not feel himself bound forever by the treaty of Bologna, added his contingent, and in a short time the united forces repossessed themselves of Milan. On the prospect which this opened, England, having joined the Confederacy, renewed her ancient claims upon a portion of the French territory, or rather to the Crown itself of that kingdom.

While Charles V. and Henry VIII. were now contemplating an attack upon France, they succeeded in drawing over to their side the most powerful of the great French nobles the Constable of Bourbon; for the independence of the French nobles, although suppressed, was not entirely extinguished. When the Italians remarked, concerning the subject princes of France, that the prospect of succeeding some time or other to the throne themselves kept them under control, they state that which was perfectly correct, at least as far as regarded Bourbon. As Francis I. had remained some time without male issue, the Constable flattered himself with the hope that the Crown was destined for himself, and spoke upon that subject once with a Venetian ambassador.* But Francis I. had sons at length, and the Constable saw himself not only excluded from all participation in the government, but, after the death of his consort, disturbed and threatened in the possession of the rich provinces and estates she had brought him, and which he regarded as his own. To be condemned to an

* Badoer. *Relatione di Milano*, 1516. Bourbon told the ambassador that it was true "Mons. di Nason," namely, Charles d'Alençon, was nearer to the crown, but that his grandfather (Jean le Beau) had forfeited his claims through rebellion, for in France the revolt of a prince of the blood destroyed the right of succession to the crown in his posterity for seven generations, and that the right therefore devolved to him: "unde li vien a lui, perciò in quel caso il illustrissimi signori vollesse ajutarlo."

insignificant position was to him intolerable; he felt no scruple therefore in preferring his own personal position to the interests of France, and went over to the Emperor. It was a faint resemblance of the league of the great feudal nobles with Charles the Bold.

Thus it came to pass that Francis I. saw himself suddenly assailed from all sides and placed in imminent danger. An imperial army penetrated into Provence, and through the possession of this territory alone the Emperor hoped to be the master both by sea and land. The Duke of Bourbon acknowledged the claims of Henry VIII., who had fortified himself with a Papal bull, by which the French were absolved from the obligations of the oath of allegiance which they had taken to their king. Francis succeeded, however, in expelling the imperialists from his kingdom, and further prepared himself for the reconquest of Milan, through which he would have been in a position to laugh at the designs of his enemies. In this attempt, however, he was in the highest degree unfortunate, for, although excellently prepared and fighting gallantly, he was utterly defeated by the Germans and Spaniards at Pavia, and was taken prisoner by his antagonist. It is only necessary to recall the consequences which the captivity of King John drew after it in former times, in order to estimate the full extent of the danger with which France was threatened as the result of this event.

It looked at one time as if it would have issued in the absolute dissolution of the kingdom. Internal agitations appeared to co-operate with the tempest from without. The government of the time had made innumerable enemies through its injudicious and frequently arbitrary proceedings. The King's mother and the Chancellor Duprat, who took the chief part in public affairs, were especially hated. "Do you wish to know who is to blame for all our misfortunes? It is Lady Ambition and her Chancellor," was the purport of a paper distributed in the churches one Sunday, in March, 1525; "through obstinacy and vindictiveness;" it continued, "they have brought both the King and the kingdom into this distress, and it will become still greater if the Chancellor be not punished." It was held necessary even to enjoin the preachers not to confirm this

view of things, but rather to tell the people that the cause of all these evils was to be found in the universal sinfulness of the nation. The King himself was not always spared : on the intelligence of his sickness, the rumor of his death was spread abroad, but even if he should live, added some, he must be prevented from again taking possession of the government, and that fifty of his assistants must lose their heads.

Meanwhile, the troops, who were no longer paid, cast off all subordination. They were composed of Italians, German *Landsknechte*, but the great majority was French. Their battle-cry was sometimes Bourbon, and sometimes Burgundy ; with this cry, which is the ordinary precursor of plunder, they drew near to the walls of Paris.

The battle of Pavia was not unlike the old battles in the English war, in respect to the tremendous loss of life suffered by the nobility ; I find at least one indication of its having excited the efforts of the civic class to regulate the kingdom. Duke Charles of Vendôme, another Bourbon, was summoned by a few distinguished men—some of them members of the Parliament—to take upon himself the government of the land, which they stated was his right, as first prince of blood, rather than that of the King's mother ; and promised that, if he did so, he should be supported by Paris and all the other good towns. Charles of Vendôme, however, saw in this an attempt, on the part of the towns, to obtain an influence which did not properly belong to them,* and rejected every suggestion of the kind. But even the most discontented must have been convinced of the imminent peril that would attend an insurrection at the present moment, and all the powers of the nation united to obviate it : the Parliament took the lead, and, under its advice a civic council of safety was formed, in which the most considerable members of the different estates were included. Old William of Montmorency, a worthy and much esteemed man, was invited to take upon him the charge of the military preparations. Care was taken to give employment to all that

* Belleforest : " Considérant que pour cela on tirerait une suite dérogante à l'autorité du roi, nommons régents . . . et les ferait-on redevables à la volonté des communautés et des villes." Compare Anc. Collection des Mémoires, xviii. 302.

were unoccupied, and the most rigorous superintendence was exercised. Picardy was kept in repose, and its resources for resistance collected by Vendôme ; the same was done in Champagne by Guise, and in Provence and Dauphiné by other governors. There were misunderstandings between the King's mother, who was Regent, and the Parliament at Paris. It had been privately conveyed to the Princess that she had been disrespectfully spoken of in the assembly of the Parliament, and a few noblemen of the kingdom offered themselves personally to punish the disobedient members. It was in the highest degree displeasing to her that complaints were formally directed against the Chancellor, and that even citations were issued against him at the very time when his assistance was indispensable to her in the conduct of affairs. The feeling of common danger was, however, so strong as to prevent the outbreak of contention ; when it was once suggested in the Parliament that the States General ought to be called together, the proposition was not even seriously discussed.* The Regent sought to mollify the old antipathies by the assurance that her son would know how to respect Gallican freedom while carrying out the Concordat. She showed equal resolution and adroitness ; † to her France was not the least indebted for the preservation of internal peace, and her memory deserves not to be slandered in that country. All who possessed authority or consideration in the land, either adhered or submitted to her.

Though the condition of the country was more fortunate than at the time of Marcel, in thus obviating domestic troubles, yet the situation between two hostile powers, during the captivity of the King, was fraught with the greatest difficulty.

The innate contradiction of the pretensions of their neighbors came first and foremost to the assistance of the French. How could Henry VIII. have entertained the wish to strengthen

* The relations of Garnier, Gaillard, and Sismondi, respecting this contestation, are exaggerated, as appears from the correspondence of the 'Captivité du Roi François I.,' imparted by Champollion.

† She caused it to be declared in Venice, "meglio era il fiol incarcerado e la Franza libera, che haver la ruina del Re alle spalle e la Franza suggetta a l'Imperador, il che seguiria quando la Franza fusse perdita."

the already powerful Emperor by a number of new acquisitions? and how could the Emperor have for a moment thought of furthering the union of England and France as a single power?

In effect the Emperor gradually let drop all the pretensions arising from the claims of England, or Aragon, or the kingdom of Arles, and insisted only on the simple interests of his own house, the surrender of the dukedom of Burgundy, of which it had been deprived by Louis XI.; and from that demand no negotiations could induce him to recede. This was, however, an embarrassing condition, and incongruous with the general progress of the times: it would have broken the integrity of the French kingdom, and given the Emperor the position of a French magnate. But how could it be defeated?

Never did a captive long for freedom more than King Francis. We learn from his poetical effusions how he comforted himself at first with the reflection that he had obeyed the call of honor and of duty—that, although his body was subdued, his heart was free, that proud heart, which beat in response to honor only. He does not always, however, maintain this elevation of thought. He compares himself to a ship, whose lading is oppression and sorrow. His distress increases daily; he is unwilling to live; he would account it the greatest favor of heaven, were death to come and put an end, at the same time, to himself and to his sorrows; he expressed himself orally to the effect that liberty was the greatest of all human blessings. Yet he resolved to remain in captivity forever, rather than resign Burgundy. We feel ourselves touched by this trait of character, but even in those times we must be somewhat sparing of our admiration for chivalrous sentiment. The original document is still in existence, in which Francis I. ordained that his eldest son should be crowned King without delay, and that the government, during his minority, should remain with the Regent.* But the aspect of affairs was not

* Lettres Patentes du Roi François I. pour faire couronner Roi de France le Jeune Dauphin François.—“Donné à Madril, au royaume de Castille, au mois de Novembre, l’an de grâce 1525, et de notre règne le unzième.” Compare the fac-simile in Champollion, *Captivité du Roi François I.*, on page 423.

in reality improved by an abdication. To the Regent it appeared impossible any longer to carry on the administration of affairs without the presence of her son. However great the prospect might have been, which an alliance with Henry VIII., who had broken off his connection with his former confederate as soon as he perceived that his claims were left out of view, would have opened for France, yet the French towns, especially the capital, did not show themselves particularly willing to undertake the guarantees required by the English. How would it be possible, meanwhile, properly to conduct the war, which must, of necessity, break out afresh, without the personal participation of the King? It was a condition of the greatest embarrassment. If France was to be defended against the Emperor, the King must be brought back, in order to place himself at the head of the army; but, in order to obtain the liberation of the King, a great province (the prize of the war) must be delivered up to the enemy beforehand. The outward course of the negotiations wore an appearance as if all in the kingdom had at first resolved in earnest to give up the dukedom; when the surrender did not take place, it looks like the result of after-considerations. I do not think, however, that the case was altogether so blameless. The Regent said that, if her son were only at liberty once more, means would be found for every thing else. It is indicative that times and persons were altered, that both mother and son should regard it as lawful to pledge themselves to the relinquishment of Burgundy, without any intention of fulfilling their promise. The King narrates the affair in the following manner: Those who concluded the treaty were, he said, the plenipotentiaries of his mother, and that, after its conclusion, he had been compelled to swear to it by the Spaniards, but that he was conscious at the time that his oath was of no force,*—that before he subscribed the treaty he protested against it, and that, though he swore to return to his prison should he not be able to fulfill his word, he had a thorough conviction that an oath taken under compulsion was binding on no man. In this manner he obtained his freedom; in the same proportion as his captivity was grievous and pain-

* His discourse in the *Notables of 1527*: Isambert, *Recueil*, xli. 292.

ful to him, was the first breath of the air of France which he inhaled delightful. With the consciousness of freedom revived his feelings of recovered power. In France every one agreed with his sentiments. After a little time Francis I. laid before an assembly of the Notables, which was constituted of the clergy, the nobility, the Parliament, and the towns, the question whether he should surrender Burgundy, or return to his captivity. It behoved the assembly to consider the matter well; for he was their King, and in his person lay the honor of France. The answer was, that Burgundy formed an inalienable portion of France, and the first peerage in the kingdom; it could never, therefore, be renounced; and that the oath obtained by force from the King had no power to bind him. They all declared themselves ready to support the King with their best power, for the renewal of the war, and for the ransom of the children of France, whom the enemy held as hostages. The notables of Burgundy reiterated a principle which had been already advanced during the English wars, namely, that the right did not belong to the King to alienate a province of the kingdom. While the opinion was thus propounded and received that the unity and power of the kingdom was independent on the person of the King, and, consequently, could not be broken by any of his personal promises, the nation still gave in its adhesion to the King and to all his wishes.*

It came at length to a fresh trial of arms between the antagonist monarchs, in which they vied in putting forth all their power. In conclusion the Emperor was forced to resolve upon renouncing the inheritance of his fathers, the dukedom of Burgundy; and Francis, in return, to give up his rights to the feudal sovereignty over Flanders and Artois, which but a short time previously had been solemnly recognized. In this both acted in accordance with the nature of

* Moreau: *Prinse et Délivrance de François I.* Eimber (Arch. Cur.) i., iii., 342; it is an imitation of Froissart and Monstrelet: the author knew the court, and what he says sometimes agrees pretty well with the phrases of the "*Lettres de la Reyne de Navarre*," but occasionally he gives the reins to his fancy, and the literal truth of the circumstances he recounts can not be relied upon.

present circumstances. The relations of feudal dependency were no longer applicable when such mighty powers stood opposed to each other. France could not endure a feudatory like the Emperor, and to the Emperor himself it was a great advantage to be disembarassed of a feudal sovereignty which would have disturbed him unceasingly in carrying out his projects for the internal government of the Netherlands, and for uniting them with Germany.

As Francis I. also made a renunciation of his Italian possessions, it might have been expected that all disputes would terminate peacefully. To the French King, however, as well as to his people, the feeling of having been conquered was intolerable. In a short time he began to assert the principle that it was not in his power to resign an hereditary right which belonged to his children, and new contentions arose, which were not to be appeased by any negotiations. At last, when the Emperor took definitive possession of Milan, the war, which had been occasionally interrupted, though never entirely ended, broke out once more, and took a character entirely different from that which it had at first borne.

We shall here leave out of view the various alternations of fortune in the campaigns, and simply direct our attention to the general nature of the position which Francis I. occupied, as opposed to the Emperor.

Francis I. took possession of Savoy and Piedmont, either as a politico-military compensation for the loss of Milan and Genoa, or at least in order to protect himself from the danger that was to be apprehended from that side on account of the intimate alliance which the house of Savoy had formed with the Emperor. He had no just claims upon this country. The Duke was his enemy more through his ally, than any proper hostility of his own; but this did not prevent Francis from endeavoring to make Piedmont French as much as possible. The peculiar system of the French government by means of a Parliament was established in Turin, and it was remarked with pleasure that the Piedmontese set themselves zealously to the study of the French language, appearing to desire nothing more ardently than that they should belong altogether to the Crown of France. The possession of the Alps, and

the influence over Italy connected with it, were of incalculable value to Francis I. It could not now be said that the whole of that land was in the hands of the Emperor. Francis, however, had no intention of leaving his mountain fastnesses, pressing forward into the plains of Lombardy, and seeking to secure the reconquest of that territory, by giving battle to the Imperial forces. Even when the Emperor invaded France, the King retired before him, and avoided bringing matters to the decision of a pitched battle. His system was altogether defensive, without exposing himself to any great danger, and in this respect worthy of observation in a military point of view. He introduced the system of earthworks in fortification, which had been proved advantageous in Italy against the operations of artillery, and commenced the erection of two series of fortresses, by which the kingdom was to be secured from any hostile attempt from without. The necessity of defense prompted him to attempt also the establishment of a native militia in the provinces, to which he gave the name of legions; for although they were not destined for similar purposes, yet the form of the corps was to be an imitation of the ancient Roman model; the King himself employed his pen on the subject. A Venetian makes use of the strong expression, that Francis I. had in reference to the Emperor such a feeling as the pigeon might have in regard to the hawk; but in this he could have meant no more than that the French monarch felt the superior power of the Emperor—apprehended an attack from him each moment—and sought to secure himself against the danger.

The change of policy connected with this shows itself most strikingly in the relations of Francis I. with the Ottoman power.

The design cherished in previous ages, of conquering the Holy Land once more, and of which even now, when it had become impracticable, we still find some echoes, had, since the establishment of the Ottoman empire in the East of Europe and on the coasts of the Mediterranean, changed into the project of offering to this universally aggressive power a settled and permanent opposition in its attempts to narrow the region of western Christendom. With the attacks of the

French upon Italy, since the first enterprise of Charles VIII. against Naples, the prospect of a campaign against Constantinople was not unfrequently connected. It was on this project that Francis I. grounded with the electoral princes his desire to become Emperor. Now, however, when Charles V. had undertaken this contest, incited at the same time by Spain, Italy, and Germany, as well as by his own desire to justify his claims to be recognized as the supreme head of Christendom, Francis I. adopted the opposite course of policy. Driven from the first position among the powers of Christendom, beaten in Italy, and threatened even in France, he turned his views to an alliance with the Ottomans.

While in prison, in Madrid, he had formed a connection with Sultan Soliman. When the attacks of the Sultan placed both Germany and Italy in danger, Francis I. thought it sufficient to give the assurance that he would come to the defense of these countries, if he were called on;* but, in point of fact, he did nothing whatever for them. When the actual dangers had ceased, and the Emperor began once more to make his power felt, Francis did not scruple to enter into an open alliance with the Sultan; his determination is expressed in the words which he addressed to the Venetian ambassador on a certain occasion, in the year 1535: "Orator," said he, "I can not deny that I wish to see the Turks appear powerful at sea; not that I am pleased with the advantages they obtain, for they are unbelievers, and we are Christians, but because they keep the Emperor occupied, and thereby confer the greater security upon other potentates."† The French were ashamed when they were told of the cruelties perpetrated by the Turks upon all the coasts of the Mediterranean except those of France, whose ports lay open to them. The French would have preferred not acknowledging themselves the con-

* In a conversation with Juan Ant. Venier, 1532 (the relation is from March, 1533), he showed much sympathy for Italy and Venice: "Nè son per mancar in persona," said he, "quando sarò chiamato." He made stipulations for the support of Vienna.—*Deutsche Geschichte*, iii. 203.

† *Relatione del Cl. M. Marino Giustiano*, 1535: "Questa amicitia par a' Francesi che gli sia d' alcuna infamia et perciò s' ingegnano d' excusarla."

federates of such a power, but they continued firmly in the alliance. As the Swiss had been the substitutes for a French infantry, the Turks now supplied the place of a French fleet. To the King there appeared in this only one matter worth consideration, that now the Spaniards were not complete masters of the Mediterranean Sea.

If a new epoch had once been marked by the fact that Philip the Fair exploded the institutions in which all Christendom had united for the conquest of the Holy Land, it was a second great step in the same course when Francis I. even entered into alliance with the very power whose hostility was in the highest degree dangerous to Christendom. The conduct of Philip the Fair was thorough, open violence; the conduct of Francis I. was extremely odious. The title of Most Christian could no longer consist, as it had done originally, with the royalty of France. But for the political formation of the State, with which centuries had been occupied, both the one and the other were of unquestionable advantage. The internal unity of the State could not be thought of so long as great corporations consumed a large portion of the resources of both the land and the people upon other objects. The free transaction of foreign affairs, in accordance with what the peculiar condition and necessities of the kingdom demanded, was impossible, so long as statesmen allowed their views to be affected by the idea of a great system of peoples and states to which each belonged. This separation from the notion of a universal Christendom was, therefore, an indispensable step toward the development of the new system of the State, in reference to both internal and external relations.

Francis I. felt still fewer scruples in giving assistance to the German Protestants. They were, on their side, rather reluctant to enter into a closer connection with him, especially when they saw him form an alliance with the Turks.

It is peculiar to France to break through from century to century, as if by an internal force of nature, the circle of legality and the frames of European life, which itself had helped to form. Thus it had formerly cut off the Carolingian succession, then destroyed the power of the magnates, who, with equal claims, crowded round the vacant throne, and

afterward, with a sudden blow, annihilated the political system of the hierarchy. There was a time when France collected and hazarded all her power in order to drive the Mohammedans out of Syria and Egypt; now she stretched forth her hand to the Osmanli Turks, the rulers of these lands.

From the interior of the land and nation there arises, from time to time, a powerful and involuntary impulse of the general spirit, nearly related to, and yet essentially differing from that which had immediately preceded, sometimes altogether opposed to it.

As affairs then stood, France was once more driven to a defensive position. She was not assailed in her domestic territory, as in former days by the English, who made claims to the Crown: the Emperor stood upon the rights of his ancestors, whose hereditary portion he sought to recover; but then it consisted of considerable provinces. The position he had expressly assumed was of more significance than these claims; he appeared, above all, as a fortunate rival of the French power and Crown, possessed of a superiority in Europe which the French would not allow him to retain, and, therefore, they were impelled to the war against him by the twofold motive of a necessity to defend their country, and political ambition. The national feeling of France, in its proper sense, was aroused against him; hence it happened that, purposely, from the dangers and efforts of the struggle in which the kingdom was engaged, and through the force of circumstances, without any serious opposition being thought of, a mode of government prevailed altogether different from that which had been adopted by Louis XII.

The chief advantage of the Crown lay in the circumstance that the clergy, in consequence of the Concordat, fell into a condition of complete subjection. Cardinals filled a portion of the offices in the court of Francis I.: he selected his ambassadors from among the clergy and the high magistracy; he placed his veterans in the cloisters, and made them be supported there. But, above all, he drew from the Church enormous sums of money by way of contributions.

The spirituality had hitherto contributed, like all others, to the necessities of the State, but, up to the present time, the

tenths which they paid were in every case first conceded by the Pope. In the year 1532 Clement VII. made some difficulty in granting them, at which Francis I. felt the greater anger, having just had an interview with Henry VIII., which had excited him in an especial manner to an opposition against the Holy See. On his return he issued his orders for their immediate collection, and the clergy did not venture to refuse obedience; after that it became usual for them to pay as many tenths as he found it advisable to demand. Each tenth amounted to 400,000 francs; there were many years in which they reached the number of four and five. The clergy did not always meet to vote these sums: in general, the King merely sent an officer to each episcopal see, with an order, subscribed and sealed by himself, in which he named the sums that were necessary for the support of the Crown in its need; the chapter then apportioned these sums among all the benefices of the see, by whom they were immediately paid, and sent in to the treasury. The King said that he knew he had no right to tax the spirituality, but that it was nowhere forbidden to ask them for a free-will contribution; and that he who conferred all the benefices might well accept of something from the beneficiaries. The Pope was silent, and the nuncios made no opposition.

Under Francis I. the sale of places, in the magistracy of the Parliament, was customary; the resignation of old members was accepted in favor of even less worthy successors, if these last had the means of paying a round sum of money. This was the beginning of the system; but afterward it proceeded to the creation of new places in order to sell them like the others. It is very remarkable that Duprat, while enumerating all the reasons that might be advanced against such a method of raising money, was at the same time distributing the instructions for putting it into operation: for the necessities of the treasury seemed to make it obligatory; the perils of the war justified every thing. The administrative offices were put to sale as well as the judicial. "The number of officers," says Marino Cavalli, "who have purchased their places can not be counted: there are receivers and treasurers, councilors, presidents, and royal advocates, in every little

town; there is more than double the necessary number, and yet they are increasing every day." He calculates the revenue derived from the sale of offices at 400,000 francs annually. Still all these extraordinary measures did not meet the necessity; and the *taille* which the people were compelled to pay increased four and five fold.

The kings of France were regarded as the most absolute princes in the world; the people yielded whatever they demanded. The Emperor Maximilian, in his *naïve* manner, once said, that he, the Emperor, was a king of kings, for nobody felt it a duty to obey him; that the King of Spain was a king of men, for he was opposed but at the same time obeyed; but that the King of France was a king of beasts, for no one dared to refuse him obedience. The Venetian ambassador mentioned this saying of the Emperor's once in conversation with Francis I., who laughed loudly at it—not perhaps without a secret feeling of triumph; for if we compare the transactions of the Diet, in which the Emperor appeared merely as a president, or the discussions of the Cortes of Aragon and Castile, continually agitated by the contradiction of parties, with the condition of France, where the Estates were called together on extraordinary occasions only, and where every thing was decided by the will of the King, there was something striking in the saying of the Emperor, and Francis I. derived a pleasure from the feeling, and this recognition of the preponderance of his power. If, however, he imagined that he could do whatever was pleasing to himself personally, he was in error, and unmindful of ancient times.

One of the most important questions in the history of the ancient royalty, as it once existed in Romanic and German nations, was in regard to the relation in which the authority belonging personally to the prince, stood to that which grew out of circumstances and affairs—"free to compulsory obedience." The secret of power rests upon the fact that both coincide. In the prince of ancient descent, whose life is interwoven with the destiny of the nation, it recognizes his security as a special guarantee for its own future, and intrusts itself to his leading: without this natural authority, nothing could go on; but the personal conduct of the prince must at

the same time correspond with the high vocation of the sovereign.

Let us endeavor to form a conception of the personal character of the man in whose hand lay the destiny of France at that period.

Francis I. impressed the beholder with the idea of a handsome man full of vital power. His appearance was so remarkable, that it threw all around him into the shade: his figure was tall, with a broad breast and shoulders, and long flowing brown hair; his complexion was ruddy, and, although his countenance might have been deficient in a certain refinement of expression, every thing about him breathed of manhood, enjoyment of life, and a consciousness of his princely position.

As yet the kings had no settled residence, but while they passed continually from place to place throughout the kingdom they were surrounded by a numerous and splendid court. The nobility, who regarded the King as their peculiar chief, considered it their duty, as well as their privilege, to follow him as long as their circumstances permitted; but the other classes also, as well as persons in various occupations, formed part of his suite. In times of peace the number of horses required by the court and its followers was usually six thousand; on occasions of a general gathering they amounted to double that number, and sometimes to three times as many.* All eyes were directed toward the King, upon whose opinion and favor each felt dependent even in his private affairs, especially when he had it in his personal power to distribute so many favors.

The Court was an association of all that was famous, splendid, and aspiring in the nation; it was always changing, and yet ever the same.

Francis I. took care that the Court should not be deficient in the company of ladies, without whose presence it would have appeared to him like a meadow without flowers; and this was a motive to him to bestow particular care upon his outward appearance. When among them he took pleasure

* I take the greater number from the Life of Benvenuto Cellini; Marino Cavalli gives the smaller in his "Relatione di Francia," 1546

in his gold-embroidered doublet, through which the slashes of the finest linen were visible, and in his richly embroidered cloak adorned with golden tassels, for he was desirous of making a personal impression. All may not be true which is told of his sensuality—it is narrated, at least, in a manner not to be relied on—but we know enough to justify us in saying that he did not respect the limits of either chastity or morals, and set an evil example to both his contemporaries and posterity.

He lived and delighted in those bodily exercises which the renewed idea of chivalry enjoined as a duty. He was accustomed to practice the knightly sport of arms in the burning heat of the sun, and sought out, by preference, the most vigorous opponent with whom to measure himself; he has been known to break his lance sixty times in one day. As he was the handsomest man in the company, he had also the ambition to appear the strongest and most dexterous. Once, when at Amboise, he caused a wild boar, four years old, to be driven from the forest into the court-yard of the castle, in order that the company that attended him might witness the ferocity of the beast; the boar, however, burst through a door which had not been well secured, and rushed into the castle. The company fled in all directions; but the King advanced toward the raging brute, and with great force and skill inflicted upon him a deep wound, of which he bled to death in the court-yard in a few moments;† he would not suffer any one else to undertake the dangerous adventure. He gave himself up passionately to the pleasures of the chase, and while thus engaged was more than once in danger of his life: on one occasion a stag hurled him from the saddle by a thrust of his antlers; but such accidents made no impression upon him. He never troubled himself about wind or weather, and no hovel was too miserable to furnish him a harbor for the night. As he grew older and more corpulent, he used to ride to the chase upon a mule. A Venetian ambassador,† on one occasion, remonstrated with him for having gone to hunt in severely cold

* From the "Hardiesses des Grands Rois" of Nicolo Sala, in the Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes, ii. 280.

† Matteo Dandolo, whose narrative of the year 1542, as yet little known, has been exceedingly useful to me.

weather, when his health was not quite perfect. "On my word," answered the King, "it has made me well again."

It has been long known that Francis I. possessed a knowledge of other pursuits and occupations also—that his sensibility to the purer pleasures and to the activity of intellect was easily awakened. He had already manifested this disposition in early youth; even in the King the manifold reaction of the advanced civilization of Italy upon the genius of the French made itself evident in the liveliest manner. He was thoroughly imbued with the tendency of the age to the study of classical literature and to the revival of profane learning generally; many professors of languages—men learned in the Roman law—poets and antiquarians—received from him, personally, an allowance, and followed his Court. Learned Italians, who had been forced to leave their own country, found here an asylum; he encouraged them to activity, and rewarded them for their labors. The attendant of a German prince, who was himself skilled in literature, and who accompanied the King on a voyage down the Seine to Rouen, declared that in no other spot was there more to be learned than at the Court of France. It boasted also of a French Thucydides.* King Francis had at least some conception of the claims which the learned studies, properly so called, have to independence. He wished to separate them from the universities established for the cultivation of theology and practical jurisprudence, or rather to found by the side of these a purely philosophical Institute, which should be at the same time an academy and a school: even the partial accomplishment of this purpose had an important effect; another was perhaps of more immediate efficacy. Francis I. had a thirst for knowledge which was altogether unlimited. He spoke on most subjects with intelligence and spirit, and yet for all that he knew, he wished to learn more, and especially to read the classics. As he was not, properly speaking, learned, he required for his own satisfaction translations from the ancient languages; and in this he did the nation the greatest service, for, as by far the majority were similarly circumstanced, they followed his example. The King has been

* Hubert Thomas Leodius, *Vita Frederici II. Palatini*, p. 202.

justly applauded for having, through these means, raised his people generally from their ancient ignorance. The Italian intellect was impelled by the influence of the classic models, to the imitation of their forms; the German was led back, through the study of the language, to the original records of the faith, and to their appropriation in spirit; the French set itself in immediate and especial relations with the manifold contents of the ancient authors, particularly the historians. The literature of antiquity had then no peculiar influence upon the form of French composition; its prevailing tone was derived from the society which had formed itself round the King. His own letters and poems show that he had a vivid feeling of the gratification and demands on the mind which arise from good society; the pleasures which it offers he declared, on one occasion, to be to him the greatest happiness on earth. A monument of this society is still extant, from which may be gathered the subjects that were spoken of, as well as the manner in which they were treated. It consists in the *Tales of the Queen of Navarre*, who sometimes retired to her own residence, but generally followed her brother's court, in which she always, when present, took a prominent position. Her *Tales* are the oldest examples of French prose still read by the nation: in their first plan they are not, as is known, original, but in the manner and form they are thoroughly French—the thoughts as well as the style.

Francis I. patronized artists as well as scholars, and showed them even a higher degree of favor. Sometimes they were men of general accomplishments, like Leonardo da Vinci, of whom the King said that he had never seen a man who knew and understood more: he had brought him out of Italy, not only on account of his merit as an artist, but also on account of his personal excellence. Leonardo was exactly the man to suit the King's universal desire for knowledge, and he knew how to value him. He attracted to his court a great number of other Italian masters, appointed them places where they could carry on their works, visited them there, and showed them personal favor. Sometimes their pretensions were intolerable to him; but he corrected them with a few quiet words—he made them understand that it was he who pro-

vided them with the means and opportunity necessary for the development of their talents, but that, at the same time, he esteemed himself fortunate that not only had antiquity produced great and beautiful works, but that, under his protection and influence, his contemporaries had done the same. In this he no doubt over-estimated their works, for neither his times nor his court afforded the elements and conditions from which a really classical style could arise: the history of Alexander the Great, which he had represented at Fontainebleau, bears an entirely modern character; here and there, however, a work has succeeded admirably, especially in architecture—we need only call to mind the Louvre, which in the greatness and simplicity of its design awakens wonder and admiration. But in the very efforts to succeed there lies something, independent of success; in art, as well as in literature, Francis I. promoted a movement of mind which has extended far down beyond his age; in the transition of French taste from the manner of the Middle Ages to modern forms and style, no one has had such influence as Francis I.

The charm of the epoch consisted in the immediate contact of both elements. The customary and medieval retires every where; the scholastic methods of the Universities before the study of free philosophy; the Gothic towers of the old royal keeps before the architectural creations of a spirit formed by the contemplation of ancient art; the mounted warriors of chivalry before the infantry and the artillery; but at the same time the knightly word, and personal engagement, which was at one time exalted above every thing else, before the general interest recognized by the whole realm—the idea of the Most Christian monarchy before that of the balance of power, to which even the Infidels must contribute—and the stern discipline of the patriarchal castle-life before the sociability of the court and its unrestrained enjoyments.

In this point of view, King Francis I. himself is a correct and significant expression, as well as a representative, of the epoch; and was it not something in a government of the age to move with the times, to make men conscious of the objects toward which the universal impulse of society was tending,

and to direct that impulse in its appointed course? To lead the minds of men is to be in reality a king.

When we consider the manner in which the government was carried on by so able a man, we must not infer, from some occasional outbreaks of self-will, that he believed men would obey him blindly; we know, on the contrary, that he did not despise even the smaller expedients of government. As his daughter-in-law Catharine de' Medici related afterward, he took pains to inform himself concerning the character of the men who possessed any peculiar influence in the different provinces, not only among the nobility and clergy, but also in the towns and among the people; these he sought to make his friends by bestowing on them places in the army, in the administrative department of the law, and in the finance department, or by favoring them in some other manner. By means of their influence, he suppressed every movement adverse to his wishes.

He knew the greatest part of the nobility in the kingdom personally; he accounted himself as belonging to their class, and was accustomed to pledge his word as a gentleman; in all his intercourse with them he treated them as friends. In cases of sudden death, especially when it might have happened that a young man fell in battle, the King lost no time in visiting the father, and showing his sympathy and condolence.

When Rochelle, after its rising against the extension of the duty upon salt, had been once more subdued to obedience, he told the inhabitants that he would be perfectly justified if he were to punish them in their persons and property, but that he coveted only the hearts of his subjects, and their punishment should consist in the remembrance of their evil actions, which would weigh the heavier when they considered that, at the time of their rebellion, he was actually engaged in the defense of the kingdom. "Ring all your bells," said he, "for you are forgiven," and gave them back the keys of the city gates and the ordnance of the walls. At an entertainment which they prepared for him he accepted refreshment from them, to the astonishment of his attendants, for such was not then the custom. There is no doubt that while exhibiting this moderation he had his eye upon his

antagonist, who at the same time was directing fearful executions at Ghent, while *he*, on the contrary, sought honor in the fact that under him no blood had been shed on account of civic disturbances. He loved to bestow graces, and to see every one leave his presence with a contented countenance.

During the first years of his reign the relation in which he had grown up continued for a long period. His mother exercised a great influence on all his resolutions. Foreigners were astonished at the veneration he showed for her; he never addressed her except with his cap in hand, and nearly upon his knees; he visited her every day after dinner or in the evening, and related to her the various matters that had occupied him during the day.*

Subsequently the practice was introduced of discussing all important matters in the bedchamber of the King, immediately after he had risen, and before his mind had become occupied by any of the routine affairs of the day: this was the *Conseil des affaires*, which was continued in the same manner under his successors; those only who occupied the highest offices, and were most intrusted, could take part in this council. Under Francis I. his sister, the Queen of Navarre, acquired an overwhelming influence—such as quiet and sharp-sighted women, whose observation is general and constant, have from time to time exercised in great states. It can not be said, however, that the King allowed himself to be led by the will of another. As the foreign ambassadors, in the beginning of his reign, remarked, that even the extemporary answers of the young King were always to the purpose, and praise his ability and understanding in affairs; so also in his latter years they assure us that the most important matters were invariably decided upon by the King himself.† What they missed in him, as they themselves express it, was industry of spirit: he was content to order, and did not take sufficient pains to see that his orders were executed in detail.

* Antonio Justiniano, 1520: "Honora molto la sua madre, Ser^{ma} Madama, la qual è sapientissima donna, et ogni giorno va il Re de S. Ex^{cia}, osia poi pranso, o poi cena, e ragiona con lei di tutte le cose li hanno exposto li oratori."

† Cavalli: "Sua maestà, siccome nelle altre cose si rimette a loro, così in queste vuole che e loro e tutto il resto si rimettino a lei."

For a long time the Ministry was almost free from control. The Chancellors Duprat and Poyet, the Admiral Chabot and the Constable Montmorency—for the administration was still connected with the great officers and dignities of the State—seemed on some occasions to be all-powerful, as if they had no one above them; but the very freedom and discretion with which they were allowed to act was dangerous to them—sometimes one and sometimes another of them was dismissed without any one being exactly able to assign the cause. The changes that took place in the highest offices of the State—the rise, and fall, and recovery of the persons who filled them—have something in them that suggests the sudden alterations which take place in Oriental courts. The cause of this was that the King, after he had long observed a course of improper conduct, roused himself against it all at once; the suggestions of third parties, to which he had long refused to listen, then found sudden attention; but he was also jealous lest any one should raise himself to a degree of power, which might prove inconvenient to him. He was not particularly bound to any certain persons: he formed attachments quickly, but forgot them with equal speed.

Beneath all his tumultuous impulses, negligence, and the partialities to which he gave himself up, a spirit might have been observed which never forgot itself.

In his conversations with the ambassadors he spoke naturally and impulsively, and this not without design—his rival had the reputation of being a close artful character, which Francis wished to avoid; but in all his effusions he knew how to preserve his own secrets. The ambassadors frequently complained that they were kept at a distance, and allowed no opportunity of bringing important matters under his notice.

He was generous, and wished to be so: to many he appeared to be extravagant, but with all his expenses he was careful to preserve a surplus of income over expenditure, and left behind him a sum in his treasury destined to meet any unforeseen necessity.

Madame d'Estampes, his mistress, was thought to have unlimited power over him; the elevation and the fall of

many persons was ascribed to her influence, and probably with good reason. She took upon herself the championship of the rights of the youngest of the Princes, whom the King loved most tenderly, and who resembled him most closely; but neither her counsels nor the King's own predilection could induce him to create an establishment for the Prince, which might at a future time be disadvantageous to the power of the Crown and to his successor.

Family events, concurring with public misfortunes, often troubled his life. What a moment was that for him when his eldest son, and of whom the greatest expectations were entertained, was snatched away by a sudden death at the very time when Charles V. with his army had invaded Provence! "My God," cried the King, walking to the window, and lifting up his hands, "Thou hadst smitten me already in diminishing my consequence, now Thou takest away my son, and what remains but that Thou shouldst destroy me altogether?"

Henry, the second son of Francis I., who was now Dauphin, was married to Catharine de' Medici, of Florence. For a long time they had no children, and, as she was by many not deemed his equal in birth, the idea of sending her back to Florence began to be spoken of. Catharine herself, wise and resolute as she was, came to the King and offered to depart, while a flood of tears choked her language. "My child," replied the King, "as God has willed that you should be my daughter-in-law, such shall you remain." This act is worthy of high estimation, for Francis was anxiously fearful that none of his sons would have male issue, and that his race would, therefore, become extinct in the second generation. The joy was all the greater when Catharine, some time after, was happily delivered of a son. "It is the most wished-for day," cried the sister of Francis I., "which our eyes have seen, and the most indispensable; it is God's doing." The King also regarded it as giving additional security to the State. Soon after this he had the good fortune to frustrate a new and formidable invasion of the Emperor's, and to obtain the recognition of the claims of the French royal family to some Italian provinces at the peace of Crespy.

That Francis I. should ascribe all events to Divine interpositions, in answer to his prayers, would hardly be anticipated. "I, thy servant," he says in one of his poems, "have called to Thee; Thou hast heard me according to my reliance on Thee, and hast not forgotten me; Thou hast given me conquests, children, defense, and power."

Francis I. loved enjoyment; giving splendor to the dignity to which he was born, worshiped by his people, his wish was to pass his days in joy and magnificence, in a rapid, uninterrupted, and complete movement of all the powers of life; at the same time he had a great object to effect, and he devoted himself to it. His whole life was an incessant struggle, a political and military contest with a rival. He did not attain the highest prize—that which hovered before him in his youth—but he succeeded in maintaining the independence and power of his kingdom against his subtle, cool, and restless antagonist, whose ambition and great designs extended over, and embraced the world. The secret of the obedience yielded to him lay in the fact that he strove for and attained this object. He lived, thought, and felt as his people did; the changes in his fortune, his dangers, and his losses, as well as his successors, were also those of the nation.

Francis I. died on the 1st of March, 1547, and was succeeded by his son Henry II.

CHAPTER VI.

HENRY II. AND HIS EXTERNAL RELATIONS.

HENRY II. was also of lofty stature, well formed, and, equally with his father, indefatigable in the chase and in the knightly games of the age. He rode to his forest sports sometimes in every week, and, at times, followed the stag for seven hours without a pause; horses used to fall exhausted under him. No tournament was held at the court in which he did not don his helm and break his lance. If a foreign knight of reputation happened to be present, the King himself must, by all means, have a trial of arms with him. There could be no doubt of his bravery in battle, for he had been seen to occupy with firmness the most dangerous positions in the face of the enemy.

The personal splendor which surrounded the military character of his father did not altogether descend to him; no action of his could be mentioned comparable to that of Margrignano. Of philosophy and the arts he understood nothing, and he was satisfied if he could express himself without faltering. But he was more to be depended on in his friendships, and immovable in the resolutions which he once adopted. He was not deficient in industry: every day he devoted some hours to the regular sittings of the council; at table he was to be spoken to about private affairs, and after dinner he gave audience to the ambassadors. A grave deportment was natural to him—he was seldom seen to smile. Before all other things he was a soldier, and bestowed his highest consideration upon soldiers only.*

* Dandolo, 1547: "A Landresy (the 'laudarsi' of the Florentine impression is an error of the press) non si portò meno da buon soldato che da buon capitano, et m'è detto persona degna di fede che si trovò seco in qualche luogo pericoloso."

A most extraordinary connection influenced his life; it was formed in early youth, and continued without interruption to the moment of his death. The object of this attachment was Diana of Poitiers, a lady much older than himself. It commenced in passion, and settled down into a steady friendship. At the court it was asserted that it was she who preserved the notions of honor and of manly virtue in the mind of the young Prince, and roused to activity his originally indolent disposition. Another merit ascribed to her is still more extraordinary: it was said that she was the means of preserving a good understanding between Henry and his consort.* As the continuation of the royal race depended upon this, Margaret of Navarre may have alluded to that circumstance when she said in one of her letters to Diana, that the crown of France was more indebted to her than to any other woman in the world. She acted like an old friend; she attended the Queen in her lying-in, and during her illnesses. I even find the expression that she waited upon her as a servant.† The King paid her a visit every day without failing, and spoke with her concerning his affairs.

Henry II. had also a friend, who had attached himself to him in his early life, the Constable Montmorency. An enterprise against Piedmont, which had been intrusted to the young Prince, was successful only because the Constable placed the best troops at his disposal. To the reputation which Henry acquired from this, and which was worthy even of his high position, he believed himself indebted to his friendship. Montmorency could not retain the favor of Francis I., who blamed him for what he had done, telling him that he was not content with his delegated power, and that he would

* Marino Cavalli: "Alcuni credono che questo amore, che è grandissimo, non sia lascivo, ma come materno filale, avendo la detta dama pigliato carico d'instituire, correggere ed avvertire, eccitare esso Monsignor Delfino a pensieri e operazioni degne di tal principie."

† Contarini, 1552: "La Regina, così pregata dal Re, se lo tolera patientemente e pratica continuamente con lei (la duchessa, et all' incontro la duchessa fa boni offici col Re per la Regina." Soranzo, 1557: "(La duchessa dimostra) di amare et di portare grandissimo rispetto alla Regina, et in tutte le sue malattie ed altri bisogne serve lei e li figliuoli come fosse propria sua serva."

be king himself. It has all the appearance of probability that Madame d'Estampes, who was an enemy to Diana and Henry, and therefore to the Constable, contributed to his disgrace.* But hence it followed that after the death of Francis I. Montmorency came forward as the natural counselor of the new King. He appeared immediately, and entered as if it were a matter of course, upon the administration of affairs, with that undiminished youthful vigor which he retained even in his old age, and with unlimited authority. He held himself justified in refusing his assent to resolutions adopted in full council and in the presence of the King, when it appeared to him more advisable. Pietro Strozzi once, on an occasion of this kind, reproached the Constable for his obstinacy; but he answered simply that the circumstances of the case had altered: and this was sufficient for the King: he spent no words upon it, for he lived in the firm persuasion that the Constable understood things best.

We shall again return to the consideration of these personages, and some others who were associated with them, as the two Guises, when we come to speak of the religious affairs. Now we shall direct our attention to the manner in which the new King and his court conducted the government in respect to the great questions connected with the foreign relations of the kingdom, which Francis I. had left undecided.

Henry II. was for many years more fortunate, both in policy and war, than his father. Francis I. was obliged to leave Boulogne for a series of years in the hands of the English who were the more oppressive to the land as they still held possession of Calais. The power of France was first directed against them by Henry II.

He began his operations by counteracting the increasing preponderance of the English influence in Scotland, and by forming himself a firm connection in that country. The forces which Pietro Strozzi led thither, with a recently formed fleet, were received with joy by the Scottish nobles, who felt a strong antipathy toward England, and who proposed the future marriage of their young queen with the Dauphin

* Dandolo, who hesitated to state this in his first relation because his audience was not particularly secret, narrates it in his second.

while both were yet children, and allowed her to be carried into France. Her mother, a member of the house of Guise, obtained the regency after some time, and conducted it, notwithstanding many fluctuations, in the interests of France. It was expected with certainty that if not the very next king of France, at least the next following who should have Scottish blood in his veins, would rule in that kingdom also.

The complete success of the French in this enterprise is specially attributable to the fact that England was then under a minority, which was more than usually unquiet on account of the religious differences which divided the nation. It did not escape the French how advantageous this might be for the promotion of their own purposes. The Constable Montmorency in particular comprehended it. Against the counsel of the majority he urged the renewal of the war with England. The English had just then reduced their garrisons in their continental possessions; and, on the other hand, the French nobility whom the English had dispossessed, and who were burning with eagerness to recover their lost property, joined the Constable in his enterprise, for it was rather a war of people against people than of state against state. The territory round Boulogne was occupied without much difficulty, and the town itself so hard pressed that the English Government found it advisable to surrender the place, in consideration of about a fifth part of the sum which had been stipulated for in the last treaty; they also did not insist on the payment of the sums which Henry VIII. had required, as it were, as an acknowledgment of his claims on the crown of France.

In the execution of the treaty, especially in ascertaining the boundaries, there arose so much contention and ill-will, that we are informed the French seriously entertained the idea of renewing the war, and, after having experienced so many invasions, to make an attempt from their side upon the island. They had a correspondence with Ireland, and the Scots were only waiting for the signal to cross the border;* the plans of the fortifications erected in England by the late king, were in their hands, and they had already caused the

* Contarini: "Di Scotia ha più volte mandato persone in Hibernia, o fra li altri vi andò due anni sono M. di Monluc."

channel of the Thames to be examined. The intelligence which they received from a Florentine, who had been long in the service of Henry VIII., but who was dismissed by the then existing government, confirmed them strongly in their purpose.*

Meanwhile a prospect began to appear of victory over him who must ever have been viewed as their most formidable and dangerous enemy. The power which Charles V. then exercised in Germany and Italy—in the latter political violence, and in the former anti-national despotism associated with religious oppression—had aroused throughout these extensive territories a universal fermentation against him. Multitudes of refugee German officers and Italian exiles crowded the French court. There were Neapolitans of the Angevin faction, to whom the King caused to be paid considerable pensions, to indemnify them for the estates they had lost; Milanese, some of whom were excellent soldiers, others learned scholars; Florentines of the party of the eldest branch of the Medici, who still reckoned upon being able to overturn the government of Duke Cosmo. On the occasion of his marriage with Catharine de' Medici, Henry had determined to found a great principality; and now, when the Farnesi appealed to him for aid, the time appeared to have arrived when the King could execute what was denied to the Prince. But the decisive circumstances of the case were, that even those German princes who had made common cause with the Emperor against the champions of Protestantism, had now, on both religious and political grounds, separated from him, and felt no scruples in entering into alliance with the Crown of France.

Thus strengthened with more powerful allies than ever his father had been able to make, Henry II. prepared for another attempt against the ancient antagonist of his house, who apprehending nothing of the kind, was totally unprepared for it at the moment. The enterprise succeeded completely.

* The Venetian Justinian is explicit on this point: he names the Florentine "Il Portinaro." This word appears in the English dispatches as a proper name, Portinary; and he is spoken of as having been in the service of Henry VIII.

The power which seemed to be established in its strength for ever was dispersed with one blow, and their independence restored to the German Protestants on the one hand, while on the other the possibility of a political existence was secured for the Italian states; France amidst them rose once more to the position of a powerful nation.

Notwithstanding his declaration that he desired to protect German liberty, the King at the very outset of the campaign took possession of the German cities Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which lay nearest to France. The pretext was that the Emperor intended to have made them subservient in a special manner to the advantage of his house, and that therefore Henry was compelled by necessity to take them under the protection of his power. This protection was little less, however, than complete subjection. Distracted by internal contention, the German Empire had allowed these places to fall, without defense, into the hands of its most formidable neighbor; it was unable by any efforts it could make to recover them.

Siena also, in the general agitation, having seized the favorable moment, cast off the authority of the Emperor, and was protected by the French troops which had been sent to assist the Farnesi, and were immediately at hand. They were not able to defend it, however, against the arms and intrigues of Duke Cosmo of Florence and the Spaniards; but they maintained the name of the Sienese Republic in Monte Alcinò, and, with many other positions in Italy, they retained possession of the Maremma. As Genoa did not cast off its connection with the Emperor, it furnished the French with a pretext for attacking Corsica, which then belonged to Genoa; they took possession of Ajaccio, and of the whole island, with the exception of a few places. They still ruled in Piedmont; and with the assistance of the Ottomans, and especially of the Dey of Algiers, obtained the ascendancy in the Mediterranean over the Spaniards, and at the same time over the English in the Channel; they also sent out a colony to Brazil.

It appeared as if the superiority which the French Crown possessed in its most flourishing period had returned to it again: and that the proud growth of the Burgundo-Spanish

power bowed before it. A prelate, animated with the fiercest hostility against the house of Austria, ascended the Papal chair, and planned an attempt to expel the Austrians from Italy, with the assistance of the French, to whom Naples was to be restored.*

Soon after, however, it became apparent that there was on the side of the opposite party a military power, which a young prince had brought together with infinite exertion.

Fortune, which had become untrue to the old Emperor, inclined once more to his son Philip II. He saved Naples, and established his power in Upper Italy; he gained repeated victories in the Netherlands; and the conductor of the war and first minister of the French—the Constable Montmorency—himself fell into his hands.

In the year 1558 the aspect of affairs had become so completely altered, that the question was forced upon the consideration of the French whether they were capable of continuing the war any longer. For, as we have seen, the military establishment of Francis I. was only possible when sustained by imposts, which shook that internal order upon which the nation rested; but the campaigns of Henry II. had been still more expensive, for he did not possess his father's disposition for a regular system of finance: it has been calculated that each year of the war under Henry II. cost as much as four years of war under Francis I. In the year 1558 the debt was already thirty-six millions, and the deficit in the annual balance amounted to two millions and a half. The King called an assembly of the Notables, which is described as one of the Estates, and they resolved to cover the deficiency. Of the three millions which Henry asked, the clergy undertook to provide one, and the third Estate the two others; but the usual taxes could not now be collected without violent measures and the hardest oppression. How much more severe therefore would be the pressure of these extraordinary imposts! The nobility were exhausted by the services of the

* That these considerations did not occupy the principal point of view, as Thuanus and those who follow him observe, has been already remarked by Walkenaer on Hénault, *Abrégé Chronologique de l'Histoire de France*, p. 565

war and the money which, in their private capacity, they paid for ransoms, as those of the lesser gentry were set at ten thousand, and of the greater lords at from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand golden crowns. The whole burden fell upon the rural population, who in many cases, it has been said, forsook their villages in order to escape from the intolerable oppression.

The distress of the Netherlands and of Spain, however, was not much less. The Spaniards had made prodigious efforts in the year 1558, and brought into the field a larger force than at any previous period, without doing any serious damage to the French. On both sides there must have been a consciousness that, under such circumstances, they had no further advantage to expect from each other. France had not allowed herself to be oppressed, nor Burgundy to be separated. The two powers must co-exist, and conclude a peace.

The equally-balanced power and fortune of the negotiating parties made it exceedingly difficult to come to an agreement. The Spaniards demanded the surrender of all the towns and provinces which had been taken by the French, and especially of Savoy and Piedmont; the French, on the other hand, already grown used to the possession of them, would not listen to the proposal, but offered an indemnification to the Duke of Savoy in the interior of France. The Spaniards, on their part, could not consent that the claims of a prince who had united his fortune with theirs should be superseded by the donative of a possession which did not guarantee his independence, nor could they bring themselves to suffer the presence of the French in Italy. They went on the principle that the peace was to be perpetual, but if the French should insist upon retaining Piedmont, it would be a proof that they contemplated the renewal of the war in Italy. They asserted that mountain-ranges are the true boundaries between great countries, which, although they may be occasionally overstepped, yet the invaders can not maintain themselves on the other side. They desired to see the Alps as well as the Pyrenees recognized in the treaty as the frontier divisions

between both nations. The French hesitated to make so great a concession, and even in March, 1559, it was feared that the whole negotiation would come to nothing; they would have consented, if at all, with great difficulty, had not a corresponding compensation been offered on the other side.*

England had again made common cause with Spain in the war, and the destiny of both countries appeared to be united in the most intimate manner, as the King of Spain was at the same time the consort of the Queen of England; this, however, gave the French an opportunity of making themselves masters by a sudden attack of Calais and Guines, the last relics of the ancient English conquests. The English were compelled to abandon these towns and the districts belonging to them, which were peopled anew by the French—now for the first time lords and masters of the entire territory and soil of the kingdom, and determined never again to give up so much as a foot's breadth of it to strangers. In this resolution all the estates of the realm were at one with the sovereign.

Philip II. would not have it said of him that he had given up an ancient possession of one of his allies to the French, and among the places whose surrender he demanded Calais was numbered. The aspect of affairs had altered, however: Mary, the consort of Philip II., was dead, and her successor, Elizabeth, could not flatter herself that the King of Spain would henceforth regard the affairs of England so completely as his own. The Duke of Alva agreed to all the English had stated concerning the advantages the Netherlands derived from their possession of Calais, but he remarked that, in order to retake it from the French, it would require a war of from six to seven campaigns, the resources for which they hardly possessed. Elizabeth was apprehensive that the Spaniards would con-

* Granvella mentions, in a letter to the Conde de Feria, Quesnoy, April 3, 1559 (v. 585): "El desconcierto que hubo el juéves santo en la negociation de la paz, y como los Franceses fingieron de quererse partir y lo que succedió el biernes que viendo nos firmes los dichos Franceses volviéron al negotio."

clude a separate peace, and, lest she should have to bear the burden of the war alone, she so far controlled herself as to give up Calais to the French,* she agreed to this for a certain time only, but the nature of things was stronger than treaties, and Calais was never afterward recovered. As the mountain-ranges on the one side, so should the waters of the sea on this side, divide the nations.

The King of Spain overcame the difficulties connected with the conquest of the three bishoprics more easily. After he had in vain given himself so much pains to obtain the imperial diadem, he had no desire to come forth as the champion of the Empire and of its claims, be they ever so just; he said, simply, that the affair did not concern him. It is impossible to deny that the possession of Calais and the three bishoprics was of greater importance to France than that of Piedmont. As Calais was a defense against the English by sea, so was Metz by land an impregnable bulwark against Germany.

The peace of Câteau Cambresis was concluded on the 12th of April, 1559, and, although it secured to France most essential advantages, it awakened throughout the kingdom dissatisfaction and complaints of a vivid character; but this was occasioned by the fact, that the rival power which they had had a prospect of dissolving still continued to maintain itself in its full strength.

The losses caused by cession on the part of Spain affected those powers only which had been its allies but were so no longer; the Spanish monarchy itself obtained a firmer footing than ever by the agreement. It was an incalculable gain for its position before the world, to have attained the object toward which it had continually striven—the exclusion of the French from Italy—which if not literally effected, for they still retained Saluzzo, was accomplished in its essence

* Elizabeth's instructions, Feb. 19, 1559. The declarations of the Spaniards give her reason "to take it for a lykelyhod of a great disposition in them to peace." The ambassadors were to conclude definitively if they remarked that the Spaniards "might be tempted to conclude their peace without our satisfaction." Forbes, *Public Transactions*, 59.

and intention. The most glittering prize of the contest—the superiority in Italy—remained with the house of Burgundy.

That the great struggle was not thus brought to a close, that it would again set the world in commotion, was manifest; but now other interests, connected with the interior policy of states, and in an especial manner with religion, were to occupy men's minds.

BOOK III.

APPEARANCE OF EFFORTS FOR ECCLESIASTICAL REFORM IN FRANCE.

CHAPTER VII.

INTRODUCTION.

AMONG men who had carefully studied the past, there could be no doubt as to whether the rise of Protestantism was or was not, a necessary event. Modern Catholicism itself is indebted to it for its improvement, and without this opposition would not be possible. As the royalty of modern ages was established in the conflict between the German and Romanic systems, the hierarchy in the storms of popular movements and amidst the formation of peoples, and the system of government by estates and civic companies amidst the dangers of general violence and arbitrary power; so, when the time was come (for all things on earth have their times and seasons divinely appointed), Protestantism arose from the inner impulses of European life. Far from involving a principle contradictory to religion, Protestantism sought to comprehend it in a more spiritual and unselfish disposition, in opposition to a worldly priesthood. It endeavored to bring back the doctrines of the faith from the accidental formations of the hierarchic epoch to their essential intent and their universal application. Still in its very existence it included the moving causes of a most exasperating and formidable struggle, for the questions it affected were not merely ecclesiastical, but, on account of the intimate connection between the Church and State, upon which the whole system rested, in the highest degree political also.

If in Germany, under the conduct of profound and enlightened spirits, and sustained by the almost universal approbation of the nation, the Protestant movement only partially succeeded, and even that not without a perilous and bloody

struggle, how much more inevitable was such a struggle in France, where for centuries the union between the monarchy and the Church was of the most intimate description. The difference between the two cases may be comprehended if we consider that among the Romanic populations the Church, though not actually older the State, was yet older than the existing form of the State, and than the monarchy, while among the Germans the Church was indebted to the sympathy of the principalities chiefly for her establishment. But these commotions were unavoidable even there; they sprang from the common soil of life and thought, which was the same throughout Europe, and touched a living chord also in the Romanic, especially in the French, mind.

FIRST MOVEMENTS OF ECCLESIASTICAL INNOVATION.

MASTER JACOB LEFEVRE, of Estaples, may be regarded as the patriarch of the Reformation in France. While the King and his chivalry were carrying on the war in Italy, Lefevre made several visits to that country for the purpose of thoroughly mastering the principles of the newly-awakened learning. The study of the classics had led him, as it had so many Germans, to revolt against the doctrinal system of the monks and the scholastic method; numerous eager scholars assembled around him. Lefevre was a man of insignificant, almost despicable appearance, but the extent and solidity of his acquirements, his moral probity, and the mildness and gentleness which breathed throughout his whole being, invested him with a higher dignity. When he looked round upon the world, it appeared to him, both near and far, to be covered with the deep gloom of superstition, but that with the study of the original records of the faith there was associated a hope of reformation, which he told his most trusted pupils they would live to witness. He himself proceeded in his course with a circumspection amounting almost to hesitancy. He could not wean himself from the practice of kneeling before the figures of the saints, and sought for arguments to defend the doctrine of purgatory; in the prov-

ince of learning alone had he courage: there, in a critical dispute, he ventured first to renounce a tradition of the Latin Church in favor of the opinions of the Greek; he afterward drew from the Pauline Epistles certain maxims concerning justification and faith, which were in unquestionable antagonism with the prevailing representations of the objective value of good works,* and suddenly obtained a universal importance through the appearance and efforts of Luther, which took place at the same time. Lefevre possessed, in connection with a daily attention to study, an undiminished vivacity of spirit; even in the most advanced age which man is permitted to attain, he commenced a translation of the Bible, which forms the basis of the French version of the Scriptures:† when he wrote it he had already passed his eightieth year.

In France also the literary deviation became speedily associated with the mystico-practical direction of the intellect, which urges the application to life of the recognized religion. The episcopal power itself seemed desirous of promoting the Reformation. The bishop of a large diocese, William Briçonnet, of Meaux, an old friend of Lefevre's, and who held similar opinions respecting the doctrine of justification, and went with him in his consequent opposition to the notion of external sanctification by works, undertook to reform his diocese in accordance with these principles, although in other respects he was greatly inclined by nature to a life of peaceful contemplation. It appeared to him intolerable that his parish priests should speak of nothing at any time but their own dues, while they neglected their duties, and that the chattering monks who supplied their places never promulgated any opinions except such as were directed to their own gain and advantage. He endeavored to disembarass himself of both the one and the other, and, in close association with

* Compare Count Jacobus Faber Stapulensis, in *Niedner's Journal of Historical Theology*, iii. 1, p. 41. The question concerning the priority of Lefevre's Reformed opinions, raised once more by Merle d'Aubigné (*Histoire de la Réformation*, tome iii. 492), can be answered only when his earlier writings, and especially his Commentary on the Pauline Epistles, have been considered apart from his later works; as to their originality there is no doubt.

† Meyer, "History of the Exposition of the Scriptures," vol. ii. p. 312.

Lefevre, and his disciples, Farel, Roussel, and Aranda, to give another form to life and doctrine. They were roused to this attempt in an especial manner by the religious treatises of Luther, which were finding their way rapidly into France. Briçonnet was desirous of being a bishop in the right and ancient intention of the word, and he ascended the pulpit himself.

These efforts were, however, destined speedily to find in France the most stubborn opposition. In Paris was the great theological university, which had always been the champion of Latin orthodoxy. The poor masters, for whom Louis IX., had originally founded the College of the Sorbonne, constituting as they did at the same time the theological faculty, had become a power in the world. On one occasion, in the fourteenth century, when the Romish Church had canonized Thomas Aquinas, the doctors of the Sorbonne renounced all variation from the Thomist system, and submitted themselves unconditionally to its doctrines, which, they declared, enlightened the Church as the sun illuminates the world.* They clung to the ancient dogmata with irrefragable obedience, and declared it to be a deed offensive to God only to read a book which had not been expressly ordained to be read in the schools. Every deviation from what was usual found in them irreconcilable antagonists: they condemned Marsilius of Padua, the doctrinal novelties of the Nominalists, the spiritual ones of the Flagellants, Wycliff, and Huss; Jerome of Prague fled before them.

During the fifteenth century, and the first part of the sixteenth, they maintained a supervision over the doctrinal opinions of nearly the whole Church, and assailed every innovation. When Reuchlin, in his dispute with the Dominicans, at Cologne, reckoned upon a certain degree of respect from the Paris University, especially as he had studied there, and done honor to the high school by his writings, he found himself mistaken: they disowned their son, as it was expressed, in order to prevent their sister, the University of Cologne, from falling. It was then to be expected that so decided an attack as Lu-

* *Decretum pro Doctrinâ M. Thomæ, 1325, proceeding from the bishop, "vocatis omnibus sacræ theologiæ doctoribus," in Argentré, Collectio Judiciorum, i. 222.*

ther's upon the ancient system would most completely awaken their repugnance and wrath. As if foreseeing what would arise from Luther's movement, when his controversial writings were laid before the faculty, they named a Delegation in Matters of Faith, similar to that which had been chosen at the time of the Council of Constance,* on whose official report Martin Luther, because he despised the opinions of the Doctors and the decrees of the Councils, was condemned, and designated as a rebel, whose pretensions should be combated with chains and bonds, and even with fire and sword. This delegation continued, with many renewals, for more than half a century, and offered to Protestantism an opposition little less important than that of the Papacy at Rome itself. Their efficiency was owing to the fact that heresy was regarded as a civil crime; and that the Parliament, which exercised the criminal jurisdiction, held the judgment of the Sorbonne, in relation to heretics and heretical books, as decisive and final.† Lefevre, already suspected, on account of the Greekish tendency of his opinions, was now in addition looked upon as a Lutheran. He retired to Meaux, in order to escape being treated as a heretic; but there his activity and that of his disciples was not to be endured. The monks, who complained of the bishop, found attention to their complaints in the Parliament. The Sorbonne condemned some of the articles as connected with the innovation, which had been adopted there, and demanded their recall. The society of Reformers could not long withstand their united power—it was totally broken up and dispersed. The bishop now bethought himself that it was time for him in some measure to re-establish his reputation as a faithful Catholic, and for the rest he took shelter in his mystic obscurity.

The organ of ancient orthodoxy exercised an almost independent power. Was there not, however, an able and energetic king in the land? What position, it may be asked, did he assume in the contest?

Francis I. loved neither the Parliament nor the Sorbonne,

* Compare Argentré, *Collectio*, ii. 1.

† Roussel to Farel. "*Senatus a parte theologorum stat, et quod ii decreverunt cunctis comprobatur calcalis.*"

with which he had a fierce dispute on account of his Concordat. The monks, however, he liked least of all, and had long entertained the project of founding a philosophical institution, and placing at its head Erasmus, the most distinguished opponent of their method of thinking and their manner of teaching. The religious spirit of the time did not leave the king untouched. With his mother and sister he frequently read the Scriptures, and they were heard to remark that the divine truth—which seemed to them to be there—ought not to be designated as heresy. Dr. Luther and his writings were spoken of in terms of praise at the court, and the Sorbonne lamented that the persecution of the followers of the heretic, and the destruction of his books, met with obstructions from that quarter. The supervision of the press, which belonged to the Sorbonne, was to have been restricted, but, by their intelligence with the Parliament, they held out all the more vigorously on that point. As the faculty was about to condemn a writing of Lefevre's, the King removed the case to his own court; but the Sorbonne was not deterred from placing the writing in the index of forbidden books. The dispersion of the Reforming association at Meaux was not acceptable to the King. His sister still carried on a mystic religious correspondence with the bishop, and he himself saw no reason why Roussel or Aranda should not preach at the court.

Louis de Berquin enjoyed the special favor of the king. He was, of all then living, perhaps, the man who united in himself most vividly the notions of Erasmus with those of Luther. With a taunting ridicule, like the former, he attacked the disorders of the cloister and the evils of celibacy, regarding them from a religious and moral point of view, and fully exposing their corruptions; but he also showed a great esteem for the depth of the latter—for the maxim that all Christians were priests, and an almost enthusiastic conception of the doctrines of grace and faith, and of the true church communion. The King, one time, soon after his return from Spain, liberated Berquin from the ecclesiastic prison; but he made it a point of honor not to retreat before such enemies, and considered himself able to convict Beda, the Syndic of the Sorbonne, and the leader of the delegation, of holding

heretical opinions. What Francis I. might have done had the contest he undertook in Italy ended in victory on his side, we can not say; but, as Erasmus once remarked, in a warning to Berquin, the defeat which the king suffered had weakened his authority even in domestic affairs; and when Berquin was once more charged with heresy, the royal influence was insufficient to save him a second time, and he was burned on the Place de Grève in the year 1529. The people, over whom the preachers of the Sorbonne had always preserved the greatest influence, showed less sympathy for the unhappy victim than at other times for the most abandoned criminal.*

After that the Sorbonne proceeded in a course of systematic opposition to the King. They endeavored to cramp the activity of his college for the cultivation of the ancient languages, when it was established. They made loud complaints that the Lent sermons preached at the Louvre were not altogether orthodox. Their pupils in a scholastic comedy ridiculed the evangelical tendencies of the King's sister, and even himself was charged not indistinctly with heresy. Francis I. on one occasion commanded Beda and his most distinguished colleagues to quit the city; but we soon find them returned back again, and engaged in their old occupations. On the next occasion the King was induced by them to take part himself in the work of suppression. Although he suffered a certain variation, yet it was within very narrow limits: neither the principle of the hierarchical orders, nor the mystery of the Eucharist, must be trenchd upon. The King frequently boasted, in his negotiations with the Imperialists, that there was not a single heretic in his kingdom.

Now, however, a public attack was made through the overweening zeal of some innovators, who formed too high an estimate of the favor they enjoyed, as well as of their own power and numbers, upon the adoration of the Sacrament—a practice consecrated by the usage of ages. It appears even as if the Anabaptist fanaticism, which then aimed at a universal change, and prevailed to some extent throughout the

* Erasmus ad Carolum Utenhofum, cal. Jul., 1529: "Sic omnium animos in illum excitant qui . . . nihil non possunt apud simplices et imperitos."

whole of Germany, had arisen in Paris also.* Not only the clergy and the populace, but the King himself, were thrown into a state of violent agitation: he came in person to the city, in order to propitiate the Deity, offended by these crimes, by a solemn procession, in which the whole pomp of the Catholic ceremonies was displayed. The persecution commenced again, and eighteen of the accused—they were called insurgents—suffered death by fire.

This, however, did not prevent the King from carrying on negotiations concerning a religious union with the German Protestants, with whom he was anxious to establish a political connection. He was surrounded by churchmen of insight and moderation, who filled the highest offices of the court, and, like a contemporary school in Italy, thought they might be able to control the abuses of the times, and to establish peace. They reckoned also upon the co-operation of the most peacefully disposed of the Protestant party. The King had even an intention of calling together a great free congress of theologians on both sides, and had already invited Melancthon to take part in it; but the Sorbonne opposed every attempt at approximation, whatever might be its character, and held firmly by the maxim that the corrupt members must be cut off from the Church, and that any community with heretics was dangerous.† What could be expected from a conference with persons who denied "the principles"? The principles were the traditions of the Church, the Decretals of the Popes, and the decrees of the Councils. So long as this high school possessed its authority, a free conference upon matters of religion, such as had taken place in Germany, was not to be thought of in France, much less an understanding of any kind between the opposed parties.

* Compare a letter of Granvella (Papiers d'Etat, ii. 283). The churches were to have been fired, and the Louvre plundered. Sturm's letter to Melancthon is more impressive: he describes the innovators as "*homines furiosi, qui metuerunt parum multos fore suarum partium, nisi astutis, ut ipsis videbatur, sed utres indicavit stultissimis et seditionis rationibus regna et gentes perturbarent.*"

† Instructio data magistro nostro Balus et Bauchigni: Argentré, i., ii. 386. Codicillus quo ostenditur non esse disputandum cum hæreticis, Ib. 384.

In the immediate circle of the King sympathy for the Protestants was excited—in part indeed of a kind calculated to do them little credit.* He himself did not possess that deep and persistent earnestness which the accomplishment of an ecclesiastical enterprise would have required. He regarded the preservation of the French territory, the maintenance of his own great political position, and the contest with the Emperor, as constituting the problem of his life. It could not have been expected of him that he would resolutely oppose the Pope, and by that means compel him to take part with his antagonist, nor that, while he was uniting all the power of the kingdom to resist the Emperor, he would favor a movement which would have divided the nation.

In the year 1543 the Sorbonne issued an instruction to the preachers, which contained a declaration concerning the disputed dogmata, the scope of which was in the most direct and complete opposition to Protestantism; and this the King was forced to confirm, for he must by all means avoid a schism in doctrine, which would have resulted in an insurrection.

In the time of Francis I. variations of an extensive character were overlooked, but still nothing had been done to moderate the rigor of the canon law for the future. Even under him—the king of civilization, who looked upon it as an honor not to shed the blood of his subjects—the most revolting executions took place: whole congregations of innocent Waldenses were massacred. Francis I. had long resisted these proceedings, and when at last he consented to them, he was, as his successor asserted, deceived by false intelligence.†

It is remarkable that what the potent monarch could not even think of undertaking, was attempted, and to a certain degree accomplished, by his incomparably less powerful sister, Queen Margaret of Navarre, in her narrow dominions.

* The Spanish ambassador says, November. 15, 1546, Madama de Tampes (Estampes) se tiene en gran manera de la disciplina Lutherana."

† Proclamation of Henry II., March 17, 1549: "Sur ce que l'on auroit fait entendre au dit seigneur Roi qu'ils étoient en armes," etc.

We have already mentioned Queen Margaret, and noticed the boldness and grace of her literary talent, as well as the part which her brother permitted her to take in state affairs. To the Venetian ambassador, Dandolo, she appeared as the ablest person he had ever met with in France. He admires her observations on political matters, as well as upon the complicated religious questions of the time.* She looked upon her brother as almost the *beau idéal* of a man, and accompanied him through life with that enthusiastic admiration and sympathy which finds the satisfaction of its own ambition in the good fortune of another, and often probably came to his assistance in the transactions of government with the superiority of her calm, clear, feminine intellect, which was untroubled by any passion. Her sympathy with religion was still more independent; she wrote upon the subject: a book of hers is remarkable from the circumstance that it says nothing of purgatory or of the intercession of the saints, but speaks simply of the merits of Christ. Her religious poetry has something of an enthusiastic, we might almost say Zinzendorfian character—referring to what appeared at a later period—but at the same time a right feeling of the relation which, amid the temptations of the world, erring creatures have with the Divine Being, from whom they derive their portion of the fullness and consciousness of universal life; but *she* also confined her deviations within narrow limits, and took care not to touch the mystery of the Eucharist.† Roussel, whom she had made Bishop of Oléron, proceeded in his episcopal labors in entire accordance with her views. He preached twice, sometimes three times a day; he founded schools, and taught in them himself, for the hopes of the world appeared to him to depend upon the young; his income

* Questa credo sî la più savia, non dico delle donne di Franza, ma forse anco delli huomini; in cose di stado non credo che li si trai li miglior discorsi, et nella dottrina Christiana così ben intelligente e dotta che io credo pochi ne sappiano parlar meglio. (Dandolo, 1542.)

† "Sire, Nuls de nous n'ont été trouvé sacramentaires," *Nouv. Lettres de la Reine de Navarre*, 15, ed. Genin. Those times may have been very corrupt, but still in later days also we have seen crimes which were foreign to their nature imputed to the purest characters. Schmid and Roussel were well informed concerning Margaret.

he divided among the poor. His religion rested entirely upon a lively conception of justification by faith, and of the invisible church. Thus the work which commenced at Meaux was carried on in the territory of Béarn, which was unaffected by the immediate influence of the Sorbonne. The Queen gave refuge to other exiles also, and Lefevre himself died in her neighborhood. It was at last one of the greatest pleasures of her retirement to search the Scriptures, and endeavor to comprehend their meaning, in the society of friends like-minded with herself; and this practice she continued till she felt the approaches of death. She believed that she had been forewarned of her dissolution by an apparition, which showed her a bunch of flowers, with the word *Soon*.

CHAPTER VIII.

GLANCE AT THE REFORMATION IN GENEVA.

THERE were still other peoples who spoke the French tongue, but were independent on either the religious or political power of France, among whom the same seed ripened to even a more important and flourishing harvest.

In the territory of ancient Burgundy, which was unsubdued by the French crown, and which, although acknowledging the Emperor, enjoyed in fact complete independency, the dukedom of Savoy and a few of the towns of the Helvetic Confederacy came into collision as they sought to extend their limits, the one in a monarchical and Catholic sense, and the other in a popular and, although not exclusively, yet chiefly Protestant sense. The spirit of the Reformation had taken invincible hold of German Switzerland; but, though proceeding from the same principles as those from which it had arisen in the German Empire, and agreeing with the Lutheran movement on the whole, it varied decidedly in the comprehension of doctrine and in practical forms.

At this time William Farel, of Gap, in Dauphiné, the most energetic of the disciples of Lefevre, and one of his coadjutors at Meaux, after the society there had been dispersed, retired to Switzerland, and joined the leaders of the Reformation, who were there engaged in the heat of the contest, and by whose experience his original convictions were deepened and confirmed. These Reformers were just then in much embarrassment. A difficulty presented itself to the further extension of their doctrines in the Romanic border-lands, which they knew not how to overcome—the difference of language. It appeared to them then an inestimable acquisition—and it

was so in fact—to obtain a man like Farel, whose return into France was forbidden, and who was qualified to undertake the mission in the Romanic border-lands.

Farel, whose zeal was thoroughly steeled by his second exile, was just the man for such an enterprise. It was his delight to come forth suddenly in the midst of his opponents, to provoke their anger, to hold forth in the midst of the wildest tumult, and to endure the rage of the excited multitude. When the churches were closed against him he preached in the open air, in the church-yards, the market-places, and the fields. But sometimes also he forced his way into the churches, and while the priest was reading the mass, ascended the pulpit. His followers at times interrupted the consecration of the host; on one occasion he himself is said to have snatched the relics, which a priest was carrying, out of his hands and flung them into the water.* For this he was waylaid, in his wanderings, by armed enemies, under whose blows his blood gushed out and reddened the wall against which he stood; but even in this condition he could not be brought to offer the customary reverence to the image of a saint, considering it to be idolatry; even while their blows descended upon him he raised his voice against the practice. Men like this can not, it is true, be compared with the Apostles, but it may be said of them that in their devotedness, the zeal of later converters of the heathen, such as St. Martin, was revived in another form.

It is not to be supposed, however, that Farel would have succeeded in his enterprise had not the Helvetic Confederacy encouraged it, and the council as well as the community of Berne both stimulated and sustained him. They saw their own interests promoted by the success of his labors: with the word of the preacher, the authority of the powerful communities which favored him gained ground every where, and at the same time the free movement of the civic population, under the protection of the first general peace of Capel. Farel reformed, by degrees, Aigle, Morat, Neufchatel, Valangin, and Moutiers, and was the first who carried the doctrines

* Kirchhofer's doubt concerning this, in his life of Farel, must give way before the fact that the circumstance is mentioned in the most ancient manuscript records of the time. (MS. Genev. 14).

of the Reformation to Geneva, where it came into opposition with kindred, yet still peculiar relations.

The constitution of Geneva was of a very peculiar character. It was formed of three distinct powers, interpenetrating one another: the power of the Bishop, to whom the princely authority belonged; that of the Duke of Savoy, who had acquired the vicegerency; and that of the Burghers, who, although not very numerous, yet insisted on their rights with coolness, determination, and energy. In the sixteenth century the Dukes of Savoy sought to increase their authority by uniting with the bishopric, as had been done in many other places, hoping thus to obtain the actual sovereignty; the citizens, on the other hand, united with the potent Confederacy, which was advancing its influence in their neighborhood, from which the republican party in the city took its name of Eidgenots. They entered into civic relations with Freiburg and Berne, and, with their assistance, had already frustrated several attempts of the Duke. In the year 1534 they were once more threatened in a most formidable manner.

The nobility of Savoy and Vaud cut off their supplies, and, from time to time, beleaguered the town. The adherents of the Bishop, who had been expelled, took possession of a castle in the neighborhood, which gave them a strong position, from which they could harass the citizens; and woe to the Genevese who happened to fall into their hands! After this the entrance of Protestantism aroused fresh contentions. The religious parties within the walls rose against one another, and sanguinary brawls took place between them at their public banquets. Their patron states themselves were divided: Freiburg, which remained Catholic, relying upon the power which Catholicism had again obtained in the Confederacy by the revolution of affairs after the battle of Capel, was on the side of the Romish party; while Berne declared itself, though not without hesitation, on the side of the Protestants.

If we look away from single events and their incidents, it will appear plainly that the Protestant tendency must, from the very nature of things, attain a predominating influence. Thus it necessarily brought with it the character of a struggle of the towns, directed chiefly against the spiritual power. The

Bishop, in close alliance with the Duke, had pronounced sentence of excommunication against the city, which was repeated by the Metropolitan, and even by the Pope. Within the pale of Catholicism there was no right to resist such a sentence; if the city, therefore, desired to maintain its freedom, and to continue the contest, there remained for it no other resource than to embrace the Protestant doctrine, which was chiefly opposed to these sentences of excommunication. The intimate union between the spiritual and temporal power, which had chiefly aroused the resistance of the citizens, impelled them also toward Protestantism.

The little congregation which had formed itself round Farel when he first appeared, although compelled to yield in the beginning, was able to maintain itself, and even without any clerical leaders it increased, and exhibited a permanent vital power. When Farel visited it again some time after, he produced an indescribable effect by his preaching; priests were seen to throw off their vestments before the altar, and to pronounce the confession of the new doctrine. A religious conference, which was appointed to consider, not whether preaching should be tolerated, but whether it should not prevail alone, had the effect of bringing over to the Protestant cause even those who contended on behalf of the Romish system. All the adherents of the old ritual were looked upon as, at the same time, partisans of the external enemies of the city. An attempt to poison the most distinguished preachers having been discovered, the community, in a state of high excitement, laid before the chapter and the religious synods the simple question, whether they could still say any thing in defense of the Mass; and when these felt neither called upon nor inclined to take up the dispute afresh, the Council and the citizens held themselves justified in issuing a formal edict, by which the further celebration of the Mass was strictly forbidden: * whoever did not accede to this was compelled to leave the city; among others, the Sisters of St. Clare passed the

* Compare the notes to Spon's *Hist. de Genève*, i. 260; here nearly identical with Ruchat, v. 300, according to Vulliémín (continuation by Müller, i. 260) there is no mention of this decisive edict in the Council's books.

gates, conducted by the magistracy, and scarcely recognizing again the world, from which they had been so long separated.

As these proceedings necessarily aroused the hostility of the neighboring powers to twofold animosity, the position of the Genevese became more urgently perilous than ever; but Berne at length resolved not to allow them to be destroyed, and at the same time to bring her own ancient quarrel with Savoy to the decision of arms. Berne took possession of the Canton de Vaud, and by this act not only saved the independence and the Protestantism of Geneva, but gave them permanence. A general council of the Genevese citizens was held on the 21st of May, 1536, at which the first Syndic put the question to the Assembly, whether any of them had any objection to offer to the manner in which the Gospel was preached among them. They declared unanimously that they regarded the evangelical ritual as the proper form of worship, and that it was their resolution to renounce the Romish Church for ever.

It is an event in the history of the world, that here, in the centre of Europe, and among a Romanic population, a system of doctrine should take root which forbade and denounced the very ceremonies that had hitherto constituted the strength of their faith and worship. In its first progress it was incorporated with the efforts of a community struggling to emancipate itself from the double yoke of ecclesiastical and temporal power, to which it had been previously subject. With these it triumphed, though it had not originated in them; but it gave them a foundation and a deeper impulse in the principle of Protestantism, without which Geneva could not have expected any assistance from Berne.

To maintain in their purity the principles of Protestantism among men habituated to a totally different method of thinking, and who had adopted them amidst the pressure of stormy events, was almost a more difficult task than that of planting them originally. The pupils of Farel, continually engaged in spreading the new doctrines, and in storming the strongholds of Catholicism, were not qualified for the quiet cultivation of the growing opinions, and were moreover fully occupied with their missionary labors in Vaud.

Just at this juncture appeared in Geneva John Calvin, of Noyon, a Picard, as was Lefevre.

Calvin belonged to the second generation of Reformers. It was not necessary for him, in mastering languages, first to acquire skill by a painful application of rules—in a short time he attained such proficiency in Latin, the language of the learned world, that he could perfectly express his thoughts in it; he learned Greek and afterward Hebrew under good masters. Neither was it necessary in his case to fight through the battle with the principles of the hierarchy from the beginning: his attention had been directed by a friend to the new system of doctrine, which was already established, and which appeared to him to contain the truth. He did not adopt it, however, as something in itself complete and indisputable, he endeavored to form a fresh and thorough comprehension of it for himself, through the study of the sacred Scriptures.

He was disgusted with persons who, when they had conned a few positions out of Melancthon's Manual, held themselves to be thoroughly learned divines; for his own part, he was accustomed to study till late at night, and, when he awoke in the morning, to review, in quietness and retirement, all that he had read: these undisturbed habits of feeling and thinking contributed greatly to his success. He often said that he had no higher wish than to continue these practices throughout life, for he was timid by nature, and disposed to avoid strife. But in those times a learned or religious life, entirely devoted to its own peculiar objects, and at the same time tranquil, was not conceivable. In the persecution of the year 1534 Calvin was compelled to depart from France. The storm carried him to Geneva, where he arrived just at the period of the decision; his intention was merely to pay Farel a visit, and then to continue his journey, in order to see and to learn still more than he knew already. Farel, however, who immediately perceived his vast ability, was resolved not to allow him to depart, and, when Calvin refused his entreaty to remain, he announced the wrath of Almighty God upon him should he follow out his design, for God, he said, would make the quietness of study a curse to him. Such was the manner in which these men dealt with one another. Calvin

said it appeared to him as if he had seen the hand of God stretched forth from above to hold him back—he dared not resist it.

Even in that century the different epochs of the Reformation have been distinguished from one another. In Luther men have recognized the great emancipator, and seen in the subsequent epoch the introduction of the Christian life as the principal problem of the later Reformers. For Farel and Calvin the latter was the course enjoined by existing circumstances; but while they were proceeding in their duty, they met unexpectedly an invincible opposition.

One of the articles of the Confession which had been adopted by the citizens in their various circles, and which confirmed the sentence of excommunication for gross immorality, found in its execution an obstinate resistance. Many had adopted the Reformed system in the expectation that it would allow them greater freedom in their personal habits: how could they then submit themselves to the strict and, in fact, petty discipline of the new preachers? Whether there were also Anabaptist movements in the city, I can not positively say, yet such an opinion has been maintained.* After a few years of hard struggling, the inflexible preachers were expelled, and obliged to leave the city unheard.

Calvin was far from caring too anxiously for his person. He had been obliged to endure opposition, combined with agonies of conscience, which he declared were more bitter than death, and the mere remembrance of which made him afraid. He began now again in fact to wander and to learn; in particular he commenced a correspondence, in writing, with the German Reformers, and formed a closer acquaintance with

* Vie de Farel, MS. at Geneva: "Ils eurent rudement à combattre contre les vices et les vicieux, et surtout contre une faction d'Anabaptistes." One of the chief causes of contention was the adorning of brides, the "*plicatura capillorum*," which the preachers, according to 1 Peter iii. 3, would not permit. In the Registries of the Republic, May 20, 1537, we find that the mother and female friends who were present when a bride appeared "*avec les cheveux plus abattus qu'il en se doit faire*," were also subjected to punishment. The new preachers placed themselves under an obligation to permit the benediction of the bride "*en cheveux pendans*."

them at the Diet. It soon appeared, however, that he could not be dispensed with at Geneva. The independence of the city was threatened in two directions by his enemies: one party, which was inclined to Catholicism, were disposed to re-establish the old constitution; the other showed a spirit of compliance with Berne, which imperiled that free position of the city, the prize of the recent struggle, and which even then called forth a warning from the Imperial court. Both the one and the other were subdued, after a new series of sanguinary domestic conflicts, and those remained triumphant who regarded the maintenance of the strict Protestant system of discipline as the salvation of the city. Deeply penetrated with this conviction, they looked upon all they had suffered and experienced as a punishment for the expulsion of their preachers, and resolved to recall them. Although it was unspeakably painful to Calvin, yet this time also he gave up his own inclination to the solemn adjurations of Farel, who had himself engaged to go to Neuchâtel. He considered that human life was appointed to be a contest, and returned to Geneva in the autumn of 1541.

The condition of his return, although not distinctly stated, was tacitly understood to be the carrying out of his ecclesiastical discipline. Twelve of the oldest men in the three Councils were selected, who, together with the preachers, formed the Consistory, to which was intrusted the oversight of the religious and moral life of the congregation, and who had authority to pronounce the sentence of excommunication.

The perception of the fundamental principle of Christianity which prevailed among the awakened French of this period was that of the most complete communion of men with God, through Divine grace, and of God with his believing people, through the Church. Calvin, without drawing back before the possible inferences deducible from such a doctrine, laid it down as an essential position—which he himself describes as a terrific one—that every individual is predestined from the beginning to belong either to the elect or the reprobate; and that the former, though they might err, and even fall, could not thereby forfeit salvation. According to this dogma, the true Church could consist of the elect only; but Calvin satis-

fied himself with the consideration that, since the elect could not be distinguished from the reprobate in the visible Church, every one who adhered to it must be recognized as one of its members; but all who denied it, either in word or deed, he would the more sternly cut off. From the depths of his religious perception arose to his mind the necessity of church discipline, and especially of exclusion from the Eucharist. When he rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation, and the views connected with it, it was far from his intention to lessen the significance of the sacrament; he regarded its spiritual enjoyment as the central point, not alone of ecclesiastical existence, but of collective individual and social life.

His deviation from Catholicism did not consist by any means in a desire to render life independent of the authority of the Church; on the contrary, while he rejected the decrees of the Latin Church, he adopted it the more strongly as taught in the original records of Christianity, the harmony of whose doctrines he was eminently qualified to comprehend. While with a powerful congregation he separated from the hierarchical corporation which dominated Europe, he sought to realize the most perfect communion, which lies at the foundation of the idea of the Church.

Under his guidance—for he also took part in the temporal legislation—the strongest fetters of discipline were laid upon outward conduct; the expenses of clothing and of the table were confined within certain limits; dancing was prohibited, and the reading of certain books, such as “*Amadis*,” forbidden; gamblers were seen in the pillory with the cards in their hands. Once a year an examination took place in every house, to ascertain whether the religious precepts were known and observed; mutual imputations of failings which the members of the Council observed in one another were permitted at their sittings. No indulgence was known for transgression: a woman was burned for having sung immodest songs; one of the most distinguished of the citizens was compelled to kneel in the great square with an inverted torch in his hand, and publicly to entreat forgiveness, because he had mocked the doctrine of salvation and personally insulted the great preacher. In accordance with a requisition

of an assembly of the people, adultery was made punishable with death; and the man who suffered for it, praised God, in dying, for the strict laws of his native city.

The fundamental principle of these proceedings was that vice and sin must be destroyed, because to tolerate them would draw down the vengeance of God.

It is astonishing how Michael Servetus could have so grossly misunderstood the things of the world, when, with views which since indeed, in the conflict of opinions, have prevailed widely, but which then had no footing whatever, he ventured himself into this stronghold of a new orthodoxy, which was bound together by the most severe discipline. It is probable that he was deceived with false hopes by the enemies of Calvin, who, though subdued in the city, were not completely annihilated. Otherwise, it is inconceivable how so able a man could allow himself to be led astray so far as formally to undertake the contest with Calvin, to accuse him of being a follower of Simon Magus, and even to demand that his poor estate should be given to himself as an indemnity.* The opinions of Servetus were unanimously condemned by the Swiss, German, and English theologians; for the Reformation, when once accomplished, was under the necessity of setting bounds to itself, that it might be seen where its action ceased; it would fain know its own limits. Calvin held it to be his duty to secure the world from the seductions and infection with which it was threatened by this man, and urged his execution—a fate which would have befallen the Socinian, Valentine Gentilis, subsequently, if he had not saved himself by a penitential recantation.

It will be asked, how it was possible that such fanatical severity could have pervaded the joyous city of Geneva. As from the court of the Dukes and the houses of the wealthy prebendaries dissipation and sensual enjoyments were previously promoted, so did this stern moral restraint include in it a republican element, closely resembling what had taken place a short time previously among the adherents of Savon-

* Rilliez, *Relation du Procès intenté contre Mich. Servet*: “Comme magicien qu’il est doyt être exterminé et déchacé de vostre ville, et son lien adjudgé à moi, en récompense du mien, qu’il m’a fait perdre.”

arola in Florence. The independence of the city was now identified in the closest manner with the positive Protestant principle, and appeared to be secured in the best manner by its strictest practical application.

With the intimate union of the spiritual and the temporal power, which was now again effected, arose the inevitable question, in what degree the former was dependent upon the latter, or whether it were dependent at all. The faction of the Libertines, who appear in other respects to have adopted very extraordinary doctrines, which were hardly Christian at all, opposed the autonomy of the spiritual power: they demanded that from the sentences of the Consistory, which, although composed of laymen as well as clergymen, yet bore a decidedly clerical character, there should lie an appeal to the Council of the Two Hundred, in which resided the sovereignty. Calvin would not concede so much. He maintained that as the clergy were the subjects of the Council, they were therefore amenable to it, but that the Council itself was subject, in spiritual things, to the word of Christ, as whose interpreters he regarded the spiritual synod.* He preserved the Consistory in the full possession of the discipline of the Church and the power of excommunication, yet not without various struggles.

Calvin lived in a very straitened condition, upon an inconceivably small income; yet he always proudly declined to accept any support, not even so much as would enable him to have his chamber warmed. Strangers were astonished when he opened the door of his dwelling to them himself. But with this primitive simplicity in private life, he maintained a lofty authority in public: in the Consistory he took possession of the presidential chair without having been elected to it, and no one regarded it as presumption; by his personal superiority he ruled both his colleagues and the Church. He did not take an official part in the administration of the Republic, and in difficult conjunctures only was

* As the clergy express it, according to the *Ordonnances Ecclésiastiques*, "Je promets servir tellement à la seigneurie et au peuple que par cela je ne sois aucunement empêché de rendre à Dieu le service que je lui dois en ma vocation."

he invited to the Council; but it is undeniable that, whether he sought it or not, he lived as the head of the civic party. It was intolerable to him to be carried hither and thither by the fluctuations of the Republican dissensions; so that, when he felt himself in a situation to do it, he seized the first opportunity of bringing the contest to an open rupture, in order that it might be at once decided, and for him at least finally; had his friends been in the minority he could not long have maintained his position. It was of the greatest advantage to him, in his contest with the Libertines and their party among the people, that he had obtained the freedom of the city and seats in the Council for the French who had fled from their country on account of their religion and gathered round him in Geneva; they were thenceforth his staunchest supporters. Calvin knew the value of a peaceable existence, and possessed a strong inclination to domestic retirement and the pleasures of friendship, yet we find him unceasingly engaged in a passionate struggle. He had a perfect conception of the tone of moderation which became literary composition, and complained of its absence in others, yet his own controversial writings are among the fiercest that have ever appeared; in a cause for which he was always prepared to contend, he did not take it ill if, as he said, he was himself caught by the whirlwind—it had happened thus with the prophets and the apostles, and even Christ himself had been wroth. His temperament and manner do not remind us of the soft grace for which the scenery amid which he lived is so renowned, but rather of those rough days sometimes experienced there, when the billows of the lake, boiling up like those of the ocean, dash against the beach, and the Rhone drives its green-blue waters past the city in a fierce billowy chase, toward the rough precipices of the mountains between which it has to seek its way.

Thus did these two Frenchmen, exiled from their native land, conquer, as it were, a new world for the principle on account of which they were compelled to flee. Farel took possession of it; Calvin maintained it in the most important and furthest-advanced positions, and organized it against the enemy. Geneva still continued to be the great commercial city

it always had been, but the bustle of trade and manufactures was no longer interrupted by alarms of civic tumult, nor by ecclesiastic pomp and extravagant enjoyments—even among the higher classes all was order, discipline, and industry. It was still, as it always had been, a principal point of communication for central Europe, but it was especially so for the refugees on account of religion, who assembled here, and, having been instructed in the churches or in the newly erected schools, went forth thence once more into the world. Thus destroying all that was heterogeneous within itself, and attracting all that was in affinity with it—cherishing those who sought its shelter, and at a proper moment sending them forth again—Geneva appears like a warlike religious march on the confines of a hostile world for attack and for defense.

There can be no doubt that Geneva was principally indebted for its preservation to the political system of the French kings. When Francis I. attacked and expelled the Duke of Savoy, he removed the most formidable enemy of the city, and secured its independence. Even Henry II. once warned the citizens to be upon their guard against the Emperor, and promised them his assistance.* The alliance with Switzerland, and especially that with Geneva, was of essential moment to the French Kings in their contest with Spain.

But this same Geneva stood now in deadly hostility against the religious system which prevailed in France. The Genevese Church had advanced far beyond the notions with which the Church at Meaux, and Roussel at Béarn, had been satisfied; nay it had outstripped even the tendencies of the Lutheran reformation itself, and bore the manifest impression of the republican tempest amid which it had arisen. The expanding spontaneity of the collective congregation and of each of its members, the co-operation of the laity in the

* Calvin's Letter to Viret, January 15, 1548: "Venit a rege nuncius cum fiduciariis literis, et amicè hortatus est, ut bono essemus animo, et tamen vigilantia opus esse monuit; Cæsarem enim magnas habere copias. . . . Regem quoque suis partibus non defuturum promisit." (MS. Genev. 106.)

creation of the spiritual authority, the logical rigor of the doctrine and severe discipline of life, gave to the whole system a character in the highest degree peculiar, possessing an infinite power of attraction for the temper of the French, from which it had sprung, while it was in an equal degree repulsive to others.

CHAPTER IX.

THE LAST YEARS OF HENRY II.

WE have remarked in Francis I. a secret sympathy with the first tendencies of the Reformation; there was nothing of this in Henry II.: he remained constant to the religious notions which he had been taught; he considered the Church militant adequately armed, to prevent every deviation from its doctrines within his kingdom.

The Sorbonne was incessantly occupied in censuring the suspected books imported from foreign countries, or those for the publication of which means had been found even in France. So early as the year 1544 it promulgated an index of forbidden books, from which men were to abstain as from poisonous plants, and the number of which was afterward increased from year to year. When we inspect this register we are surprised to see how much trouble the Sorbonne had on account of the varying opinions of the monastic fraternities. A number of Augustinians were condemned for denying that the saints work miracles; a Carmelite, because he omitted the Ave Maria in a sermon he preached on the festival of the Mother of God; others, because they administered the Lord's Supper according to the Lutheran ritual, or acknowledged Luther's doctrine of justification. Cistercians, Minorities, Dominicans themselves were condemned. The Sorbonne had much to do also with the translations of the Bible, which were condemned simply because they varied from the Vulgate. They desired to uphold in its integrity the ancient doctrinal system of the Latin Church exactly as it had been formed by St.

Thomas—in the same unconditional dominion as it possessed during the hierarchical ages—without any deviation, small or great, without any obscurity; the rising order of the Jesuits awoke their suspicions.

From the close of the twelfth and the commencement of the thirteenth century the punishment of heretics, as appointed by the Church, was execution and the confiscation of goods. "If," says a bull of Innocent III., "this punishment is appointed by the laws for those guilty of high-treason, how much more ought it to be inflicted upon those who are guilty of rebellion against the Majesty of Heaven;" but we know that Godhead and Church were identical ideas, and all who taught differently from the Romish Church, concerning the seven sacraments, incurred the guilt of rebellion against the Divine Majesty; even their defenders and abettors were pronounced infamous and incapable of any office.* All temporal powers were to be bound to destroy such heretics as the Church should point out within the limits of their jurisdiction: to be sworn to this on their accession to power, and if they neglected it, to be compelled to its observance and execution by the censures of the Church. These views had then been incorporated in the legal codes, and, among the French as well as among the English, divergence from the faith was likened to the crime against nature, and punishable, in a similar manner, with death by fire and confiscation.†

The rise of German Protestantism was possible only because a number of the princes and cities had been permitted, by resolutions of the Imperial Diet, to refuse the aid of the secular arm to ecclesiastical laws; but in France these laws were still in full force. Throughout the entire circuit of the kingdom the Inquisitors of heretical wickedness searched after the professors of doctrines varying from the standard of the Church; they settled the nature and degrees of error, and brought those who fell under them before the inferior tribunals, which almost always condemned them to the severest

* Compare Decrees, Lucius III., of 1185; Innocent III., of 1199 and of 1215; Decretale Gregorii XI. lib. 5. cc. 7, 9, 12.

† Beaumanoir, ed. Beugnot, c. xxx. p. 413.

punishments. The poor people appealed to the Parliaments, which generally ordained some commutation within certain limits, leaving the punishment, however, still terrific; royal edicts appeared from time to time, for the better regulation or for the alteration of the proceedings, but they were very far from moderating them in the main point. Death by fire, and confiscation of goods, was the universal punishment for all who felt scruples concerning the sacrament or the worship of the saints; according to the edict of Compiègne, those also were to be put to death who brought forbidden books into the kingdom, or even circulated them.*

While all contradiction was thus punished with fire and sword, the abuses of the Church, by which that contradiction had been called forth and animated, increased daily.

The Concordat, which placed the presentation of ecclesiastical benefices so entirely in the hands of the King, produced the most ruinous and corrupt effects. The King rewarded with them services rendered him in his own house, and in court or in war, and gave them to the younger children of the nobility as means of living; many persons received them in the name of their children; an Italian is mentioned who drew from the property of the Church an annual income of 10,000 ducats in the name of his little son, and after his death his right passed to his wife. All, however, did not think it necessary to inscribe under another name the benefices they received: there were soldiers who possessed rich abbacies in their own name, and at the same time were leading their companies of foot. Many, too, who were totally unqualified, undertook themselves the administration of the offices they had obtained. Men who yesterday were engaged in mercantile affairs, or who were courtiers or soldiers, were seen to-day in the episcopal stole and ornaments, or officiating as abbots. Personal merit, a good moral reputation, even mere scholarship, were not required or looked for: all depended upon the relation in which men stood to the court. What was to be said when even the mistress of the King, the

* Derived from an extract from the Parliamentary registers of Don-
gois († 1717), by Tallandier, *Mémoires sur les Registres du Parlement*
sous Henri II. (*Mémoires des Antiquaires de France*, xvi. 386.)

Duchess of Valentinois, had in her hands the distribution of the ecclesiastical benefices?*

In proportion as the general moral susceptibility was awakened to deeper sensitiveness, a state of things like this must have appeared horrible: no respect was paid to any thing that might be said in its excuse, and the worst tales told of the corruptions of ancient times were readily believed.

The Constable and the Cardinal of Lorraine were regarded as equally selfish and avaricious with the Duchess. The Constable saw so little injustice in the multitude of offices and dignities which were accumulated upon him, and which produced him a surprisingly large income, that, on the contrary, he was proud of it; he formed a device out of their insignia, with the motto "God and my Service." But they were all like-minded. The divisions which we have observed between them were caused less by any expressed and significant opposition, than by their personal interests; each party and family desired to get the King into their hands exclusively. Henry II. did not possess sufficient native energy—or, if we may use the phrase, was not in reality sufficiently King—to break through the circle which his nobles and courtiers had drawn around him: he granted them all that they desired. It was universally asserted that the Marshal St. André, whose personal intercourse was particularly agreeable to the King, used to urge the persecutions on, simply because he wished to enrich himself by the confiscations. This is so far not impossible, as the confiscations formed a part of the royal income,—the "*parties casuelles*," which it was customary to bestow in presents. But what an impression must it have made, when men perceived that persecution was an ally and a promoter of the avarice of the nobility, under a king who did not look after matters himself.

Whoever desires to understand the ideas and opinions of those times fully, must read Rabelais. In the picture of licentiousness, full of repulsive nudities, which he unfolds, lies concealed a profound seriousness. Rabelais is one of the few masters of satire who has depicted the failings of a whole

* Soranzo. "Particolarmente la dispensatione delli benefici ecclesiastici è in man sua."

epoch in great and truthful outlines. He cites the errors of all classes before the tribunal of sound human understanding—the extravagance of the chiefs of the land, permitted by over-indulgent kings; the disorders of the capital, which the King, to the astonishment of strangers, did not better suppress by the administration of justice; the abuses of justice itself—its forms confusing and entangling the causes—its multiplied documents in the process—and at last its decisions arrived at as if by the chances of the dice; the grinding of the revenue chamber, which knew how to draw its drink-money from all that came before it.* How little do they know him who think that his allusions are chiefly directed to the trifling occurrences which took place at court, or to insignificant personages! The manifold grievances and anxieties of the nation, which did not yet venture to show themselves openly, appear in the ingenious fancy-pieces of the patriot in the fool's-cap. His most important aim, however, is the state of religious affairs. The adventurous and gigantic heroes, in whose education the change of times is represented, share the convictions of the Protestants: they will no longer endure the false prophets, and, in gratitude for their victory, simply cause the true Gospel to be preached. In accordance with the disposition of the age, he mocks in the bitterest manner the hypocritical monks who mark their abodes by disgusting debauchery. But the satirist leads us still deeper into the secrets of the clerical condition. He depicts the Golden Book of the Decretals, with its marvelous power of conferring happiness upon the faithful, and of destroying the unbelievers; the prisons in which the new heretics were pining, and the punishments they endured; until at last we see the monster itself, from which all these torments proceed—at the same time a ravening wolf and a fawning dog, whose paws are full of blood, its claws like the claws of a harpy, and above its lair the image of Injustice. There is something sublime in the terrific grotesques of this description.

While such opinions and notions prevailed in the nation,

* As to the question whether the fifth book, in which these representations are given, was written by Rabelais himself, the most learned of his early editors, our Duchat, holds that it was, and with him I agree.

and forced their way into its literature, we can not wonder that the number of Protestants continued to increase constantly. The persecutions they suffered gave them fresh vital energy. Even in the time of Francis I. entire towns, such as Caen, Rochelle, and Poitiers, showed a decided inclination to the Reformation;* it was not openly promulgated, but the magistrates did not think it expedient to inquire after private opinions.

During the disturbances caused subsequently by war, there was necessarily a period of still greater relaxation. In the year 1555 a congregation at Paris ventured to perform a baptism. In a short time little societies were formed in Normandy, along the Loire, in Orleans, Tours, Blois, and Angers, in Poitiers, all through Saintonge, and among the seafaring population of the neighboring islands.

It has been maintained that the influence of the Waldenses was favorable to the Reformation in Dauphiné and Provence, and that some remains of the Albigenses entered into the composition of the new church of Languedoc; but this has never been pointed out with that accuracy which the historian could desire. The former statement is, however, exceedingly probable, for in those regions the new doctrines flourished in an especial manner.

In the year 1558 it was believed that there were already in the kingdom 400,000 persons who were declared adherents of the Reformation, and men were astonished at the close union that subsisted among them. In fact they cherished the intention of giving themselves a common organization, and carried it out shortly after at Paris, in May, 1559, in the very face of the stake and scaffold. The principle of the Genevese Consistory was now introduced into the French congregations. No congregation was to have the right of interfering with another; for the care of the general interests, assemblies of delegates, conferences or synods, were consti-

* Cavalli: "Li maestri di Sorbonna hanno autorità estrema di castigare li eretici, il che fanno con il fuoco, brustolandoli vivi poco a poco. Ma il Luteranesimo è tanto ampliato ora per tutto, che non solo si trova qualche eretico, ma le città intiere; che vivono non già in palese, ma con tacito consenso privatamente tutti a costume de' Protestanti—Caen, Rochella, Poitiers, e simili assai in Provenza."

tuted, according to the narrower or wider extent of their districts, and a general confession of faith was adopted.

We may easily comprehend that the Sorbonne and the clergy, when provoked by the increasing numbers of the Separatists, made use of all their legal resources, and of their influence upon the mass of the people, to annihilate them, for that was the object of their enmity. We may ask, however, whether these views must necessarily have prevailed with the legal tribunals and with the government.

Notwithstanding their intimate union, there prevailed a permanent and marked difference between the spiritual and secular powers, in consequence of which the former was not in any way permitted to exercise immediate action. When it was on one occasion seriously proposed to introduce into France the regulations of the ecclesiastical inquisition, which had been renovated and sharpened at Rome, and had proved very efficacious in Italy, the Parliament opposed it, "because the subjects of the King ought not to be delivered up to the arbitrary will of the bishop's officials."* It retained in its own hands the decision of spiritual processes.

But if the independent authority of the secular tribunal were acknowledged, it must have an effective operation, for otherwise it would be without meaning. The members of the Supreme Court of Justice stood a grade nearer to public opinion than the members of the Sorbonne. In contending for strict Catholicism, they were not so completely advancing their own cause; neither could they have possibly remained altogether unaffected by the religious tendencies of the time. Especially must it have been apparent to them, from the progress of the secession, which was already organized as a new Church, that its repression in the manner hitherto practiced could never be effected.

In the year 1559 there appeared in the Parliament a deliberate intention to moderate the proceedings against heretics. Seguier and Harlai, two men of the highest judicial authority,

* "L'autorité et souveraineté tant du Roi que de sa couronne seroit grandement diminuée quand les sujets naturels du Roi seroient prévenus et entrepris par un official ou Inquisiteur."—Crispin, *Histoire des Martyrs*, 463.

were then at the head of the criminal department, called La Tournelle, and a few young men, having been charged before them with heterodox opinions concerning the Mass, which they refused to renounce, the judges ventured to condemn them, not to death, as the letter of the law required, but merely to banishment. This affair excited the greatest attention, not only on account of its own importance, but also because of the men engaged in it. As the contrary proceeding had hitherto been always followed, it was considered proper to discuss the question solemnly in an assembly of all the Chambers of Parliament. It is possible that this motion proceeded chiefly from the enemies of the religious innovation; but even its friends were not opposed to such a course: they hoped to see the moderation of the proceedings established as a universal rule.

Under such circumstances the sittings commenced. In the early ones the ancient councilors, who had hitherto followed the rigorous mode of procedure in the great Chambers, spoke and declared themselves for its continuance. In the following sittings however, the younger men spoke, and uttered opinions of a very unexpected character. Some thought that the accused should be allowed half a year to return from their errors, and if after that time they refused to recant, that they should be allowed to leave the kingdom with their property; others insisted that it was necessary to await the decision of the Council upon the doubts which had been raised before taking further measures, for until that was delivered no persecution of the new opinions ought to take place, since nobody could say whether or not they were heretical.* We are assured, in the most detailed official report of these sittings, that this view of the question was received with great applause.

It was just before the period in which the festivities were to be held in solemnization of the marriage which had been

* La Vraye Histoire de la fausse procédure contre Anne Du Bourg, *Mémoires de Condé*, i. 220: "Faire sursoir la persécution et jugemens capitaux contre ceux qui tiennent les propositions qui n'ont encore esté jugées ny déterminées hérétiques par le jugement de l'Eglise Catholique."

agreed upon in concluding the peace. The Protestants had already among them men of such great authority in the kingdom that they entertained the design of presenting, during the festivities, a petition praying for toleration, which, concurring with the judgment of the supreme court of judicature, might have produced an extraordinary result.

It appeared all the more urgent to the champions of the rigorous system to prevent such a decision; for what would be the consequence if the supreme tribunal should renounce the ecclesiastic doctrines which France had held from of old time?—the entire religion would be lost. But personal motives blended with their zeal. A memorial was seen in the King's hands, presented by Guy Le Maistre, the First President, in which the members suspected of an inclination to Protestantism were named, and their estates and benefices, which, should they be condemned, could be distributed anew, specified;* and there were persons reckoning upon them already, either on their own account or of that of their relations. The King's attention was then especially directed to the old edicts, according to which no member suspected on account of his religion should be allowed to retain his place in the Parliament, and their violation pointed out. They wished the King in person to see and hear that such was the case. The question itself, whether an amelioration in the laws was necessary, and in accordance with the interests of the State, was not investigated; all who were inclined to such a course were described to the King as guilty of disobedience to the edicts he had issued. Although in his nature far from being inclined to acts of violence, Henry II. was carried away by the representations which had been made to him. In the *Mercuriales*—as assemblies of this kind were named—the youngest councilors who were most inclined to the new opinions had yet to speak, and it was concerted that the King, who had been always considered as the chief President of the Parliament, should appear there unexpectedly on the 10th of March, 1559.

* "*Quarum pars eaque opimior vulturiis aulicis destinabatur, partem illi filiis suis posebant.*"—Thuanus, who was informed of it by his father, Christopher de Thou, lib. xxii. 452.

All that had been anticipated came to pass. The presence of the King inflamed the professors of the Protestant doctrine, and instead of reserving their opinions they advanced them with all their zeal. Some declared against the defects of the Romish Curia, and demanded a council; others showed in an energetic and vivid manner the contrast between the crime and infamy which were tolerated, and the innocent doctrines which were so fiercely persecuted. The King, who had been previously prepossessed against such opinions, and particularly enraged by certain expressions which he thought reflected upon his personal connections, declared that he perceived clearly that there were in that place both good and bad—that he would preserve the good, but the bad he would remove. He immediately ordered the two who had expressed themselves most energetically, Du Four and Anne Du Bourg, to be seized and imprisoned in the Bastille. The judgment of the Tournelle, which had been drawn up with great forbearance, was revoked to the Royal Court for the purpose of being revised. In a short time there appeared a circular from the King, addressed to the Parliaments and to the judicial tribunals, in which they were urged to proceed against the Lutherans with the greatest severity, and the judges informed that they would be held responsible should they neglect these orders, and in which he declared plainly that as soon as the peace with Spain was concluded, he was determined to make the extirpation of the heretics his principal business.*

King Henry II., in the reasons he advanced for these proceedings, frequently referred to the ancient and intimate connection between the Church and the Crown, to the example and edicts of his predecessors in the thirteenth century, and to his title, "the Most Christian King." The deductions from these views are sufficiently clear; but on the other hand it was manifest that the State was not at the same time the Church, and that it had duties of a peculiar nature, different from those of the Church—that Henry II. had acted differ-

* *Lettres Patentes* of Escouen, cited in the "*Histoire des Martyrs*," liv. vii. 506 b. Tallandier, 456, etc., asserts that the registers for this year are lost.

ently from the majority of his predecessors, and even from his father, to whose conduct he constantly appealed. Francis I. had left the law to take its course as administered by the tribunals; but the conduct of Henry II. was very different, when he himself interfered with and quashed the judicial sentences of the courts, as delivered by his most distinguished judges. Moreover, whatever might be thought of the younger members, neither Seguier nor Harlai could be regarded as Protestants; and what shall we say when this interference was not prompted by any personal feeling on the part of the King, but induced by a clique which looked upon the affair from a personal point of view, and merely followed their own interests? The Protestants never believed that the hostility against them proceeded from the King himself, but from the faction that ruled him—a faction in close alliance with the ancient enemies of the realm.

It was said at the time, that in the conclusion of peace the suppression of the Reformation had been formally agreed to between France, Spain, and Savoy, but this has never been demonstrated. It is unquestionable, however, that the extension of Protestantism was mentioned in the negotiations, as a proof of the necessity of peace. On the Spanish side it had always been said that Spain was influenced in the treaty by a desire to set the hands of the King of France at liberty for the extermination of heresy;* besides, the relinquishment of the policy which had hitherto been of service to Protestantism involved a corresponding danger to it.

Under these circumstances the most anxious apprehensions prevailed among the adherents of the Confession; it was believed that the King would make a progress through the kingdom, and enforce the suppression of Protestantism with all his power, and that in concert with the Duke of Savoy he would attack Geneva, the metropolis of Calvinism, and destroy it with its colonies, when the intelligence spread abroad that this prince, who was yet in the prime of life, and bloom-

* The Duke of Alva reminded the French afterward that Spain had concluded the peace, "para que le (Henry II.) quedasse la mano libre para remediarlo (lo de la religion)."—July 7, 1571; Gachard, ii. 181. This is literally correct.

ing in vigorous health, had been suddenly killed by an accident of a most extraordinary character.

At one of the fêtes given in celebration of the marriages, Henry II., as was his custom, took part in a tournament, in the colors of his lady, the Duchess of Valentinois, and, mounted on a war-horse of his new brother-in-law, the Duke of Savoy's, which he rode with peculiar pleasure. As after a number of brilliant courses he was running one more, which he said should be the last for that day, his opponent's lance broke upon his vizor, and the splinters entered his forehead; he was carried out of the lists in a state of unconsciousness, and expired a few days afterward, on the 26th of July, 1559.*

The Protestants recognized in this event the almost visible judgment of God, though as far as they were concerned, they could not expect that its consequences would be favorable to them. The successor of Henry, Francis II., who was still a boy, gave his entire power into the hands of a man whom they regarded as their fiercest adversary—the Cardinal of Lorraine, of the house of Guise.

We must here say something of his extraction and personal character.

* In the "Lettere di Principi," iii. 196, there is an accurate description of the accident: "Orges (Montgomery) roppe la lancia nella buffa del Re: un pezzo sotto la visiera, ove il tronco sfugendo in suso, andò a trovar la visiera, et entratavi dentro una scheggia, ferì la fronte sopra l'occhio destro, et trovato l'osso durissimo prese la volta verso la tempia et si venne a cacciar sotto l'occhio assai profondamente." This narrative as little corresponds with the memoirs of Vieilleville and of Carloix, as do authentic accounts in general. I have departed totally from them.

CHAPTER X.

ADMINISTRATION OF CHARLES, CARDINAL OF LORRAINE.

RENE of Lorraine, who fought with Charles the Bold, and who more than once brought the claims of his house upon Provence, Naples, and Jerusalem to remembrance, ordained in his last will that Antoine, the eldest of his sons, should succeed him in Lorraine and Bar, and that the second, Claude, should inherit his possessions lying in France: these were estates scattered throughout Normandy, Picardy, Flanders, and the Isle of France, with the baronies of Joinville, Mayenne, Elbœuf, and the counties of Aumale and Guise.

Among the chivalrous military leaders of Francis I. we find this Claude, who named himself "of Guise," which had been raised to a dukedom, making a brilliant figure. His bravery and miraculous preservation at the battle of Marignano, the part he took in preserving the peace of the kingdom during the King's captivity after the battle of Pavia, and the presence of mind he displayed on the second invasion of Charles V., made him a great name in the realm. Even Paris felt endangered by the advance of the Emperor, and Lorraine entered into immediate connection with the population of the capital. He had married a princess of the royal blood, Antoinette of Bourbon: it was a fortunate marriage, from which sprang six sons, filled with vital energy; three of whom devoted themselves to the Church, and three to the military service; sometimes he appeared at Court in their company, for he was fond of showing them, considering that in them his own life was multiplied sixfold. He gave his daughter in marriage to James V. of Scotland, and Mary Stuart was his grand-daughter. Of the sons we have already frequently mentioned Francis Guise, the eldest, who was the

conqueror of Calais; the next, Charles Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine, played a part not less important during the whole reign of Henry II.

Charles Guise acquired in his youth the scientific knowledge which accorded with the requirements of the clerical profession; he spoke the majority of living languages, and the Italians remark with admiration the excellence with which he expressed himself in theirs. Henry II. took him into his confidence at the age of three-and-twenty, and he showed himself fully equal to the management of affairs. While the Constable gave offense by his severity and rudeness, Charles Guise gained favor by his agreeable and flattering address. He was elevated in early life to the Archbishopric of Rheims, and omitted nothing which a great prelate could effect to establish in his diocese an imperishable remembrance of his actions: he caused unhealthy morasses to be drained and turned into gardens and meadows; he caused the wood for the edifices at Rheims to be felled in his forest at Joinville, and the old sentence was applied to him, that he had found a city of clay and left it of marble; he founded at Rheims a university, a theological college, a seminary, and a convent for a lay fraternity; for in no respect did he neglect his clerical and episcopal duties—he provided that the parish priests should discharge the duties of their office, he preached himself occasionally, and from time held provincial councils. Though the youngest of the French cardinals, he put them all to shame by his self-control and his zeal in the duties of his position. Hounds and falcons were never seen in his house, and at Easter every year he retired to some cloister in order to give himself up to spiritual exercises. He was a man of imposing exterior: his person was tall, and he was particularly distinguished by his broad, lofty, and intelligent forehead; when he spoke all hung upon his lips—his discourse, sustained by a never-failing memory, flowed from him intelligibly and gracefully.*

* The Venetian ambassadors depict him thus unanimously. I can not repeat what was said of him in common; the indecencies in Brantôme, which have been referred to him, relate to his uncle, and to the times of Francis I.

With all these various and splendid endowments, he failed in the most distinguishing quality of great men—moral elevation and forgetfulness of self. To obtain power all means were right in his eyes, and when he possessed it he gave himself no concern about any one else in the world. He was looked upon as envious and unkind, slow in the bestowal of favors, but always prepared to do an injury—not to be depended upon by his friends, and revengeful against his enemies.*

His niece, the young Queen of Scotland, having been married to the Dauphin, the Cardinal and he became united in the closest connection. The Dauphin was adorned with the crown matrimonial, and regarded with ambitious eagerness the prospect which the rights of his consort opened to him of possessing the full royalty. Even during the lifetime of Henry II., the Cardinal and his brother, with the Dauphin and Dauphiness, used all their influence and efforts to give to the French policy and military force a direction hostile to England; at the same time they formed the closest union among themselves.

On the change of sovereigns the conduct of affairs fell, as if spontaneously, into the hands of the Cardinal of Guise; nor is it necessary to repeat the smaller causes that contributed to that event, with which the contemporary narratives are filled. The experienced uncle, by the side of the young King, his nephew, not yet quite sixteen, must have virtually possessed the royal authority. Montmorency, who had at length recovered his great influence, received together with all his friends, marks of personal disfavor, and was compelled to leave the Court; however, he had opposed the designs against England, which now entirely occupied the thoughts of the Court. On their accession to the throne, Francis II. and his young consort assumed the title and arms of England, and at their solemn reception in the great cities were greeted as the pair through whom Gaul and Britain were united.

* Chiefly from the Venetian official reports. Micheli speaks of the "odio universale concepito contro di lui per i molti effetti d'offesa che mostrò verso ognuno mentre nel governo ebbe l'autorità."

If any doubt could be entertained respecting the position which a Cardinal of the Romish Church would be likely to take in reference to the religious controversies of the time, it was speedily removed by these circumstances. Within this circle Queen Elizabeth had long been regarded as illegitimate, and not entitled to the crown;* an alliance with the Romish Court was naturally formed, which claimed anew the right of decision in this case, and through that an alliance with the strictest Catholic opinions generally.

The question which at that time chiefly occupied men's minds had reference to the renewed demand of some members of the Parliament, that the judicial proceedings against the Protestants should be moderated, at least till a new Council, to be called, should have pronounced authentically concerning the sacraments. When the Cardinal laid these questions once more before the Sorbonne, it is difficult to see in his conduct any thing like concession to public opinion; for what could have been expected from the faculty except a judgment completely rejecting the demand? Their sentence stated that such a view could not even be taken into consideration—that it was even itself sacramentarian, heretical, and thoroughly corrupt and destructive, calculated to break up alike both the State and the Church. Thus completely was all idea of moderation rejected.†

After the delivery of this judgment it was impossible for those who stood accused on account of the opinions they had uttered in the Parliament, to reckon further upon any grace. Du Bourg applied in vain to all the courts of appellate instance appointed by the ecclesiastical constitution in France; he was rejected every where. A German Prince, the Elector Palatine, hoped to save him by calling him to the Professorship of Law in his University of Heidelberg, but the times were past when intercessions of this kind would have been respected on account of political relations. Du Bourg suf-

* Killygrew A; Jones to the Queen, January 6, 1560, in Forbes, 293. The Marshal St. André told him, "that immediately after the death of Queen Mary, the Queen (Mary Stuart) did take the title (of England) upon her, as justly apertaining to her."

† Censura sanctissimæ Facultatis, August 29, 1559. Argenté, ii. 279.

ferred the punishment of heresy, by the halter and fire, on the square before the Hôtel de Ville, in December, 1559. The Cardinal rested his personal authority in the State on his severe administration of the ecclesiastical law : he knew that his popularity among the masses would lose nothing by such proceedings ; the people of Paris, imbued with anti-Calvinistic notions by the preachers of the Sorbonne, took delight in the executions. All secret meetings for religious purposes were forbidden, under pain of death to their promoters ; every favor shown to an accused person was set down as a crime in itself ; whoever betrayed the hiding-place, of a condemned person was entitled to half his estate as a reward, but whoever should dare to protect such a person, or to conceal him in his house or strong place, against him they threatened to march with arms, and to raze his house or castle to the ground.

In the affairs of the interior the Cardinal proceeded in the course which King Henry, not without his influence, had marked out, with this difference, however, that what the King had only threatened, the Cardinal undertook to carry out : men of name and rank, who had previously been passed by, were now dragged to execution. To the foreign policy, on the other hand, he gave a decided tone of hostility against England, for the immediate purpose of counteracting the influence of that kingdom upon Scotland, and to confirm the Catholic interests of the Stuarts, which were at the same time those of the Guises, and in this particular conjuncture appeared to be the interests of France. We need not expatiate upon the hostilities, both religious and political, which he aroused by these proceedings. Even Spain was by no means favorable to him. Besides all this, however, he fell into insuperable difficulties through his own personal position, and the financial condition of the kingdom.

Even in 1547 it was computed that, of the income of the country, which might be about sixteen million francs, three millions were assigned to creditors, and that the domains, to the value of perhaps fifteen millions more, were mortgaged. The deficit which occurred in the income by these means, as well as the continuous expense of the war, it was sought to

cover by raising the taxes, and by laying on fresh imposts ; but these, for the greater part, could not be collected, and the attempt only awakened a thorough and universal discontent. What shall we say of these measures when we read the credible assurance, given from various quarters, that the peasantry in the most fruitful provinces forsook their villages because they could no longer bear the grievous burdens laid upon them ? But even in the towns the oppression produced agitations, and here and there the idea of the fifteenth century was revived, that the King had no right to lay on taxes arbitrarily ; and thereby the Government found itself in the most urgent embarrassment. Henry II. had left an unfunded debt of considerable amount, the interest of which could not be obtained ; many salaries were in arrear, and much service which had been rendered remained uncompensated. The Cardinal endeavored to obtain some relief for the people, and at the same time to introduce some economical measures. He succeeded in reducing the expenses of the royal household by half a million, but in doing so he caused fresh discontents among those who were affected by his proceedings. Meritorious officers, who had served in the war, were driven from the Court with harshness. The restoration of credit was not to be thought of. It could not happen otherwise than that this condition should be attributed to the Cardinal, even though not with entire justice ; especially as he had conducted the administration of the finances under the previous reign. It was regarded as indefensible that he should be preparing armaments for the purpose of interfering in the affairs of Scotland, which was ascribed to his personal connection with that country, and nothing else.

To this was added a second cause, of universal operation. It was asserted that the existing government was not strictly according to law ; that King Francis II., who numbered barely sixteen years, and who, weak in mind and body, was incapable of forming any resolution for himself, was, in point of fact, still in his minority ; but that in such cases the Regency belonged to the princes of the blood, and that an assembly of the Estates should be called ; that the next princes of the blood, the King of Navarre and the Prince of Condé, had

been excluded from the government, and removed from the court under various pretexts; that even the Constable and his nephew, Coligny, were supplanted; and that all the power of the state lay in the hands of two strangers—for the Guises were, strictly speaking, strangers, and in opposition to the monarchy, their house having contended against the Crown for entire provinces, as Provence and Anjou.

Claude Guise and Vendôme had at one time labored together for the protection of the kingdom; their sons now stood at the head of two hostile parties. The sons of Guise were in possession of the government, and exercised it as seemed to them good, while round the sons of Vendôme, the Bourbons, were closely united all who were in opposition to the Cardinal. A peculiar disposition of the time was in favor of the latter.

Not long before, the Scottish nobility had put a cardinal to death who sought to unite the political power with the ecclesiastical: at the same time, in the Grumbach Transactions, the gentry of the German empire rose, in order to recover their independence from the pen and the crozier. To this impersonal rule, where a prince resigned his authority to the clergy and legislature, opposition was offered even in places where obedience was more complete than in either Scotland or Germany. It was this which some time afterward agitated the Netherlands from their foundation. The prince was regarded less as a ruler than a leader; men would yield obedience when the command was personal, and especially from personal concession; but the abstract notion of the State was not yet fully recognized.

This was more especially the feeling of the French nobility; they believed themselves justified in opposing an authority which was exercised over them under the name of a prince who himself possessed no power; it was their duty to obey those only who were descended from the royal house of France; the great King Francis had maintained the distinction between the royal princes and strangers, which it was now sought to abolish; by princes of the true blood only would France be governed. From such various motives of the interior and foreign policy of the State and of religion, of the general

opinion, and of momentary embarrassment, sprang the movements of opposition to the power of the Guises. It could not continue long in France without coming to an outbreak.

The Christaudins, as the Protestants were at first called, who expected merely toleration in their secret meetings for worship, but for that were dragged before the tribunals and mishandled, suddenly made themselves remarkable for their opposition when they comprehended that the authority over them was not legal. Sometimes the prisoners, who were conducted through the country in considerable numbers, were rescued from their guards, and sometimes those who were condemned were liberated by a sudden attack as they were dragged to the place of execution. At this time an idea was suggested among those who had fled to Geneva of the greatest political and religious consequence: they held it possible and lawful to overturn, by a sudden *coup de main*, the government of the Guises, which weighed so heavily on the realm. Calvin had been spoken to on the subject, but he was totally opposed to it; if he were to concede that, because the authority the Guises exercised was unlawful, an attack might be lawfully made upon them, a requisition from the princes of the blood must first be laid before him—nay, that a declaration of the Parliament against them would be necessary.*

The most distinguished contriver of this scheme was De la Renaudie, a gentleman of Perigord, who had fled from Burgundy, where he had a lawsuit, and now obtained leave to return to France for the revision of the legal proceedings—a man who sought to take personal vengeance on the Guises who had caused his brother-in-law to be executed;† for the rest he was neither to be relied on nor of a blameless character, but he possessed uncommon adroitness both in conduct and speech. At Nantes, in Brittany, he succeeded in gaining over a number of French gentlemen to his enterprise; they were persons who were discontented on religious and political grounds, who thus agreed in the conviction that the power

* "Qu'il valoit mieux que nous périssions tous cent fois que d'estre cause que le nom des Chrestiens de l'Evangile fust exposé à tel opprobre."—Letter of Calvin, in Henry's 'Life of Calvin,' iii. app. 154.

† Compare Barthold, 'Germany and the Huguenots,' i. 262.

of the Guises was a usurpation, and might be lawfully overturned. La Renaudie did not scruple to tell some that the Prince of Condé was the real head of the enterprise, but that he wished it to remain a secret, or to assure others that, according to the judgment of the German theologians and jurists, the undertaking was perfectly lawful. Such a judgment has never come to light authentically; and it is impossible that it could have proceeded from Calvin and his friends. But it can not even be said, with historical accuracy, whether La Renaudie ever spoke with Condé on the subject. Historians of the time, who were near the events, have related it; the Prince always denied it, and the supreme tribunal subsequently acquitted him of all blame in the matter. Over the entire case there remains an obscurity which has never been cleared up. Was La Renaudie actually in correspondence with the Queen of England, who regarded the Guises as her personal enemies; and who ascribed to them the appearance of the French in Scotland, and who could not but wish for a movement against them in France? Did such men as the Chancellor L'Hôpital of a latter period, as it is asserted with still greater positiveness, share in the conspiracy? It is assumed that the attempt was to be made at Blois, and that the sudden removal of the Court to Amboise frustrated it; but the removal of the Court, according to the narrative of the English ambassador, was determined upon on the 28th of January, whereas the meeting at Nantes did not take place until the beginning of February. We therefore renounce the attempt to penetrate the secret movements of the conspirators, and shall merely observe the course of affairs in Amboise, concerning which we have official information from day to day.

The Court without any apprehension, proceeded thither by the most circuitous route, by Vendôme and Châteaurenaud; but when there it soon became aware of certain hostile indications around it. The reason why the Guises had not yet seriously interfered in the affairs of Scotland was, because they apprehended that the beginning of the war would occasion a general outbreak. As early as the 7th of March there was some rumor of the discovery of a conspiracy. Suspected persons were arrested; the two Guises surrounded themselves

with armed guards, and fresh troops were drawn together. In the district of Tours, horsemen were taken up, carrying pistols and ammunition, and in Tours itself some bloody skirmishes took place between the assembled gentry and the royal troops. Here the name of Huguenots originated, which at first designated a tumultuous crowd, suddenly appearing, and which may have some connection with the tradition of the place of the wild-hunt of King Hugo.* The Huguenots of the State were distinguished from the Huguenots of the Church. The English ambassador finds it difficult to describe, with sufficient force, the confusion and bewilderment that filled the Court on the tidings of these events. No one knew whom to trust or whom to suspect; those who were dismissed yesterday were recalled to-day, and those who to-day enjoyed the most entire confidence could not be counted on to-morrow; seditious persons, chiefly of the lower classes were arrested, and immediately afterward dismissed again with small presents. A number of gentlemen, who had assembled in a neighboring castle for the purpose, as they said, of presenting a petition, were compelled to surrender, but under the guarantee of good treatment, and brought into Amboise. The most remarkable incident in the whole affair occurred on the 17th of March, though even that was of little importance. On the morning of that day, about a hundred and fifty horsemen marched to the castle of Amboise, and, having arrived at its gates, they fired a few pistol-shots at a neighboring church; meanwhile they heard the drums rolling in the court-yard of the castle, and the soldiers calling for their horses and arms; the horsemen were convinced that they were the weaker party, and retreated precipitately, but

* As in all countries the legend of the Wild Huntsman has been connected with the most renowned names, Arthur, Waldemar, and Charlemagne, so in France it was associated with that of Hugh Capet. Compare Grimm, German Mythology, p. 894. Since the time of Mezeray, it has been customary to derive the name from Eidgnos. It is not for me to deliver a definite opinion upon the question. It is quite true that the old Genevese song, "Tes Aignos sont au-dessus; tes Mamonellus sont ruez jus," was not yet forgotten; still it is remarkable that in a learned work (Mémoires de Condé, iii. 235), the author of which knew that this song was remembered, the name Huguenots is not referred to it.

the royal troops rushed out, pursued and dispersed them; several were cut down, and others were captured and brought back to the castle. The previous forbearance was now exchanged for severity: some were hanged, and others drowned in the river; eighteen military officers of distinction were decapitated with the sword, and their heads set upon pales—among them was seen that of the most distinguished leader of the party, La Renaudie, who had fallen fighting bravely. But the Guises considered themselves by no means secure against a new attack, and began to fortify Amboise.*

Calvin compared the enterprise to an adventure of knight-errantry, and as he had condemned the scheme, so did he the school-boy hesitation with which its execution was attempted, congratulating himself that he had opposed it from the beginning. If we do not err however, though the act itself came to nothing, yet the movement of which it appeared as the central point and expression, produced the most powerful effects.

In the prospect of the coming storm, the Cardinal of Lorraine became more moderate in his policy: thus, immediately after the first disturbances, and before the attempt upon Amboise, he issued a decree, which is described as being ready to appear on the 8th of March, by which the prisons were opened and the Protestants confined in them set at liberty. He offered to all those who solemnized the Lord's Supper and baptism according to the Genevese ritual, or who had attended the services of the Calvinistic preachers, pardon and the remission of punishment, upon condition that they should henceforth conduct themselves as good Catholics and true sons of the Church.† The preachers themselves only, and those who had commenced the violent proceedings, or had been implicated in conspiracies against the Crown and the State, were excepted from the amnesty. The Cardinal soon

* The most direct description of the occurrence that has come before me is given in the dispatches of Throckmorton, Forbes, 378. The accounts of this conspiracy, given by La Planche, Bèze, and La Popelinière, agree, for the most part, literally, and are in fact identical; only occasionally are there traces of their having been somewhat elaborated.

† Edit d'Abolition en faveur des Héretiques: Isambert, xiv. 22.

after, under increasing apprehension, promised to all who had showed a desire to advance toward Amboise a general pardon if they would return to their homes. The effect of this was incalculable. For the first time the Government had relinquished the severity with which the law had been administered, and declared of its own accord that the carrying out of the edicts was impossible; that the King must not mark the first year of his reign with a multitude of executions, which would amount to a massacre. The prisons were opened every where, but how could it have been expected that those who were liberated would return to the Catholic rites? They had in the prosecutions against them stood upon the justice of their cause, and now for the first time they felt that it was completely secure.*

In the new edict given at Romorantin, in May, 1560, the assemblies for worship were forbidden in harsh terms, and full power given to the inferior courts for their suppression; but even in this the Government did not revive the entire severity of the earlier proceedings. They refrained from inquiring into mere profession, for, as the Chancellor said, the weeds had grown so strong in the field of the Church, that they must abstain from attempting to eradicate them; but it was impossible to reconcile this remission of punishment for religious opinions with the prohibition of meetings for worship, for it is in the community of worship only that religion finds its full utterance. The Protestants felt aggrieved that their meetings for divine worship should be classed with rebellious assemblies, and the revocation of the new edict was demanded in all the provinces.

An opportunity presented itself in the summer of 1560 for bringing forward this requisition in the most impressive manner. In the midst of its constantly increasing ecclesiastical, financial, and political embarrassments, the Court thought good to appoint a general consultation of its chief advisers at

* Micheli: "Onde ne furono liberati et cavati di prigione di Parigi et di tutte le altre città del regno un grandissimo numero, che rimasero poi nel regno, praticando (not predicando, as it is printed; the MS. in the Archives has the correct reading) liberamente et parlando con ognuno et gloriandosi," etc.

Fontainebleau. The marshals of France, the members of the Order, and the councilors of the Supreme College assembled accordingly. The Constable and the Admiral were also present.

Admiral Coligny had been long decided in favor of the new opinions, although he had not yet professed them publicly. He had just acquired fresh merit by the service he had rendered in the pacification of Normandy, and now undertook to bring the great questions with which all the troubles of the kingdom were connected to a decision. In the very first sitting of the assembly of the Notables at Fontainebleau (August 23, 1560), after the King had opened the proceedings, the Admiral rose and presented to him two petitions from the faithful dispersed in different parts of the kingdom—for the adherents of the ecclesiastical reformation thus designated themselves. The contents of these petitions were very remarkable. In the first they formally renounced any participation in enterprises like the recent attempt against Amboise, as such could be approved of by Libertines and atheists only. In the second they set forth the impossibility of renouncing their meetings for worship; and, in order that they should not be compelled to hold them in secret, they demanded that the King should grant them churches for the preaching of the Gospel and for the solemnization of the sacraments—a requisition resting completely upon the principle of individual religion, but which had also not only an ecclesiastical but a high political significance: it was in antagonism with the idea on which the entire principle of the accord between the Crown and the decrees of the Catholic Church was founded. This idea of the inseparable union between the spiritual and the secular power was that which had given their character to the Middle Ages; the modern period began with its dissolution, or with opposition to it. While the Protestants in France again professed themselves obedient to the secular authority, they pressed for this concession, without which they could not exist; but their demand indicated a change in general notions.

It constituted in itself the commencement of an epoch, that in the full council of the Most Christian King, one of the most noted men in the kingdom should bring forward and recommend such a requisition, although he was not able to attain

his object. The Cardinal had been able to open the prisons, with the proviso that each person liberated should return to the ancient faith; to allow the Protestants to have churches lay without his range of vision; he said that the King by doing so would ratify their idolatry and forfeit his own everlasting salvation.*

In this assembly, however, there were other proposals made, to which he could not give such decisive opposition.

Charles de Marillac, Archbishop of Vienna, the same who in former years resided as ambassador at the court of Charles V., had acquired a certain degree of experience in the nature of the ecclesiastico-political troubles of the time. He showed himself penetrated with the conviction that an isolated position, such as that which the French Government had assumed, could not be maintained in opposition to a universal movement. He found that a government by Estates, such as had been formerly in full operation every where, was indispensable for France also, and stated that in several of the provinces it was rumored that the imposts would no longer be paid without the grant of the Estates. He also proposed the immediate calling an assembly of the Estates for financial purposes, and a national council, such as had been so frequently contemplated in Germany, for settling the condition of the Church; he spoke on this subject with manly emphasis, and at the same time with singular adroitness, placing his proposals in that light which made them most evident, and which secured to them the assent of his hearers. The young King himself received a visible impression. The Cardinal had not so much objected to an assembly of the Estates as he had to the calling of a council. By means of the former he hoped to pacify the nation as regarded the administration of the finances, as well as to re-establish the public credit; but the latter, he said, was at least unnecessary, as the Church had long since decided upon all the questions. At length, however, he acquiesced in both. A resolution was adopted, to call together a national council in January, 1561, and an as-

* "Quant à leur bailler temples, ce seroit de tout approuver leur idolâtrie, et que le Roi ne le sauroit faire sans être prepetuellement damné."—Maier, Discours des États Généraux, x. 299.

sembly of the States General the month previous, that is, in December, 1560. The letters of summons were immediately issued.

In Spain and at Rome men were astonished at the concessions of the Cardinal of Lorraine. The Venetian Soriano asserts that he was never at any time sincere in making these proposals—that he wished merely to throw dust in the eyes of those who were desirous of innovations, that he might pacify them first, and afterward get the leaders into his power, by whose chastisement he hoped to stifle the entire movement.*

I do not altogether rely upon the Italians when they speak of guileful calculations for the future, yet it is obvious that the Cardinal agreed unwillingly, and partly by compulsion, to the calling of an assembly for consultation; he could not conceal from himself that it must expose him to great storms. The foreign affairs of the kingdom had also proceeded unfortunately. The party of the Guises and of the French in Scotland had been compelled to come to an agreement of a disadvantageous character, which confirmed the influence of England, and was followed by the loss of that of France, and although he might with justice have attributed this to the internal agitations of the kingdom, yet the position of a leading minister must always be endangered by the mere fact that he has been unsuccessful. If violent measures formed part of the Cardinal's original plan, it is incomprehensible how he could have intrusted the Great Seal to a man of mild disposition like L'Hôpital.

The prospect of a free expression of opinion in matters of religion and concerning the State was hailed generally throughout the country as one of the happiest and most promising of all the innovations. In the provincial assemblies, the old idea of a universal reform, which had been so often before brought forward, and as often rejected, was once more the subject of discussion. Papers were distributed from house to house and from province to province, in which the fiercest war was

* Soriano, *Commentarii* (relation of 1562): "Con la deliberatione del concilio si venne a dar pasto a chi cercava di far mutatione nella fede, e con quella di far li Stati si venne a dar intentione di mettere nuovo ordine nel governo."

declared against the clergy and nobility, who, it was stated, had forsaken their original vocation—against the Parliaments, where every thing was done for money, and nothing without money—and against the abuses of the administration: and it was asserted that these were the opinions of ten out of the thirteen governments. It was vain to seek for any thing like unity of design or certainty of execution in this administration of affairs; nothing was to be seen but unscrupulous severity while the government was unopposed, and resiliency in the moment of danger—yielding and pliability under foreign pressure—and yet, amidst all circumstances, the design of retaining and confirming its power.

There can be no doubt, however, that the Guises hoped to be able to subdue all opposition to their authority, and for this purpose they concentrated the entire power of the State in their own hands and those of their friends. During the tumult at Amboise, Francis, Duke of Guise, was appointed the King's Lieutenant-General, and invested with the command of the military force. Notwithstanding the claims also which the Prince of Condé possessed, according to the French custom, upon the government of Picardy, which had been wrested from Coligny, it was withheld from him, and given to Marshal Brissac, who immediately united with the adherents of the Guises. With the other members of the house of Bourbon, who were in possession of governments, were associated lieutenant-generals chosen by the Guises; with the Duke of Montpensier, in Anjou, Touraine, and Maine, Le Roy, Lord of Chavigny, who a short time previously had fallen off from the Montmorency party; with the Prince of Roche-sur-Yon, in Orléans, Philibert de Marcilly, Lord of Cypierre.* Smaller governments were separated from the greater, and intrusted to hands that could be relied on. It was a period when the power of these provincial rulers, in which were united the military and civil political authorities, was made dependent upon party, and a portion of its machinery.

What the predominating intentions were, is discovered, among others, in the instructions which were given to the

* Le Laboureur: *Additions to the Memoirs of Castelnaud*, i. 508.

Marshal Thermes for Périgord and Limousin, in which it is set forth that people in these provinces lived as if they were in Geneva, which was contrary to God's honor and the King's: the Marshal was to search out and arrest the most distinguished preachers, and the officials who should give them any comfort or assistance, and to punish both in a proper manner.* The repression of the new faith now commenced generally: we hear every where of books burned, preachers persecuted, imprisonments, condemnations, and executions. The old knights who had served in the previous wars were excited to madness when they came toward Amboise, and saw the heads of their former companions in arms fixed upon the pales: "Ha!" said old Aubigné, "they have beheaded France, the hangmen!"

The French Protestants have been sometimes reproached for having joined a political party, but how was it to be avoided under these circumstances? The Guises directed their most determined hostility alike against the Protestants and the princes of the blood; those were to be suppressed and these excluded: the inevitable consequence was, that a strict alliance was formed between the two.

Calvin did not expect much from the Estates, and nothing from the promised ecclesiastical assembly, which was sure to refer every decision to a General Council; on the other hand, he hoped for great things from the quiet opposition of the King of Navarre and the Prince of Condé. Meanwhile he exercised all his influence to prevent violent proceedings on the part of his adherents, such as taking forcible possession of churches in the provinces. He learned with pleasure that his coadjutor Beza had reached Béarn in the midst of the disturbances that filled the provinces, and under circumstances of great danger, in order that he might there come to an understanding with the King of Navarre. To arouse him to make a great demonstration, was Calvin's idea. The King was to place himself at the head of the nobility of Provence, Languedoc, and Normandy, in opposition to the Guises; would he only venture to do so, he could break the power of these violent men without shedding a drop of blood. Calvin was convinced that it

* Le Roi au Maréchal de Termes, October 1, 1560, at Paris, *Négociations sous François II.*

required simply the show of opposition in France to effect an alteration among those who adhered to the Guises, for they had only joined them as the possessors of the supreme power. He believed even that Queen Catharine might have been reckoned upon, as she was one who would well know her own interest.*

Beza's mission was by no means fruitless; it furnished the first opportunity of carrying out the Reform in Béarn, though it failed in accomplishing its immediate object.

King Anthony of Navarre was an amiable, generous, and well-educated man, and heartily inclined to Protestantism, but yet incapable of forming a bold and manly resolution. When he was summoned to the Court, in spite of numerous warnings, and under the dangerous circumstances of the time, he did not venture to decline attending: he flattered himself that no one would dare to lay hands upon him or his brother Condé, who accompanied him. The Court was then at Orléans, making preparations for the assembling of the Estates. The suspected magistrates had been seized and imprisoned. The old bands of Piedmont and Picardy, and the companies which had returned from Scotland, were all drawn together at Orléans, so that the Cardinal of Guise was completely master of the place and of the surrounding country. The two Princes had not long arrived, when Condé was arrested, and placed in strict custody till the examination which had been commenced respecting the attempt upon Amboise should be concluded. It was seriously contemplated that judgment of death should be pronounced upon him. It was even said that Anthony of Navarre would have been killed one day by the young King of France with his own hand, had not his courage failed him;† but this tale appears to have taken its rise more from the apprehensions and timidity of Navarre, than from any actual fact. However this may be, the executions that filled the realm concurred with these obscure proceedings and

* Calvin's Letter, Baum, *Life of Beza*, ii. 116, 124.

† Olhagaray, '*Histoire de Foix*,' maintains that he had this from the mouth of Queen Johanna, and had taken it out of her *Mémoires* (l'original dont j'ai tiré mot à mot ces paroles), 528. The words agree with the narrative of La Planche, but do not add any thing to its credibility.

occurrences at the Court to fill the minds of men generally with anxiety; and under these circumstances the delegates of the Estates met at Orléans. It was then asserted that the Cardinal wished to make the presence of the Estates subservient to his purposes, first in authorizing his proceedings against the Princes, and then in condemning the Protestants by a solemn determination. The members of the assembly were compelled to subscribe a Catholic confession of faith, and the same was required, throughout the kingdom, from the magistrates and private persons in every parish; whoever refused was delivered over immediately to the severity of the courts of heresy. Columns of soldiers marched through the land in all directions to enforce the execution of these edicts, and to secure the Catholic power of the Guises upon a permanent foundation.*

I have found much by which these assertions are corroborated, but nothing which places them entirely beyond doubt. It is difficult to know with certainty what are the ultimate designs of parties striving for power, or whose possession of it is endangered, before we see them in their actual results; but these did not now at least proceed so far. While every thing was thus expected from the Cardinal, and the apprehension he caused and the hatred against him had risen to the highest degree, his power was already at an end. The young King, upon whose connection with the Cardinal depended all his power, and whom he had never allowed to take an active part in any affairs, died suddenly, December 5, 1560, before the opening of the Estates.

This was the prince whose birth, seventeen years before, was hailed as the greatest and happiest event that could have occurred for France; but the early death of his father, and the combination of circumstances through which the strict Catholic notions which were embraced were associated with the efforts of parties before he had attained sufficient expe-

* Mémoires de Castelnau, 2. ch. 12. A. C. xlii. 79. Mergey, whose information refers to the Duchess d'Usez, "qui possédoit fort la Reine Mère," Ibid." 41, 51. The Queen said afterward to the Cardinal Ippolito d'Este, that they thought "far fare la confessione della lor fede a tutti i consiglieri e a tutti gli officiali reggii," and that this had been already spoken of during the time of Francis II.

rience to interfere in them independently, made the short time he reigned a period of present and future misfortune.

The Cardinal of Lorraine entertained the idea of boldly using for his own purposes the influence he had acquired with the clergy and upon a portion of the Estates, as well as that which he might draw from the notion of Catholic unity and the great military force that stood at his disposal. He counted upon the enterprising spirit of his brother, and upon the support of the Queen Mother, who had always been on his side, and to whom he said that she, a stranger and disliked, would not be able to maintain her position without him and his friends. But his brother was the first to withdraw from him. The Duke of Guise knew the nobility, and shared in their royalist feelings; he felt that it would not be possible to preserve a form of government not legally justified. But the Cardinal had miscalculated still more upon the Queen Mother. She longed for the moment when the domination of the Guises should come to an end: it was barely tolerable only because it was in accordance with the wish of Francis II., and therefore not to be avoided. She intended to show the Guises that the public hatred excited by the last reign was directed, not against her, but against themselves.

"When all was lost," said Beza, "behold the Lord our God aroused himself."

An alteration followed in the aspect of affairs, not suddenly, but by degrees, and on that account the more decided. The idea of Calvin prevailed over that of the Cardinal.

CHAPTER XI.

DELIBERATIONS OF THE ESTATES AND PARLIAMENTS.

- THE difference between the present and the former demise of the Crown lay in the circumstance that now there was an unquestionable minority, and all the rights which had been previously exposed to opposition could now be enforced with full authority.

The Queen Mother herself had a certain claim, although it was not accurately defined. Catharine de' Medici did not spend much time in lamenting her lost son. She appeared in the Council leading by the hand the eldest of her surviving sons, upon whom the succession to the throne had devolved: this was Charles IX., who was then in his eleventh year. The boy, at the command of his mother, appointed those assembled Chief Councilors of the Crown.

The claim of the princes of the blood to the chief conduct of affairs was, however, beyond all doubt, in accordance with the ancient laws and customs of the kingdom. The Council resolved that the opinion of the first prince of the blood, the King of Navarre, ought to be heard in all matters. This was exactly what Calvin had wished for, and what he had contemplated as the result of a great demonstration, but which now came to pass spontaneously. The French nobility saw now actually at their head the prince in whom naturally, as well as on account of his openness, bravery, and affability, they had placed their confidence.

The Estates were opened on the 13th of December, 1560. The Cardinal had expressly forbidden them to utter any opinions on religious matters, but now that he had lost his power these formed the chief subject of their consultations.

The proposals of the third estate aimed at nothing less than an entire alteration in the constitution of the Church. The objectionable personal character of so many members of the higher as well as of the inferior clergy, suggested the design of re-establishing the custom of election, and even of giving it a wider extension than it had ever had previously. The pastors were to be chosen by the congregations, and the selection simply ratified by the bishop; the examination of their qualifications was to be conducted publicly by men of learning and reputation. In the election of the bishops the pastors of the towns were to take part, together with the secular notables. The archbishops were to be chosen by their suffragans; with the canons and parish priests. The property of the Church was not to be reserved exclusively for the enjoyment of the clergy; a third part was to be devoted to the relief of the poor, and another third to the building of churches and pious establishments, hospitals, and schools. We perceive that the proposals of the third estate would have given the Church a civil constitution.

A great part of the nobility went still further than this, and from the opinions delivered by them we learn in how large a number of districts the Protestant doctrines had obtained the ascendancy.

The nobility of Touraine demanded, in the language of German Protestantism, that the Church should be reformed according to the pure Word of God, without any thing being taken away from it or any thing added to it, and that for this purpose a free ecclesiastical assembly should be called, in which every one should be at liberty to express his opinions without any apprehension of being called to account for them afterward.* There exists a remonstrance of the nobility from fifty-two districts in Normandy, Guienne, Poitiers, Toulouse, and Brittany, in which the same views predominate. All disorders are ascribed to the conduct of the clergy in not

* "Pour faire un bon accord sur les différends qui sont aujourd'hui en la doctrine de la religion, et que toutes les disputes y soient décidées par la Parole de Dieu, contenue aux livres canoniques du Vieux et Nouveau Testament."—Des Etats Généraux, tom. xi. p. 189. Cahier du Tiers Etat, x. 279.

preaching God's holy word, and a free council demanded, in order, as it states, that all disputes may be decided according to the word of God contained in the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments. Deputations from the Reformed churches, who had been hitherto deterred from approaching the Court by the Cardinal's threats, now hastened to strengthen these demands by requisitions of their own. They also desired a free consultation, with the liberation of those who had been again imprisoned under the last administration, and, above all things else, permission for their religious assemblies for the solemnization of the sacraments as well as for preaching.

Nothing, however, could now be done in these matters, for all commissions, it appears, were determined and dissolved by the death of the late King. L'Hôpital considered it sufficient that the regency of Catharine was recognized by the majority—not, as he asserts, without his zealous intercession.* While he dismissed the Estates, he announced at the same time that a new Assembly would be speedily summoned, to which, in order to diminish expense, each of the thirteen governments would be required to send but one deputy from each estate; he also required that a preliminary consultation should be held in every province and official district, concerning the instructions which they should give to their delegates.

It is easy to conceive how profoundly men's minds were impressed and agitated by this revolution of affairs, in respect both to persons and measures.

Four principal parties, says the Venetian ambassador Barbaro,† now acquired consideration—the Queen Mother, eager to govern all, and jealous of every rival in power; the King of Navarre, whom she suspected of a design to deprive her of authority, and to grasp the government in his own hands

* In his will he stated: "Etant donc iceux induits, ou par équité, ou par nostre continuelle poursuite, donnèrent à la Reine Mère la charge et tutelle du Roi et de ses biens, luy associant pour ayde et conseil le Roi de Navarre."—Duchesne, Chanceliers, 645.

† Relatione di M. Marc' Antonio Barbaro, 27 Luglio, 1564. MS. in the Venetian Archives to be carefully distinguished from the spurious copy printed in Tommaseo's collection.

exclusively; the house of Guise, which had acquired importance through the last administration; and, finally, the Constable, who, as supreme chief of the army, and on account of his personal abilities, held a position of great consequence. The factions which had joined these several party chiefs were all divided between themselves. What a position was that of France at this moment!—her king a boy, the government in the hands of a woman, the great nobles all at enmity with one another, and the people in a state of insurrection on account of religion.

I will not here depict the antagonism of these factions, the movements of their chiefs, nor the fluctuations in their influence; the oscillations of the needle in the balance of ascendancy, which now inclined to one side, and immediately afterward to another—especially since the accounts of them which have been transmitted to us are both defective and contradictory. All that can be said with certainty is that such fluctuations actually took place.

The Queen succeeded, through the energy of her character in establishing a good understanding with the princes of the blood. Anthony of Navarre resigned to her the general conduct of affairs, content that he should be acknowledged as Lieutenant General and representative of the person of the King in all the territories within his allegiance. The Estates in which Navarre had a powerful party, were forbidden even to consult concerning the composition of the government; enough seemed to have been done to satisfy the law, when in the edicts the princes of the blood were named who had taken part in forming them.* Condé was acquitted, and resumed his place in the Council. The Admiral also took his seat again, and, in connection with the Chancellor, the Bishop of Valence, and occasionally with the Bishop of Orléans, powerfully represented the moderate tendencies of the time. Still, however, the Guises and their party were by no means entirely subdued; Brissac, Thermes, St. André, and the Cardinal of Tournon set themselves in opposition to these tendencies, and rendered it impossible that matters could be arranged

* Lettres au Roi, de la Reine Mère et du Roi de Navarre; Fontainebleau, 30 Mai. Mém. de Condé, ii. 279.

with firmness and decision by the will of those in supreme authority.

Meanwhile the Protestants were bestirring themselves every where; they would not suffer themselves to be impeded any longer in the public exercise of their religion. Calvin himself was astonished at the numbers, from all parts of France, who crowded his doors, entreating him to send them preachers, as if every thing had been already decided. The proceedings aroused the populace, and tumults were created against them in various places, but the Reformed took arms, and the attacks of the one party and defense of the other filled the whole kingdom with commotion and contention.

The Council, influenced by the newly-introduced element, issued, occasionally, decrees of a milder character. A riot, which had been raised in the city of Beauvais, and which terminated in acts of sanguinary violence against the Protestants, occasioned an edict by which they were formally taken under the protection of the State, and which ordained that individuals should enjoy security in their own houses or among their friends, proclaiming that it belonged to the magistrates and officials alone to deal with recusants according to law, but that no others, under any pretext of the previous edicts, should disturb the religious assemblies, and stating that it was the King's wish, on the contrary, that all who had forsaken the kingdom on account of their religion, should return to their homes.

This declaration, however, awakened the liveliest opposition among both the French and foreign Catholics; the Spanish ambassador looked upon it as a formal toleration of the Protestant assemblies, "to the scandal of all Christendom."*

The government thought it right, under the altered circumstances, to lay the questions once more before the Parliament of Paris (July, 1561). All the members and the peers delivered their opinions; the Duke of Guise spoke with peculiar vehemence, and the Admiral with not much less. The votes were taken down, and afforded an opportunity of seeing that a vast change had taken place in this corporation: what was

* Lettre de Chantonnay à la Reyne Mère, 22 Avril: Mém. de Conde, ii. 6.

regarded two years before as an unheard-of mitigation, namely, that simple heresy should not be punished with loss of life and property, but merely with exile, now obtained the preponderance of opinion, and was approved of by a formal resolution. There was also an important number of votes in favor of allowing the Protestants the right to hold religious meetings, and the contrary was decided, some say by a majority of three, according to others, of seven votes, in an assembly of one hundred and fifty. A new edict, named the Edict of July, was issued, forbidding all assemblies of the Protestants, especially for the celebration of the sacraments in any other but the Catholic form, with weapons or without weapons, under pain of death and confiscation.*

Meanwhile the Estates assembled once more. The clergy were summoned to a special consultation at Poissy; the deputies of the nobility and the third estate met at Pontoise. In accordance with the regulation of Orléans, a small number only had been elected, but they were furnished with the instructions of the provinces. Their feelings were totally opposed to the tenor of the new edict, and the demands which they made were altogether unexpected.

The opinions expressed by a portion of the nobility at Orléans, appeared at Pontoise as the universal determination of that estate. The representatives of the nobles holding governments made a collective demand that the decisions of the religious disputes should be in accordance with the doctrines of the Gospel, and of the word of God contained in the Old and New Testaments, and that until such decision took place no prosecution should be allowed against any one who held the Apostles' and the Athanasian creeds.

These views had now taken a powerful hold of the third estate also. In a memorial which they presented to the King, they urged him to call a free national council within three months, and to preside over it himself; and prayed him to take measures that no one should be allowed to vote in it who

* Edit sur la religion, St. Germain-en-Laye, Juillet; in Isambert, 14, 109, especially art. 4, 6. La Place (130) and Thuanus contain some notices. Languet is particularly instructive: Epistt. Arcanæ, ii. 126.

was personally interested in the affairs to be discussed; that he would cause all articles considered doubtful to be decided according to the word of God alone; and that, until such decision took place, he would order a stop to be put to the prosecutions; for, they added, it was against all reason to compel any one to take a course which, in his heart, he believed to be evil. The aspirations of this estate went still further: they prayed that the adherents of the new faith might have a church provided for them in every town by the King, or else that license should be given them to build one for themselves, where every one could see and hear both what they taught and what they did, and that a royal officer should be charged to take care that no popular tumult should be excited either by them or against them.

It is easy to perceive the import of these resolutions. The stipulations of the nobility and of the third estate for a Council, contain in themselves the principles of Protestantism, and, if they had been adopted, would have led in France as far as they had in Germany, and, in consequence of the unity of that kingdom, perhaps still further.

It strikes me as very remarkable, that these resolutions, the original documents containing which, are preserved in the MSS. of the Library at Paris, should, up to the present time, have been little, if ever noticed.* They and all that remains of the proceedings connected with the movements, are of great importance, if not for the course of events, yet for the information they give us of the age and its tendencies.

The nobility urged a reformation of the judicial system and of the administration of the law. They insisted that the office of judge ought not to be made a matter of gain, but one of public duty. According to their view there should be cho-

* "Au concile national vous plaira présider avecq' nos seigneurs les princes du sang, gens doctes de bonne vie et mœurs vous assistans ainssy que soigneusement les empereurs et roys l'ont cy devant gardé, ne recevant aucun à donner voix délibérative qui ayt aucun intérêt particulier à la réforme, et ferez ung souverain bien, en ordonnant que tous les articles pour l'aujourd'hui révoquez en doute y soient décidés et résolus par la seule parole de Dieu."—Etats tenus à Pontoise, Cahier Général du Tiers Etat du Royaume de France: Library at Paris, 8927.

sen in each bailiwick, every three years, suitable persons from among the nobility as well as from the other classes, for the purpose not only of administering justice in the inferior tribunals, but also to sit in the Parliaments; and this they looked upon as a duty from the discharge of which no one had a right to withdraw, although the recompense he might receive should not correspond with his rank, or be adequate to the pains of the office. They held that an office conferred in perpetuity, tended to make its possessor remiss and negligent of his duties, but that, under regulations like these, one would endeavor to excel the other.

It would have accorded well with this if the nobility had been willing that the governors also should be appointed every three years. The third estate meanwhile renewed the ancient demand of the Estates which had been heretofore made at Tours. They desired a regular assembling of the Estates every second year; that no new imposts should be laid on, nor any war undertaken without their consent; they presented rules for the composition of the Council, in which, among other regulations, they recommended that no priest should have a seat, being a person bound to obey the Pope by a special oath. In order to re-establish his finances, they said, the young King, through a commission of the Estates, might resume all the crown property which, through the dishonorable avarice of the finance officers, or excessive salaries and pensions, had been alienated into private hands; that an inquiry ought to take place, from which the Queen Mother alone should be excepted. They pointed out to him that this was especially necessary as regarded the property of the clergy, with respect to which he might either ordain that no possessor of a benefice should be permitted to receive from it more than 5000 livres, and that the rest should go to the royal coffers, or he might proceed at once to dispose of the clerical estates by sale. It was firmly insisted upon, that it was not necessary that the whole income of the clergy should exceed four millions, while the interest of the amount which the sale of the property would realize, would be very much higher; besides, as every one was endeavoring to obtain freehold possession of the land, if the King were willing to erect the greater estates

into complete baronies, he would, by that means, be able to bring to light all the treasures which had been so long kept buried in the soil. They stated that there was no doubt the sales would fetch one hundred and twenty millions, while, according to the usual rate of interest, forty-eight millions capital would be all that was necessary in order to provide their four millions for the clergy, for the payment of which they should receive security; a surplus of seventy-two millions would then remain to the King, of which, forty-two millions might be devoted to the liquidation of his debts, and to the redemption of the domains; there would then remain thirty millions, which might, with the greatest advantage, be lent to the principal cities in the kingdom, by which means money would be circulated among the people, trade would increase, and the prosperity and power of the kingdom be promoted: the interest of the loan could be applied to the fortification of the frontiers and the payment of the troops, while the purchasers of the clerical estates, being raised to the rank of barons, would render the King military service and fulfill the duties of true vassals.

In seasons of great agitation all designs tend to those energetic changes, and reforms, the notions of which having been long nourished in secret, by the contemplation and suffering of prevailing abuses, now burst forth suddenly. The significance of proposals like those made at Pontoise by the third estate is obvious,—an alternation in the magistracy, grounded upon election; the sale of the ecclesiastical property in a mass, for the advantage of the nobility and the estates, as well as of the king; a clergy paid from the treasury of the State; the royal power limited, through the periodical assembly of the estates, every two years. All this together would have constituted France an entirely new kingdom. These projects have an analogy with those which were afterward effected by the Revolution. The Parliaments and the clergy would have been overthrown by them in the same manner, and the third estate would likewise have drawn from them the chief advantages; but, above all, the nobility would not have been abolished, but strengthened. The movement did not spring from a negative philosophy, but from Protestant

principles: not that these would have required so total a change in the form of the State—the example of England shows how little this is the case; but from the coincidence of financial disorders and of a universal political fermentation with the religious tendencies of the age, and the absence of authority in the supreme power, a more radical change had been inevitable in France than that which took place in England.

At the first view, it appears as if Protestantism must have acquired new strength through this union, but, looked into more closely, we must acknowledge that the political ideas, though in themselves powerful, were the most dangerous allies of the religious principles. I do not find any great Protestant name decidedly associated with the political movements of the day, nor, on the other hand, that any such renounced them with resolution and judgment. As the combination became apparent, the religious exertions of the Protestants necessarily aroused hostilities, which alone perhaps they would not have awakened. It excited the opposition of the corporate power of the clergy, which in England had even shown itself favorable to such efforts; of the Parliament, whose authority was so deeply founded in the general feeling; and, more than all, of the great nobles, who would have been forced to surrender the possessions which, under the old constitution, they had, as they said, well acquired through their own services and the royal grace. The reforms in prospect were so immeasurable, that they terrified men's minds, and caused them to draw back from their contemplation.

An agreement was even then made at Poissy, which bore a totally opposite character, and which relieved the government from the most painful embarrassment. Urged by the requisitions of the Crown, the projects of the third estate, and the general spirit of the time, the clergy offered a yearly contribution of 1,600,000 livres for six successive years, on the condition that they should be secured in the possession of their estates and their franchises.* The Queen and the

* "Que V. M. feroit jouir les ecclésiastiques des biens de l'Eglise et de leurs libertés."—Collection des Procès Verbaux, i.

Chancellor did not consider the sum offered quite sufficient, but at last it appeared to them better to accept a means of assistance which could be made current at once, than to proceed to the proposed alienation, or to a systematic imposition of taxes, the consequences of which could not be foreseen, and which would necessarily excite against them the entire Catholic population. A contract was concluded, which became of the greatest importance to the constitution of France generally: the Crown, already closely connected with the clergy by the power of appointing to places, acquired a new interest in the possession of the church property; the clerical corporation and its possessions, a new right to the protection of the Crown.

There was yet another and an infinitely more difficult union attempted at Poissy, namely, in matters of faith: the government opposed to the assembled prelates the most distinguished clergy of the Reformed Church, among whom were men who had worn the monk's frock or received the priestly consecration. At the head of the preachers appeared Theodore Beza, the friend of Calvin and of Condé, a handsome man, of dignified appearance, universal scholarship, good morals, and thoroughly confident in his cause; the ladies of the court remarked, with pleasure, that he knew how to maintain his position, both in jest and earnest, against the Cardinal of Lorraine. I will not say that an agreement in the comprehension of doctrine was not possible, if they had earnestly desired it; for they came very near one another on one of most disputed and most important points in the controversy—the Eucharist. In the commission, to which the most learned and moderate men on the Catholic side were appointed, they actually agreed to a formula concerning the spiritual reception through faith, which was satisfactory to both parties. This formula, however, was not at all approved of in the great council of prelates to which it was referred, and with respect to which the commission occupied now a difficult position. The prelates proposed another formula, which the Reformed declared they could never adopt. They had, however, only left for the moment in abeyance some distinctive opinions; and it is doubtful if the

agreement would have continued, particularly if Calvin would have declared himself satisfied with it.*

In short, the object to be accomplished here was not the reconciliation of a few religious dogmas, but of two great systems of religious conduct and opinion. The Sorbonne, which also assembled in strength at Poissy, could not yield, after having but recently added to the known confession made in earlier times the most stringent definitions: the Sorbonne must either maintain its doctrines or be annihilated.

It was not said, with all this, that the old punishments appointed for religious errors could now be revived again. Queen Johanna of Navarre was one of the most zealous professors of the new doctrine, which at this period, through the preaching of Beza, and the social conversation he was in the habit of holding, had found its way into the Court also. But, besides these circumstances, the irresistible extension of Protestantism throughout the country obtained for it the most remarkable respect. In the autumn of 1561, it is computed that there were more than two thousand Reformed congregations in the kingdom: the consciousness of this vigorous growth gave them boldness and confidence. A number of the Reformed having been on one occasion insulted by the mob of Paris, on their return from a religious ceremony, the gentry of the neighboring districts resolved to come to the next assembly to the number of some thousands, and, should any injury be attempted to the Protestants, to seize the churches and chase away the monks. The government to avoid a catastrophe, persuaded the Protestants to postpone their meeting. But there was another reason which rendered it impossible to return the ancient system of persecution: the people, it was said were now attached to these preachers, and would if deprived of them, go over to Anabaptism, which aimed at

* Compare "Histoire Ecclésiastique," 609; De la Place, 199; and especially the fragments from the reports of Despençe, in Rainaldus, 1561, n. 99. The motive I find only in a letter of Beza to Calvin, MSS. Genev.: "Quod mutaverant tolerabile non erat; quoniam verbo tribuebant quod fidei erat: i. c. suo modo volebant presentiam inculcare quæ a verbis et syllabis penderet. Τῇ βασιλείᾳ," he adds, "nihil mutabilis. Et nihil hic animadverto nisi ἀναρχίαν. Acres diligentes imperterriti sunt hostes, in nostris nihil simile."

What condition?
the ruin of the State itself. Thus in France also Protestantism presented itself as a bulwark against the anarchical and destructive movement which had sprung from the general confusion of all conditions.*

In order that the mitigation of the laws might have a basis corresponding with the constitution of the kingdom, it was resolved to call an assembly, to be composed of members from all the Parliaments, for the purpose of consulting as to the measures to be taken for this object. After some delay the assembly was opened, at St. Germain, on the 5th of January, 1562. There were present some who still thought that every thing might be accomplished by strictness and severity. The Chancellor L'Hôpital asked if the King was expected to destroy so many of his subjects, who were in every relation worthy and estimable people; he wished to be informed what fruits the severity of the previous edicts had produced, and stated that the question there was not, which was the true religion, but how men could live together. He convinced the largest part by far of the assembly that a legal position must be accorded to the Protestants. When it was asked afterward, however, whether they were to be granted possession of churches, or simply the right of holding assemblies, the same agreement did not prevail. It is not without interest to observe the proportion of the votes which appeared on the division at either side: of the forty-nine members present there were twenty-two for granting the churches, and sixteen for merely giving the right of assembly: with the latter, the severe Catholic party, who originally would have rejected every idea of a legalized position for Protestantism, now associated themselves.†

Upon the basis of this resolution, an edict was promulgated

* Languet, Epp. ii. 150, Sta. Croce al Cl. Borromeo, from the mouth of the King of Navarre, 14: "Una gran parte del popolo crede a costoro talmente che col mezzo loro si potranno ridurre alla via buona, come che altrimente siano per diventare Anabatisti o peggioro."

† It is easy to see, from the letters of the Cardinal-Legate Ippolyto d'Este, how greatly this conclusion exceeded his anticipations. He said that it was brought about chiefly through the members of the Council, "nonostante che la maggior parte di questi huomini di robba lunga havessero tirati nella sinistra parte:" He tells it as a piece of good news.

in January, 1562, by which all the punishments ordained up to the present time against Protestants assembling for worship, whether within or without the towns, were abolished, and their preaching, prayers, and religious exercises formally allowed. They were to bind themselves, however, by a solemn oath to teach no other doctrines than those contained in the books of the Old and New Testaments and in the Creed of the Council of Nicæa, to submit to the municipal law, and not to hold their synods without permission from the royal officers.

The preachers accepted it with joy, and published it with a special commentary of their own, in which they confirmed it from point to point.

It was not all they desired or aimed at, but, compared with the illegality of their previous condition, it was an incalculable gain. They were now actually received into the peace of the kingdom, under certain stipulations, as the German Protestants had been formerly: they were not excluded from any province nor from any place in the kingdom.

The Parliament of Paris refused for some time to verify the edict; but it could discover no other means of pacifying the discontents which were increasing before its eyes, and, upon the urgent desire of the Court, consented finally to register the edict; several members absented themselves on the occasion, in order to avoid taking part in the act. Thus, what Henry II. had but two years and a half before prevented by his arbitrary interference, was now fully accomplished. The great corporation, which formed the bulwark of legal order, even then held a mitigation of the canonical decrees against heretics to be necessary, and, although purged of all elements having an affinity with Protestantism, it had shown a strong disposition to pursue a similar course six months previously, and was restrained from it by only a small majority; now it proceeded in that course after the judgment of all the other cognate corporate bodies had been delivered in its favor. A license was thus granted to the Protestants, before which they deemed that the Papacy would hardly be able to maintain its ground—so much did they expect (doubtless too much) from the resistless power of the Confession, if allowed freedom

of operation. But, even leaving this out of view, the results of this measure were of immense importance.

The religious dissent which was at first totally rejected and disallowed, and then arbitrarily suppressed, which was combated the more vehemently within the kingdom because it had been excited from without, obtained by this measure a legal and recognized existence.

An edict demanded by the Estates, consented to by the Government, and adopted by the Parliaments, did not, it is true, secure to the Reformed all they wished for, nor even all that was necessary to their religious exercises, but it gave them certainty of existence, and deprived their enemies of the weapons which were intended for their destruction.

A new element, in congruity with the universal spirit of effort and enterprise which was especially characteristic of the German people, was thus adopted into the French nation, and, whether pressing forward or driven back, whether recognized or subdued, was calculated to exercise a boundless influence upon its destinies.

BOOK IV.

FIFTEEN YEARS OF RELIGIOUS CIVIL WAR.

CHAPTER XII.

RELIGIOUS CIVIL WAR.

THE rise of the religious reform in France involved not only an alteration in the Church, but, as has been indicated, a great political innovation. It had always been regarded as the duty of the Crown to maintain the hierarchical decrees as if they were divine commands, and to execute them with the sword. This unity of the Church and the State was now broken through. The recognition of an ecclesiastical form differing from that of the old Church included, if not a conscious, yet an actual modification in the idea of the supreme power. Let us not mistake, however: according to the very nature of the transaction it could not have been accomplished without the greatest difficulty.

The Protestant opinions had a reference almost innate to the privileges of the secular power, and a near relation to French policy. Francis I. well understood this in his time; but, engaged as he was in a formidable struggle for the integrity of his kingdom, he could not venture to break with either the national or the universal hierarchical power. Henry II. was indebted to his connection with the Protestant element for one of the greatest positions ever occupied by a French monarch. But the contrary principles also rendered him great service, and surrounded him with a powerful defense. At length he allowed himself to be swayed to give new authority and force to the hierarchical decrees which were intended to extirpate dissent.

The Reformed had secured themselves from the persecuting laws of the State, but still there were mighty powers independent on the government which set themselves

against the Protestant position, and sought to make it retrogressive.

The old system still prevailed with the great majority of the population; it was connected with all that possessed recognized authority in the kingdom, and during the last storm had, through its financial concessions, entered into a new and strong relation with the Crown. It had never acknowledged even the most general quality of a religion or a church in the intruded element, the adoption of which it regarded as an offense against the Godhead; naturally then it directed the whole energy of its collective power to the purpose of disembarassing itself of so hated an enemy.

The essence of the matter is misapprehended by those who attribute the success of the Protestant movement to the political faction, though it is undeniable that the former had formed a union with the latter, and was encouraged by it, and wore, so to speak, its colors. This was seen in the support which the Prince of Condé, the most distinguished leader of the Reformers, received at this time in the capital. The citizens were disarmed because a tumultuary outbreak was apprehended. The Prince was surrounded with armed troops of his co-religionists, who accompanied him through the streets in rank and file as he went to a preaching or returned from one.* It was computed that there were twenty thousand Huguenots in the city, and it was feared that in union with them he would endeavor, by a sudden *coup de main*, to make himself master of it, and that the same would be attempted in other cities also. In all probability he did not think of such a scheme, yet the jealousy of his antagonists was so powerfully excited that it was believed and asserted that religious zeal and political antipathy had united themselves for a common hostility.

The blame is not always to be laid on an evil disposition when elementary powers fall into contention with one another;

* M. A. Barbaro, Relatione, 1564: "Avendo egli già, col mezzo che teneva nel consiglio del Re, quale la maggior parte favoriva questa nuova religion, ottenuto di levar l'arme al popolo di Parigi, e poi, sotto pretesto che non avrebbe a seguir qualche seditione, ottenuto che gli Ugonotti la portassero per sicurtà sua."

but the dispositions of men show themselves in the manner in which that contention is carried on.

When Calvin from Geneva surveyed the condition of affairs he was not satisfied with it; he admonished his followers to beware of the first act of bloodshed, for it would draw streams of blood after it—France and Europe would be overflowed with blood. But events different from any he could have foreseen were concealed in the bosom of the future—events which it lay not in his power to prevent. He and his followers might have wished for peace; their antagonists needed, demanded, and began the war.

CHAPTER XIII.

COMMOTIONS OF 1562 AND 1563.

THE leading men who had held the supreme power under Henry II. were profoundly conscious of the common danger to which their disunion exposed them; the decrees of the Estates at Pontoise were equally threatening to each of them. The progress made by the Huguenots, and their haughty bearing, were not less distasteful to the Constable Montmorency than they were to the Guises, and the old understanding between them and the Marshal St. André was easily re-established.

At one time it was thought that these powerful chiefs intended to attempt the suppression of the new opinions without the participation of the royal authority, and even in opposition to it;* but in general it forms no part of the character of French parties to establish a definite right apart from the ruling power—they seek rather to form a union with it, or in one way or other to bring it under their influence and get it into their own hands. How much easier would all have been had they now succeeded in such a course!

The most important means of giving the government a Catholic tendency were furnished by the co-operation of Spain.

Philip II. neither could nor would for any consideration approve of the rise of Protestant opinions in France. Besides his position before the world generally, and the reaction on the Netherlands to be apprehended from it, his relations with Navarre formed another powerful motive. This territory having been in former times conferred upon his predecessors

* This is asserted by the Cardinal-Legate Ippolyto d'Este, who was against it, in one of his unpublished letters.

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by a papal sentence, the fact that the Protestant principle recognized the hereditary right only, and refused to acknowledge the authority of the Papal power to abolish that right, urged and at the same time authorized him to resume the dispute, and to attempt the seizure of the province. A Protestant prince, who possessed claims upon Navarre, Lieutenant-General of the King of France, and impelled onward by a multitude of persons of his own way of thinking; was in every respect formidable to the King of Spain. His councilors did not deny this, but they saw clearly that an open interference in French affairs, even in connection with the magnates of that kingdom, involved the most imminent political and even religious dangers. In this embarrassment Granvella adopted the design of applying to King Anthony of Navarre himself. What a vast advantage would be gained if the very man from whom Spain had most to fear, who might be regarded as standing so near the throne, and was the head of the Protestants in France, could be induced to renounce them and be brought to the Catholic party! It is worthy of notice that Granvella did not advise any guarantee of an indemnification to Anthony for the loss of Navarre, but merely to excite the hope of one in order to amuse him;* he would thus allow himself to be brought over to measures through which both himself and his adherents must be ruined. Anthony of Navarre was known throughout his whole life as a man who, although he adopted his opinions with vivacity, did not hold them with firmness. He was then in a state of unwonted vacillation between the two contradictory views of the doctrine of the Eucharist, having a predilection for that of the Augsburg Confession; he was told, however, that, as regarded that subject, the difficulties would be removed and every thing reconciled by the Council of Trent, which had just been revived. In a short time we find him in full negotiation with the Papal legate and the Spanish envoy, concerning the indemnification to be guaranteed to him for the loss of Navarre. They gave him reason to hope that he would be put in possession of Sardinia, or of a conquered

* "Entretenerlo con esperanças."—Granvella to Philip, Dec. 15, 1561: Pap. d'Etat, vi. 461.

territory on the African coast, but stated that, in order to obtain either, he must incline toward the Catholic movement. The ambassadors of the Catholic courts unitedly urged it upon him; the Constable and St. André carried him away with them, almost against his will,* and he conceded that the edict just promulgated should be once more altered.

This was indeed far from being a legal authorization, but it was sufficient for persons who without it were bent upon a decided course of action.

On one occasion, during the previous parliamentary debates, when the renewal of the penal edicts was carried by a small majority, Francis Duke of Guise exclaimed that this resolution must not be neglected, and that his sword should not remain in the sheath if it were required to carry the decree into execution. He now offered to fulfill this promise.†

In himself, this gallant soldier was not disposed to deeds of violence; he is represented as rather of a quiet, and even phlegmatic temperament; he was praised for the mildness he exhibited toward conquered enemies, and for the self-control with which he endeavored to rectify any injustice that might have been committed, and was thought to know, in a superior degree, the duties of man to man, and what became them. Still there had been always observed in him a certain dependency upon others; he appears to have had an arm to execute, rather than a head to design. The universal rage which the carrying out of the edict excited in the Catholic world now seized him; an unusual refractoriness displayed itself even in his own government; he may also have believed that his honor was pledged through the words he had spoken.

However this may be, his first proceeding led to a fatal event. As he was returning from Joinville to the neighboring town of Vassy, he found a Calvinistic congregation, who, under the protection of the edict, were just beginning their Sunday's worship in a barn, and among whom were many of his subjects. Guise told them that he wished to

* "Era persuaso da essi, contro però la sua natural volontà."—M. A. Barbaro: he himself had negotiated in the affair with Anthony.

† Lettres de Pasquier, iv. 10.

speak with such of the Joinville people only as were present; but while he, with his followers, filled with hate, and with swords by their sides, rushed upon the congregation, and they endeavored to shut the doors against their assailants, a collision took place, which ended in a bloody massacre of the helpless people.* Whether the Duke intended it or not, it is enough that he did not prevent it: the deed was his, and upon his head must rest the applause and blame of it, with its consequences. Public morality was still so low, that this sanguinary incident was hailed by the zealous Catholics as a great transaction; and when Guise appeared at Paris, where the civic mob had been prevented from perpetrating similar deeds by the precautions of the government, which they looked upon as almost an encroachment upon their municipal freedom, he was received, according to the statement of the Venetian ambassador, almost as if he were the King himself. Condé, with his preachers and his armed followers, conscious that they would not be able to defend themselves against this alliance, left the city, and immediately a complete alteration took place, under the guidance of the civic authorities. All who professed an inclination to the new opinions were compelled to leave the city. The constable caused the pulpits of the preachers, and the benches of their hearers, to be burned, for the satisfaction of the populace, while the Cardinal of Lorraine, on the other hand, commenced preaching in the old Catholic style, and was once more esteemed as surpassing all other men in eloquence and philosophy; numerous processions traversed the streets; the members of the parliament swore to the confession of faith which had been drawn up a few years before by the Sorbonne. The citizens, who had been disarmed, received

* In the "Discours Entier de la Persécution et Cruauté exercées en la Ville de Vassy par le Duc de Guise, le 1^r. Mai," there is a very detailed report on the part of the Huguenots: Mém. de Condé, iii. 124. In the "Discours au Vrai," which immediately precedes, there is a letter on the subject from Guise himself. The difference is that he asserts that stones were first thrown at him; he acknowledges that he rushed on the barn with his followers. With respect to Davila's representation, I have expressed myself at length in an Academical exercitation.

their weapons again, and in a short time appeared to the number of twenty-four thousand, all of Catholic minds, as they boasted, practicing themselves in military exercises.

It is in itself a great event that the capital, which, ever since the times of Louis XI., had been continually increasing in population, and the influence it exercised upon the country, now strove to become the spiritual metropolis of the kingdom, almost identified its municipal pride with Catholicism, and surrendered itself to the exclusive idea of the persecuting religion.

The confederates could not call themselves masters, however, till the queen was drawn within their circle.

As to the intentions of Catharine at this period, there is no room for doubt. "Her design," says the Papal legate, Ippolyto d'Este, "is directed not only upon religion, but also on the government."* She favored the Reformed, in order not to show disfavor to their leaders. At a sitting of the Council, on one occasion, she required that St. André, whose connection with the King of Navarre was adverse to her, should leave the capital and retire to his government, which gave rise to a warm dispute between them. She was now at Fontainebleau, with her son and the Court; and the letters remain in which she implores Condé to take the children, the mother, and the kingdom under his protection, and to save them from those who wished to ruin all. But before Condé had formed any resolution, the confederate Catholic chiefs arrived at Fontainebleau, for the purpose of bringing her back to Paris. It appears that she had an intention of escaping from them at Melun, but they had taken precautionary measures to prevent her.† On her arrival in the capital, she was informed that she would not be deprived of her part in the government, so long as she lent her aid to the maintenance of religion.‡ She yielded to what was

* "Che ha reso," he adds, "tutti questi negotii tanto tanto più travagliosi."

† Thuanus, lib. xxix. Elaboration of the contemporary account which is contained in the *Mémoires de Condé*, iii. 195, but with valuable contributions of its own.

‡ Chantonay (*Mém. de Condé*, ii. 33): "Ont promis et juré que oncques ne l'avoient pensé (de lui ôter le gouvernement), ne le feroient,

inevitable. The energetic Catholic combination which had been formed in despite of her, must henceforth lend authority to her name and to that of her son.

The Confederates did not think it advisable at present to revoke entirely the edict of January, but they abolished it without delay in the capital and its environs.

Their design was to enforce the revocation of the edict in the principal cities first, and then throughout the whole kingdom. The King of Navarre* said this expressly to the Spanish ambassador, and took the same occasion to remind King Philip of the favor he had promised in the indemnification for Navarre, the negotiations concerning which were resumed; for the majority of the governors had given in their adhesion to the Guises, and were besides bound to place the armed power collectively at their disposal for the suppression of the Huguenots.

In order to reach this end the more easily, they made a trial of the Prince of Condé's firmness without delay.

Louis Prince of Condé was remarkable for his versatility and enjoyment of life, he was fond of jesting and laughter, and not inaccessible to sensual indulgences, which brought him into frequent collision with the severity of Huguenot morality. It was thought that, not being wealthy, the offer of a principality, which it was intended to make him, would prove irresistible, and bring him back once more to the Papacy; but they were mistaken in him: the doctrines he professed had for him an importance beyond the momentary authority with which they invested him, and he declined all the offers that were made him. There was in him a certain elevation of mind which displayed itself in a natural eloquence, that awakened the admiration of his friends; his temperament was such that difficulties and dangers were more salutary to him than a life of ease and prosperity. He would have thought it a disgrace to refuse the offered contest.

tant qu'elle tiendroit la main à la conservation de la religion et autorité du Roi." As the latter is self-evident, the emphasis rests on the former.

* Chantonay, May 29; p. 29, etc.

If, when the Guises had formerly conducted the government in the name of Francis II., the legality of their position was questioned, and resistance to their authority held to be justifiable, how much more was that the case now, when they opposed, on their own mere authority, a law which had been established with all formality—when they had begun their resistance to it with deeds of sanguinary violence, and brought the persons of the king and queen into their power, not without compulsion! The Prince of Condé declared that the queen mother and the young king were held in captivity by the Guise party, and that the best service he could do them was to be effected with arms in his hands. Were it otherwise, however, and they were in freedom, he would cast himself to the ground before them.

Animated with these ideas, the nobility from all the provinces of the kingdom gathered round him.

The leaders were his own nearest relatives: there were the three Chatillons, the uncles of his consort; the Count Porcian who was married to his niece; Francis de Rochefoucault, who was married to his sister-in-law, and of whom it was said that he could bring an army into the field composed of his friends and vassals in Poitou alone. The Viscount René de Rohan led the Bretons, Anthony Count de Grammont the Gascons, Montgommery was present from Normandy, and Hangest de Genlis from Picardy. At Orléans, where the Prince took his position, there assembled in a short time three thousand gentlemen, of whom Languet says, "If they were destroyed, the very seed of masculine virtue would have been annihilated in the kingdom." An association was formed among them, to continue until the King himself grasped the reins of government, when all that had been done would be justified.

The Protestant clergy examined the question whether it was lawful to have recourse to arms in the present state of things, and pronounced it to be not only permitted, but enjoined as a duty, for the liberation of the King and the Queen, for the defense of religion, and for the maintenance of the edict which had been solemnly enacted and promulgated.

Like the nobility, the cities of the second rank generally

joined Condé, or were taken possession of without difficulty—in the immediate neighborhood, Blois, Tours, Bourges, and Angers; in Poitou, Poitiers; and Rochelle in Aulnis; in Normandy Havre, Dieppe, and Caen; and further, Châlons-sur-Saône, Macon, Lyons; the chief towns of Dauphiné, Gap, and Grenoble; all the Venaisin and Vivarez, the towns of the Cevennes; and important places in Languedoc, as Montauban, Nismes, and Montpellier. While the edict of January was revoked in Paris, the Prince of Condé promulgated it in all the places which acknowledged him, for he had adopted a kind of anti-government system as an inviolable law in his conduct.

Thus did both parties stand opposed to each other, fully armed and determined to decide their quarrel by judgment of battle: between them the government of a boy and a woman disappeared.

In England and Germany the proofs advanced by the Prince of Condé, in justification of his proceedings, were accepted as satisfactory. The old Landgrave Philip of Hesse gave the Marshal Rollshausen leave to advance into France with some thousands of cavalry and arquebusiers, for as it was certain that the enterprise was meant to effect the liberation of the King and his mother, it might be undertaken with a good conscience. Queen Elizabeth, besides this, regarded the possibility of the Guises obtaining authority over the neighboring ports in Normandy as dangerous to herself, since the members of that house were her particular enemies, but the Huguenots were obliged to promise that they would deliver Havre-de-Grâce into her possession provisionally, before she would agree to assist them with either men or money. In November, 1562, Condé was strong enough in native and foreign forces to take the field. The death of his brother Anthony, who lost his life in consequence of a wound he received in an attack upon Rouen, gave Condé greater claims to authority than he possessed previously: in his brother's place, he now demanded that he should be himself acknowledged as Lieutenant-General of the King. His intention was to proceed directly to Paris, and to decide the cause by one great blow; and, from the excellent appearance and courage

of his troops, his friends believed that the design must succeed.*

The Guises meanwhile had also collected a body of auxiliaries—German mercenaries who came for pay; members of the Helvetic Confederacy from Lucerne and the Forest-cantons, who came, as the inscription on their banners stated, in order to support the King of France and the old religion; some thousands of Spaniards also arrived; and the Guises had the adroitness to amuse the Prince with negotiations until all were collected, and even the fortifications of Paris in some measure completed.

The Prince, whose associates had from the beginning disapproved of his negotiations, confessed at length that there was nothing to be effected here, and directed his course toward Normandy, where the struggle had commenced with the greatest fury. The province had in part fallen into the hands of his antagonists, but the English had already arrived and brought him a sum of money. He intended to surprise Chartres, to throw himself then upon Pont-de-l'Arche, and to take possession of the towns and strong places on both sides of the Seine. The English ambassador, who was with him, confirmed him in this intention, and urged him to its execution.

This was, however, the course which the Catholic confederates were least disposed to allow, and they therefore placed themselves directly in his way, on the plains of Dreux. On the 19th of December, 1562, a collision took place on the banks of the Eure—the first between the two parties in the open field. It well deserves an attempt to recall its principal traits.

The two armies stood inactive before each other for a considerable time, while the artillery played on both sides, yet without doing much damage. Condé's chief gunner showed himself particularly incompetent. Among the French gentry on both sides the reflection was excited that they had now opposed to them companions in arms, fellow-countrymen, and

* *Literæ* Bezæ ex pago Sti. Arnolphi, 14 December (MS. at Geneva): "*Nullæ usquam copiæ instructiores vel alacriores;*" the negotiations had taken place "*multis frementibus et nostris reclamantibus, sed frustra.*"

blood-relations, proved in many a former struggle for a common cause. But the new and great questions which divided them could not be otherwise decided—they must meet one another on the deadly field. Condé was the first to attack; with the portion of his cavalry comprising the most zealous adherents of the new faith, and the most practiced in the use of arms, he charged the Catholic centre, and threw it into confusion. The Constable, who commanded it, was thrown from his horse, but caused himself to be lifted into his saddle again, renewed the battle, and was taken prisoner. Meanwhile Condé's mercenaries advanced upon the Swiss battalions of the centre, which had remained firm notwithstanding the rout of the cavalry, and now advanced to meet the assailants whom they repulsed with loss, and presented to their repeated attacks an impenetrable forest of lances. While the battle was raging here, Francis Duke of Guise, who led the van, and St. André, to whom the rear-guard was intrusted, remained immovable, and many mistook Guise's motives; but he possessed the comprehension of a true general, and knew that the issue of a battle does not depend so much upon single advantages as upon the total victory.* When the Huguenots were thrown into disorder by the pursuit of the routed and the resistance of the Swiss, he put himself in motion, and the dark cloud of his Spanish and French battalions poured itself over the field, crushing down all before it. Condé brought up fresh troops without ceasing, to resist Guise's movement, and was at last himself wounded and taken prisoner. This however did not decide the affair. The troops which were unbroken collected themselves under the Admiral, behind a pile of felled timber, which was more in favor of the assailed than the assailants. "He who holds his troops together to the last," cried Coligny, "carries off the fruit of the battle." Here he found means to maintain his position gallantly against all the attacks of Guise and St. André. Among many other men of name who fell was the Marshal St. André himself. The battle was lost to the Huguenots, but Coligny was able to retreat unmolested.

* Montaigne, who it is known was well up in his Plutarch, compares Guise's conduct with that of Philopœmen against Machanidas, i. 45.

The Protestants were very far from regarding themselves as conquered.

"Our infantry," said the Admiral, in a letter to the Queen of England, "has suffered a defeat without fighting, but our cavalry, which alone fought the battle, is undamaged, and wishes for nothing more ardently than to meet once more, without delay, the enemies of God and of the kingdom; these will deliberate whether to attack us or to await an attack from our side."*

After the prisoners had been placed in security, the Admiral in a short time repassed the Loire, and renewed the war in Normandy.

But Guise was also strong, and took the field in force; he undertook the siege of Orléans, without doubt the most important place in the possession of the Huguenots.

Here, however, he was himself destined to give a proof that the worst consequences of political or religious passions are not those which arise from their giving themselves vent in open battle.

That which characterizes other Romanic nations even at the present day, the habit of repaying violent deeds with violent deeds, was then the general custom of France also. The Duke of Guise had caused a number of English and French Protestants, who had fallen into his hands in Normandy, to be shot, in return for which the Prince of Condé caused all those who had borne arms against him in Pluviers, which he had just conquered, to be hanged. If a Protestant counselor was deprived of life at Paris, a Catholic must die for it at Orléans; and now this furious passion of retaliation with injustice and cruelty, for injustice and cruelty suffered, took a personal direction against Francis Guise himself. The deed he perpetrated at Vassy was regarded as the horror of horrors, and he himself pointed out as a destroyer of men; prayers were offered in the religious assemblies that God would liberate his people from the tyrant. Calvin asserts that long

* Ducamp à Mém. January 2, 1563, in Forbes, ii. 247. Beza, December 27, 1562 (MS. Genev.): "Noster equitatus est integer, exceptis equitibus ad summum 150 partim captis partim interfectis; apud hostes infinita sunt vulnere et cædes maxima."

previous to this the offer had been made him by persons of resolution to rid the world of the Duke, and that they were prevented from doing so only by his dehortations. Now, however, Guise, who was besieging the chief stronghold of Protestantism with the aid of a powerful force, appeared more formidable than ever, and there he was assassinated by a fanatical Huguenot, a young man named Poltrot de Meré, who was in the service of the Duke of Soubise. Poltrot had spoken to the preachers of his having received, as he believed, a special mission for the accomplishment of this deed, but they had exhorted him not to undertake it, and warned him of the spiritual dangers which he would incur by it, yet not altogether so powerfully as to change his intentions. As it was maintained that the murders of the Admiral and his brother, as well as of the Prince, were known to have been concerted by the Catholics, Poltrot ventured to give the Admiral himself some hints of his intention. Coligny guarded himself from giving the fanatic any encouragement, but, on the other hand, he did not prevent him, considering it sufficient that he had warned the Duke of a similar attempt formerly. Poltrot remained persuaded that he ought to avenge upon the Duke the wickedness he had committed against poor Christians, and felt animated by religious zeal to prevent similar deeds for the future; even in the churches the act was spoken of as a righteous judgment of God.

Before the fanatical conception of religion, the morality which lies at the foundation of all civilization and of all human society vanished. A mingling of resignation with enmity, of religion with hatred, took place, such as the world had never before witnessed. It was like a bloody religious feud, in which those who held the same principles regarded themselves as one family. Whither would this have led in process of time!

After the leader had fallen, the further continuation of the war was not to be thought of; to the others also who had occasioned the recourse to arms it had brought only disaster—Navarre and St. André were slain, and Montmorency was in prison. The Queen could now, as she had always desired, bring about a peace.

Having given Condé his liberty from the Catholic prison, and obtained that of Montmorency from the Huguenots, she contrived a meeting between both on an island in the Loire—*aux Bouvieres*—near Orléans. She had a kind of chamber erected for them on a barge, but they preferred the open air, and conversed, while walking up and down, of the past and the future: the first subject discussed and determined upon was the liberation of the prisoners. The next day the Queen herself appeared on the island, and an earnest conference took place concerning the establishment of peace. Condé insisted upon the renewal of the edict of January, which had been issued in consequence of a peculiarly formal and solemn consultation: Montmorency answered, "that it was impossible the edict could be acknowledged by the adherents of the Pope." They then returned to the consideration of proposals somewhat similar to those made by the Queen at the last negotiations in the neighborhood of Paris, and at last, by mutual concessions, they came to an agreement, which was promulgated in the form of an edict on the 19th of March, 1563, at Amboise. The Protestants were by this edict guaranteed the liberty of worship in those towns in which they exercised it, and, besides this, in each official district a place was to be assigned to the Huguenots for the exercise of Divine worship. All noblemen should have the right to live according to the Confession in their own houses; the barons and holders of high jurisdictions, together with their tenantry and subjects. Upon one exception alone did the Queen insist with firmness—the exercise of the Reformed religion must remain prohibited within the metropolis and its district. Among the towns which had been engaged in the war, Paris had taken a distinguished part; the citizens had armed themselves, and furnished money for the army, chiefly from their own resources; they were unconquered, and would not allow themselves to be forced once more to receive the Huguenots. What would not Condé have given to be able to appear there again at their head! he declared that the danger alone with which such a step menaced the Crown had induced him to give way.

The pacification thus took place like a treaty of peace be-

tween two hostile powers, which confirms to each the results obtained by the changeful fortune of arms. It did not guarantee to the Protestants what they had previously possessed, nor what they still laid claim to, but yet it gave them much more than their opponents wished to concede. They were still so strong that the Parliament dared not refuse to verify and promulgate the edict; and now, under the protection of legal authority, and re-established once more in the King's peace, they were at liberty to erect their churches, and to attempt an imitation of the religious and civil life of Geneva.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE UNIVERSAL RELIGIOUS WAR IN FRANCE, FROM 1567
TO 1570.

ANOTHER feature, of a more political character, appeared in this event. There was still a royal authority in France.

We have seen how it was almost taken possession of by a party, and that Queen Catharine did not dare to oppose the Duke of Guise.* She lamented his death in a seemly manner, but was heard to say soon after, that if it had happened earlier, it would have been better for the welfare of France. Navarre and St. André were also dead. The war had removed the chiefs who had imposed their will upon her; she could now indulge the thought of being able to govern by herself, as far as in the confused state of affairs it was possible.

The first step was to establish this pacification, and the heads of the hostile parties, both Montmorency and Condé, were obliged to lend her their assistance.

By this she acquired the merit of having once more united the power of the kingdom, and of having directed it against Havre-de-Grâce. The English had founded great hopes upon the possession of this town, and expected at least to obtain Calais once more in exchange for it; but the want of supplies in the fortress, a virulent sickness which broke out among the garrison, as well as the course and nature of things, rendered it impossible to maintain the place. Newhaven, as the English named Havre, fell again into the hands of the French,

* M. A. Barbaro: "Nè gli si poteva la Regina apertamente contrapporsi, dubitando ella non si far nemica la parte Cattolica, la (qual) s'appoggiava e dipendeva da esso Duca totalmente, come suo capo"

to the no small honor of the Queen, who was known to have urgently insisted upon the undertaking.*

In order that every objection to her government should be removed, the Queen Mother caused the young King, who had just entered his fourteenth year, to be declared of full age. This declaration was accompanied with a renewal of the edict of pacification, which was confirmed in all its points; the suggestion of the Parliament of Paris against that course having been rejected with some asperity.

The enmity of the parties, which from time to time blazed forth, was a source of much perplexity to her Government. The widow of the Duke of Guise implored vengeance for the murder of her husband, and innumerable disputes arose concerning property and legal titles. The Queen endeavored, if not to satisfy both parties, at least to keep them in something like a state of moderation. She conducted herself, says the Venetian Barbaro, with sagacious deliberation toward both parties. She formed her resolutions from the actual state of circumstances, and carried them out in accordance with new considerations; she had the skill to fill both parties at one time with hopes, and at another with apprehensions. The offices rendered vacant by the death of the Duke of Guise, she distributed among his relatives, without regarding the complaints of the Constable, who claimed for himself the dignity of a *grand-maitre*; soon after, however, she appeased his discontent by bestowing an extraordinary favor upon his son. In December, 1563, the Constable and the Admiral appeared at court, surrounded by retinues greater than that of the King himself. The Parisians observed, with suppressed rage, that among them were the very men who, some time before, were desirous of conquering and plundering the city; the Queen, however, did not interfere.

The Prince of Condé, who was not wanting in activity at the siege of Havre, appeared at the Court at Fontainebleau, in the beginning of the year 1564, and was most cordially received. As he had distinguished himself by his bravery in the field, he now desired to shine through his versatility, by

* Barbaro: "Essendo seguita questa impresa quasi per sola volontà sua."

taking part in the knightly festivities of the Court, in which it was then the fashion to represent the heroic fables of the Greeks, and, in accordance with his nature, allowed himself to be but too easily ensnared by the pleasures of the Court.

When the Court left Fontainebleau, on the progress through the kingdom, which brought it as far as Bayonne, the preservation of the peace of the capital, which was in a state of ceaseless fermentation, was intrusted to Francis de Montmorency, the son of the Constable. A prohibition against carrying fire-arms, which had been issued a short time previously, was indispensable to him for this purpose, and he enforced it even against the Cardinal of Lorraine himself. The Cardinal, confiding in a prerogative granted him by the Queen, wished to bring his two nephews, Guise and Mayenne, into Paris with an armed escort, but Montmorency met and disarmed them on their entrance: he was of opinion that he ought not to allow the general law to be infringed in his government, and, besides, he had a strong objection to that privilege of the Cardinal, as well as to his manner of making it subserve his purposes.

The public saw in this a movement of the old party spirit which animated each faction with a desire to inflict a blow upon the other. The Queen did not rest until, on her return to Moulins, the feud was extinguished, at least in appearance. The Admiral Coligny declared, before the secret council of the King, as if he had been in the presence of God, that he had had no part in the murder of the Duke of Guise, and was acquitted of all blame in the matter. A *scène* of reconciliation ensued, which, for a time at least, gave a pledge of peace, and which might have guaranteed its continuance further, had not the general European character of the great religious opposition to the old Church, which was constantly on the increase, reacted upon France also.

The Council, which the adherents of the new opinions had so often demanded, had at length been held, but in a form altogether different from what they had proposed; and its conclusions amounted to a rejection of every opinion which varied from the ancient system, to which it gave a definite constitu-

tion, and to the hierarchy generally a connection of parts and a discipline which it had never previously possessed.

In France there was no intention of submitting inconsiderately to the decrees of the Council respecting the constitution of the Church and its reform. A number of presidents and members of the Parliament, before whom the Court caused the decrees to be laid, declared that they were incompatible with the rights of the Crown and with the prerogatives of the Gallican Church.*

It was impossible that the French Legislature, which was at the very moment occupied with measures for the protection of the jurisdiction of the kingdom from all foreign influence, and for its centralization in the hands which wielded the supreme power, could adopt decrees which vindicated the old complete independency of the spiritual jurisdiction. The efforts of the Chancellor L'Hôpital were directed much more to the subjection of the spiritual to the secular jurisdiction, and four-fifths of his colleagues in the Council held similar opinions. The Queen, as she could expect no satisfactory result from the articles of the Council of Trent, entertained the design of bringing the most distinguished princes together to a consultation, in order to compel the Pope to several things in which he had hitherto shown himself exceedingly obstinate, for she thought that he would not be able to withstand the authority of such great princes.

So far as we have authentic information of the Queen's intentions at this period, there is no room to doubt that she desired earnestly to maintain this condition of peace, after which well-disposed men, like De Thou, the historian, yearned in after times. "The misfortunes of the last war," said she, in a letter to her ambassador at Vienna, "have taught men that religion is not to be restored by force of arms;" and added, that she had opposed such a course from the beginning, but had not then the power to prevent it, and that,

* The articles mentioned by Matthieu, "Histoire de France," i. 279, and which also exist elsewhere, of a delegation which was to be held at Fontainebleau, in February, I can not regard as genuine; they are in discordance with the letters of the Queen, Feb. 28, and of Morvilliers, March 3, 1564.

now the pacification was effected with such infinite pain, she would, if it were necessary, lay down her own life to preserve it.*

Whatever conduct the Court might have adopted, the spirit of party, which had never been subdued, wrought in the depths of men's minds, and, in association with the religious agitations, especially with the doctrine and teaching of the Jesuits, who had established themselves in France in defiance of all opposition, caused an antagonistic movement in the nation. The natural indwelling aversion of the professors of an acknowledged and prevailing doctrine to all variations from its standard, was fanned to a glowing hatred; expressions indicating a thirst for blood, at which men stood aghast, were heard among the mob of Paris.

When the Court came to Lyons, information was conveyed to it that if the King and his advisers should continue to resist the impending general rising against the Huguenots, it would be turned against himself; and the eagerness for the possession of the estates to be confiscated already showed itself. In the south of France anti-Protestant associations were formed, of which the Court was very far from approving.

The influence of Spain was also felt anew; it had rejected every thing like toleration within its own bounds, and it sought to make things retrograde in France also.

It is perfectly true, as it has always been narrated, that at the meeting between the Queen Mother and her daughter of Spain, which took place at Bayonne in June, 1565, the Duke of Alva left no means untried to urge upon the French Court stronger measures against the Huguenots; in which he found the liveliest co-operation among some of the French who accompanied the Court. The Duke of Montpensier, who wished to place himself at the head of a Catholic association, Blaise Monluc, who was eager to acquire a religious and chivalrous reputation in the contest with the Huguenots, the Cardinal of Lorraine, and others, cordially agreed that two great re-

* "Je veux conserver la tranquillité d'aujourd'hui jusques à y employer ma propre vie."—Le Laboureur, Additions to Castelnau, ii. 329.

sources must be brought into operation against the Huguenots. The one was to expel the whole body of their preachers from the country; the other, at once to assassinate the unhappy men who stood at the head of the faction—in number from four to six, and upon whom all depended—or in some other way to render them incapable of doing mischief. It is a great error to believe that either the young King or Queen Catharine was a party to these designs, or that the plan, as concerted, was to be executed by them. Charles IX. expressed his dislike to violent measures, and on one occasion, when it was proposed only to renew the war, with such emphasis, that Alva remarked, ironically, he appeared to have learned his lesson well. Catharine also rejected with decision a suggestion that L'Hôpital should be dismissed from office. She even spoke, at one time, of a national ecclesiastical council, to inquire whether the decrees of the Council of Trent could be accepted.* The Spanish Court would not now proceed further in considering the French proposals for a new alliance of the two houses, by means of a marriage, to take place at a future time; and both parties separated from each other with coolness.

Alva did not on this account abandon his projects; he gave expression to the most extensive and daring designs, and declared that if the French government refused to participate in them, he was himself ready to unite with the leaders of

* This is the import of Alva's letters to King Philip from June 13 to July 4, from which H. Martin has given an extract, x. 682. St. Sul-pice (in the Raumer letters from Paris, i. 117) was not well informed. The assertion, so often repeated, that the murder of all the Huguenot leaders, a kind of Sicilian Vespers, was proposed and resolved upon here in Bayonne, just as it came to pass afterward, is stated with emphasis by Gio. B. Adriani, "Storia di Suoi Tempi," 1583, iii. 740. It was intended to carry the scheme into execution at the proposed meeting at Moulins, but it was given up "per alcuni sospetti che apparivano nelli Ugonotti." He does not say that he has this from any special source of information: "Questo fatto non si seppe allora per alcun principe, ma il tempo l' a poi scoperto." Thuanus caused this narrative to obtain some credit by suggesting that it might have been derived from the papers of Duke Cosmo of Florence; "ex Cosmi Etruriæ Ducis, ut verosimile est, multa hausit" (the words of Adrian remind us of the expressions which appear in the biography of the Admiral, published in 1575). This narrative has henceforth predominated in history.

the Catholic party, who had already manifested their adherence to King Philip, and emulated his own subjects in the confidence they placed in him. Montpensier said that if his heart were opened the name of Philip would be found written on it.

Some time after this, we find Catharine still true to her maxims: when, in consequence of the severity of the Spanish measures, commotions broke out in the Netherlands, she thought it fortunate for France not to have experienced so great an evil, and stated that all the French were concerned in respecting it was, to preserve their own country in a peaceful condition.*

It was, however, one of the most difficult of all the problems of political science, in a time of universal disunion, when the spirit of party agitated all Europe, and broke out in various contests, to preserve the independent position of a state in whose interior the same elements were fermenting. It required a firm, decided mind in the general conduct of affairs, and a definite object.

In Catharine, whose personal peculiarities we shall notice hereafter, there was so much consciousness of the true conditions of authority, that she endeavored to keep down the rage of the several parties. Her love of peace had no other foundation than a dislike of war. She declared a thousand times to the Papal nuncio, as well as to the Spanish and Venetian ambassadors, that she hoped yet to be able to re-establish the old condition of things. The opinion that she cherished an inclination to the Huguenots and their doctrines, was one that she always contradicted with a kind of offended anger. She was seen once more assisting, with her sons, at the ecclesiastical processions; she removed from the Court all the ladies who had ceased to attend the Catholic services and ceremonies; wherever the Court appeared, no Protestant worship was permitted for many miles round. The edict of pacification was limited by partial arrangements, now in one

* "Qu'il se fallait mettre en peine de s'y conserver (en repos) e d'y demeurer hors des maux que havoient les aultres."—From one of her letters, in Bouillé, ii. 383. A collection of Catharine's letters is indispensable to a detailed history of those times.

way and now in another, without any respect to the complaints of the Huguenots, however well grounded. They gnashed their teeth, but they did not stir, as the state of things in general gave no cause for dissatisfaction.

There has never been any proof brought forward that an understanding existed with King Philip, when he sent an Italian and Spanish army into the Netherlands under the Duke of Alva. On the contrary, we find that the towns were ordered to be fortified, lest, little as it was expected, they might possibly be attacked by the Spaniards; that, a short time previously, an alliance was again formed with Switzerland, in direct opposition to Spain; and that a fresh enlistment of troops was effected there in the year 1567, amidst impediments constantly thrown in the way by the Spanish faction.

It was not possible, however, for the government, as the leaders of the Huguenots required, either to make the movement in the Netherlands subserve the political interests of France, or to oppose the passage of Alva's troops. Condé had founded the most ambitious expectations upon these projects; between him and the Queen's second son, the Duke of Anjou, whom she was endeavoring to place at the head of the armed power, because she deemed him personally more to be relied on than the King, an angry explanation took place at the supper-table. "Cousin," said the Duke, "if you strive to obtain what belongs to me, I will make you little in the same degree as you imagine to become great."* The times were past when the Prince could have flattered himself with the hope of acquiring a leading influence in general affairs, and of moderating the portions of the Edict of Pacification which were unfavorable to his co-religionists. These very pretensions of his excited the Queen's antipathy against him.

No sooner had the champions of the Huguenots left the Court than the Cardinal of Lorraine appeared there and took his old place in the Council. With all his apparent moderation and much vacillation in his ordinary conduct, he was

* What Brantôme narrates concerning this incident in the life of Condé (*Hommes Illustres*, iii. 218) receives a peculiar illustration from the intelligence which reached Germany.—Schardius, *De rebus gestibus sub Maximiliano*, ii. 64.

ever the same—unchangeable in his views, and, despite of all reconciliation, implacable. He was not yet master in the highest Council, but he might be so at any moment.

The tidings of Alva's arrival in the Netherlands had meanwhile reached France, and of the arbitrary measures he had taken against all who had hitherto been powerful, and whom he looked upon as hostile, or even as not cordial. The Protestants throughout Europe regarded Alva's mission as a common danger—as the beginning of a hostile enterprise affecting them all; but the danger was nearest and most imminent to the Huguenots in France.

Even the French government commenced arming. New captains were appointed to the civic militia of Paris; the companies of the *hommes d'armes* were raised to their full number. The newly enlisted Swiss, who were to have defended the frontiers, were, to the number of six thousand, all zealous Catholics, drawn into the interior of the kingdom. This was the ancient resource of the supreme power in its intestine as well as in its foreign wars. The Lieutenant-Governor of Champagne, Barbezieux, made it publicly known that their destination was against the Huguenots; they were warned of the same by those members of the Council, who with their assistance hoped to be able to resist the Cardinal. The most fearful apprehensions took possession of them. Their King was a child, the Queen a woman upon whom no dependence could be placed, and in whom no one confided: how easily might she be persuaded that what she had held to be impracticable could be accomplished without difficulty, or even, as in the year 1562, be carried away by the hostile faction, to give an apparent consent to their proceedings! The Huguenots were determined not to allow this to take place a second time. How could it be expected, said they, that we should continue to make requests to them, and to wait inactively for their answers, until through the power of our enemies at the Court we be condemned afresh and overpowered—until we are thrown into prison or chased like wild animals in the woods, should we flee from the tyranny? With the power they possessed they declared that such pusillanimous conduct would bring them into contempt with all

the warriors in the world. They determined on this occasion to anticipate the movements of their enemies—to compel the Court to remove the Cardinal, and to dismiss the Swiss troops—for French history teaches that that party only which was master of the Court could accomplish any thing.*

Had Calvin lived, I am of opinion that he would have approved as little of this deviation from the regular course of justice, in which the faithful should ever be consistent, as he did before of the plot at Amboise; the Admiral Coligny, the coolest and most penetrating of the French leaders, was also against it at the beginning. But the urgency of the gentry, who were always easily aroused, and now excited with Protestant sympathy, and goaded by vague apprehensions, was not to be resisted: it appeared to them that all their actions would be justified when they had a prince of the blood at their head like Condé, who was now as zealous as any. They resolved then to take up arms, a course for which they were always prepared.

On the 27th of September, 1567, the movement took place simultaneously in all parts of the kingdom. While the distant provinces rose separately, the Huguenots from the surrounding country assembled at Roye-en-Brie, and took their way toward the residence of the Court, which was then at Monceaux, near Meaux, hoping to surprise it during the preparations for the solemn observance of Michaelmas.

In the secrecy with which the plan was formed, and the rapidity and precision of its execution, the learned men of the age could find nothing in the whole course of history to be compared with it, without going back to the times of Mithridates, king of Pontus.

The Court, however, was warned at the critical moment, and returned to Paris under the protection of the Swiss—so far therefore the enterprise of the Huguenots had miscarried; but they had the upper hand in all parts of the country, and menaced the capital, and the Cardinal was in fact compelled to leave the Court: he took an opportunity to escape during the tumult, and fled to Rheims.

It appeared to him very possible that the Huguenots might obtain the mastery in the struggle, and force the Crown to a

* La Noue, *Mémoires* Anc. Cl. xlvii. 169.

treaty, which might have the effect of expelling him and his family from France.

The offers which the Cardinal made, under the influence of this fear, to the King of Spain, are not only curious for the moment, but also of consequence for later times. He called the attention of the monarch to the claims he possessed upon the crown of France in right of his consort, and offered to place himself altogether under his protection and to deliver into his hands some strong places on the French frontiers. Both the King and his general, Alva, were inclined at this time to accept the offer of the strong places, but of nothing more;* they were also afraid that the Huguenots would succeed in reducing the Court to terms, in which case they resolved to carry the war themselves into France, for the establishment of Catholicism.

This time, however, things did not come to so decided a rupture between the parties. The Huguenots, on the failure of their first attempt, contented themselves with making demands for their security; and the whole question now was whether the Court would accede to these demands.

They first brought forward the oft-discussed state of the nation, in association with their own particular case. There were many grievances of which all complained—the unworthy occupation of offices, the imposts continually increasing, even in times of peace, and which went for the most part to enrich the Italian bankers, and the presence of foreign troops: they also demanded that the Estates should be again convoked; but, as was said to them, they had in these demands encroached upon the royal office.† In the second memorial therefore they left all these grievances out of view, and asked only for liberty, “to call upon God publicly according to the purity of the Gospel without distinction of place or persons, in order that they might be able to yield lawful obedience to the King, whom they were subject to next after God.” Their

* We learn this from a letter of Alva to King Phillip II., Nov. 1, 1567, in Gachard's *Correspondence de Philippe II.*, i. 593, No. 673.

† Popelinière, xii. 21, 23, has both articles. Serranus remarks that the Queen declared “caput illud de onerum levatione” to be rebellious, and thereby caused it to be altered: iii. 92.

request implied no doubt a complete equality of rights, though expressly they merely asked for the repeal of limitations which had been made to the Edict of Pacification.

The Court, however, now in the midst of its orthodox capital, did not feel so weak as to yield to the necessity of conceding even this immediately: furnished with a sum of money by the clergy who were assembled in accordance with the agreement made at Poissy, it felt itself able to send a force into the field from the walls of Paris against the Huguenots. Old Montmorency had placed himself once more at the disposal of the King, stating that he was willing to die at the foot of the throne: the leading of the troops was accordingly intrusted to him. The two armies met on the 10th of November, at *St. Denis*, and a fierce, short, and bloody encounter ensued. The Huguenots lost the day, but the Catholics also suffered severely; Montmorency himself was mortally wounded, and died a few days afterward.

It rested with the Queen alone to bring a more considerable armed force into the field. The Duke of Alva had offered to enter France with an army of 5000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, and to terminate the whole matter if she desired it.* Her refusal of this offer is easily comprehended, if it arose from a hesitation to introduce into France a power which would have imposed laws on herself; but how is it to be accounted for that she made no opposition to the enlistment of troops in Germany for the Huguenots,† and even requested those who were engaged in preparations for arming them to hasten their operations, as likely to promote peace?

John Casimir, of the Palatinate, who was zealous for his creed, and always prepared to fight, entered France at the head of seven thousand five hundred cavalry and some thousands of infantry—not, as he declared, to make war upon the King, for should even his co-religionists attempt such a course, he would himself turn his arms against them, but to defend them against the enemies of their persons and their religion. Immediately afterward the Huguenots formed a junction with the German auxiliaries, and the united force directed its march

* Alva's letter, December, 1567, in Gachard, 608, etc.

† Such is the report of Hubert Languet.—Epp. Arc. i. 43.

upon Chartres. It appeared as if the city must in all probability fall into their hands, when the Court (March 28, 1568) resolved in reality upon peace, granting to the Huguenots what they had demanded from the beginning, namely, the restoration of the Edict of Pacification to its full operation.

A request that they should receive a guarantee for the fulfillment of these promises, was declined by the Court as an indignity, and the Huguenots resolved not to insist upon it. In fact, the gentry, fatigued with the hardships of a winter campaign, longed for their homes; they imagined they had accomplished their object, and hoped now "to be able to honor God, and to serve the King in peace." The Germans, in like manner, returned to their own country. It seemed as if the balance of power between the two parties would be again restored, even in the midst of the universal storm.

Was this in reality to be expected, however, from the nature of affairs and relations in France, or from the personal character of those who guided them?

I can not concur in the statement so often repeated, that this peaceful agreement was formed with the deliberate intention of breaking it immediately. It had been brought about by the Chancellor L'Hôpital and the Bishops of Limoges and Orléans, the most moderate members of the Council, who held that concession was necessary, and upon that ground all their policy, and who, no doubt, would have observed it willingly. But the spirit of party division had penetrated the Council itself, and by the side of the members who loved peace, sat men of another disposition—men who rejected every thing like concession, as fundamentally inadmissible. The Cardinal of Lorraine had again taken his place there, after the storm had blown over, and now received more countenance from the Queen than formerly. However her language might vary, she could not pardon the last rising of the Huguenots, the disrespect they had shown for the royal dignity, and the embarrassment into which they had brought the Court. Besides this, the Cardinal was indispensable to her, since his authority in the capital, which, being thoroughly Catholic, placed the utmost confidence in him, would most easily induce the citizens to grant her supplies of money. King Philip

once more offered his assistance in the most respectful terms: he especially magnified the political motive of the rebellious proceedings which had taken place at Meaux: it might be thought, he said, that he wished to sow discord in France for selfish purposes, but that such arts were foreign to him as a knight and a man of honor; with all that he was and all that he possessed, he was ready to serve the French Crown in its contest with the rebels.*

Many others also, greatly exaggerating the objects of the Huguenots in their movement upon Meaux, reminded the young King Charles that he was not bound to observe either truth or consideration toward rebels who had attempted his life and his authority. In Alva's letter to him, appear the most inflexible maxims of religious and political absolutism. "A prince," said he, "who enters into a treaty with his subjects can never again reckon upon their obedience. It is not competent to him to make concessions in matters of religion, for in doing so he interferes with foreign rights—the rights of God, who will not suffer it; better is it that a kingdom should be ruined by war, than that it should be allowed to apostatize from God and from the King for the advantage of Satan and the heretics, his retainers."† His suggestion must have been all the more influential, since he had succeeded in keeping the Netherlands in subjection. To this advice, the Cardinal added that the conduct of the Huguenots was a revolt against the Deity; that the King had it in his power to punish such rebellion, and that, if he neglected to do so, he might justly fear the vengeance of God. Pope Pius V., in the harshest terms, expressed his disapproval of the agreement that had been made, and enjoined the King to purge his kingdom of heretics, and his court of the corrupt counselors by whom he was surrounded.

A feeling akin to that expressed in these counsels and admonitions had been awakened in the interior of France. The

* "Che si vaglino delli Stadi della persona e di quanto ha".—The Venetian ambassador in Spain: November 10, 1567.

† "Il vaut beaucoup mieux avoir un royaume ruiné, en le conservant pour Dieu et le Roi, que de l'avoir tout entier au profit du démon et des hérétiques ses sectateurs."—In Gachard, 609, etc.

armed rising of the Huguenots, however well grounded it might have been, and the violent proceedings they had commenced, excited the aversion of all who did not belong to them. The blending of religious with political partisanship fanned all the passions of the time to a raging flame: the Venetian Corro asserts that he was not acquainted with one person who was not in a kind of fury on account of either his own affairs or those of his friends. The unanimity and progress of the Huguenots, had held their opponents in terror for a long time; but the peace had now a twofold effect—its conditions aroused the old Catholic pride, while the disarmament of the Huguenots gave their opponents resolution to declare against them. In the towns, where their place was now taken by royalist garrisons, the majority of the inhabitants, who were Catholics, would not hear of the fulfillment of the conditions of peace, and wherever the Huguenots raised their voices against this injustice, they were subjected to the violence of the mob. In several places the governors refused to lend their authority to the renewal of the Edict of Pacification. Associations were formed, in many of the provinces, between the governors, the nobility, and the clergy, which were called "Christian and royal," but in whose declarations there were clauses which breathed a spirit by no means royalist, as that of the union in Champagne "for the defense of the Catholic Church in France, and for maintaining the royal authority in the house of Valois," to which was appended the significant proviso, "so long as it should govern in the Catholic and apostolic religion."* Was not this rather a threat than a promise? It is still more broadly equivocal than the pledge once given by Francis Duke of Guise to Queen Catharine, that he would obey her if she would protect religion.

Under these circumstances the more moderate party could not maintain their position in the Council. L'Hôpital was once requested by a German friend still to attend the sittings occasionally, since, although he might not be able to effect any thing good, he might probably be the means of prevent-

* Serment des Associés de la Ligue Chrestienne et royale de la province de Champagne, 25 Juin, 1568.—Journal de Henry III., 1744, iii. 31.

ing much evil. The Chancellor replied that in the Council his very appearance was hateful, to say nothing of their attending to his advice. He states in his will that the young King himself did not dare to utter his opinions; in all decisions Catharine, the Cardinal, and the President Birago, who had a thorough understanding with them both, carried every thing in their own way.

A full execution of the treaty of peace was, as we have already hinted, not to be expected. Violence on the one side, and resistance on the other, with alternate charges and complaints, filled men's minds every where with new discord. The Catholic party, once more in possession of the supreme authority, had a decided preponderance, and, while the others dispersed toward their several homes, they took possession of the towns, the strong places, and the passages of the rivers, with their troops and devoted adherents; for they had not dismissed either the Swiss or the Italians, or even the French companies. Their first design seems to have been to keep the heads of the Huguenots separate from one another in the provinces where they resided—Montgommery in Normandy, Gensis and Mouy in Picardy, Andelot in Brittany, Rochefoucauld in Angoulême, and Condé and the Admiral in Burgundy. But their plan went still further. We know, with as much certainty as the state of affairs allows, that the government ordered Tavannes, governor of Burgundy, to seize Condé in his castle at Noyers. Tavannes belonged to the sternest section of the Catholic party, but he scrupled to break the peace, and especially to lay hands upon a prince of the blood; besides this, such proposals, coming from a woman, a priest, and a lawyer, were not at all approved of by the old soldier and gentleman, who contrived in some manner to send an obscure yet significant warning to Noyers.* The Admiral also happened to arrive there just at the moment. He had submitted to the treaty of peace only in accordance with the universal wish, and never properly approved of it, for he saw beforehand the results in which it would issue. The passages of the rivers were not, however, so closely watched that it was im-

* Mémoires de Tavannes, A. C. xxvii. 40. Popelinière asserts that all the governors had similar orders.

possible to flee: the Prince and the Admiral, with their wives and little children, fortunately saved themselves, and escaped to Rochelle, the inhabitants of which had taken good care not to receive a royal garrison, and which was now the place of general refuge. The Cardinal Chatillon, being threatened in his residence, in violation of a personal assurance which had been given him, fled to Tréport, where he was fortunate enough to find a vessel, in which he passed over to England.

The Counts Egmont and Horn had been executed a few months before in the Netherlands, and there is no doubt that, had the leaders of the Huguenots fallen into the hands of their enemies, a similar fate would have awaited them. It appeared as if the proposal made formerly at Bayonne, and afterward dropped, were about to be carried into execution.

The Edict of Pacification was, upon the demand of the Pope, solemnly revoked; the preachers were ordered to quit the kingdom within fourteen days; no Reformed person was to fill any public office; the mere freedom of conscience was granted to those only who should keep quiet in their homes, but the public exercise of any other religion than the Catholic was forbidden under pain of death.

The Queen allowed herself to be persuaded that the measures which she herself had helped to frustrate, in the previous administration under King Francis, were now salutary, and every thing seemed to lead back to the courses which had been forsaken. The Holy Father moreover yielded, as a rare favor, to a request that he would allow an alienation of the ecclesiastical property, but under the condition that the produce, amounting to about a million and a half francs, should be applied to the war against the Huguenots. When the war broke out he also sent an army himself across the Alps, with orders to avoid all intercourse with the Huguenots, and, if they should hear of any unchurchlike treaty with the heretics, immediately to separate themselves from the French. Alva enjoined the leaders of the troops which he sent into France to contrive that the example which he had given in the Netherlands should be followed in that kingdom also.

Thus did the universal movement affect France. By the relations in that country alone the rising of the Huguenots in

September, 1567, could not be explained, much less justified; it was the response of the Protestant spirit to Alva's proceedings in the Netherlands. But opposition ever begets opposition. The effect of their enterprise was to arouse a violent spirit of reaction among the Catholics of France, and to draw to their assistance allies from all parts of Europe. Disputes between states ceased for a moment, and the interest of the great ecclesiastical quarrel absorbed all others. The peculiar spirit which it occasionally called forth is worthy of remark. The Huguenots, both the princes and the common people, had given up their valuables and their savings the year before; in order to pay the German troops that had come to their assistance; in like manner the money to pay the Catholic army was collected in the places devoted to the Church from voluntary contributions. Money was also collected in the English churches to sustain the Protestants in France and in the Netherlands.

We have seen that the Catholic enterprise was joined with a common political tendency, namely the realization of that abstract authority which was to arise from the union of the spiritual with the secular power; but this tendency had also its antithesis.

I know not whether the alliance, which was at that time the subject of negotiation between the leaders in France and those of the Netherlands, actually took place; the mere sketch of such a union is all that exists, but the motives insisted upon in it are in the highest degree remarkable. They declare that they have no quarrel with the King, but merely with his advisers, who, in order to found a personal tyranny of their own, seek to suppress at the same time the true religion, the nobility, and that important civic class without which no royal authority can exist, and that it was necessary to save the royal authority itself from this abyss.*

In Germany and England no one would admit that either Condé or the Prince of Orange were rebels, for it was felt in

* *Projet d'Alliance*, Août, 1568, in Groen, "Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau," iii. 282: "Leur intention est d'exterminer la vraye religion et aussy la noblesse et autres gens de bien, sans lesquels les rois ne peuvent être maintenus en leurs royaumes."

both countries that the very foundations of the existing royal authority were threatened by the progress of this ideal hierarchical power, according to the decree of the Council of Trent. In July, 1568, Queen Elizabeth was informed of new attempts for her destruction. A bull of excommunication was prepared in Rome, which deprived her of all her rights. The countries might be different, and the dangers nearer or more remote, but the cause was the same.

Thus began the war which, in many respects, was a universal one, and may be regarded as unique in the course it took in the Netherlands and France.

In the year 1568 the war was carried on principally in the Netherlands, where Alva struck down all opposition with iron determination. In France numerous bodies of armed men eager for the contest stood opposed to each other, but without further collision than a few skirmishes of some magnitude, until a severe winter put an entire stop to any movements which might have issued in a battle.

In the year 1569, on the other hand, the weight of the contest rested on France. It is not quite clear that this was the result of any formal resolution of the Protestants of both countries, as was then stated;* but every one felt that there was a connection in the sequence of events. When the Cardinal of Lorraine applied to the King of Spain for assistance, his chief argument was that the good fortune of the Duke of Alva had turned the storm upon France, and that, should the Catholic cause be unsuccessful there, the whole power of the insurrection would be again thrown back upon the Netherlands. King Philip declared that the French cause did not lie less near to his heart than his own. The Prince of Orange also went himself into France, for he knew that he contended there against Philip as he had done in the Netherlands.

In the open field the fortune of arms was not favorable to the Protestant armies: they lost the battle of Jarnac in May, 1569, and the Prince of Condé was slain while fighting among

* "D'établir premièrement leurs affaires en France, comme au plus grand et principalieu, et que par après il leur sera bien aise de les établir aux Pays Bas."—La Mothe Fénelon, 28th November, 1568. (Dep. i. 21.)

the bravest. Another Palatine Prince, Duke Wolfgang, of Deuxponts, had just then conducted over the French borders an army which had been raised with the help of English subsidies; this force has been estimated at about seventeen thousand men, composed of High-German infantry, with cavalry from Lower Germany and Huguenots.

They succeeded in forcing their way amidst numerous difficulties, and although their leader died on the march into the interior of the country, but the fortune of the field was not retrieved even with their help. They were again beaten in a great battle at Moncontour, which was fought in October, 1569, and at which people professing the opposite creeds from all countries were engaged. The Germans were subjected in this affair to a fearful massacre. The Reformed were, however, too numerous, too well organized, and had struck their roots too deeply, to be subdued by the loss of a few pitched battles.

Many zealous Catholic commanders complained that in obedience to the royal edict they were obliged to spare the Huguenots in their own houses, and that by the persons thus spared, both men and women, the Huguenot army was supplied with necessaries, and received from them the best and most useful intelligence.*

It was of the greatest advantage to the Huguenots that they had made the district lying round about Rochelle an almost exclusively Protestant territory.

Rochelle had always been one of the first commercial places in France; it was well known to the English under the name of the White Town, as they called it, from its appearance when the sun shone and was reflected from its rocky coasts. It was also much frequented by the Netherlanders; there were, it is known, merchants belonging to the place who had each as many as ten ships at sea at one time.

The town had besides enjoyed extraordinary municipal franchises ever since the period of the English wars. It had by its own unaided power revolted from the English dominion, for which Charles V., in his customary manner, conferred upon the townsfolk valuable privileges—among others, that

* Commentaires de Blaise de Montluc, A. C. xxv.

of independent jurisdiction in the town and its liberties. The design of Henry II. to erect a citadel within their walls they had been enabled fortunately to prevent, through the favor of the Chatillons and the Montmorencies.*

Rochelle exhibited Protestant sympathies at an early period. A Genevese preacher arrived there in 1556 on his return from an unsuccessful missionary enterprise to Brazil, and founded a church among the Rochellers; with the rough and hardy population, habituated to the sea, a teacher like this, who had boldly performed his voyage across the ocean in a little vessel, must have found great acceptance. In all the reactionary changes and alternations of party during the civil war the Protestants held the ascendancy, chiefly because their religious claims concurred with the municipal rights of the city. The inhabitants of Rochelle would not suffer themselves to be again deprived of the public exercise of their religion, which had been accorded by the edict of January; and after the government had consented to withdraw its garrison and to intrust the fortress to the custody of the burghers, they could not be persuaded to receive any royalist troops within their walls. They preferred associating themselves with the Prince of Condé, whose whole argument in proof of the illegality of the power opposed to him they adopted as their own; they acknowledged his deputy as their governor, and took an oath of obedience to him.

It was of incalculable value to the cause of the Huguenots that their leaders, when suddenly beset in their own residences in the year 1568, were able to find a secure refuge in Rochelle. The Queen of Navarre also came thither with her son and a considerable military force: situated as she was on the borders between France and Spain, she felt herself in danger from both sides, and attributed to the Cardinal of Lorraine a design to annihilate the House of Bourbon. The idea was entertained of taking possession of Poitou, in the neighborhood of Rochelle, where the Protestant nobility had the preponderance, and afterward adding Guienne, which were to be erected into a Protestant state, acknowledging

* Arcène, 'Histoire de Rochelle,' i. 302, from the contemporary narrative of Barbot.

the supremacy of the king, but substantially independent—a sanctuary for all those who could not obtain toleration in the other districts of France. A number of strong places and towns situated within these limits had fallen into the hands of the Huguenots—St. Jean d'Angely, the wealthy and industrious Niort, the ancient residence of the Counts of Poitou and Fontenay le Compt—in short, so completely masters were they in this part of the kingdom, that when they proceeded to alienate the ecclesiastical lands, they actually found purchasers for them.

It was perfectly natural that the victorious Catholic army, after the battle of Moncontour, should direct its first efforts to the subjugation of this district. Some places fell into their hands easily, in others they met with a stubborn resistance. The garrison of St. Jean d'Angely, when the King, who was himself present, summoned them to surrender, ventured to reply that they had been placed there by their governor, the Prince of Navarre, and that to him, and to no other, were they answerable. They were compelled at last to yield; but the fury and resolution of the enterprise against the Huguenot territory was broken by this siege.

The Protestants showed themselves still stronger than they had been reckoned; they even found means in Rochelle to equip a small fleet, consisting of nine ships of war, with their barks and shallops, by means of which they kept the whole of that coast in subjection, and brought in many a richly-laden vessel of their enemies, which they regarded as lawful booty, and sold for the benefit of the Prince. Nismes, in Languedoc, fell into their hands by a fortunate surprise; Vezelay, in Burgundy, successfully resisted all attempts at capture; in the Bourbonnais, a castle was defended for two months by a lady, Marie de Brabançon; and in all parts of the country there were strong castles and towns, both small and great, occupied by brave garrisons devoted to the Huguenot party. What immense efforts, what hazards and bloodshed, would be necessary in order to obtain the mastery over them! After a little time the Admiral appeared once more in the field, not, it is true, with what might be properly called an army, but at the head of a body of cavalry, the nucleus

of which was formed by 3000 German horse, and to which the presence of the two Princes, Navarre and Condé, gave great importance in the sight of the country. From the Dordogne they traversed the country rapidly to the Rhone, and from thence to the Loire, and even beyond it. The plan of the Admiral was to threaten Paris, or to occupy the great roads leading to the capital, in order that the Court might be frightened into a disposition for peace.*

The energy of these warlike proceedings did, in fact, awaken once more the thoughts of peace.

The King, it was said, may indeed be superior in troops and money to the Huguenots; these, however, are not only inured to war, but resolved upon extremities—nay, driven to despair; they know better how to economize their money, and they will never want for assistance from foreign countries. They have been beaten in two great battles, but what has been the advantage? Even should two more be won, it would not be sufficient to extirpate them—that could be accomplished only by a long and profitless struggle, which would fill the kingdom with fire and slaughter. On the other hand, the fortune of battle was uncertain. What if victory should incline to the side of the Huguenots?—the consequence would be a new and still greater secession from the Catholic party to theirs; and who could say that the relation of subjection to the Crown could ever again be re-established? Disaffection was already on the increase; the chiefs on both sides had attained to a dangerous state of independence; the people, habituated to the appearance of freedom, might probably conceive the notion of forming themselves into cantons, and living after the manner of the Swiss.

To these motives were added others arising out of the state of the foreign relations of the kingdom.

The intimate alliance with Spain which now appeared to exist, and which was necessary for the continuance of the war, ran too strongly against the character of both nations

* Aluise Contarini, who expressly states this motive, "Relazione di Francia," 1572: "Quelli dell' una parte come dell' altra si andavano, usando a non obedire al Re, far tutto le cose per viva forza et encominciar di pensar di mutatione della forma del governo."

to be long maintained. The French believed that the Duke of Alva might have prevented the entrance of the German troops into France if he wished, and some critical remarks of the Duke upon their generalship had given them offense.

Above all, however, they were conscious that the continuance of the war could finally conduce to the advantage of the King of Spain alone.

His ambition appeared to them immeasurable: he intended, should the Catholic movement in England be successful, to marry the Queen of Scotland, who was now in captivity in that country, to his half-brother, Don John of Austria, upon whom Mary's claims on the English crown would thereby devolve in the course of time.* After Philip had subdued the Netherlands, it appears that his intention was to bring Scotland and England into a state of dependency upon Spain. At the same time he proposed a marriage between the King of France and his sister, who was a clever woman, but no longer young, and Cardinal Guise was sent into Spain to negotiate the business. Had this plan succeeded, all these countries, as well as Italy, would have fallen under the influence and authority of Spain.

It was impossible, however, that these designs could have been approved of by Queen Catharine, who herself cherished a vivid, and in the highest degree personal, dynastic ambition, especially as the family tie that united her with Philip was dissolved, her daughter, the Queen of Spain, having died some time before.

Even the Guises were not disposed to favor the Spanish scheme. As far as their views can be discovered, they would have inclined rather to the marriage of Mary with Norfolk than to that proposed by Philip. The Cardinal of Guise, when rich benefices were offered to him on condition that he would promote the match between Charles IX. and

* De la Mothe Fénélon asserts (December 29, 1569), that Alva endeavored to bring over the great nobles altogether to his side: "Et les attirer à ses intentions, et entre autres à celle, qu'il a grande, du mariage de la Roynie d'Ecosse et de Dom Joan, avec le tiltre de la succession de ce royaume (Angleterre), à quoy le Comte de Northumberland s'est toujours montré fort enclin," ii. 423.

the Spanish princess, declared that he would not sell his King.

Even leaving this vast combination of projects out of view, the French court believed that there were indications in the conduct of Philip II. that he wished to make his alliance with France subserve the purpose of improving his position with regard to England, and that he had even founded some hopes upon the possession of Calais.

The final result was, that the great confederacy of the two kingdoms, which had been formed in their zeal for religion and directed against the domestic enemy, was again broken up, through the antagonism of their foreign relations. The Cardinal of Lorraine himself assisted in bringing about this event. The opinion was now predominant that the religious war was not to be determined in France, and that it must be removed to another arena.

Under these circumstances, it could have been no secret from the first, that the peace could not be preserved without a renewal of the Edict of Pacification, with all its clauses; nay, that the government must even consent to another important concession. If the King's word had hitherto been always esteemed a sufficient guarantee, this was now no longer the case, since the last peace had been so speedily and arbitrarily broken. The Protestants demanded that they should be put in possession of certain places of security, where all belonging to them, which might be in danger in their private residences, might be deposited for safety; and the King actually consented to their demand. At first he offered them three such places for three years, but finally granted them four, on condition, however, that they should retain them for two years only. Among these places was the powerful Rochelle, where the most distinguished chiefs were once more assembled, and where the Queen of Navarre held her court; besides this, there were Cognac, which had acquired a name through its successful resistance to the Duke of Anjou, Montauban in Languedoc, and La Charité, which commanded an important passage of the Loire. By these concessions the government confessed itself incapable of practically discharging its most important duty—the maintenance

of internal repose. The Huguenots were convinced that security, even in the midst of peace, was not to be obtained without the exhibition of armed force.

The assistance they had received from the Germans in men, and from the English in money, had been more effective than the support their adversaries had received from Spain and Italy. They had sustained the first assault of the Catholic powers with gallantry and manhood.

CHAPTER XV.

DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE QUEEN MOTHER AND COLIGNY.—
ST. BARTHOLOMEW'S DAY.

GASPARD DE COLIGNY, the leader under whose conduct these great successes were obtained, was at that time perhaps the most renowned man living.

He belonged to an ancient race of the high Burgundian nobility. His father had, by the side of the King, acquired reputation in war and authority in the State. After his death, which occurred early, his widow, a sister of the Constable, who, as far as can be ascertained, inclined to the ecclesiastical reformation in its most general form, made the education of her three sons the object of her life.

Those who viewed the brothers together were astonished at the diversity of their natural endowments. Odet, the eldest, who devoted himself to the clerical profession, and who, through his father's connection with the King, and the King's with the Romish See, was raised in his early years to the dignity of a cardinal, showed himself benevolent, generous, and amiable in his intercourse with others. Dandelot, the youngest, had a fiery disposition, which suggested the boldest schemes and impelled him forward to every enterprise proposed to him. Gaspard, the second, was meditative, spoke but little, and that slowly, and bestowed little attention upon others. He did not feel himself in his place at the Court, for he despised favors which were incompatible with the full consciousness of personal pride, and knew nothing of the art by which men exhibit a cordial bearing toward their enemies. He was much more at home in the camp, as Henry II. and his uncle wished, and was, in short, a thorough soldier. Here he emu-

lated the bravest in contending for the prize of valor. He was distinguished before all others by his innate sense for discipline and the interior organization of an army; long subsequent to his times the regulations which he established for the discipline of troops were revived and applied in practice. With the same determination, however, he cared for the condition of his troops. He compelled the enemy to carry on the war according to the law of nations, by the most impartial reprisals, and was almost terrible in his conduct toward the peasantry who laid hands on his soldiers. When besieged in St. Quentin, he drove the citizens who would not assist in the defense or in the labors of the fortification, out of the town without mercy; and threatened the refractory with death. When, in spite of all his precautions, his chief rampart was taken by the enemy, he disdained to give ground with the flying, and coolly allowed himself to be seized by a Spaniard, whom he informed that he need not look for any further booty, as his prisoner was the Admiral of France. He has himself described this siege, not because he wished to excuse himself (for should any one complain of his conduct, he knew how to answer him as became a man of honor), but because so much that was false had been published to the world: every one who was present at an affair was bound to rectify erroneous representations of it. His simple narrative, a memorial of historical conscientiousness, shows, at the same time, a patriotic self-dependence and strong spiritual feelings. He sees the cause of misfortunes in the will of God alone—in that inscrutable will to which he must submit as a Christian, without attempting to explore it. His change to the Reformed doctrine is usually dated from this imprisonment. In the full occupation and tempest of war, he could hardly have found the time for attending to religious questions with that closeness which their importance and his own disposition would have demanded: his captivity allowed him the involuntary leisure which they required. Calvin maintained a correspondence with him and his consort.

When he was set at liberty by the peace, he introduced by degrees into his castle at Chatillon the Protestant domestic system, an example which many others afterward followed.

He himself conducted the morning worship, and collected all who belonged to the household, upon appointed days and at certain hours, to hear sermons and to join in the singing of psalms; before the administration of the sacrament he endeavored to reconcile all whom he knew to be at enmity with one another.

It was not his destiny, however, to live in the simplicity of the patriarchal state, as the priest and father of his household; he was, as a great party chief, implicated in the affairs of France and of Europe.

I do not estimate the external struggles in which he was engaged by any means so highly as those he endured within. The former were the lot of every man then living. The contradiction between religious notions and civil duties, which no longer ran concurrently as formerly, made it necessary for every man to seek out his own course independently.

Every step the Admiral took had to be weighed and considered; but the great vital question was the first that called for decision. When Guise with his confederates took possession of the power of the State in 1562, and began to sap the edict of January, upon which rested the security of the Protestants, Coligny understood perfectly the extent of the power which the enemy had succeeded in attaining, and the impotence of the opposite party, which had as yet no permanent form. He knew what fallings off, what misfortune was to be expected there, and what danger, exile, or, it might be, death. He asked his wife if she had sufficient firmness of soul to encounter all this, and also the ruin of her children. This lady, Charlotte de Laval, was at this moment even more resolute than the Admiral himself, for it was not, she said, to oppress others that he took up arms, but for the rescue out of the fangs of tyranny of his brethren in the faith, whose torments would not permit her to sleep. He must renounce the wisdom of the world; God had lent him the talents of a captain, and he was bound to use them, and if he did not fulfill his duty, she added that she herself would, when the day arrived, bear witness against him before the judgment-seat of God.*

* Aubigné, who, for example, knew nothing of the meeting at Bayonne, in whose book the excerpts from Thuanus, De la Planche, and

Whatever difficulties and dangers they might have resolved to brave, there were still heavier in store for them than they could have foreseen. In the midst of the wild passions which were inflamed by the union of party spirit and religion, of self-defense, of justice, and of vengeance, the way led at times to a moral abyss. When Poltrot undertook to avenge on their author the suffering brought on his co-religionists by Guise, Coligny did not encourage him, but neither did he prevent him: he allowed the retribution, as he understood it, to take its course.

How also, it will be asked, could he reconcile with the innate loyalty of his principles his conduct in opposing an army collected in the name of the King? Coligny always asseverated that he fought against a faction only, which had abused the name of the King. All that had been done against him, the judgments that had been issued against him, and the proclamation of outlawry, he attributed to the fact that this faction hated him because God was making use of him for the good of his Church.* While the enemy were plundering his house of his wealth, he would not touch valuables belonging to the Court which fell into his hands. He never spoke without deep respect of either the King, the Queen Mother, or of the Duke of Anjou; who stood opposed to him in arms. With these divided feelings he carried on the war.

The whole responsibility of the movement, with all the hatred to which it gave rise, fell by degrees upon his head; yet he was not completely master of the cause in which he was engaged. Recourse was had to arms, and agreements were concluded, without his full approval. This is the ordinary position of a party chief.

It was only in actual warfare, when engaged in battle with the enemy, that he paid no attention to the suggestions of his

others, may be distinguished, often, however, states portions of his own experience, and immediate communications of great value, which must be kept separate; we here follow his narrative (*Histoire Universelle*, i. iii. 2.): he sets a high value upon it: "Comme une histoire que j'ai apprise de ceux qui étaient de la partie."

* "Par la seule haine, qu'on me veut, de ce qu'il a plu à Dieu de se servir de moi pour assister son Eglise."—Letter to his Children, October 16, 1569.

followers: on such occasions he was the general, and they were mere soldiers. He declared that it was much better he should be blamed without cause among his friends than that the enemy should have reason to turn him into ridicule. He was often defeated in the open field, but his nature was of that deep and persistent character whose masculine vigor increases with misfortune. "We had been ruined," said he once, in the words of the ancient Greek, "if we had not been ruined." Coligny, like William III., and Washington in after times, showed himself stronger than ever after he had suffered a defeat. His authority was not founded upon the enthusiasm which triumphs awaken, but upon the profound feeling that he was indispensable to his party. When he fell sick on one occasion his value was immediately made plain by the errors which were committed in his absence. Every thing yielded before his proud and dispassionate temperament. The discipline and subordination in which he kept his army was admired as a merit of the highest order. He entered into the nature and feelings of the German cavalry, and, as the French said, controlled their rude *bizarrie* with the same firmness which he exercised in dominating the natural liveliness of the French nobles with whom he had to do; over all his influence was as complete as if he had had a right to the chief command. Among co-religionists and companions in arms, who were all his equals, he appeared at the same time as a censor and a king. The few intimacies he formed made the deeper impression on account of his habitual reserve, and men boasted of his confidence among their friends.*

His was one of the greatest positions a subject ever occupied in a monarchy; but let us not mistake it, for it was at the same time the most anomalous: a powerful party, armed and proceeding to the accomplishment of their object, resign themselves without conditions to the guidance of a private

* The Venetian Aluise Contarini compares him with Hannibal, and extols him, "che avendo perso tante battaglie si è conservato sempre in riputatione, massime i Reistri e Lancichenech, i quali se ben erano creditori di molte paghe, e se ben hanno molte volte pers le bagaglie e carrette piene di rubbamenti che avean fatti, mai però si sono ammutinati."

nobleman, and by their obedience to his commands and their pecuniary contributions, raise him to a position of almost independent power, acknowledging his authority to call them to arms at any moment. But his connections extended far beyond France. All who were inclined to the Protestant opinions in the territories of the King of Spain had their eyes upon him; he himself said that not only in the Netherlands, but throughout all the Spanish provinces, it required but a little of his powder to set them in a blaze. The German princes, who dreaded, as they said themselves, the effects of this European conflagration so near their own walls, regarded him as their champion; the troops which served under him bore his name in Eastern Germany. With all this there is no trace that he ever desired to render his position subservient to any personal object; he was ambitious, but his ambition was of a religious and patriotic character.

No one felt more deeply than he how important it was to put an end to this intestine war, with all its horrors—horrors which he, as a chief leader, witnessed and deplored, but had not the power to prevent. He was fortunate in being again on good terms with the King, for all these connections were to be employed for the advantage of the Crown, of the kingdom, and of religion.

France had now dropped the alliance with Spain, and showed an inclination toward England. It was the Admiral's brother, Cardinal Chatillon, who suggested a marriage between Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Anjou. Judging from the earnestness with which the negotiations concerning the religious stipulation were conducted, we should conclude that there was something more than mere appearances in these proposals. The negotiations finally failed on account of the French prince demanding freedom for the exercise of the Catholic religion, which was incompatible with the laws recently enacted in England. The plan was not allowed to fall altogether to the ground however; his youngest brother, the Duke of Alençon, was ready to submit to any conditions for the hand of the Queen, and Catharine promised her ambassador such rewards as ambassador never before received if he succeeded in bringing about this marriage. Had it taken

place, the design was to reinstate Mary Stuart in Scotland, not under Spanish influence, but under the united influence of England and France.

The jealousy of the two powers against Spain was augmented by the alliance which Philip II. formed with the Venetians and the Pope against the Ottoman Porte, and greatly increased after the great victory gained by the allies at Lepanto. European history will always linger with peculiar interest upon the political aspect and disposition of those times which brought forth an event of such vast significance as the origin of the United Netherlands. The men and the circumstances of the age were calculated to make it possible. Without the common opposition of the English and the French against Spain, the ships of the Prince of Orange would unquestionably have been destroyed; and when the *Gueux* succeeded in gaining possession of the Brill and Flushing, they could not have maintained these places if the conquest of Mons, which was effected principally by the French Huguenot troops under Count Louis of Nassau, had not compelled the Spaniards to divide their forces.

The state of religious affairs in France opened still greater prospects of another kind. It facilitated the concurrence of the house of Valois with the house of Austria in reference to the Crown of Poland; it was even rumored that at the next vacancy of the imperial throne the King of France might be called to it, because he was bound alike to Protestants and Catholics, and showed himself disposed to uphold the principles of the Pacification.

To this it is to be ascribed that a complete understanding and reconciliation took place in France, if not between the two parties, at least between the royal house and the government on the one side, and the Huguenots on the other.

The government of the day was not in the habit of appointing or dismissing ministers, except very occasionally. This alteration in the system was owing to the circumstance that the men whose opinions corresponded most with those of the supreme power at the time, took possession of the places to which, as members of the Council, they had a common right.

and the others, whose opinions were different, retired to make room for them.

Thus the sons of the Constable, and the Marshal Francis de Montmorency in particular, were especially powerful in the State. They had concluded the peace, and represented the principle of reconciliation. The proposition of a marriage between Margaret of Valois, the youngest daughter of Catharine, and Prince Henry of Navarre, who was regarded as the head of the Huguenots, came from the Montmorencies.* Charles IX. agreed to it readily, for it would serve admirably to reconcile the hostile parties, and even the Huguenots themselves, after some hesitation, were not opposed to it. The Prince was firm enough not to allow himself to be drawn into the designs of his mother-in-law; on the contrary, he would be likely to exercise a salutary influence upon the King, his future brother-in-law, in favor of religion.

The hopes of a thorough understanding were so strong, that the Admiral, notwithstanding the enmity he had so often experienced, formed the resolution of repairing to the Court in person. In a consultation held upon it at Rochelle, the majority of his friends declared themselves against such a step, as the great leader, upon whom the salvation of the cause depended, should not venture into the midst of their old enemies. The Admiral, however, insisted upon it: he had had so much success in opposition to the King, that with his power they must obtain all they desired; he had often yielded to the opinions of others, he said, and now begged that he might be permitted to follow the dictates of his own judgment. He did so, and when he arrived at the Court, was received in the best manner. The Queen showed him every mark of favor and friendship; King Charles IX. told him he was as welcome as any one who had been at the Court for many years,† and manifested for him all that admiration which a youth of warlike disposition would be likely to feel for an experienced old warrior.

* So says Margaret herself, Mém. p. 24: "La maison de Montmorency étaient ceux qui en avaient porté les premières paroles."

† This was communicated to the English Court by Walsingham, and by the ambassador De la Mothe Fénélon to France; the King said it was quite true, i. 268.

In fact, Charles IX. felt strongly disposed in favor of the Admiral's views and propositions.

It gave him great pleasure to hold intercourse with military officers, to listen to their experience of war, to learn its rules, and to cherish the hope of performing future actions himself. He believed himself destined to assert by his arms the ancient rights of his predecessors. He regarded Milan as his unquestionable property, and loved to see Italian emigrants around him. He looked upon the proposed marriage of his sister to the Prince of Navarre, as likely to afford him an opportunity of carrying the war beyond the Pyrenees. The refugees from the Netherlands were also received by him, and, among others, Louis of Nassau. He held long conversations, which often continued till late at night, with the Admiral, who seemed destined to guide the fortunes of France, and was now esteemed as powerful as the Constable had formerly been at the court of Henry II.

Coligny himself, stimulated by these circumstances, began to form plans of the boldest character. Indirectly to promote the Protestant cause in the Netherlands was no longer sufficient for him: he used all his influence to bring about an open war with Spain. His reasons were these. King Philip II. was destitute of money; the French forces, after so many actions in the interior of the kingdom, were superior in military exercises to the Spanish; by a foreign expedition the King of France would be able to unite all the domestic factions; he had only to throw himself with his undivided power upon the Netherlands, and all the provinces would submit to him.

Against such a course there were many objections, and the adverse party did not fail to bring them forward. They declared that it would manifest the most crying ingratitude if the King were to attack those from whom he had received such important assistance in the last war; that Philip II. was not so weak as not to be able to re-establish order in his provinces, when he might turn all his power against distracted France; but admitting even that the King of France were victorious over Philip, even that would be highly dangerous, since the King would in that case be indebted to the Hugue-

nots for his success; that these would then become stronger and stronger, take the guidance of all affairs, strive to obtain possession of the supreme power in temporal and spiritual things, and perhaps force the subjects of the King who belonged to the ancient religion to rebel against his authority, for if the Catholic people had nothing good to expect from their King, they would attach themselves to the great Catholic nobles. A plan was devised, in accordance with which the Catholic associations were to be united under the several governors of the provinces and one trustworthy chief, as closely as the Huguenots were on their side, in order to inflict upon them some great blow. It was not yet possible to destroy them totally; the King must be compelled to acknowledge that he was in error.*

This consultation indicated the whole difficulty which a nation distracted by two parties must necessarily experience, should it resolve to interfere with foreign concerns: in such a case each party will bestow more attention upon its own interests than upon the common interests of the State. What a vast revolution in affairs would it have caused, had the Huguenots succeeded in identifying the great external interests of the French kingdom with their own special views! The result of their design was, however, that all the advantages which the enterprise which they furthered promised, were not obvious to the zealous Catholics, who saw nothing in it but danger to the Church and to the State.

In July, 1572, the war against Spain appeared inevitable. A body of mercenaries which had been drawn together by the Admiral, attempted to penetrate into the Netherlands under Captain Genlis, but were met in the district of Mons, defeated, and dispersed. A letter fell into the hands of the Duke of Alva on this occasion, which proved beyond question the participation of Charles IX. in the expedition.† In this

* Discorso sopra gli umori di Francia, di M^r Nazzaret: 1570 Bibl. Barb. at Rome.

† Alva to Zayas: "J'ai en mon pouvoir une lettre du Roi de France, qui vous frapperait de strépeur si vous la voyiez."—July 19, 1572, in Gachard, ii. 269.

letter he promised the Count of Nassau to devote all the power which God had given him to the purpose of liberating the Netherlands from the burden that oppressed them.

Distrustful friends had once more warned the Admiral, reminding him of the hostility of some members of the royal house as well as of the Council, and of the old threats which had issued from Bayonne; but it is easy to conceive that such suggestions made no impression upon him. He knew well that he had enemies, and dreaded the hostility of the Duke of Anjou even more than that of the Queen, but he hoped to win his favor by meritorious services. The King, he said, was bound by his connections with the Netherlands, with England, and with some of the German princes; God had inclined his heart, and in his disposition there was room for praise only. He had sent a fleet into the neighborhood of Rochelle, but it was an unworthy suspicion to imagine that it was intended to act against that town; it was destined to intercept the Spanish fleet, to conquer it, and then bear up for Flushing. In these maritime prospects, Coligny acted for the most part in accordance with the title which he bore. It was an old thought of his to found Protestant colonies in America. His first attempt had failed through the incompetency of the person to whom the enterprise was intrusted; to the second, which was sent to Florida, the Spaniards, out of national and religious jealousy, had put a frightful termination. But in the year 1571 Coligny sent out a sea-captain named Minguetiere, with orders to explore the territories in South America, and to bring back correct information respecting that continent.*

He had formed the idea of separating the Netherlands from Spain, and at the same time assailing the power of King Philip in the Indies, to place himself at the head of the powers which would then have the maritime superiority in the southern world, and thus obtain for his nation and his faith a share in the dominion of the other hemisphere. He was so occupied with these speculations that he despised all warnings, which, for the most part, were founded upon the observation of trifling

* "Pour bien remarquer les lieux . . . dresser une parfaite representation de tous ces quartiers."—Popelinière, ii. lib. 25, p. 21.

circumstances only. He appears to have felt that the suspicions which led the Huguenots to take up arms in the year 1567 were unfounded, and he was unwilling to disturb himself, or to allow his old age to be troubled by a repetition of similar errors. Rather would he die than spend the remainder of his days in continual apprehension of a power which was now once more above him. Compared with the great plan which he had conceived, life itself had no value for him unless it could be devoted to its execution. There was apparently every prospect of its success.

The miscarriage of the expedition under Genlis, the cruel treatment of the prisoners, and certain offensive expressions of Alva's, which, as the King said, amounted almost to putting him on his trial, caused a general agitation in Paris; all was in favor of the war, and the King himself seemed to desire it. The Venetian ambassador, who had been sent to France by his Signoria, in order to prevent the outbreak of a war between that country and Spain, which would have rendered all further undertakings against the Ottoman Porte impossible, asserts that the war then appeared inevitable; that orders were issued every hour for raising and arming troops, and that a multitude of officers, both cavalry and infantry, had offered their services to the King.*

There was still one question to be decided—What would Queen Catharine de' Medici, who had hitherto given the deciding impulse to all the transactions of the kingdom, say to this undertaking?

Let us endeavor to recall her position and her qualities at this the most important moment of her life.

The house of Medici, at Florence, to which Catharine belonged, had distinguished itself in the fifteenth century by high cultivation, superiority of intellect, and a successful policy, which preserved peace in Italy; in the sixteenth it

* Juan Micheli, 1572: "Successo non solo molestissimo all' Amiraglio, ma a tutta la Francia, trovandovisi un gran numero di gentiluomini e di persone di rispetto. . . . La guerra per quattro o sei giorni continui fu tenuta per ferma, et se ne parlava pubblicamente come di cosa accordata. E già si erano fatte, et si facevano tutte l'ore, spedizioni di cavalleria et fanteria." That the defeat of Genlis should have discouraged the French is not to be thought of.

contended with all the resources of power for the maintenance of its disputed sovereignty. This conflict gave occasion for Machiavelli's book, entitled 'The Prince:' it was written for Catharine's father, Lorenzo de' Medici. Next appeared those sprung from another line, Cosmo, the founder of the Grand Duchy, of whom the emigrants said, that as in former times justice and honor were prized in their beautiful Tyrrhenian land, so now he appeared to be most highly valued who was most deeply stained with blood, and had made the greatest number of widows and orphans. Cosmo maintained his authority by severity, guile, and vengeance.

Catharine's earliest recollections carried her back, not to days of infancy such as most other princesses remembered, when they grew up in peace amidst the most watchful attentions and cares, but to scenes of the fiercest religious and political animosity. As a fatherless and motherless orphan, she was placed in the Convent Delle Murate, at Florence, but the nuns took part for and against her,* so that it was found necessary to remove her from the convent; she left it weeping violently, for she feared she was about to be put to death.

When she grew up, her worldly-wise uncle, Clement VII., contrived to bring about a marriage between her and the second son of King Francis I. The King, in consenting to the match, was moved chiefly by the fear that, if it did not take place, she would be given in marriage to the Duke of Milan, and that France would be thus more completely excluded from Italy.†

On the other hand, on the occasion of this marriage, the view of erecting a great Italian principality founded on both the French and Medicean claims, was more definitely maintained. Urbino, Modena, Pisa, and, if possible, Milan and Genoa, were to belong to it. This was a plan, however, the execution of which could never have been possible. Catha-

* Varchi, "Storia Fiorentina," xi. 374: "Si cominciò prima a bisbigliare e poi a romoreggiare."

† Loaysa to Charles V., June 9, 1531: "Es grande el temor que tiene (el Rey de Francia) que el Papa case su sobrina con el Duque de Milan."

rine was not to spend her life as an Italian, but as a French princess: here her intellect and her destiny led her on from step to step in a continual ascent to power. At first the elder brother of her husband stood in the way, but his death, which plunged the country and her husband in deep sorrow, opened to her the immediate prospect of a throne.

Her friends, however, reproached her all the more that she remained childless for a long period. We have mentioned how at one time she was in danger of being repudiated by her husband; but her readiness to suffer all that might fall upon her—either to retire to a convent, or to remain at court, in order to wait upon the more fortunate wife who should succeed her—disarmed all antipathy.

At length she had children, and as the consort of a king and the mother of future kings she took a high position; but even this was not accomplished without difficulty. The Duchess of Valentinois, no longer probably a rival of Catharine in the peculiar sense of the word, still exercised an indescribable influence upon her husband. Catharine was compelled to show a resignation to this state of things, which she was far from feeling, in order now and then to obtain some slight satisfaction for her ambition. Excluded from all affairs she appeared to live only for her husband, her attendants, and a few personal favorites. She was not wanting meanwhile in the almost hereditary predilection which distinguished her family for art and splendor. The income appointed her, which was not by any means insignificant, was never sufficient for her liberalities: * she thought she did something peculiarly French, when she kept the court as magnificent as it had been in the time of Francis I.; she made it her occupation, and showed a special talent for it. For processions, dances, and plays she possessed a naturally inventive faculty, and was the soul of every festivity; after the fashion

* Lorenzo Contarini, Relatione, 1550: "E donna più giovane del Re 13 giorni solamente, non bella, ma savia. . . amata da ognuno e dal Re particolarmente per il suo ingegno e bontà, e quanto alle cose ordinarie assai ben trattata; ha 200 m. sc. da spendere ogni anno, se ben non le bastano, perchè è liberalissima, ha gran corte di uomini e di donne."

of the time she also took part in the manly recreations; she was esteemed amiable, ingenious, and affable, and those who listened to her discourse were pleased and instructed. She said in after times that nothing lay then upon her heart but the love of her husband, and that her sole anxiety was that she was not beloved by him as she desired; * when he was absent from the Court during the campaigns she wore mourning.

She asserted that she possessed that inexplicable quality of a common family consciousness, the existence of which has been constantly denied, and which is yet perpetually pretended to, by which things and events removed both in place and time appear as if present, and that she was made aware beforehand, either by an apparition or a dream, of every misfortune which befell any member of her family; she even stated that she had had a presentiment of the fatal accident which deprived her of her husband in the tournament already mentioned. She would never afterward enter the place where it was held, and her carriage took a round whenever it was necessary to pass that way.

Under the government of her eldest son, which followed that of her husband, she took some share in the transaction of state affairs, especially in authorizing the public decrees with her signature. A thorough influence over them she could not attain, in consequence of the ascendancy of the Guises, which she was compelled to endure; Mary Stuart also took precedence of her; yet such was the state of things at that time that she had it in her power, and sometimes ventured, to mitigate in some measure the prevailing severity.

With the accession of her second son to the throne the time at length arrived when she could perform a political part, and when she believed it necessary to take it upon herself.

The personal and dynastic character she exhibited under these circumstances was peculiar. She accounted it a crime

* Letter to Elizabeth of Spain: "Vous m'avez veue si contente comme vous, ne pensant jeamés avoyr autre trisbulatyon que de n'estre asses aymaye à mon gré du Roy vostre père, qui m'onoret pluls que je ne mérites; mès je l'aymai tant que je aves toujours peur, comme vous saves."—Paris, Négociations sous François II.

on the part of the Guises that they should have formed the design, immediately after the death of Francis II., of marrying Mary Stuart to Don Carlos of Spain, because she had destined her youngest daughter for that Prince; she looked upon it as intolerable that subjects should presume to enter into rivalry with the house of France.

When she looked round her, however, in the confusion of parties she could discover no other reliable support: as she said in one of her letters, God had taken away her husband and her eldest son, and she was left with three little boys in a kingdom full of divisions, where she did not know one man in whom she could place confidence, but where all sought their own interests with passionate selfishness. "I will, however, strive," she adds, "to maintain my power for the preservation of my children."

In her earlier years a predilection for the Protestant religion was ascribed to her, and it is possible she may have had her fits of ecclesiastical heterodoxy like other Court ladies of the time; but a real earnest inclination to Calvinism was not to be looked for in a gay Italian princess, who enjoyed life keenly, and whose antecedents connected her so closely with the Papacy. She was always of opinion that Catholicism must be the religion of Kings and States; she was not on this account however devoted to the severest doctrines of Catholicism; her experience of the world, and even her connection with the Papal See, taught her to see in religion not religion merely.

Her principal object was to sustain the sovereign power which belonged to her sons, and the administration of which devolved chiefly upon herself, although a stranger, and with but a dubious right to such a position.

According to the general fashion of the age she was disposed to search, in reference to public events and circumstances, for the mysterious and marvelous agencies that were believed to co-operate in their production. On one of the towers of her castle at Blois, a pavilion is pointed out which was used by her astrologer for his observations and calculations, for she was as much attached to the science of the stars as her uncle Clement VII. She has been charged with

atheism, of which a sort of school was then founded at the French Court by another Florentine, Pietro Strozzi, who was her relative. It may have been such an atheism as characterized the Italian philosophy of the age, which revived the doubts of antiquity respecting the immortality of the soul, but which, on the other hand, attributed unbounded power to the heavenly intelligences, and to the influence of demons. Amulets are also exhibited, which are said to have been worn by Catharine de' Medici, and to be composed of human blood, the blood of beasts, and of all kinds of metals, inscribed with the names of demons, and with magic figures; one of her bracelets exhibits a variety of talismanic characters, and among them the name of God. The co-operative powers of Heaven and Earth, which it was sought to discover and to dominate, were to serve to bring forth or restrain the personal fortune of the individual.

Catharine de' Medici was of a large and, at the same time, firm and powerful figure; her countenance had an olive tint, and her prominent eyes and curled lip reminded the spectator of her great-uncle Leo X. Continuous and even violent exercise was absolutely necessary to her; she rode to the chase by the side of the men, and having boldly followed the game on horseback, through brakes and thickets, over stocks and stones, she gave herself up without reserve to the pleasures of the table. At the same time, however, she was indefatigably occupied in her own personal affairs, such as her buildings, of which she had always four or five in hand, and the training and education of her children, and more especially with the general affairs of the state, both domestic and foreign. She may be said to have possessed power, but she was very far from being in a position to use it as she thought proper. She found herself in the condition of a person who, having been raised to power by the force of circumstances, and seeing his authority every instant in danger, is compelled to devote every energy to its maintenance. It was not with personal interests merely she had to contend, but with the strong opposition of general opinion, the strength of which, however, came back to the side of those in authority. She favored the weaker party so long as it suited her purpose, yet not without

foresight;* she placed it in opposition to one that was growing too strong and independent, but she did not commit herself completely to its views; in short, she wished to make use of both, in order that she might govern, but did not wish to be governed by them. No one trusted her, and she confided in no one. Many a man, says a Venetian, might well have forgotten the art of fencing if placed in her position, where friends and enemies were no longer distinguishable from one another—where she was obliged to ask counsel of persons whom, at the time, she was well aware were concealing their real opinions from her. In her own chamber she was transported with anger and grief; when the hour of audience arrived, she dried her tears and appeared with a pleasant countenance. Her maxim was to cause every one to depart from her presence contented; but while she appeared to give a definite answer, it was immediately observed that she had not pronounced her final decision, and while this was expected the conversation was suddenly changed to some other topic. She never lost sight of the opposition by which she was checked and limited. Many of her written instructions still remain, referring to foreign affairs, which had, however, the closest connection with those of the interior of the kingdom; they exhibit a strong conception of the general aspect of things, subtlety of comprehension, and a singular energy of expression, and possess a peculiar *naïveté* in the recommendation of secret means and courses.

Catherine threw into the contest, in which the history of the world was to receive a new aspect, all that fearful presence of mind and inexhaustible versatility of a female intellect, which sees its own interests alone in all it contemplates. Her ambition passed for maternal duty and solicitude. Her pride was simply self-defense. She said that if she had not constantly borne the burden of government upon her head she would still have ever drawn it behind her; the meaning

* Sigismondo di Cavalli: "La Regina, per conservarsi sola in sede molto tempo, andò schermendo con favori et inalzare or l'una or l'altra parte, secondo che a lei pareva necessario dar contrapeso a quella che più pareva di spingersi innanti."

of which seems to be, that she would never have allowed it to go altogether out of her hands. The attainment of this object, occupied all her attention; she had none to bestow upon the means by which it was obtained. In the opinions which were taught, she saw neither their import nor their value; she looked merely at the political principles with which they were associated. Moral precepts she did not respect, but she found no pleasure in vice. Human life had no value in her eyes. She professed Italian morality—the morality of her house—which looked upon all means as lawful by which power was attained or preserved.

After the peace of 1570 general efforts were made to bring about a reconciliation; Catharine was not only not opposed to them, but, on the contrary, saw with satisfaction that her younger children associated themselves with the various parties: her second son, the Duke of Anjou, made common cause with the Guises; the third, the Duke of Alençon, joined the Montmorencies; her eldest daughter was married to a member of the house of Lorraine, and the youngest she gave to the youthful Bourbon, the head of the Huguenots. And upon these connections she founded the most extensive projects. Her children felt from time to time that they were made subservient to a purpose; they were disunited among themselves, and did not love their mother, but yet they were always ruled by her.

A man now rose to great authority in the midst of the universal fluctuation of parties—one who was zealously attached to his religious views, and who undertook to bring the policy of France into concurrence and co-operation with the opinions he had embraced, by leading that kingdom to an open war with Spain.

Catharine, who had become Queen of France in opposition to Spain, could not be much disposed to favor Spanish interests; but an open war with this power, whose resources she estimated as immense, and which represented a principle, which though she did not adopt she was unwilling to frustrate, did not lie within the range of her policy. Besides, she could not be expected to consent to an enterprise which

would have been decided by an influence not only independent of her, but actually opposed to her.* The mutual confidence between her son and the Admiral had been for some time highly distasteful to her; she complained that the King saw the Admiral too frequently and herself too little. Should Coligny's wishes influence the King, and should his designs succeed, he would in that case become as intolerable to her as ever Francis Duke of Guise had been.

The Queen was on a visit to her daughter of Lorraine, at the time when the outbreak in Paris threatened to lead to a war, and hastened to the capital, determined to put an end to the warlike movement, whatever it should cost her.

Charles IX., upon her representation, founded on experience, consented immediately that before the affair proceeded further it should be once more discussed in Council.

Coligny objected to such a step, stating that the Council consisted for the most part of men whose temperament and position in life made peace appear desirable to them, and that it could answer no purpose to dispute with persons who were not open to conviction. The King promised that he would summon to the Council men experienced in war, such as the Dukes of Montpensier and Nevers and the Marshal de Cossé, against whom nothing could be objected.

Under these circumstances the project of war came to a fresh deliberation. The Admiral delivered his opinions with warmth and eloquence, hoping to draw those who were hesitating to his side, by the force of his reasons. In this assembly, however, the feelings of the members were not favorable to him. The King's mother and his brother, the Duke of Anjou, were decidedly against the Admiral, and finally the King himself agreed with them, so that Coligny's proposal was unanimously rejected. He was not disposed, however, to rest satisfied with this decision. He had himself promised assistance to the Prince of Orange, and now observed, that the

* Aluise Contarini, Marzo, 1572: "Per molti inditii si vede che la mente della Regina Madre non è di lasciar romper l' amicitia colla Spagna, per i pericoli e danni che potria correr la Francia delle armi di Spagnoli, abbondanti di danari, copiosi d' amici, gagliardi di forze, uniti, accorti."

King would, it was to be hoped, have no objection to his rendering such assistance by means of his friends and perhaps in his own person. This disclosure was received with astonishment; one word followed another, and a warm dispute arose. "Madame," said Coligny at last, "The King now withdraws from a war which promises him advantages; God forbid that another should break out, from which he may not be able to withdraw." Although these words were intended to allude to the war in Flanders, which in one way or other must have implicated France, yet the Queen took them as a threat, as if the Admiral had determined to excite new troubles and to kindle once more the flames of civil war.

She was an Italian—she had not yet settled her account with Coligny. Had he not on one occasion opposed her regency? Had he not on another attempted by a sudden surprise to get the whole Court and even herself into his power? She asserted that one of her most trustworthy confidants and retainers had been destroyed by the contrivances of the Admiral. She had entertained the design of taking vengeance upon him as early as the year 1568, but he was too strong, and had compelled her to consent to peace, and now he wished to force her into his political views. The Admiral, whom the regular income arising from the contributions of the Huguenots provided with considerable pecuniary resources, possessed, moreover, through their unconditional attachment to his person, a power which was almost independent. It was said of him that he could raise a better army in four days than the King could in four months. He was not merely hated by the Queen, but while he lived she was in danger; she resolved to get rid of him.

The period had arrived when the marriage between her daughter and Henry of Navarre, by which the parties were to be reconciled, was to be solemnized. The Huguenots had assembled in great numbers to witness the ceremony. How different were the designs and projects by which the festivities were interrupted!

The Admiral had attended the Council which was held in the Louvre on Friday, the 22d of August, and was returning to his residence, when just as he was passing by a house be-

longing to an adherent of the Guises, a shot was fired at him; he was indebted for his life to an accidental movement which he made at the moment, but the bullet struck him in the hand and arm.

Every one attributed the deed to the vengeance of the Guises, and the King threatened them with punishment for it. Cautious observers, however, rejected that explanation from the first, for it was said, how could the Guises venture, in the very precincts of the Court, to give free course to their revenge? Meanwhile the suspicion contained a portion of both truth and error. The Papal nuncio gives the following account of the matter.

When the Queen had finally decided upon a course hostile to the Admiral, she immediately took into her counsels the widow of Francis Duke of Guise. This lady was, like herself, an Italian, and had already repeatedly, though always in vain, prayed for vengeance for the death of her husband. The Queen now assented to her desire; the two bound themselves together to procure the destruction of the Admiral, and took their sons, the one the Duke of Anjou and the other the Duke of Guise, into their confidence. The most extravagant plans were proposed. Young Guise was of opinion that his mother should with her own hand shoot the Admiral when in the Court circle he should be among the Queen's ladies,* for in those times ladies learned the use of fire-arms in the chase. This proposal was, however, rejected, and the murderous enterprise intrusted to a person on whom they could rely, who had concealed himself in that house and waited till the Admiral should be riding by.

The majority of those who were near the event, have asserted that if the Admiral had been killed on this occasion, the Queen would have been satisfied with the one victim; but he had escaped, and was now for the first time in a position to become truly formidable.

The Huguenots crowded round him with redoubled zeal, and demanded justice: their requisitions sounded like threats

* Salviati, August 24, 1512: "Madame di Nemours fu da Msgnr. di Guise suo figlio stimolata a tirare l' archibusata mentre l' Amiraglio fusse con la Regente."

proceeding from a confident knowledge of their power. The general suspicion soon fixed upon the most important and real originator of the deed. Certain expressions came to her ears one evening at supper; they were probably exaggerated, but at any rate they gave her grounds for apprehension on her own account. The consideration of the personal and general danger incurred by the deed already perpetrated, excited her still further to the designs of blood and violence which had lain latent in her mind. The Huguenots were in her hands—it was only necessary for her to will it, and they were all destroyed.

It has always been the general opinion that Catharine de' Medici had for years been preparing every thing for this catastrophe; that all her apparent favors to the Huguenots, all her treaties and conclusions of peace, were simply so many guileful pretexts in order to win their confidence, that she might then deliver them over to destruction.

Against this supposition, however, it was observed long ago, that a stratagem laid so long beforehand was contrary to the nature of French modes of proceeding, and is in itself nearly impossible.* We have ourselves seen, as we have proceeded, many circumstances which render it extremely improbable. The notion which some have maintained that the King of Spain and the Duke of Alva were informed beforehand of the design to massacre the Huguenots, and had approved of it, must be rejected without hesitation. We find, so far from this, that the Spaniards were just then in full expectation of the outbreak of the war. The Cardinal of Lorraine had even sent a special courier of his own to warn the Duke of Alva of the hostility of the French Court. The Queen herself was also in earnest, as her letters prove, in the affair of the English marriage, which had been suggested by the most moderate party in the Council: her dynastic and maternal interests were involved in it, and these could not be simulated. Besides, the marriage between her daughter and the King of

* Cavalli advances these good reasons: "Se prima dell' archibuggiata vi fusse stato questo pensiero di distruggerli (Ugonotti), così facilmente si poteva far come seguì da poi senza poner in dubbio, che per la ferita buona parte se ne andassero."—Relatione di 1574.

Navarre, which is regarded as the last step in the whole proceeding, was proposed, not by the Queen, but, as we have already noticed, by the peaceful Montmorency.

Do they take the right view of the affair, we may inquire finally, who attribute the whole to a momentary fit of rage on the part of the Queen, or to a sudden burst of vengeance among the mob of Paris? Against this view there are certain historical events which can not be explained away, and which render its adoption impossible.

It is not altogether without its significancy that the Queen had always declared she would revenge herself upon the Huguenots. She mentioned in confidence the example of Queen Blanche, who had subdued, at the same time, both the rebels and the heretics, and revived the authority of her son: she had read an old chronicle in which this was recorded, and on one occasion told the Venetian ambassador that she did not wish the Huguenots to know that she was acquainted with this history. Although she had not first proposed the marriage of her daughter with Navarre, yet she had zealously promoted it, and insisted that it should take place in Paris. In reference to the intent of this, hints were given to the Papal legate and to the Papal nuncio, which were of unequivocal significancy. The Legate, the Cardinal of Alessandria, who had been sent to France for the purpose of obstructing the marriage and proposing a different one, frequently complains, in his dispatches, of the small progress he has the opportunity of making; at last, however, he announces, unexpectedly, that he has received an answer not unfavorable; * he does not communicate the nature of this answer in so many words, but the man who then accompanied this Cardinal as auditor, and who afterward himself occupied the Papal chair, Clement VIII., has recounted, that the King said he thought of nothing but how to revenge himself upon his enemies, and that he had no other means of doing so than

* "Lettere e Negotiati del Sr. Cl. Alessandrino," in the Corsini Library at Rome. Letter to Rusticucci, March 6, 1572: "Con alcuni particolari che io porto, de' quali ragguaglierò n. Sne. a bocca, posso dire di non partirmi affatto mal expedito."

what this plot afforded.* The nuncio Salviati likewise asserts that the King told him at Blois, that he had favored the idea of this marriage merely for the purpose of freeing himself from his enemies.† It must not be forgotten, neither, that at one time, among the Italian republics, marriage festivities had been made subservient to great party massacres. What then is true, and what is false? Was there a great deed of violence contemplated long beforehand, and preparations made for its execution? Or were the negotiations concerning the English match, which had been carried on with the greatest vigor, and the at least indirect hostility against Spain, during the summer, meant in earnest? The question would never be decided, if we had to do with a person of a simple, straight-forward mind, in which contradictory plans of necessity exclude each other; but there are characters with whom this is not the case, persons with whom it is a natural necessity to have two strings to their bow, that if one break, they may have another in reserve—in whom there is a native duplicity, which enables them to contemplate opposite courses at one and the same moment. While Catharine pursued zealously the plan which corresponded with the course of her desires and interests, she cherished, in the depths of her soul, the feeling that the measures she took to accomplish that plan, might also be made subservient to another purpose. A reconciliation with the Huguenots was not distasteful to her, since, by means of it she would acquire a loftier and more brilliant position in Europe; but, at the same time, she saw them streaming into Paris with a secret pleasure, when she thought of their coming into the midst of a populace which required merely that the reins should be slackened in order to destroy them. Were they to go further than she contemplated or desired, or any other event occur, she had in her hands an infallible resource. Since Condé's residence in the capital, the Parisian populace were filled with rage against the Huguenots, they would not suffer any of that way of thinking within their

* The letter of Ossat of September 22, 1599, cited by all against Lingard. *Lettres d'Ossat*, lib. v. no. 26.

† Salviati, in Mackintosh's *History of England*, iii. 336, app.

walls; even during the negotiations of peace, they threatened with death and destruction those of their opponents who had come into the city on that occasion. The authority of the Court and its expressed will, were necessary to control the people, and for this purpose it was that the civic militia was organized. The confidence alone of Coligny, in the greatness and future success of his cause, which he believed destined to the conquest of the earth, makes it conceivable, how he could have ventured in the midst of this hostile, agitated, and easily roused mob, which endured his presence and that of his followers, only with suppressed fury. All who observed the antipathy between the elements that now came into contact, forboded evil consequences. The preachers in Geneva and the Cardinals at Rome foresaw and predicted a catastrophe. The Admiral Coligny reposed an unlimited confidence in the word of the young King. After he had been wounded, the Huguenots consulted whether they ought not to leave the city armed as they were, and, notwithstanding his condition, carry him away with them: young Téligny, his son-in-law, however, assured the others that he knew the King to the very depths of his heart, that he was certain he was to be relied on, and that there was no ground for apprehension.*

And no wonder that Charles IX. should appear to be sincere, for he was so in reality. All that had been comprehended by him, in his mercurial way, of what was passing, had entirely escaped him in the martial effervescence of the last few days.

Catharine was different. That she had from the beginning a design against the Admiral, connected with the invitation to the nuptials, is in the highest degree probable, yet the design was contemplated rather as a possibility, and expressed rather as a justification. She allowed Coligny to proceed on his course until he became intolerable to her, and then caused him to be shot at. This act brought matters to a state in which they could not possibly remain. Several

* "Que c'estoit faire injure au Roi, de révoquer en doute sa parole et sincérité." The earliest biography of Coligny is a valuable authority for what took place among the Huguenots, as it is from the notes of an eye-witness.

Italians took a principal part in Catharine's counsels. Big-rago, a native of Milan, and now keeper of the great seal, who constantly condemned the hesitation which was felt, and advised that the suspected leaders should be secured, Lodovico Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers, Albert Gondi, Duke of Retz, all these were of opinion that the security of the king and queen required that the leaders of the Huguenots should be got rid of by murder. The Duke of Anjou, and Angoulême, a natural brother of the King's, as well as Marshal Tavannes, took part in the consultations, and declared themselves of the same opinion. There only now remained to obtain the consent of the King.

Charles IX. was still convinced that the attack upon the Admiral should be punished, and every movement of the civic populace in favor of the Guises suppressed. He was now informed for the first time that the attempt upon Coligny's life had not been made by these alone, but that his mother and brother had had a share in it. He was reminded of Charry, one among the few of his trustworthy confidants, a person to whom he had been indebted for his education, and whom the Admiral had caused to be put to death—of the design he had expressed in early years, and never altogether given up, to take vengeance for every injury he had received—of the danger now to be feared from a rising of the Huguenots, which would be directed against the queen; that now they were masters of them, and had them all, as it were, in a cage, were they to open it and allow the lion to fush forth, what devastation would he not make! Already it was rumored that the Huguenot forces had been summoned to meet speedily at Melun. They must not wait till this took place; they must not allow a war to break out, which would be fraught with the most ruinous consequences to the Crown and to the country.

It was a monstrous step to which the young king was urged. Notwithstanding all the political motives advanced by the Queen, she was in this matter what she was in reality, a revengeful and ambitious Italian. She had associated with her cause the passions of other private individuals, and was he who possessed the sovereign authority to forget the sacred

character of his office, to approve of the vengeance of a party which he hitherto invariably condemned, to give free course to the bloodthirstiness of a portion of that Parisian populace which he had up to the present moment controlled and repressed? That Catharine de' Medici wished him to do so constitutes her great political crime against her son, against her house, and against the royal authority generally. She felt only as a party chief, who had obtained possession of sovereignty by usurpation, somewhat like her cousin-german Cosmo, not like a queen born to her dignity. In the condition into which she had now fallen she was tormented with apprehensions for the security of her position, and even for her life, and she saw no way of calming her terrors except by proceeding to the execution of the sanguinary design which she had long contemplated as possible in such a case.

However unlimited the authority was which Catharine exercised over her son, she had on this occasion to encounter some resistance on his part. The proposal appeared to him horrible. She answered him with an Italian proverb, "Mildness is sometimes cruelty, and cruelty mildness." He feared the evil impression it would make upon mankind generally, but he was answered that the enmity of the two parties, and the name of the Guises, would carry all the blame. He could not resolve upon sacrificing friends with whom he was on terms of the most confidential intercourse, such as Coligny and La Rochefoucauld, who had spent this very evening with him in pleasant jesting and conversation. Catharine, however, insisted, and it went so far that his mother and brother threatened to leave the Court,* since they could not induce him to take precautions against the ruin with which he was

* Sigismondo Cavalli, Relatione di 1574: "Stette più d' un ora e mezza renitente; finalmente, combattuto della madre et del fratello, consentì; e vedendo la Regina, che, se la cosa si fusse diferita, niente portava pericolo di scoprirsi, venne a questo per far risolvere il Re di chiederli licenza di ritirarsi in qualche parte, e così fece Monsr." The report of Micheli has been of more assistance to me than that of Cavalli; it deserves to be printed. I would only observe, that the narrative put into the mouth of the Duke of Anjou appears to me, on many grounds, which will be investigated elsewhere, to be spurious, and to have been derived from another source.

threatened, and which might be so easily averted; finally, she reproached him with want of courage, which put an end to all his reluctance, and Charles IX. yielded, nay adopted the proposed scheme with all the native vivacity of his temperament.

Late on the evening of August 23d, Charron, Prévôt des Marchands, and his predecessor Marcel, who had just retired from the office, were summoned to the Louvre. The question was laid before Marcel, who was known to be well acquainted with the capital, and very influential—supposing the King, under very urgent circumstances, should need the assistance of the Parisian populace, upon what number of them could he reckon? Marcel answered that the number would be in proportion to the time allowed him for assembling them; that in a month he could have a hundred thousand men ready. "But how many in a week?" He named a proportionate number. "And this very day how many?" He thought he might be able to collect twenty thousand, or perhaps more. These inquiries were made not so much on account of any embarrassment felt in finding agents for the execution of the design they had determined upon, but because they always contemplated an armed resistance on the part of the Huguenots as possible. Charron was charged to summon the citizens to arms in their several quarters, and to close the gates.

A few years before Catharine de' Medici had herself experienced a fierce opposition on the part of the Parisian mob, and now she formed with the same mob this terrible alliance. Revenge, ambition, a conviction of the danger of her position at the moment, all now prompted her to call to her aid the fury of the populace. Still, however, all was not to be left to the blind impulses of the multitude: the most frightful feature in the whole transaction was that in all the confusion there was a certain order observed.

They wished to spare the two princes, Navarre and Condé, but those of their companions who were to be slaughtered, were pointed out to the Duke of Montpensier.*

The murder of the Admiral, and of those who were most

* The report sent to Spain by Olargui, Secretary of the Embassy. Gachard, in the Bulletin de l'Académie de Bruxelles, xvi. 252.

closely associated with him, was undertaken by Guise, Aumale, and the Bastard of Angoulême. According to one account, which wears the appearance of truth, the Admiral was assailed in his own chamber, without any respect shown for his gray hairs; he was mortally wounded, but before life became quite extinct, he was dragged to the window and flung out. It is said that he had laid hold of a column of the window with his left arm, and received repeated wounds before he relinquished it, but was at last hurled into the court-yard, where Guise and Angoulême stood by while he expired.*

La Rochefoucauld and his son, Téligny, the Admiral's son-in-law, Briquemont, his sons, and all who were with them, were then killed, and their bodies thrown into the street, where they were stripped by the populace.

The "Paris Matins," as the massacre was called—a name suggested by the remembrance of the "Sicilian Vespers"—had meanwhile commenced in all quarters of the capital. The tocsin was sounded every where, and the populace stormed the houses of the Huguenots, murdering them and plundering their property, with the cry, "The King desires and commands it." They had come confiding in the hospitality which had been offered to them: they were surprised in their beds, and indiscriminately slaughtered; there was no distinction made between those who had borne arms and those who had not, between the illustrious and the obscure, the master and the servant. The King of Navarre's bed was sprinkled with the blood of friends, strangers as well as natives, who had come from the remotest parts of the kingdom to witness the ceremony of his marriage. The zealous reformer of the University, La Ramée, was hunted out in his hiding-place by one of his colleagues, whose ignorance he had frequently exposed, and by him given up to a party of paid murderers. It was a combination of private vengeance and public condemnation such as the world had never seen since the days of Sulla's proscriptions. To repress the horrors arising from civil war, was the final cause which had built the moral foundation of

* Serranus, iv. 33: "Nondum mortuus Amiralius brachio fenestræ columnam complectitur, ibi acceptis aliquot vulneribus in aream deturbatur."

the monarchy. In this act it forgot its historical origin, and made common cause with the very party whose hatred it should have controlled; its traces were lost altogether in these orgies of blood.

Oral orders, which were carried from town to town with the swiftness of the wind, authorized the rage of fanaticism every where. According to the most moderate calculations, there fell two thousand persons in Paris alone, and the number massacred in France was not less than twenty thousand. From time to time the flame broke out afresh, even after orders had been issued to restrain it. The rage of the multitude lived in its own movements, longing for blood, and nourished with blood. The minds of men were filled with wild fantasies, which made them afraid of themselves, and caused the very elements to appear fraught with terror.

Charles IX., about eight days after the massacre, caused his brother-in-law Henry to be summoned to him in the night. He found him as he had sprung from his bed, filled with dread at a wild tumult of confused voices, which prevented him from sleeping. Henry himself imagined he heard these sounds; they appeared like distant shrieks and howlings, mingled with the indistinguishable raging of a furious multitude, and with groans and curses, as on the day of the massacre. Messengers were sent into the city to ascertain whether any new tumult had broken out, but the answer returned was that all was quiet in the city, and that the commotion was in the air. Henry could never recall this incident without a horror that made his hair stand on end.

CHAPTER XVI.

TRANSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM CHARLES IX. TO HENRY III.

It sounds incredible, and yet it is quite true, that even after the events of the bloody wedding Queen Catharine professed still to sustain the character of a mediatrix, while on both sides nothing else was thought or could be thought of the whole occurrence than that the French Court had joined the irreconcilable reactionary party in their efforts against Protestantism. The Queen avoided receiving the Papal legate, who just then arrived; and when his entrance could no longer be deferred, she left Paris, in company with her son, in order not to witness it.

The Duke of Alva spoke to his friends of the whole transaction as it had occurred with strong disapproval, for the informal violence to which the fanaticism of the mob had been excited was in direct contradiction to his habits of thought and disposition. He expected from it, however—especially now that the most formidable enemies of his King were removed, that the policy of the French Court, might be brought to concur with that of Spain. King Philip felt himself moved by the event, which was totally unexpected by him, to an approximation with France, and caused to be made to the French Court an offer of his assistance toward the complete extermination of the Huguenots. The Court, however, answered him with pompously sounding, and, under the circumstances, memorable words, that “a King of France needed no allies but his own people.”

The fearful deed had come almost unexpectedly upon the very person who perpetrated it—the Queen. She was not

prepared for an alteration of her policy; she was firmly determined to raise her son, the Duke of Anjou, to the throne of Poland; she also hoped that either he or the Duke of Alençon might be called to the office of Protector of the Netherlands, and hoped to see him married to the Queen of England. She thought, under the impression of the universal terror, to put an end to the domestic commotions, by a declaration she made, to the intent that, although she had forbidden meetings and preachings, she did not wish to lay any restraint upon individual liberty of conscience. That that was the arrangement to which Catholicism had submitted in England.

The English Ambassador told her that the only difference between the two cases was, that his sovereign had not bound herself to the contrary. To this it must be added, that no one trusted in these new promises of Catharine's.

There were some among the Huguenots who were inclined to make their peace, and held it to be almost a duty, since the King their master was now a man, and directed the government himself; and many, under the influence of the terror that overspread France, reconciled themselves to the Mass. The greater part, however, were of opinion that no guarantee of any kind deserved their confidence; of two evils, said they, the lesser was manifestly to be chosen, and that consisted in the continuance of hostilities: in distrust alone was their safety: how much more wretched was it to be slaughtered by hired murderers than to fall in a struggle which was justified in the sight of God and man; for they were not contending against their King, but against criminals who gave loose to their fury under the shelter of his name. Nismes and Sancerre, following the example of Rochelle, refused to receive royal troops. Fiery preachers, putting all at hazard, inflamed the minds of their hearers, and summoned them to the service of the judgment of God, whose arm was already raised against the guilt-stained authors of the massacre, and exhorted them to destroy the tyranny in the tyrants.

Four royal armies took the field in order to force the towns to submission, the strongest body marching against Rochelle. But here there appeared another kind of reaction arising from

what had taken place; the assailing troops were disunited among themselves. Many of the bravest soldiers were seized with horror at the idea of being associated with the men who had murdered the Admiral, or who bore the blame of that deed, and would not serve with them. In the midst of their social enjoyments, the remembrance of blood intruded itself: on one occasion the company imagined they saw drops of blood under the dice which young Guise had just thrown upon the gaming-table, and the play was given up in horror. When the English fleet approached, the two princes of the blood who were in the army, Alençon and Henry of Navarre, formed the resolution of escaping to the ships, and fleeing to England. There appeared among the troops a party of discontented persons who were, in secret, Protestants. In the camp itself the notion was entertained of demanding justice against the murderers, and even, if necessary, of compelling it by force.

It does not follow from these circumstances, however, that the attack was not carried on with great earnestness. Many thousands must have fallen in the attempts to storm the fortress; but the defenders never forgot that they were contending not only for all spiritual good, but for existence itself. The union of the towns-people, with the refugees in the great principle of religion, made them invincible. The most desperate assaults were heroically resisted, and the most daring sorties made by the besieged, and the Catholic banners which they took were displayed upon the walls; fortunate accidents were regarded as visible tokens of Divine favor, and proofs that God had heard his people when they cried to him in their deepest distress.

Three causes wrought concurrently in favor of the Huguenots—the heroism of the defense they made, the divisions among the besieging troops, and the moderate tone which had been adopted in the foreign policy of the kingdom. The consequence was, that in July, 1573, they obtained a tolerably favorable edict, by which the free exercise of their religion was guaranteed to those who possessed the highest jurisdiction, and to all others liberty to follow their several occupations in peace. This extended to the three towns of Rochelle,

Montauban, and Nismes. Sancerre, which had suffered a siege resembling that of Numantia in ancient times, obtained peace through the mediation of the Polish ambassador, by whom the Duke of Anjou received the invitation to assume the crown of Poland, for the possession of that dignity also rested then upon a position of reconciliation between the two religious parties.

Upon the anniversary of St. Bartholomew's Day the Protestants felt themselves again strong enough to demand, at an assembly which they held in the town of Milhaud, complete freedom for the exercise of their religion.

The disunion of the camp had meanwhile transferred itself to the Court. After the departure of the Duke of Anjou the precedence which he had always possessed was claimed by his brother, the Duke of Alençon, and as it was not granted he commenced an open opposition. He was charged with having joined Henry of Navarre—in allusion to the conspiracy of La Mole and Coconas—in order to expel the Queen from the Court, or even to get her murdered—that is, the mother by the son. Catharine thought it necessary to place the two princes in close custody, and to send their chief confidants, the Marshals Cossé and Montmorency, to the Bastille.

From what appears in the state documents concerning these transactions, it is impossible to apportion the mass of guilt with accuracy; the impression they make is one of astonishment at the very extraordinary condition of this court, and the disposition of the minds of those who belonged to it. Alençon believed that he was hated by his mother—that she not only postponed his claims, but wished to destroy him; the King of Navarre was more than once apprehensive that his death had been determined on. On the other hand, the King and Queen trembled for their own lives at the slightest movement; and much was spoken of wax-figures, and certain superstitious and heathenish ceremonies, by which it was intended to shorten the King's life. Magic and mysterious superstition play a part also in reference to other persons. The Italians, ready for any undertaking, daring and trust-worthy, had the chief hand in these matters, such as Cosimo Ruggiero, the tutor of Alençon, who could

not be forced to make a confession by all the agony of the torture.

In this hour of confusion the eye involuntarily turns toward Charles IX. In his earlier years he had excited much sympathy; he appeared to be a good-tempered, interesting, and generous youth, and showed a taste for poetry and music. For the purpose of invigorating his weak frame various kinds of physical exercise were thought necessary, and to these he gave himself up almost passionately. A smith's forge was erected for him, and it gave him pleasure to be found there bathed in sweat, while he was at work on a suit of armor. He often rose and took horse at midnight in order to ride to the chase, and thought it the greatest honor if he could excel every one in his bodily exercises. The consequence of this was, however, that little was done for the education of his intellect, and nothing for the formation of his morals. To reflect on the affairs of the State, in which nothing could be done without him, or to devote any thing like earnest attention to them, was not in his nature.* His passion, when excited, vented itself in a storm of wild imprecations. His ambition and his imagination had been long occupied with warlike schemes against Spain, with campaigns for the conquest of Milan, under the leading of the Admiral, or for the recovery of Navarre. But the natural vehemence of disposition which he cherished was capable of receiving another direction amid the passionate impulses of the religious and political parties by which he was surrounded, and then even the friends and companions in whose intercourse he had found pleasure appeared to him as his most dangerous enemies. Thus, after some slight resistance, he allowed himself, in an evil hour, to be seduced to the commission of that deed which has consigned his memory to the hatred and execration of succeeding ages. He himself was never entirely free from its effects; he felt conscious that he was regarded as a man of bad heart, in whom slumbered an indomitable savageness. It was remarked that he never looked any one straight in the face: in his audiences he generally kept his eyes shut, and

* Sigismondo di Cavalli, 1574: "Al Re pareva bella cosa aver chi el governasse, e senza altro fastidio potere attendere ai suoi piaceri."

when he opened them he directed them upward, and immediately afterward cast them down upon the ground. He now, for the first time, communicated his intention of beginning himself to reign, and to be king in reality, but it was too late. The violent gusts of passion to which he gave way, and were followed by corresponding depression of spirit; the distraction caused by conspiracies which were continually discovered round him; the excessive and continued efforts of a body otherwise weak and full of corrupt humors, led to early death on the 30th of May, 1574, before he had completed his four-and-twentieth year.* He had never, in fact, awoke from the intoxication of passion and excitement to a full self-consciousness, nor ever emancipated himself from his mother. A few hours before he expired he appointed her Regent till the return of his brother from Poland; his last word was "My mother."

Catharine, in whom we find no trace of emotion that interfered with her energy, effectively preserved the peace of the country generally, but she succeeded in doing so only because she held those who were really able to disturb it—the two princes and the two marshals—in her custody. Meanwhile all was still full of fermentation, and of new manifestations of disaffection and threatened revolt.

One fact may be regarded as certain, and is expressly stated by the Venetian ambassador, namely that all men of understanding, without difference of creed, regarded the massacre as a deed of horror and scandal. Absolute power, said they, had at least an acknowledged jurisdiction, but this was a deed of lawless tyranny. Must it come to such a state of things in France that men can no longer lay themselves down to sleep in their beds without the dread of being murdered during the night? Deeds of this description, they stated, would be im-

* That the representations in the "Henriade," among others, are exaggerated, may be seen from the almost medical report of the Florentine Ambassador, in Alberi, p. 416. Sig. Cavalli is also very correct: "La morte del povero Principe si causò per una pessima abitudine, acquistata dal mal modo di vivere, per la quale cascò ammalato da una straordinaria ebullitione di sangue, che tutta la massa era corrotta, e se bene parve che da essa se ne levasse, però da poi mai stette bene;" to which must be added his mental disquietude.

possible, except to the Queen, descended from the tyrant race of the Medici, and to her Italian companions.* It was not thought incredible even that she had taken the Turkish government for her model.

When, however, the idea of violence which characterized the usurping sovereignties which had subjected the Italian republics, had, through a combination of persons and circumstances, acquired influence over a great monarchy whose fundamental principles were in direct contradiction to that idea, it must of necessity have excited the opposition of the principles it had infringed. This opposition had in fact manifested itself some time before.

Even in the reign of Henry II., La Boétie had published a small *brochure* in opposition to the spirit of faction which prevailed under that monarch. In this pamphlet he treats the supreme authority as the domination of faction dependent upon a single person, and proposes the question why all the others do not unite against that one. Up to the present time this little book had been circulated in private only, it now was published. But the transaction of St. Bartholomew's Day called forth far different utterances of the aversion which sought a theory for its justification. In opposition to it the idea of the sovereignty of the people now makes its appearance in French literature. Francis Hottmann, a Frenchman, was one of those who had narrowly and with the utmost difficulty escaped the slaughter of 1572. He took refuge in Switzerland, and was the first who, leaving out of view the religious aspect of the question, which was that dwelt upon by the clerical writers and especially by the Jesuits, argued it upon political and historical grounds. He had studied the history of the ancient Franks, and confounding the aristocratico-military assemblies of the Champ de Mars with the body politic, he maintained that the King ought to be elected, and that the whole mass of the people should concur in the election, for free men were not created to submit to despotic

* Micheli: "Attribuendolo alla Regina, come Italiana, Fiorentina, et di casa di Medici, di sangue, dicono essi, tiranno, perciò odiosissima, siccome per causa sua è in universale tutta la nazione Italiana con pericolo che un giorno non la faccia male."

dominion, nor to be driven like herds of cattle. The same views prevailed in another work called "Junius Brutus against the Tyrants." In this it was affirmed that the authority of the King could not exist without the sanction of the people—that the right of election was an inalienable franchise of the people; first the people, then the King, and the King must be amenable to the people. They departed as widely from the fundamental principle of the Romanic German states as the disciples of Machiavelli; after the terrific experience of the past year, such views were received with applause—thoughts that were before whispered in the ear in secret, were now proclaimed from the house-tops.

Another result of the massacre was the rise in the country of a new form of the opposition which was promoted by the general discontent. The governor of a great province, who was not particularly disposed to favor Protestantism, undertook voluntarily to defend a principle which was by no means that of the government, and to insist upon it with urgency.

When the peace which was concluded in the year 1568 was immediately afterward violated, and moderate courses once more forsaken, there appeared a new party, composed of persons possessing great authority, who wished to observe the treaty from political considerations, and which was therefore named the party of the Politicians. At their head appeared the sons of the Constable, the Marshal Francis de Montmorency and his brothers, who, like their father, were Catholics, but systematic opponents of the Cardinal of Lorraine; for every thing, however general its bearing, was now again dependent upon the combinations of faction. The sons of the Constable had, as we have mentioned, obtained a momentary ascendancy by the peace of 1570, and exercised it to establish the measures of reconciliation which were adopted. On this account, however, they were the more affected by the sudden relapse to violent proceedings, and the Marshal himself escaped the general slaughter by a mere accident. The discontented in the camp before Rochelle immediately united with him in his views, and there is no doubt that he took part in the agitations with which the Duke of Alençon filled

the Court. The Queen kept him personally in prison; his brother, Henry de Montmorency, named Damville, Governor of Languedoc, was not less suspected by her: she was eager either to get him into her power, or to remove him from the province. Damville maintained positively that there was a design to get him murdered.

Catharine, however, found in Damville a man who was not only cautious, but who was ready to defend himself with arms. He did not willingly allow the delegates of the Queen to come near him, and surrounded himself with a guard devoted to him personally. Much was said of a tame wolf he had—however rare such a phenomenon is—which showed a wonderful attachment to him. That powerful man, Captain Aragon, who with one blow had cut in two a noble beast upon the bridge of Avignon, slept in his chamber. The Queen deprived Damville of his government, and assigned it to another; but he met this movement by forming a still closer connection with the province, and with both the religious parties. Since the bloody nuptials the Protestants in Languedoc had become thoroughly organized. They possessed a number of castles and small towns, and in every district where they had the authority they appointed a chief who should send military assistance to any that were attacked. Montauban was the central point for Upper Languedoc and Guienne; Nismes for Lower Languedoc, Rovergue, and the Cevennes. Deputies from the several districts were associated with the military commanders. The Reformed did not find favor with the multitude here any more than in other places; but they had a great part of the nobility on their side, about two hundred gentlemen in Languedoc, chiefly young men who had been engaged in study, and a large number of the better class of burghers and artisans, whose spirit had not been broken with labor. It did not appear quite certain that they would join with Damville, who did not belong to their creed, but they fully recognized his merit. He was the first man, they said, who aroused men's minds from the torpor into which they had been thrown as by a general paralysis, and remembered that he owed duties to God and the Crown, and at the same time to the mass of the people. Their union with the princes

of the blood had, after a long struggle, obtained for them the assurance of peace; their union with the governor of a great province must, now that that edict was revoked, secure for them its re-establishment; for Damville and his whole political party demanded the renewal of the Edict of Pacification as a preliminary condition to any further negotiation. A great portion of the Catholic nobility who had relatives among the Huguenots, and had been reproached on that account with not having opposed them earnestly enough, now also joined the governor. The Parliaments held firm by the fundamental maxims of the persecuting religion, and this furnished another motive to the nobility to take the part of the Huguenots, for they hated these lawyers, by whom their rights were limited, and themselves treated with injustice. A preliminary arrangement was made at Milhaud in August, 1574, the Huguenots declaring themselves ready to acknowledge Damville as Governor of Languedoc, while he on his part pledged himself not to introduce the Catholic service into any town in which they were masters. A council composed of members of both creeds was to assist the governor in his administration."*

Thus was it attempted in this province to re-establish the Edict of Pacification, which the Government had abolished, and to make it possible for both parties to live together. The arbitrary manner in which it was done, they excused by asseverating that a faction composed of foreigners, had obtained possession of the supreme power, and was striving with all its authority to annihilate the kingdom, the nobility, the princes of the blood, and with them every thing like education and pure morality. It was hoped that when the new king arrived, and learned the real state of affairs, he would confirm all that had been done.

There was some reason to expect this, for when Henry III., without altogether renouncing his Polish kingdom, yet left it with a degree of impatience which looked something like a flight, he sent for Damville, as he was coming from Venice, on his return to France, in order to consult with him concerning measures of pacification. The Marshal met the King in

* Vaissette, Histoire de Languedoc, v. 322.

Piedmont, who assured him of his intention to establish peace, and recommended him to return to Languedoc and to wait for what should be further effected.* When Damville arrived at Beaucaire, he caused all the bells to be rung, and announced to the assembled burghers that it was the King's will that both parties should live peaceably with each other.

If a private man who loves his native land, and is removed to a distance from it, where he is less affected by the momentary impression of events, feels impelled to weigh its circumstances thoroughly, and to devise that which would be most advantageous to the general interests, how infinitely more is this to be expected from a prince who hastens to undertake the government of a country. Henry III., on his journey, appears to have cherished designs which he afterward regretted were not carried into execution. He intended, immediately on his arrival, that a general assembly of the Estates should be summoned, in order to conclude with both parties the measures most conducive to the benefit of all. He might have reckoned upon obedience to ordinances issued on the authority of resolutions of the Estates, and would have been in a position to compel it if refused. In this assembly measures were to be taken for liquidating the debt, and for regulating the expenditure of the Court, and of all the other governmental departments; it was then to be announced to the neighboring powers that the new monarch desired to maintain friendship with them, but at the same time required definite treaties, and an unequivocal understanding of their positions relative to himself. A settlement of the religious, financial, and external affairs, would have made a fortunate and powerful government possible.†

It is not clear whether any consultation was held concerning these ideas. The members of the Council commissioned to oppose them by the Queen, could not, as far as they them-

* This is narrated by Damville in his manifesto, November, 1574, *Le Laboureur*, ii. 135; he says nothing of the plots to which he is said to have been exposed.

† Letter to Villeroy, in Groen van Prinsterer, Suppl. 232: "Il falloit moy, venu à la couronne, faire une assemblée d'Etats, et résolvant tant avec les uns qu'avec les autres, ce qui pouvoit réunir le tout, faire le jurer et le signer par tous les principaux et les compagnies."

selves were concerned, be in favor of the King's notions. They had no ideas of commencing a new system of government, but rather of carrying on the previous system without alteration. Catharine insisted that it was the final desire of Charles IX., that those who had last risen against him, should be punished, and that its fulfillment was incumbent upon his successor. The Cardinal of Lorraine was with her in these views, and tendered the power of his convincing eloquence to prevent any deviation from the system of severity.* The whole transaction ended with Henry's adopting the political principles of his brother, whom he succeeded, and went even a step further back. He caused it to be announced that he acknowledged liberty of conscience, but that he would not tolerate any religious practices which deviated from those of Catholicism. He promised peace, but it was only to those who would lay down their arms and submit to his authority.

The renewal of the policy of Charles IX., necessarily aroused all the old hostilities against the government.

Montmorency, cited before the tribunal at Lyons, and, at the same time, assailed in Upper and Lower Languedoc, as well as from the side of Provence, now formed a definite alliance with the united Huguenots of the south and west. They acknowledged him as their chief, and he took their leaders into the council by whose advice he desired to be directed in the affairs of justice, policy, and finance. Regular provincial and general assemblies were ordained, for the general arming, on the principle of mutual toleration. In the places where the professors of the two creeds dwelt promiscuously, both were to vow, with their hands lifted up to God, that they would observe the peace toward one another. The name of Montmorency attracted the nobility to take share in the proceedings, and they associated themselves with Damville in no small numbers, adopting his views and joining their arms to his. The conduct of the Count de Ventadour is particularly remarkable. He demanded once more the calling of a national council, in order to put a final end to all doubts re-

* This fact we learn from the speech of Henry IV., delivered to the deputies of the Parliament of Guienne, on November 3, 1599.—*Lettres Missives*, iv. 183.

specting religion, and declared that, until this decision was arrived at, every man must take part with the one or the other Confession.* Political demands were, however, connected with those referring to religion: the abolition of the sale of offices was urged; the calling of the States General; the diminution of the taxes to what they were in the time of Francis I. The provincial Estates of Dauphiné, Provence, and Burgundy, raised their voices loudly for these and similar concessions.

The attack of the royal troops upon Languedoc was not of much consequence. Damville said it would have been much easier for him to drive them off than to retain his confederates afterward in a legal course of action; for he always believed himself to be acting legally, as the new King also was ruled by that foreign faction which he constantly described as enemies to the kingdom.

Damville's authority acquired another considerable accession by the adhesion of the Duke of Alençon, who found an opportunity at last of leaving the Court, and joining the discontented, all of whose complaints and grievances he adopted. A religious war was no longer spoken of, but a war for the public interests, as in the time of Louis XI.;† but although the name of the Huguenots was thus put somewhat in the background, the religious element still continued in active operation. Soon after the departure of Alençon from the Court, young Henry of Navarre left it also, and deemed it expedient to return without delay to the Reformed confession. The bond of union between the parties was the promise of the Politicians to labor for the re-establishment of the edict of January, which constituted the great object toward which the wishes of the Reformed were directed.

The dispute, however, was not to be decided this time, either, without the interposition of neighboring nations, and peoples who were related in their religious views.

* Serranus, *Commentarii*, v. 186. Serranus is probably the best authority for this period, and contains the most detailed information concerning these projects. Thuanus also has an extract, l. xii. 170.

† Giovanni Micheli, 1576: "Non considerandosi per capo principale il fatto della religione, si è transferito e mutato il nome d'Ugonotti in quello di malcontenti."

England again furnished money, and Germany, men. These joined young Condé, who had fled into Germany from Picardy when measures were first taken against Alençon and Navarre. The Palatine John Casimir was once more the leader of these auxiliaries, and with them crossed the French frontiers in December, 1575. The Germans were not altogether without their own object in these movements; on the contrary, they contemplated a very important one for their own country. John Casimir obtained from the chiefs of the Huguenots assurances that he should be named administrator of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which would have brought these towns and districts once more into union with Germany.* A considerable army was formed gradually, composed of French and German troops. In March, 1576, Alençon mustered thirty thousand men, who demanded to be led directly to Paris, in order to avenge upon the murderers the horrible deeds of St. Bartholomew's Day.

Henry III. was not altogether unprepared; he also had German and Swiss mercenaries, besides the French who gathered round him. He was of opinion afterward that it would have been better had he met and opposed his brother boldly; that, however, was not to the taste of his mother or his ministers. The Government, feeling itself to be as yet the weaker party, commenced to negotiate.

The great object was to satisfy Alençon; he was assured of a provision, which was almost inconsistent with the royal authority. Condé also was provided for; and lastly John Casimir was induced to forego his demands, through the influence, it was said, of the Swiss upon his father. The King undertook to satisfy his troops as regarded their pay, and the Count Palatine immediately commenced his march homeward.

The investigation of the political grievances was referred to the meeting of the Estates, which was to take place the same year. The religious affairs were also accommodated. The edict of January was not fully conceded to the Protestants. They were excluded from Paris, and from its immediate environs to the distance of two leagues; but in all the rest of

* Languet, *Epistolæ Arcanæ*, i. 186.

the kingdom there was granted to them the free exercise of their religion, capacity for all offices, for the decision of their legal disputes a court of appellate instance in the Parliaments, composed of members of both religions, and several places in Guienne, Auvergne, and Languedoc were given up to them for their security.*

The Politicians indulged in the boldest expectations. Marshal Damville renewed the proposal for a national council, to which the Protestants were also to send deputies, in order that "through a real reformation of the clergy the wrath of God might be appeased." They believed that after this decision had proceeded from them, they would be able, by means of powerful representatives, to rule both in the Court and in the provinces. They were strong, but yet not strong enough for this. Their proceedings had produced an extensive effect, but one neither so rapid nor so thorough as they expected. The powers which they imagined they had conquered, offered them once more the most obstinate resistance.

Their conduct was intolerable to the King especially. It wounded his feelings of self-esteem that a law should, as it were, be forced upon him by a successful rising of his vassals, aided by foreign troops—a law which he disapproved of in his heart, for notwithstanding all external vacillation he was a thorough Catholic. Throughout the country also the interests of the corporations and of the provinces, as well as the progressive Catholic restoration, the effect of the Jesuits' preaching and instruction, awakened a spirit of zeal which would hear of no reconciliation. The Parliaments were not disposed to admit into them the Reformed, in other chambers which had been conceded to them. In the great towns they would not hear of the divine service of the Huguenots, and when they assembled for worship they were followed with hootings and revilings, and not unfrequently fired upon. An article in the peace of the Prince of Condé stipulated particularly for the delivery of the town of Peronne as a place of security to the Protestants, but this excited the liveliest opposition on the part of the townsmen and the neighboring nobility. It is quite possible that from the Netherlands all

* Paix, named "de Monsieur," May, 1576, in *Popelinière*, ii. 399.

available influence was exercised in order to prevent the execution of this article, for Peronne would have been a most convenient basis for aggressive operations on the part of the Huguenots. Another motive, still weightier, may have been at work. The spirit of provincial separation under one powerful chief had shown itself favorable to the Protestants in Languedoc: the same spirit now operated in favor of the Catholics in Picardy. The governor, d'Humières, who was at law with the Montmorencies, was on this account particularly desirous to keep them at a distance. He, therefore, formed an association, comprising the nobility, the clergy, and the burghers, against the permission given to the Protestants. The immediate pretext may have been that the German auxiliaries, whose claims were not yet fully discharged, might march upon the town, and put Condé in possession of it by force. But the tendency went direct to the maintenance of the old ecclesiastical system in all its severity. The spirit of the Catholic association, which had occasionally shown itself in 1564 and 1568, began now to manifest itself every where.

The waves of opinion have at all times been high and strong in France. From time to time they run in opposing currents. The general bias of men's minds in favor of the Reformation no longer existed. From the opposition to the massacre sprang a turn toward a moderate conciliatory policy, but the consequence of this was, that it awoke the consciousness of its strength in the Catholic element, and it now all of a sudden took possession of the arena. The complete alteration in public feeling was made plain at the elections for the Assembly of the States which had been summoned. The Protestants and the Politicians had greatly deceived themselves in their expectations of the result: the Reformed were almost entirely excluded, the majority of votes was against them every where.

As to the connection of the Court with this reactionary movement, there can be no doubt that it was approved of. The Court used all the power and influence it could command in order to promote the election of Catholics; the manifestoes of the associations also, although conceived in the

most insidious terms, do not exhibit any indication of the King's having taken offense at them; he desired, on the contrary, that they should be formed every where as in Picardy, and with similar zeal, and upon his suggestion they were extended far and wide.

He did not disguise the fact that his only object in the negotiations of 1576 had been to separate his brother from the confederates, and to get rid of their troops, but that it had never been his intention to observe the edict they had forced from him; he joyfully seized the opportunity which the altered disposition of the nation seemed to offer of relieving himself from its stipulations.

The Assembly of the Estates was opened at Blois on the 6th of December, 1576, but it was by no means such an Assembly as the Protestants and the discontented had wished and hoped for, nor such as the King originally intended, in which a free consultation was to be held between the different parties, whence might have resulted a practicable and satisfactory arrangement. In this one party only was represented, and the King endeavored to impel that one still further than it had itself at first contemplated.

The efforts made by the Court on this occasion to bring the Estates to make a declaration of a character the most decidedly unfavorable to the Reformed are worthy of observation. Even the leaders of the clergy and the nobility had not at first thought of proposing the exclusion of Protestants from the kingdom: Queen Catharine was obliged to use her influence with both Estates to bring them to her views. The clause referring to this subject in the speech delivered by the Speaker of the Court of Nobles was composed by Catharine herself, and corrected by the King. In the third Estate it required the express announcement that it was the desire of the King, and even then their resolution was by no means so decisive as the Speaker Versoris took the liberty of expressing it.

In the month of December such had been the progress that a requisition was presented to the King by the States, demanding that he would allow one religion only in the kingdom. Henry III. declared his complete concurrence in these views,

for he had sworn to them at his coronation, and against this his first oath no other could bind him.*

A general war against the Huguenots appeared now unavoidable, especially since, alarmed by these proceedings, they had already taken the field. At Court it was seriously considered in what connection the paid troops could be placed with the gentry, who had been summoned to take arms by the provincial associations, so that they might at the same time assail the strong places in possession of the Huguenots, and advance against them in the open field. Contracts were made with some of the captains of the German mercenaries for the purpose of bringing an army composed of these troopers into the service of France.

It was still a question whether the French Estates, after the experience they had had of the power of resistance possessed by the Huguenots, would resolve upon a war of extermination against them—whether, after having complained so loudly and frequently of the increase of the debt, of the distress and poverty of the people, and of the confusion of the finances, they should consent to new pecuniary grants of large amount. Indications soon appeared that their zeal did not carry them quite so far.

The first proposition laid before them referred to the change of indirect into direct taxation, which was to be levied according to the number of hearths in the kingdom; these were reckoned at three millions, and it was computed that fifteen million livres might be raised from them. But it was impossible that so crude and untried, and at the same time comprehensive, a scheme could be approved of, especially when its execution threw more power than ever into the hands of the finance officers, who were partly foreigners, and altogether regarded as a band of robbers. The proposal was rejected without debate. Even a more moderate demand for an extraordinary supply of two millions was rejected by the

* In the Journal of Nevers, which extends from December, 1576, to March, 1577, we have authentic information concerning the consultations of the Court and the vacillation of its views. There is an extract from it in the *Mémoires de Nevers*, i. 166, repeated in the thirteenth volume of Mayer, p. 97. The journal in the third volume of the *Journal of Estoile*, 1744, is still more complete; I keep entirely to it.

deputies of the third estate; for their instructions went no further than concerned the relief of the King from his debts, and they had no authority to contract fresh burdens. The Court finally had recourse to a sale of the domains, which it was thought the Estates could not refuse. This proposition, however, aroused not only a transient, but almost a systematic opposition. The learned John Bodin, deputy from Vermandois, maintained that the King was entitled to the usufruct only of the crown lands, but that the right of property to them was in the people. In the provincial assemblies also, where alone the alienation of the domains could be properly resolved on, the proceeding was not agreed to, for the assigned reason that the deficiency which would thence arise would have to be covered afterward by the third estate, in some other way.

In the other estates also views of an extraordinary bearing were discussed. The notion was propounded, that no question should be made the subject of any new conference with the royal Council except such as had remained undecided in the Estates, but that every one concerning which they had agreed should have immediately the force of law.* It was further desired that the grievances complained of by the States should not for the future be referred to the royal Council exclusively, but that a deputation, to be named, should consult with the Council, and that they should unitedly resolve upon the measures to be taken. It was thought that by this means the number of members in the Council would be limited, and those of them who appeared unfit removed.

Thus the Estates, instead of concurring unconditionally with the King in his warlike views, commenced a dispute with him upon the principles of the constitution. He avoided going into it, but its significance was perfectly evident to him.

But even in the Council itself objections were raised to the

* *Recueil de tout ce qui s'est négocié en la compagnie du Tiers Etat, pris des Mémoires de M. Bodin, in Maier, 13, 299.* Bodin is in his political work very full on the subject of the domains also, yet, though he holds the fundamental principle firmly, he does not express himself in such republican terms: *De Republica*, vi. 1002. An "aliénation perpétuelle" was expressly forbidden by an edict of Charles IX. given at Moulins in February, 1566.

proposals of the Court. Belèvre drew attention to the mischievous operation which the assertion, that the King was absolved beforehand by his coronation oath from obligations which he had subsequently assumed with every formality, must have upon the foreign relations of the kingdom.

In this state of general doubt and uncertainty, a solemn consultation concerning the policy to be adopted was opened in the assembled Council on the 28th of February, 1577. The spiritual members, the cardinals, demanded now, as they had before, the establishment of the unity of religion, asserting that in the face of all difficulties, men must trust in God. They were joined by the Dukes of Guise, Nevers, and Mayenne. Nevers still in the warmest glow of Catholic zeal, recommended that the war should be undertaken as a crusade, the cost of which, he was of opinion, could be obtained by means of offerings laid before the Most Holy, not for the King, but for God. On the other hand, some who held themselves to be not less sound Catholics, declared against these views—the gallant Marshals Byron and Cossé; the Duke of Montpensier spoke with peculiar emphasis, for he had paid a visit to the King of Navarre, and was convinced that some concessions might be expected from the Huguenot party. All were now eager to know what part the Queen Mother, who still retained the greatest influence in all affairs, would take concerning this question. Easily moved as she was, and decided in the course she adopted for the time, she now joined her influence to that of the moderate members of the Council. “When people can scarcely live,”* said she, “whence are the means to be obtained for sustaining a war such as this must be? Should the kingdom be ruined by it, religion must also be destroyed, while by upholding the former, the latter would also be preserved. It might be a comfort to others that they believed themselves able to maintain religion in its integrity amidst the ruins of the State. She did not belong to them; she advised the king to preserve his kingdom and

* Thuanus, lib. lxiii. p. 180: “Quod concordibus Ordinum suffragiis decerneretur, id ratum esset; in quo dissiderent, id a Rege et Regine parentis, regii sanguinis principum, et Franciæ parium, et xii. Ordinum delegatorum sententiâ decideretur.”

his person in preference to every thing else, and to look forward to a day when the Divine power would perhaps unite the two religions once more.”

The king decided in accordance with this advice, stating that, under altered circumstances, it was lawful for him to change his opinion.

These were consultations and resolutions of immeasurable importance. The Protestants had demanded the assembling of the Estates, in the hope of finding them disposed in their favor, and of seeing a searching reform in accordance with the decree of 1560–61 carried into effect. The King, on the other hand, had summoned the Estates because he contemplated renewing the war against the Politicians and the Huguenots. The Estates took part with neither; they were Catholics, and did not betray the slightest sympathy for the Huguenots; but they were by no means so devoted to the Crown as to grant supplies for new undertakings of a warlike character.

The constant fluctuation of the antagonistic powers, their alternate advances and recessions, were such that neither party could indulge the hope of a complete victory over the other. The Crown was compelled to return to the course it had originally marked out, and to tolerate the one party by the side of the other. The execution of the ancient laws of the Catholic Church in reference to the professors of the new faith was proved to be impossible; all that appeared attainable was to reduce the concessions made to them in such a degree that Catholicism might continue to exist in their neighborhood without danger.

The war had meanwhile commenced in all quarters of the kingdom, and must be brought to a termination. The voluntary service of the nobility, the contributions of the clergy, and some grants from the Pope, placed the King in a position to begin the campaign. When he dismissed the Estates, which he did somewhat ungraciously, on account of the slight sympathy they had manifested with his designs, he told them he would not repay evil with evil, but that, on the contrary, he desired above all things to defend them against the Huguenots; that he could not, however, give occasion to a fresh de-

vastation of the kingdom for that purpose, and that his views were directed only to the establishment of a lasting peace.

The war of the year 1577 is one of the few wars in which a definite object was kept in view, the attainment of which sufficed. Two royal armies appeared in the field, the one under the command of the King's brother, with whom the Duke of Guise was associated, the other under the command of the Duke of Mayenne. The former conquered La Charité and Issoire, two of the most important fortresses in the hands of the Protestants; the latter pressed forward victoriously into Poitou, relieved some places which were threatened, conquered others, and once planted its cannon at a quarter of a league from Rochelle; the Rochelle fleet also suffered some loss.

In the mean time, while every one was expecting that these advantages would be rapidly followed up, the King stopped short suddenly. A rumor reached him that a great anti-Catholic union was formed against him, and that a new German army was already on its march to hasten the maturing of his peaceful resolutions. Queen Catharine undertook to excuse him to the Pope.*

The same feeling prevailed on the other side. Damville, in the first excitement of the moment, had resolved upon the design of inviting the Turkish fleet to Aigues-Mortes, which would have compelled the Spaniards, the Pope, and the French Court at the same time to entertain thoughts of peace; but the Protestants were already aware that the King did not intend their destruction, and were unwilling to assent to such desperate measures. Damville now began to make approaches to the Court, and in all his letters expressed his earnest desire for peace.

Henry III. was then at Poitiers, but the negotiations took place chiefly at Bergerac, and were conducted by the King of Navarre and the Duke de Montpensier. Immediately upon their commencement Henry of Navarre declared with great solemnity that in the last edict there were a few points which could not be carried out, and which must therefore be struck out.†

* The chief edict of Poitiers. The extraordinary articles, which were at first kept secret, are dated from Bergerac, September, 17, 1577.

† Discours adressé au Duc de Montpensier, in Berger. i. 147.

He promised to exert himself in the assembly of the churches that every thing which could disturb the peace of France should be allowed to drop.

Both parties were in earnest, and they therefore speedily agreed to a treaty, which is called the Treaty of Poitiers or of Bergerac, and is among the most important of all that were concluded between the two parties.

Its most important object was to put an end to the apprehension that Protestantism would overflow the whole kingdom, which had been the chief occasion of the recent troubles. For the exercise of the Reformed religion such places were appointed as it was practiced in on the day of the treaty. The high nobility were to be free in their own dwellings, but all others were limited to one appointed place in each district, and the new creed was entirely excluded from the capital and ten leagues round it. The Huguenots consented that the mixed chambers should be erected in the four southern parliaments only, but they insisted upon remaining capable of all offices.* The King obtained sufficient command over himself to express his displeasure at the excesses committed on St. Bartholomew's Day, 1572. All governors and officers were to return to the places which they had previously occupied. Henry III. acknowledged the King of Navarre and the Prince of Condé as his true subjects. The claims of the latter to Picardy were reserved, and instead of Peronne the much more important town of St. Jean d'Angely was placed in his hands for security. Meanwhile all other places were to be given up, except such as were appointed for the Huguenots, namely two in Languedoc, two in Provence, two in Dauphiné, and three in Guienne, of which they were to be put in possession, and for the cost of whose garrisons the King made himself responsible.

The concessions made to the Huguenots were calculated to give them security of existence, while the limitations to which they submitted would remove the apprehensions of the Catholics. No one rejoiced more at the agreement than the King himself; he called the peace his own—"The King's Peace"—and said it was as much so as if he had written the articles

* Maffei, Gregorio XIII. i. 295.

with his own hand ; he had even the idea of calling the town of Poitiers Ville de Paix.

This peace, as it was the result of all the earlier relations and conditions of the kingdom, is the foundation of all the later. It contains, not a theoretical, but a practical solution of the great questions agitated. It indicates the point to which the vigor and energy of the powers opposed in the struggle had brought affairs.

In carrying out the treaty there were still some difficulties and hindrances to be overcome. In Guienne it even came once more to an imprudent and partial rising, and new remonstrances and agreements had to be made at Nérac in February, 1579, and at Fleix in November, 1580. With all this, however, the treaty of Poitiers was generally observed. France appeared desirous of reposing upon it, and it would have probably afforded her repose, had there not been a power in her neighborhood which would not endure such an arrangement—a power which henceforth made it its peculiar occupation to collect together the materials for the production of an antagonistic movement and new storms.

BOOK V.

HENRY III. AND THE LEAGUE.

CHAPTER XVII.

INTRODUCTION.

As in antiquity Athens can not be thought of without Sparta, Rome without Carthage, so in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries France can neither be comprehended nor understood without the counterpart of the Spanish monarchy.

What was it that Francis I. and Charles V. contended for in their time? The Emperor sought to realize that universal supremacy which was connected in theory with his title; Francis I. maintained the French idea—the idea of France.

There was now no danger to be apprehended from the Empire; but the son and successor of the Emperor, powerful in the possession of extensive territories and the gold of the Indies, renewed the Spanish claim to a predominant authority in the world, and stepped forth himself as the champion of the ancient faith against its assailants. In the adherents to that faith he met with supporters, by whose assent he assumed the position and authority of head of that party generally throughout Europe.

Coligny's design had been to unite the energy of the Protestant impulse with the interests of France, and to place France at the head of the anti-Spanish powers: he perished on account of it. The Government, however, although it would not follow the course he had marked out, felt no inclination to associate itself with the Spanish system: it feared that by such a connection it would lose its independence. We have seen how this apprehension promoted the pacification, which was now at length established. After a long and doubtful struggle, which was continually breaking out afresh,

and again extinguished, the Reformed opinions had at last won a secure position, which was daily fortified. The recognition of these opinions, although forced from the Government, still constituted, viewing the country as a whole, and the real state of things, an element of French independence.

It could not be expected that the King of Spain would regard this state of things with a friendly eye, or that he would even reconcile himself to it. The war in the Netherlands still continued, and did not fail again to excite the sympathy which the Huguenots had previously shown for their fellow Protestants, as well as the ambition of the French Government. Philip II. was actuated merely by a regard to his own interests when he made use of all the means in his power to animate the strict Catholic party, which was favorable to him, in its opposition to the tendencies adverse to his views in France.

The League was the work of Spain and of Philip II. in a much greater degree than is generally supposed. It constituted a decisive crisis in the antagonism of the two monarchies. Philip found his most effective auxiliaries in the interior of France itself, where, notwithstanding the pacification which had been agreed to, the old passions were kept in a state of continued excitement by the continuance of the opposition between the two creeds. The King who then ruled in France did not possess the power necessary to hold his subjects together for any lengthened period.

CHAPTER XVIII.

HENRY III. AND HIS GOVERNMENT DURING THE PEACE.

HENRY OF VALOIS had while prince attained a high military position, and acquired, whether he merited it or not, a warlike reputation. But how astonished were the Poles, with whom this reputation had contributed to his election, when he arrived among them. They expected to see a man of a lofty figure and rough manners, and to hear discourse of war and of arms; instead of which a young man presented himself to them of weak physical organization, who wore jewels in his ears, and yearned for the pleasures of French society which he had forsaken.

To enjoy these pleasures in his own manner was his principal object when he entered his capital after the peace of Poitiers, with the intention of taking up his residence there, and dwelling there more constantly than any French king had done hitherto. He did not care for the chase, and was seldom seen on horseback, though he rode well; he hated all violent bodily exercise.

While his brother Charles had sought praise by endeavoring to show himself the strongest and most indefatigable of the society in which he mixed, Henry thought it an honor to appear the best dressed and most highly ornamented person in the Court. He would not hold intercourse with any except men of the same taste. He invented several new forms of the strictest etiquette.

In the midst of the violent characters that surrounded him, after so many crimes and civil wars, the embers of which were still glowing, and threatening every moment to burst into a fierce flame, he wished to lead a palace life, divided between

pious exercises, the pleasures of the city, retirement, and the enjoyment of the reverence due to the sovereign magistrate.

It was neither his habit nor his inclination to cultivate the society of old generals, politicians, or men of learning, who might have given him some information and instruction. He preferred surrounding himself with young and gay people of handsome exterior, who emulated him in the faultlessness of their costume and the brilliancy of their ornaments. There were in the beginning ten or twelve such persons in attendance upon the King, but in the year 1579 four of them make their appearance as declared favorites, and were named at Court the four evangelists; these were St. Luc, D'O,* Arques, and Saumont. Sometimes the King retired with them to one of his castles in the country, where he would not allow himself to be regarded in any other character but that of their host, and every thing appeared to be perfectly harmless. To be a favorite was not a matter of momentary pleasure, but a kind of fixed position. When the King returned to the capital, however, it was soon perceived that his young friends had much influence even in matters relating to the State.

Henry III. also strove to distinguish himself from his brother by not following his mother's counsel so implicitly in the business of the government. She always took the chief part in the morning consultations, but the resolutions agreed upon there were frequently altered afterward by the King himself.† Still less was it his intention to give unlimited freedom to the arbitrary power of the great families, or to allow their private interests to be promoted regardless of other considerations. He found much more satisfaction in bestowing favors upon those who were indebted to himself for their elevation. Arques

* Hieronymo Lippomano, "Relatione di Francia," 1580. D'O, according to this, must have been much younger than is usually supposed: Lippomano's secretary (506) says he was only twenty-eight years of age in 1579.

† Priuli, Relatione, 1583: "Voltando sottosopra le deliberationi che sono fatte alla presenza della madre, senza dargliene alcuna parte; il che viene attribuito parte all'umor del Re, ch'è fatto molto ardito nelle resolutioni, e presumò grandamente del suo giudicio, parte ancora all'autorità che hanno seco li suoi favoriti, con li quali in camera sua privatamente ragiona di tutte le cose."

was created Duke of Joyeuse, and appointed governor of Normandy and Havre-de-Grâce. Saumont was made Duke of Epernon, and appointed successively governor of Metz, Boulogne, Calais, and Provence. Arques was, moreover, invested with the dignity of an admiral, with special authority over the marine; while Saumont, through the post of colonel-general of the French infantry, exercised an uncommonly important influence in the appointment of officers to places in the army.

By these proceedings, however, Henry III. came into collision with the most powerful party in his kingdom. The progress which the great provincial governments had made in earlier times toward independence, had reached a degree of almost complete consummation during the civil war. The two minorities, one following the other in a period of confusion and embarrassment of all kinds, when the Government was necessitated to seek for support from its subjects; the indefiniteness of the laws, and the vacillations of the political system generally, had opened an unrestricted arena for the ambition and selfishness of a few great families, with all their adherents. In the tumult of war and the confusion of parties, when every one had to take counsel of himself, and to devise measures for his own security, and when by the very defense of their own personal interests men acquired merit, the governors of the provinces had attained a certain consciousness of independence upon the supreme power; and even the governors of fortresses and towns occupied a position which was but slightly dependent.* Many of them belonged to the first houses in the nation; all were united by the spirit of party. In this state of things neither the commandants of the towns nor the governors of the provinces could be removed from their places at the pleasure of the supreme authority. Each of them was convinced that he could be removed from his office by the judgment and operation of law only, and that in case

* Aluise Contarini, 1572. "Governi non sono solamente nei più grandi del regno, ma anco son tutti hereditarii, di modo che quando manca un governor, il Re è constretto, per non discontentar i heredi, consentar che i figliuoli, se sono in età, o almanco i più stretti parenti, entrino in loco del morto."

of death the claims of his relatives and allies to the vacant post should be respected. The notion of offices being hereditary began to prevail even in military organization, in the same way as it already influenced both the financial and judicial administrations.

It must have affected these powerful governors deeply, therefore, when the King not only refused to acknowledge their pretensions, but appointed others to the places upon which they had claims, or in the reversion of which they were interested. No well-founded complaint could be made against the King, for he had unquestionable authority to do what he did, but it was not expected from him, and what sort of persons were those he preferred!

The brave Charles Brissac, who believed he had an hereditary claim to the post of Colonel-general, saw himself superseded by a conceited young man destitute of all merit. The Duke of Mayenne, upon whom the reversion of the dignity of Admiral had devolved from his father-in-law, gave up his claim with the greatest unwillingness, although he received a pecuniary compensation. In the same manner Emery de Villiers was deprived of the government of Caen, and Mandelot disturbed in his government at Lyons by the favorites and their relatives; and they had but little satisfaction to expect further, since the very men who superseded them were the most powerful at the Court.

The majority of the aggrieved governors belonged to the party which had identified itself with the Catholic views in the religious contentions, who regarded the Huguenots as their sworn enemies, and to whom all concessions made to Protestantism were intolerable. They naturally found allies in a portion of the Catholic clergy who had never relinquished their claims to exclusive ecclesiastical dominion in France, and who had many other disputes besides with the King.

With the internal movement for the restoration of the Catholic system were associated the renewal of the claims of the hierarchy in opposition to the Crown. The men who in ancient times had fallen in the defense of such claims, such as Thomas à Becket, were held up to the reverence of the people, and their virtues depicted in the most lively colors.

In the assembly of 1579-80, which the clergy held in Melun, having avoided Paris lest their consultations should be fettered by local influences, a remonstrance was adopted, in which the two principal requisitions of the clerical party were renewed, namely the adoption of the decrees of the Council of Trent, and the re-establishment of free election. The Bishop of Bazas laid them before the King with much unction, but Henry rejected them without hesitation. "If the clergy wish to reform themselves," says he, "they can do so by the old decrees of the Church; they have only to resolve to devote a third part of their income to the support of the poor, as in ancient times. As to the adoption of the decrees of Trent, the Pope himself no longer urges it, since he sees that they are not suited to the constitution of France." With respect to the right of free election, he said that the authority to nominate to the bishoprics and abbaties had descended to him from his predecessors, by whom it had been exercised with the assent of the Pope and of the Church, and that it was his intention to maintain it. He drew their attention to the party-spirit and the simony which were connected with the clerical elections, and to the danger many of them would run of not being re-elected, should a new system be introduced.*

The corporation of the clergy, however, exercised no small influence upon the political administration, in consequence of the financial contract they had entered into with the Crown. They now, in order to be able to fulfill their duties, demanded the liberation of the provinces which had been taken possession of by the Huguenots; they expressed themselves on this subject in such terms as they might have used had they been speaking of an occupation by a foreign enemy, thus indicating how little they approved of the secure position which the Crown had granted to the Reformed.†

Their resistance was doubly powerful, in consequence of

* The account of Thuanus, lib. lxxiii., must be rectified by the *procès verbal* of the Assembly at Melun, from which our notices are drawn.

† In the "Assemblée pour l'audition et clôture des comptes du Receveur Général," it was resolved that "seront remontrées les nécessités des provinces occupées par l'ennemi, lesquelles attendent et requièrent les secours de S. M. pour leur délivrance."

the disorder that prevailed in the financial economy of the government, which brought every department into a state of the most inextricable confusion.

What was it, asks a writer of the period, that gave the princes of the house of Valois their high consideration in the world? Besides their heroic actions it was the attention they bestowed upon their finances, and the prudent expenditure of their income, which they regarded as some of the most important duties of a monarch.

Nothing in fact had been of greater advantage to the elder Valois, than the circumstance of their having always the command of money. Charles V. and Charles VII., and in an especial manner Louis XI., were remarkable for the order they maintained in the pecuniary affairs of the kingdom; but it was also well understood by Louis XII. and Francis I. as the only means which could enable them to carry on their wars successfully. In Henry II. a deficiency in this financial faculty, and a want of attention to money matters, began to be observed. It was principally the want of funds which compelled him to conclude the peace of 1559, and when he died, he left a debt which for France was one of unexampled magnitude. The administration of his sons and their mother Catharine de' Medici was still more ruinous.

The urgent necessities of war forced them to make the most exhausting efforts; there were some years in which double the amount of the income was expended, the extraordinary funds being procured from the Italian capitalists, who thus obtained a leading influence over the national credit and the administration.

I shall have another opportunity of returning to the subject of the finances in general; it is sufficient here to remark, that when Henry III. ascended the throne he found a treasury deficit of one million.

The new King endeavored to relieve his necessities after the manner of his predecessors. Sometimes the government officials were not paid their salaries; at others the interest of the debt was kept back from the creditors; but the chief expedient was the creation and sale of new places, often to the very capitalists themselves, who received a heavy discount

on the prices in consideration of prompt payment. This resource, however, proved all the more inadequate, that the King regarded the quality of liberality as one which should peculiarly characterize the possessor of the supreme authority. The arbitrary measures adopted to obtain money, and the manner in which it was afterward lavished on the favorites, are both placed in juxtaposition, in a journal kept by a contemporary. The comparison was certainly calculated to arouse unpleasant feelings.

But while the land groaned beneath the burden of taxation, the Court could hardly obtain the means of existence. When the troops were mustered, there was frequently not a penny in hand for their pay, nor was there any money to pay the garrisons of the frontier fortresses.

In order to discover a radical remedy for this complication of evils, an assembly of the Notables was called at St. Germain, about the close of the year 1583, in which most important proposals were made for a thorough searching reform. The Parliaments were not in favor with either the King or the nation;* the abuses which had crept into them, in consequence of the practice of selling judicial offices, were made the subject of earnest deliberation; the revival of the old companies of the Hommes d'Armes was seriously considered as a means of defense against foreign enemies as well as for the preservation of domestic peace and subordination; but the subject to which the greatest attention was given was the condition of the finances. We find, as the result of the deliberations, a detailed series of resolutions, full of sound views, respecting the recovery of the domains, the raising of the sums paid by the farmers-general from the indirect revenue, and the reduction of the *taille*.† Nor were these consultations

* Priuli: "Li parlamenti si sono empiti di uomini di bassa conditione, li quali non hanno nè animo nè autorità di poter difendere contra li ministri più intimi del Re il servitio et ben commun." The Journal of L'Estoile mentions a "placard, intitulé Evangile des Longs Vétus." "Il estoit fait contre ceux de la justice, auxquels on en vouloit fort, et qu'on disoit par leur connivence ouvrir peu à peu la porte à ceux qui ne demandoient qu'à lui faire violence."

† Articles et Propositions, etc., en l'Assemblée à St. Germain-en-Laye, au mois de Novembre, 1583: Mayer, xiv. 185.

and resolutions without effect: a multitude of overpaid officials were in fact struck out of the civil list. The investigation of the financial *employés* commenced in the autumn of 1584, and not a few of even the richest and most distinguished of them took to flight. A number of judicial offices were also abolished without consideration for those who occupied them. The new King took a course which indicated a renunciation of many of his youthful pleasures, and appeared to have placed his personal inclinations under greater control.*

The failings of Henry III. were obvious to every one. His deficient morality, his eagerness for enjoyment, and his dependency upon a few favorites, gave general and but too well founded offense. Occasionally, however, he rose to the full height of his vocation; he showed an intellectual capacity corresponding with his exalted position, and, although subject to many vacillations, great susceptibility of mind and goodness of disposition. The nation was indebted to him for the Pacification; and though his favorites had places in the Council, he took care that there were in it also men of talent, by whom they were controlled. The government comprehended the necessities of the political administration, and took pains to supply them—to enforce the rights of the Crown against the powerful governors, as well as against the claims of the clergy—to favor the general well-being of the state, in opposition to the abuses of the officers, both of the judicial and financial systems.

No prince ever did so much for the capital as Henry III. The former kings preferred their castles on the Loire to a residence in Paris. Francis I. spent most of his time at Fontainebleau or St. Germain, in the neighborhood; Henry II. held his court somewhat more frequently in the metropolis, and Charles IX. was generally confined to it by the troubles of the religious war; but Henry III. took up his abode there voluntarily, and resided there regularly. It is impossible to describe the rapid manner in which the city increased under him, both in population and the number of houses erected. The institutions of culture, which were formerly looked for in

* Augerii Busbequii *Epistolæ*, Ep. 31: "Rex urget institutum in melius conversæ vitæ."

Italy, were now found in Paris. Without giving offense to the old-fashioned portion of the nation, Henry III. patronized the rising comedy as well as the clerical ceremonies, the artistic confraternities, and literary unions.* He took part himself in an academy intended for the cultivation of languages and philosophy, and inscribed his name in its statutes.

Let us throw a glance upon this intellectual movement, which consisted, as we have mentioned above, in the advance of classical studies, and at the same time of the highly-cultivated art and literature of Italy into medieval France, and which made constant progress during the civil war, and prevailed widely in the subsequent interval of peace.

* *Lettres de Pasquier*, ix. 12.

CHAPTER XIX.

A GLANCE AT FRENCH LITERATURE.

IN the second half of the sixteenth century there flourished in France some philologists, who, in the comprehensiveness and depth of their knowledge of classical antiquity, exceeded any scholars whom Italy had yet produced, and whose equals have perhaps never since appeared.

The most learned of all printers, Henricus Stephanus, signalized the otherwise unhappy year of 1572 by the publication of a work sufficient in itself to form an epoch in the annals of learning—it was his Greek Lexicon, which may be regarded as the treasury of that language; in it he collected and digested, for the benefit of succeeding generations, all the knowledge of Greek literature which had been previously acquired.

Besides him rose above the multitude his fellow-laborer, Joseph Scaliger, a man who, in the full possession of an erudition which was universal,* never lost himself in it, and compensated for the petulance with which he sometimes behaved by a faculty of discrimination which looks almost like a power of divination, and which, even in the present day, excites the wonder of kindred intellects.

A step lower down we find learned and sensible expositors and successful imitators of the ancient languages, such as Lambin and Muret, who by their labors brought antiquity nearer to the common comprehension. For in France, if anywhere, a penetrating influence of classical studies was concentrated upon the life and habits of the people.

Peter de la Ramée can not be properly estimated if viewed

* As Casaubon especially estimates it, *Epist.* 486.

through the medium of those works which he devoted to the reformation of logic; but even these are well worthy of attention, exhibiting as they do his declination from the Aristotelian scholastic methods to the Platonic dialectics, and the grounding of rhetoric upon the imitation of nature, and of the great authors without regard to long-acknowledged formulæ. But the whole basis of his intellect appears in the plans which he had conceived for the general reform of studies, and of educational establishments. He wished to forsake in all things the path hitherto trodden, to alter the entire system of doctors and professors in the university, and to make the works of the ancients the immediate text-books of the different branches of study—the codex of the Civil Law in jurisprudence, Galen and Hippocrates in medicine, and in theology the Old and New Testaments.*

The last was impossible, at least in Paris, for it involved one of the most important of the demands concerning which the great struggle had taken place. The Sorbonne would not tolerate for a moment any departure from the Vulgate; upon this point they had contended with members of their own society who thought differently from the faculty, and with the rising order of the Jesuits, who, recognizing the necessities of the time, had not scrupled to borrow much even from Calvin and Beza.

In the other branches, on the contrary, the operations of classical literature appeared exceedingly effective. Physicians arose who brought into practice once more the deserted rules of Hippocrates; and it soon went so far, as Ambrose Paré, the reformer of surgery, said, that people were not content with what they found in the ancients, but began to regard their writings as watch-towers from which more might be discovered.

In jurisprudence, where study and practice touch each other most closely, appeared Cujacius, who, by close investigation and thorough comprehension of the ancient sources of law, made its philosophy his own peculiar intellectual property, and found in numerous members of the great juridical

* Extract from a memorial directed to Charles IX. in Crévier's "*Histoire de l'Université de Paris*," vi. 90.

corporation zealous imitators and disciples, who sought to apply their knowledge of Roman law to the improvement of the national code.

Dumoulin had already prepared the way for such a blending of both systems, and, with equal knowledge of ancient and modern law, composed a practical commentary on the *Coutumes de Paris*, by which he earned the title of the Papinian of Paris. Dumoulin, besides this, opposed his knowledge of the Roman and ancient French laws to the intrusion of the Papal authority. It is impossible to peruse a more impressive and, at the same time, learned defense of the secular authority than his judicial opinion against the adoption of the decrees of the Council of Trent. The controversy between the spiritual and temporal powers called forth the most lively intellectual efforts; and Stephen Pasquier, who, like most of the learned jurists, had joined the party of the Politicians, made it the peculiar field of his fame.

In the presence of studies like these the old mythic representations of the royalty of the lilies, which had animated the Maid of Orleans in her day, could not long hold their ground.* But men did not continue steadily in the directly opposite way on which they had entered at last; even the literature of the age is not always to be taken according to its verbal expression. What we are disposed to regard as the progress of ideas, frequently proves to be a mere momentary excitement. The doctrines of Hottman and his associates, which they propounded under the immediate impression made upon them by a deed of sanguinary violence, which had been approved of by the sovereign authority, were obliged to recede when further inquiry was made into law and history, and once more the supreme power was regarded as a bulwark against faction. Even then it was so viewed by John Bodin, in his "Book of the State," the most elaborate, well-digested, and best-known work upon that subject which the century produced. Bodin disdained to found the superiority of the

* Lib. i. c. viii.: "Si urget reipublice necessitas . . . non est expectanda consensio populi, cujus salus agitur, quæ . . . in principis prudentiâ consistit" (142). According to the preface of 1584, the most important articles were first composed for the Latin edition.

sovereign power upon a pretended abdication of the people—a doctrine from which the most dangerous results had already issued. Even the right of consenting to taxation, which he approved of and recommended, he was of opinion ought not to be absolute; for cases might occur in which the prince, to whose keeping the general weal was intrusted, could not wait for the sanction of the people. He appears penetrated in an especial manner with the idea of the majesty which belongs to the prince, above whom there is God alone; from this he deduces the right of making war or peace, the power of life and death, exemption from the law, the sovereign jurisdiction, and especially the superiority over the clergy, whose riches, privileges, and independent authority appear to him objectionable. He regards it as a misfortune that there should be more than one religion in a kingdom; but when God permits it so to be, the prince should rather tolerate the separatists than endanger the State; and, above all things, he should never take up arms against them, for in doing so he would put it to the test whether he could be conquered by his subjects or not.

The study of the ancients obtained a general and almost overwhelming influence upon the poetical literature of the age. A few youthful spirits, animated by the genius of antiquity, turned from the ballads and rondeaux with which the poets of the day satisfied the taste of the uneducated multitude, to the ancients, whom they studied to imitate day and night. They undertook to naturalize in their native land, in free French imitations, Homer and Pindar, the Greek tragedy, not without the chorus, Horace and Virgil, Anacreon and Catullus. Ambitious to prove the capacity of their language, they attempted it in new syntactic arrangements; for they regarded the opposite of what was common and usual as in itself poetic; they did not despair even of being able to introduce the measures of the ancients, and making prosody the sovereign rule of the art of poetry in France. It was something like an invasion of the philological tendencies upon the realm of modern literature. For a moment they gained the victory. Pierre Ronsard, who says of one of his books that he sets no value upon those who are not Grecians and Latin-

ists, appeared to his contemporaries, and to himself, as one of the greatest poets the world had ever seen. Philologists of reputation commented upon his works as they did upon those of the ancients. For all this, he exhibits the acerbity of a new and partial undertaking, to which individual effort lends the tang of capriciousness. He is far from possessing the solid value of the classics, but they must be willfully blind who would deny to him a brilliant talent for appropriation and utterance, or that elevation and vigor of intellect which was indispensable to the striking out of a new course. At all events he satisfied his own age. It was boasted of by his contemporaries that Ronsard had reproduced some of the most beautiful passages in the ancient poets, which every one had held to be inimitable: such as the descriptions of night, of the commencement of a sea voyage, and of a storm, in Virgil; of the spinning *Parcæ* in Catullus; or one of Bembo's admired sonnets; or the splendid commencement of a canto of Ariosto. Many deemed that he surpassed the originals.* Ronsard, with his friends and pupils, joined the Court, by which they were sustained and with which they lived. They were most of them priests, provided with good benefices, and firm adherents of the Catholic party; but that did not prevent them from introducing into France the whole system of poetic heathendom, nor from allowing themselves every kind of poetic liberty even in their lives. They emulated the ancients also in the boldness and nakedness of their representations.

To many serious men of their own party their manner and spirit appeared objectionable, much more therefore to the strictly moral Huguenots; the caustic and zealous Aubigné turns from them with moral disgust.

The Huguenots had also their poet, who, in one of his effusions, celebrated the peace granted by Henry III., and at the same time availed himself of the opportunity it afforded to finish another work which was for several years the object

* Compare Pasquier, "*Recherches de la France*," vii. 8, St. Beuve upon Desportes: "*Naturellement païens de forme et d'imagination, les poètes . . . restèrent bons Catholiques en pratique, et purement courtisans.*"

of universal applause far beyond the ecclesiastical circle. This was William de Saluste, Seigneur du Bartas. His work is entitled "*The Week of the Creation*;"* and in composing it he too took for his model, as is evident, a production of the latter antiquity—that of Georgius of Pisidia. He too, in his descriptions, occasionally vies with the most renowned poets. Retired in his castle at Armagnac, and secluded from all companionship with cultivated society, he took less care than even Ronsard to avoid those daring metaphors in which the meanest ideas are sometimes combined with the most sublime, and strange formations of words; but he is pregnant with thought, rich in imagery, and not destitute of elevation, and his diction and rhythm flow easily and without effort. He is chiefly distinguished from those clerical poets by the seriousness which characterizes his religious contemplation of the universe. He will not be numbered among the poets whom Plato banished from his republic, because they made the good bad, and the bad still more depraved, through whom Helicon became a place of lewd extravagance. He devotes himself to the service of the muse Urania, who appears to him holding a wreath in her virgin hand, which he modestly states he is eager to approach, not for the purpose of seizing it to adorn his brow, but to touch it only with the tip of his finger. He undertook to deliver the whole sacred history to his contemporaries in a poetical form; he has described the loss of Paradise, the Deluge, the deeds of the Patriarchs, of Moses, of the Judges, and of the Kings. His design was to depict the introduction of the Christian dispensation, and to conclude with the consummation of all things—the Sabbath of Sabbaths:—a vast undertaking in the plan, but almost too comprehensive to be completed with unity of design and execution, or to be transmitted to future times in diction that would last forever.

These works are in general chiefly remarkable for the effect they have had upon subsequent times. Du Bartas is

* "*Les Œuvres Poétiques et Chrétiennes de G. de Saluste, Sr. du Bartas, prince des Poètes François*" (the Huguenots gave this title to Saluste, but the Catholics claimed it for Ronsard). Genève, 1632.

the patriarch of Protestant poetry. Milton studied and made use of his works. The most important object accomplished by Ronsard and his friends, consisted probably in the fact that they attempted in the French tongue the different species of poetry which had been established among a more polished people, and introduced this side the Alps the principles of modern classical taste as they had been developed in Italy. But it was reserved for other times, and different talents, to bring these principles to a fuller perfection.

This epoch however produced one author, Michel Montaigne, whose merit was recognized at the time, and has not been since disputed.

Montaigne's mind also was formed by the study of antiquity. If De la Ramee turned from Aristotle to Plato, Montaigne gave the Skepsis the preference over the Academics; yet he only used it in order to exhibit, in accordance with the convictions awakened in him by other studies, especially those of the latter antiquity, by travel and intercourse, as well as by the habits and the events of the age, the truth of his subjective ideas, in the midst of a conflict of systems which to him were all doubtful. In the *naïve* development of these ideas consists his talent and his merit. Montaigne, if he does not describe human nature generally, has yet with perfect truth represented the Frenchman, with all the doubts and errors which characterize him, the enjoyments which give him pleasure, the desires and hopes which he cherishes, and, in short, his whole intellectual and sensual being. The peculiar genius of the people is reflected in him. How many are observed to be influenced by his very manner when they only speak of him! Next to the tales of Queen Margaret, Montaigne's Essays have maintained the first place in the enduring favor of the nation.

French culture appeared to be in the act of rising in this form from the broadest foundation—the extensive and free study of classical antiquity in connection with the efforts of other nations, and this is in the most various directions. The poetical productions of the Middle Ages were, however, by no means as yet suppressed. The Romances, the various tradi-

tional cycles, still issued from the press both of Paris and Lyons,* in the latter part of the sixteenth century. The condition of French literature corresponded with that of the State and of the country, in which manifold peculiarities were still to be recognized.

It is a question whether it was possible for these rich germs to unfold themselves together in France or not. We will not anticipate history. But already many dreaded the return of the civil war, with its destructive influences under the pretext of religion: Montaigne, Du Bartas, and Bodin, have a manifest presentiment of such an event.

The direction in which the thoughts of many were tending may be discovered, from among other sources, in a hymn of Du Bartas, in which he expresses his wish that the King of Navarre may speedily make his horse drink from the Ebro, and that the Duke of Alençon be able to unite the divided Netherlands, and to make them feel either his favor or the strength of his arm.† It was precisely from efforts of this kind, however, that the new struggle in the interior of the land was destined to arise.

* Amadis de Gaul; Lyons, 1575: Paris, 1577. Don Flores de Grèce; Lyons, 1572; Paris, 1573. Gui d'Antone; Lyons, 1579. Olivier de Castille; Paris, 1587. Huon de Bordeaux, 1586. Tristan, 1577. Lancelot du Lac, 1591. Godfrey de Bouillon, 1580.

† "Que tout le Pays Bas espreuve sa clémence, ou l'effort de son bras."

CHAPTER XX.

COMPLICATION OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS.

THE youngest of Catharine's sons, François de France, formerly Duke of Alençon, now of Anjou, obtained in the peace of 1576, an establishment which gave him a species of independence on the crown. He was placed in possession of five dukedoms and four counties, with authority to nominate to all spiritual and secular offices within their limits as he should think proper, and a large share in the prerogatives of the crown generally: the decisions of his court of justice in Alençon were final over life and death. Former princes had had apanages of fifty thousand scudi; his were worth more than five times as much, falling little short of one million of francs. His court was not much less splendid than that of the King; his pages followed him in just as rich liveries. He had his guards of infantry and cavalry—a Swiss guard—his own particular chapel, and hunting establishment. In appearance he was the very antithesis of the King. His figure was small, but firmly built, and his movements showed considerable vigor. His features, which were not handsome, were deeply marked with the small-pox; their expression was lowering, which was not lessened by a thick mass of black hair, which hung at each side of his countenance, but the quick and lively movement of his eyes relieved his otherwise sombre aspect. He made no pretensions to the affability of his brother, but affected rather the rude bearing which becomes a warrior; he read with avidity the history of those ancient and modern captains to whose fame he aspired, maintained a friendship with soldiers of reputation and talent, like De la Noue,* and undertook foreign enterprises on his own responsibility.

* Priuli, who only follows the general report: "è liberalissimo, vigilante, di animo grande."

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In the year 1578 he was induced to yield to the instances of the Count of Lalaing, who was desirous of adding to the German troops collected by the Prince of Orange an auxiliary force of strict Catholic principles, and appeared in Mons at the head of ten thousand men, for the purpose of resisting the warlike undertakings of Don John of Austria. The affair made the greater noise, as it was asserted the King of France had approved of his brother's proceedings. Lippomano asserts that this was an empty rumor; that the campaign was commenced not only without the King's consent, but against his will; that he was intimately acquainted with the circumstances, for he had been himself engaged in the negotiations to which they had given rise; that when the matter had proceeded so far the King was unwilling to adopt measures against his brother—that this was the extent of his complicity; how easily might Anjou, with his own troops and his German auxiliaries, have turned their arms against France itself! *

The whole undertaking foundered at that time through its own internal difficulties, the mutual distrust of all the different parties, and the want of clearness in their common relations. The Duke was not particularly displeased with this result.

After some time, under altered circumstances, which promised sympathy with his enterprise, he did not hesitate to renew it.

It is a proof the extreme weakness of the public feeling in Europe at this period that the King of Spain should have succeeded so easily, in the year 1580, in taking possession of the vacant throne of Portugal. The claim which he set up of having derived his right from his mother, a daughter of King Manuel, was by no means unquestionable, for there was in Portugal an ancient law by which all foreigners were excluded from the throne. The Duke of Braganza, who had married the daughter of a brother of the deceased king, main-

* "Essendo andato di già in Fiandria così di nascosto, et trovandosi in essere tanta quantità di gente come haveva, si risolse il Re di non impedirlo di quella gagliarda maniera che forse avrebbe potuto, dubitando che . . . sdegnato dappoi ritornasse con Casimiro."

tained that the right of succession was in him and in her children, by virtue of the rule of representation. There was besides a natural son of the royal house, Antonio, Prior of Crato, the shade upon whose birth did not absolutely exclude him from the throne of a dynasty whose founder was of spurious descent, and who moreover endeavored to prove that he had been born in lawful wedlock. All these deductions, however, vanished before the power of King Philip, who thought it sufficient that his claims had been approved of by his own theologians and jurists, and by force of arms took possession of the throne which made him sole ruler of the Pyrenean peninsula, and sovereign lord of both the Indies.

The whole was effected before any earnest apprehension of the consequences likely to result from such a preponderance of power was felt in either England or France. Then indeed Catharine formed the resolution of setting herself in opposition to King Philip.

She advanced claims of her own upon Portugal, which she derived from the house of Boulogne; but the general opinion then was that her chief object in this was to show to the world that she also belonged to one of the reigning families of Europe. Notwithstanding these claims, however, she recognized Don Antonio, and after Portugal was lost she endeavored to put him in a condition to maintain himself at least in Terceira, for every thing depended upon preventing Philip from taking possession of the Azores, then the great place of refreshment for voyagers from both the Indies. Could this be effected, he would not be able to derive any advantage from either the Portuguese colonies or his own, and Portugal would become a burden to him rather than a source of strength.* It has been asserted that the Queen had stipulated for the cession of Brazil to herself in the event of Don Antonio proving victorious. I find a fort mentioned, which the French raised soon after in Brazil.

The resistance of Europe to the increasing power of Spain showed its chief force, however, in the Netherlands.

* She said so to the English ambassador in a conversation which took place in the garden of the Tuilleries.—*Mémoires de Walsingham*, 493.

Just at this time the northern provinces formally renounced the dominion of King Philip, and elected the Duke of Anjou their sovereign, under conditions which they deemed necessary for the preservation of their freedom. The Duke seized with joy the offer of a prospect so gratifying to his ambition.

The town of Cambray, which had still a garrison of the Estates, but was sorely pressed by the Walloon troops of Prince Alexander of Parma, solicited aid from the Duke of Anjou. He immediately collected a considerable army, composed chiefly of the nobility, to whom war had become almost indispensable. The Walloons retreated before him; he reached Cambray in August, 1581, and declared himself lord of the city.

The project of his marriage with Queen Elizabeth appeared now to be taken up in earnest. Having accomplished something, he paid a visit to England, where he was received in the most gracious manner by the Queen, and rings were exchanged between them. The betrothing was celebrated in the Netherlands with public rejoicings. In February, 1582, the Prince appeared at Antwerp, furnished with a considerable sum of money, and took possession of the dukedom of Brabant, with the ancient customary forms. Not long afterward he was also chosen Count of Flanders, with the approval of the Prince of Orange, and it seemed as if there would not be any great difficulty in expelling the Spaniards from the Walloon provinces.

The Duke at this moment occupied a very important position. In the Netherlands the native nobility, who were satisfied with his high rank, as well as all who yet adhered to Catholicism, united with him.* He appeared destined to effect that union between England and France, in opposition to Spain, which the Admiral had once contemplated. His marriage with Queen Elizabeth was made contingent upon

* Priuli, "Relatione di Franza," 1583: "La nobiltà non poteva patire che il Principe d'Oranges fusse a loro di così gran lungo superiore, e pareva loro che si andasse a strada di introdurre un governo popolare; . . . non potevano sopportare che fusse levato del tutto l'esercito della religione Catolica:" all motives which subsequently favored the restoration of the Spanish dominion.

the conclusion of an alliance offensive and defensive between the two powers.

The King of France now, as formerly, declined any direct participation in his brother's enterprise; he even showed him the adverse side of it in conversation; but the influence of his mother, who took the most vivid interest in the proceedings, was overpowering. Among other incidents which show how Anjou was favored, the supplies furnished by France to the Spanish Walloon provinces were prohibited, and several Italian bankers who had remitted sums of money to the Spaniards were expelled the kingdom.

A fortunate military action might have then been of immeasurable consequence. Contemporaries remark how much depended upon the French fleet, which put to sea under Filippo Strozzi, of Brouage, in order to defend the Azores against the Spaniards;* had he been successful they were of opinion that all the Portuguese would have been set in motion, and that the discontented even in Spain would be excited to movements which must have issued in an insurrection.

But still the repose of the Spaniards was united with strength, and superior to the French nobility; besides the Spaniards, through the build of their ships, were better prepared for naval operations upon those waters, and better furnished with artillery. Strozzi was defeated and slain on the 26th of July, 1582, and all Don Antonio's prospects vanished in the air. The Spanish admiral caused it to be announced to the French whom he had taken prisoners, that as no war had been declared between the two kingdoms, they could be regarded only as pirates. He caused such of them as were gentlemen to be beheaded, and the rest he put to death in an ignominious manner.

The intelligence of this excited a powerful and passionate sensation among the French, to which the Duke of Anjou was not a little indebted for a new and considerable force, which marched to his assistance under leaders of reputation, and placed him in a position to undertake some decisive movement against the Spaniards. Instead of immediately attacking the enemy, however, he felt encouraged by the presence

* *Conestaggius, De Portugalliæ Conjunctione*, 473.

of so many brave warriors to attempt making himself, first, actual sovereign of the country, and then master of Antwerp. The citizens of Antwerp, however, proved themselves capable of making a more obstinate resistance than he looked for; the tumultuary assault of the French ended in their defeat, and with the failure of this attempt their whole enterprise must be regarded as at an end.

This event was of more advantage than Anjou's success would have injured him to the King of Spain. The taking of Cambray induced the Walloons to receive Spanish troops once more—which made the complete re-establishment of the Spanish superiority again possible. The disorder which arose among his enemies in consequence of the failure before Antwerp removed his fear of any danger from that side, and opened to him the way to further conquest. The Duke of Anjou, blamed by every one for having undertaken such objects, and dissatisfied with himself for not having succeeded, though still refusing to give them up,* returned to France, where, in the spring of the year he was seized with an illness which terminated in his death. Alexander of Parma, meanwhile, proceeded from one conquest to another—now in Brabant, and now in East and West Flanders. Ypres was taken, Bruges and Freie again acknowledged the King of Spain, Ghent surrendered after the murder of the Prince of Orange, and Brussels and Antwerp were closely pressed, and in the most imminent danger.

Under these circumstances the conviction was felt with double force in all the unsubjugated provinces that the restoration of the Spanish government was inevitable, unless the King of France should oppose it. The Netherlands did not conceive it possible that France could contemplate the progress of the Spaniards with calmness. They hoped that, as Henry II. had once come to the assistance of the Germans against Charles V., the son of the King would protect them against the son of the Emperor. In the beginning of the year 1585 a solemn embassy from the united provinces of

* From Busbequius's letter of May 20, 1583, we should be led to the conclusion that he intended to make Dunkirk, which was still the subject of negotiation, the seat of his government. *Ep.* 18, 504.

Brabant, Flanders, Holland, Zealand, Guelders, Zutphen, Utrecht, Friesland, and Mechlin, appeared at the French Court to offer to the King of France the sovereignty in the same manner as Charles V. had possessed it, with the reservation of their laws and their religion only, and to induce him, if possible, to unite those lands indissolubly with the French crown, offering him at the same time their oath of allegiance.

A proposal like this was peculiarly adapted to rouse the ambition of the French; but, perhaps, the difficulties which the Duke of Anjou had met with were still too fresh in their memories; besides this, however, many disapproved of the undertaking on the ground that the union of the Netherlands with France could not be accomplished. Still the King of Spain was manifestly aiming at the predominant authority in Christendom. It would be, therefore, an incalculable advantage if those rich provinces could be wrested from him in any degree. With these views Catharine de' Medici refused to surrender Cambray, the right to which had devolved upon her as inheritor to her son.

To other French princes and in other times such an offer would have been irresistible, but to Henry III. it appeared to contain something terrific.

He was dissatisfied with the political administration, which, though conducted by himself or in his name during his reign, was not attended with the wished-for consequences. He felt the general agitation which kept the nation in a state of feverish excitement as a personal misfortune. For the first time he recalled to his memory the designs he had cherished when he arrived in France to take possession of the throne, and ascribed all the evils which had since arisen to the false counsel then given him, and which he had been unhappily induced to follow. One of the most remarkable effusions of a royal mind which has ever seen the light, is the letter of Henry III., which he addressed on one occasion when his mind was filled with such thoughts, to Villeroy, the Secretary of State. "It is mentioned in the Scriptures," he says, "that one of the Jewish kings was ruined through evil counsel: may not this lesson find an application to the King of France? The

good-will of our subjects is lost, and we are diverging further from the way in which it might be regained. From the pressure of debts there is no relief to be obtained even in times of peace. The very circle nearest to the King swarms with heretics; attempts against the State are as common as eating and drinking; the number of the discontented exceeds computation, and is daily increasing; every one, except those who preserve their truth and fidelity, most carefully makes his own party, and the whole system of the nation is shaken. I think I see very clearly what would be of advantage to us," he continues, "but I am like those who, out of obedience, would rather be drowned than save themselves. I might be, too, the only one who entertained such views, and I may be deceiving myself!"*

This was the same prince who had acquired his reputation in the struggle with the Huguenots, and adopted the fearful executions of the bloody nuptials, and who was animated by a thoroughly Catholic spirit. He had granted a pacification, but it was limited according to his own good pleasure, and every advance of Protestantism was adverse and distasteful to him, and its presence hateful. He maintained the most friendly relations with England, and wore the English orders which had been sent to him at the close of 1584, and which he had received with all pomp, but at the same time he anathematized Queen Elizabeth in his heart.

It is doubtful whether either he or his mother were in earnest in their last friendly advances to England. In the State papers, in which the Court strove to justify its conduct toward the other Catholic powers, sharp-sighted contemporaries imagined they could discover, beneath the surface, that nothing would have been more agreeable than a new alliance with Spain, to be brought about perhaps by means of a marriage, with the Netherlands for a dowry. Catharine did in fact confess something of this design to the Venetian Priuli when he was taking his leave in the year 1583. She told him that she was disposed only to go so far as to enter into

* Letter of the King to Villeroy, Lyons, August 12, 1584, printed in Groen's Archives, Supplement, 229.

an agreement with the King of Spain, which might terminate all disputes, and bring the difficulties regarding Portugal and the Netherlands to a conclusion by means of a marriage.*

But even this must not be regarded as a revelation of her real intentions; for to negotiate upon opposite sides had now become the habit, and the very nature, of Catharine.

It was not to be expected, however, that King Henry, whose heart was filled with Catholic zeal, and who loved peace above all things, even though political necessity sometimes led him to take a different course, would resolve upon undertaking an enterprise which would have brought him in the closest confederacy with the Protestant element, and involved him in a war, the termination of which could not be predicted. He heard the offers of the Netherlands without disapproval, committed the negotiations concerning them to his chancellor, appeared to yield upon some difficulties arising out of individual questions, but, in conclusion, all proved useless. He adorned the ambassadors with gold chains, but he declined their proposals.

But while he delayed and hesitated, and at last showed a decided inclination to peace, Philip regarded him in no other light than as his antagonist. Proceeding constantly in his gloomy career, and not without reference to this embassy, which was not as yet dismissed, the Spanish monarch at length resolved upon decisive measures of precaution.†

* Priuli: "A me disse S. M. che lei aveva messo pensiero alle cose di Portogallo con questo fine solamente, di vedere se poteva tirare il Re Cattolico a fare un fascio di tutte le difficoltà che versano al presente et per le cose di Portogallo et per quella di Fiandria, e venir a una buona compositione col mezzo di qualche matrimonio."

† According to the Venetian Ambassador in Spain, Philip gave the following as his reasons: "Che quel Re ascolta li suoi ribelli anzi che tratta . . . di ricever il possesso di Fiandria."

CHAPTER XXI.

ORIGIN OF THE LEAGUE.

PHILIP II. had been already frequently urged by his most confidential ministers, as the Cardinal Granvella, to meet and oppose the indirect hostility of the French by an open declaration of war—a course which, they maintained, he would have been completely justified in adopting. The King, who was naturally indisposed to adopt new views of his own free choice, and was moreover fully occupied with enterprises of a far different character, had never yet resolved upon the course which such counsels pointed out. He became by degrees possessed, on the contrary, with the notion of repaying like with like, and of responding to the support which the French Court had given to the Netherlands, by offering assistance to the French rebels, and especially since these were Catholics.

In these views the Guises and their party, not yet rebels, but very much inclined to be so, fully concurred.

In consequence of the ancient community of religious and political principles which existed between Henry III. and the Guises, and especially since his consort belonged to their family, they had cherished the hope of being able to exercise a great influence upon the Government. Instead of this they saw themselves forced by a few favorites into a subordinate position, excluded from the sight of the King, and removed from all participation in the management of affairs—their claims not only neglected but their position imperiled. Their jealousy of the Princes of the blood never slept for a moment, but the Duke of Epernon was to them the most hated of mankind. The King had even suggested to Duke Henry of

Guise, that he should resign the place which he held of a *Grand-maitre* in favor of Epemon. Sometimes we find them giving expression to their complaints to the Spanish envoys, who occasionally visited them in secret. They were less affected on account of religion than they were by the personal offenses they had received, and feared to receive, which were almost exclusively the moving causes of their disaffection. As yet, however, they betrayed no symptoms of a definite understanding with Spain.*

That Philip had long previously entered into a peculiar connection with this house in opposition to the royal authority in France, is a complete error.

We have already mentioned the entreaties addressed, many years before, by the Cardinal of Lorraine to King Philip, and that they were not attended to. As the events did not occur which were apprehended, it was not deemed necessary on either part to proceed further in establishing a general good understanding. Sometimes, even as in the year 1570, the house of Guise was rather opposed to the views of Spain than in their favor.

In the years 1577 and 1578 negotiations took place between the Duke of Guise and the Spanish envoy Vargas; but it appears, from the correspondence of Vargas, that they were only of a general character, affecting chiefly a plan concerning Scotland, which never was carried into effect.†

The declaration of a Spaniard, named Salcedo, in the year 1582, created an intense sensation. He had been arrested for having formed a design against the Duke of Anjou, and accused a whole multitude of Frenchmen, who were zealous Catholics, and of considerable note, as participating in his guilt. He retracted these charges afterward, and was condemned to death for having falsely made them. If the declarations made upon oath by the most distinguished of the ac-

* In Cabrera's Felipe, ii. 1010, there is a description of the state of things at the French court, by Alonzo de Sotomayor, who had been with Guise. Its date must be later than that which it bears, for Caumont appears in it as Duke of Epemon. He is described as all powerful: "Animo cauteloso, ambicioso, atrevido, absoluto, dado á placeres," etc.

* Extracts in Mignet, "Antonio Perez," p. 24.

cused parties may be believed, there can be no doubt that the charges were wholly destitute of truth, and were even the result of fraud.* Salcedo was notorious for his fraudulent and violent conduct. The Spaniards, who were probably innocent in the transaction, saw these proceedings without displeasure; they imagined that from the distrust and suspicion to which they must give rise among the French, something might result to their advantage.

But charges of this kind, founded upon a general probability, are frequently the precursors of great events. In the year 1583 we find actual serious negotiations going on between Philip and the Guises.

John Moreo, an Aragonese and a Knight of Malta, was commissioned by Philip II. to take up his residence in France for the purpose of investigating the actual position of affairs, and of confirming the discontented in their disposition, by holding out to them hopes of aid from the King of Spain. The Duke of Mayenne, whom he found in Poitou, with a few more trustworthy Catholics, accompanied him immediately to Paris, in order to form a definitive resolution with Guise, upon whom every thing depended. Guise was greatly inclined to join them, but he felt some scruples at the idea of rising in open insurrection against his king; the Jesuits who surrounded him, and particularly Father Claude, recommended him at least to fortify his conscience with a word of encouragement from the Pope. There was one agreement entered into for that time, and Moreo hastened into Spain to report proceedings to his king.

In the spring of 1584 negotiations were once more resumed between the French and Spanish courts for an arbitration of all their differences. The Spanish ambassador was convinced that if Cambray were given up to the French, not as their right, but by a seasonable concession, they would bind themselves to interfere no further in the affairs of the King of

* Villeroy, Mémoires; "Je jure et appelle Dieu et ses anges, suppliant sa divine justice que son ire soit sur moi et mes enfans."—Busbeck told the Emperor, October 1, 1582, that Salcedo had coined false money with which he purchased an estate, and that when he was obliged to leave it he set it on fire.—Epp. 478.

Spain.* The ambassador, Juan Baptista de Tassis, maintained at the same time a close correspondence with Henry of Guise, but there was nothing more spoken concerning his rising against the King. Guise's thoughts were much more decidedly directed at this time toward Scotland; he was persuaded that King James was ready to adopt the old religion, and to emancipate himself from the dominion of the English faction. For the promotion of this, he demanded assistance both in men and money, as well as the promise of future supplies. The Spanish ambassador advises his master to comply with these demands; for he says the world may one day assume such an aspect as will prove that such money had been right well laid out.

As yet we observe that there was no project of an association against the King of France, but that certainly there was established an excellent understanding, and a close connection.

The Duke of Anjou and Alençon, as has been already mentioned, died on the 10th of June, 1584. He left no memorial of himself through great deeds, actions, or results; his death was more momentous than his life.

For what had been hitherto spoken of, but as if of some secret matter which was read of in the stars, now acquired a nearer probability in respect to political prospects; for as Henry III., the last scion of the Valesian line, was childless, the extinction of that race was foreseen, and with that was associated the prospect of the greatest changes. The right of succession to the throne would, in that case, devolve upon the chief of the Bourbons, the King of Navarre, who was a Huguenot. It can not be wondered if the anticipation of such an event caused an excitement throughout the whole realm, and roused even neighboring nations.

The Netherlanders had this probability in view when they

* Letter of Tassis, May 10, 1584; "Agora mas que antes holgarian de que V. M. saliese á la proposition hecha los dias passados de la dicha Reyna en lo de Cambray, y que por aquí se entallasse alguna reconciliacion y renovacion de amistad . . . se les quisiessse desar pacifica esta possession figura se me, que de muy buena gana se obligarian á no empacharse en ninguna cosa mas que nos toque."

made their offer to King Henry; if they had not, they would not have gone so far as they did.

But if the Spaniards, twenty years before, saw a danger in the evanescent and dubious authority which Anthony of Navarre acquired as Lieutenant-General only of France, how much greater must have been their apprehension at the prospect of the devolution of the French crown itself upon the head of his active and energetic son. They were convinced that they ought to prevent it, for it would render the war between the two nations inevitable, and imperil the existence of the Spanish monarchy and the whole European system. King Philip's son was just seven years of age; what, it was asked, could be expected of him in the face of such a formidable enemy, should any misfortune befall the King?

Philip II. might have been induced to tolerate a weak Protestant party in France;* but, as his ambassador Tassis said, that a man "who was a heretic" should receive into his own hands the entire authority of the French kingdom, to that the exalted Catholic position he held would not permit him to consent. "I see no arm," adds the ambassador, "which is able to prevent this event from taking place except the arm of the Duke of Guise."

Regarded in themselves, the Guises were by no means capable of effecting all the ambassador states. Their hereditary possessions were unimportant, and they exercised over their governments such authority only as the King had delegated to them. That which lent them weight and influence was their party position, as the Spaniards saw from the beginning—the attachment felt to them by the zealous Catholics, whose dissatisfaction with the toleration shown to the Huguenots was constantly increasing.

We have been made acquainted already with this perpetually fermenting, energetic, and violent element of Catholicism in France. After it had succeeded in consolidating itself in Paris, and extruding all Huguenotic forms, in the year 1562,

* He had also occasionally negotiated with Henry of Navarre; but what Hieronymo Lippomano wrote once from Spain is probably quite true: "Intendo che a quel di Navarra segli daranno buone parole, a quel di Guisa buoni fatti."

it exhibited independent movements from time to time in the provinces. We have mentioned the association of the nobility, in the years 1564 and 1568, which would have assumed a threatening aspect toward the Court, had it not remained true to Catholicism. The alliance formed in the year 1572, between the governors whose places were imperiled, and the fanaticism of the multitude, and the League of 1576, which arose in a province, but under the authority of the Court extended itself over the whole kingdom, and which it was found more difficult to break up than had been anticipated. It had imbued itself with municipal and clerical, as well as aristocratic interests, and it now joined heartily with the Duke of Guise, whose father had fallen in defense of its cause.

It has been said that Henry of Guise, relying on these powerful confederacies, and anticipating what was likely to occur from them, had long since begun himself to indulge ambitious notions in reference to the Crown. It had been alleged that the Guises were descended from Charlemagne, and therefore possessed a more legitimate right to the French crown than the reigning dynasty. Genealogies were composed for the purpose of supporting this view; the book usually quoted was the work of Francis de Rosières, a priest of high rank in the Church, at Toul,* and for many years a traveling companion to the Cardinal of Lorraine. In this book the claims of the Guises are traced to a period of still higher antiquity.

According to this author even old Merovius was a usurper; he had dispossessed the lawful heir, Albero, son of Clodin, from whom sprang in the direct line Itta, who brought her rights to her husband, Eustache de Boulogne. The Carolingians also sprang from Albero, but in the collateral line only. In Eustache, however, who was a descendant of Charlemagne's both paternally and maternally, the rights of both lines were thus united, and descended in the course of time to the house then ruling in Lorraine. The Capetians were all represented

* "Stemmatum Lotharingæ ac Barri Ducum tomii vii., ab Antenore ad hæc Caroli III. tempora." Parisii, 1580. Compare "Procès Verbal du Pardon demandé par Fr. de Rosières," in the appendix to the "Satyre Menippée," ii. 406.

as usurpers, and Hugh Capet as a tyrant. The author does not derive the Lorraine family directly from Charles of Lower Lorraine, but he brings them into connection with him. He endeavors to show that the house of Lorraine, for which he is animated with a thoroughly provincial and peculiar fanaticism, is not only completely French, but that it is of nobler extraction than more powerful royal races. He handles the then living king, Henry, in the same manner as he does the whole of the French dynasty, with the most astonishing contempt. His observations concerning the death of the Cardinal of Lorraine are satirical. He blames the King for giving himself up to the guidance of persons who have made him effeminate and useless.* All is not historically false in Rosières's work, and in those times it must have created a powerful sensation. We know that the Cardinal of Lorraine thought the Salic law ought not to be observed;† and the principles advanced in this book of one of his friends, accorded perfectly with the design of placing a prince of the house of Lorraine upon the throne of France.

But leaving out of view this lofty mark of their ambition, the prospect which the succession of the King of Navarre to the throne opened before the Guises, was one in the highest degree inimical to their position as French magnates. Henry III. directed Epemon to proceed with a splendid retinue to the King of Navarre, and to say that the French monarch was prepared to recognize him as heir-presumptive to the crown, provided he would become a Catholic and visit the Court. Before leaving the city Epemon took leave of all the nobility of the Court, but to the Guises he paid no compliment whatever. They regarded it as sufficiently dangerous that Henry had agreed to the proposal, since the position of the favorite would have been made still more secure by an alliance with the successor to the throne; but how much

* "Jam à publico rerum statu alienior domesticæ curæ indulgere cœpit," p. 369. He also mentions the Paris Matins: "Hisce S. Bartholomæi matutinis piæ absolutis."

† Pasquier, *Lettres*, xi. Compare the Florentine despatch in Alberi, *Catarina Medici*, 194. Toward the close of 1584 the favorites endeavored "per abbassare le parte del Duca di Guisa e crescere quella del Re di Navarra, col quale sono legati per la volontà del Re."

more so would it be if the Navarrese prince should remain firm in his religion and yet succeed to the throne! The champions of Catholicism in France were as little willing as the Spaniards that such an event should take place.

Henry of Guise had still a scruple. The ambassador who carried on the negotiations with him, asserts that he feared to appear as a rebel.* He asked the Pope, Gregory XIII., for his opinion upon the proposal.

The Pontiff answered, that "if the object was of a religious nature alone, he gave it his blessing"†—an oracular response, which the Pope could maintain under all circumstances, and which Guise interpreted in his own favor; for his most important object was, in fact, the maintenance of the Catholic religion, and all others might appear as simply means to that end.

There is a little cabinet in the castle at Joinville which has long been pointed out as the chamber in which the League was formed. In the middle of January there were assembled there the two delegates of the King of Spain, Tassis and Moreo, who had carried on the negotiations, the Dukes of Guise and Mayenne, who at the same time represented the Cardinal Guise and the Dukes of Aumale and Elbœuf, and besides these a delegate from the Cardinal of Bourbon. They concluded the Convention with some secret articles which have hitherto remained almost unknown. The sense of both is as follows.

Proceeding from the fundamental principal that a heretic could not be King of France, they declare themselves of one mind, that the crown shall not pass to the King of Navarre, but to his uncle, the Cardinal of Bourbon, a younger brother of King Anthony, who, by his plenipotentiary, joined the League and adopted this claim. Further, their union is intended to effect the complete extirpation of Protestantism,

* Tassis, 443, speaks of the "rebellionis nota, quam abhorrebat Guisus . . . nactus religionis fundamentum, ad cuius conservationem nihil esse credebatur, quod non liceret, animum ad arripienda arma componere crepit."

† Maffei, Gregorio XIII. c. ii. 319. The Duke de Nevers was not, however, by any means satisfied with the declaration from Rome, as he stated at length to Thuanus, lib. lxxxi. p. 11.

not only in France, but in the Netherlands also. The King of Spain promised for the first year a subsidy of one million scudi. The French princes, on the other hand, regarding themselves as already in possession of the royal authority, bound themselves to renounce the alliance with the Turks, as well as the system of piracy carried on in the West Indian waters; to restore Cambray, and to assist in completing the conquest of the Netherlands. In a few special articles they add some other very extraordinary conditions. They promise to deliver Anthony, the Prior of Crato, into the hands of the King of Spain, but under stipulations that, although he is to be kept in secure custody, he is to be treated with kindness. On the declination of the King of Navarre from the Catholic religion, they formed the further design of putting the King of Spain in possession of all his territories beyond the frontiers of France, as Lower Navarre and Béarn.* Guise and Mayenne bound themselves for the delivery of the Prior, and the Cardinal of Bourbon undertook for the residue of Navarre, so decisively did the territorial interests of Spain influence the formation of this treaty. Philip judged that he was not only promoting the cause of religion, but also advancing the interests of his kingdom, when he sent to the confederates large sums of money, which placed them in a condition to prepare for the contest.

King Henry III. was still engaged in those deliberations

* "Instrumentum de dedendo Antonio Portugalensi," and further, "Instrumentum donationis factæ à Cardinale Bourbonio in favorem Regis Catholici," which appear also as articles 48th and 49th of the treaty, are to be found in the commentaries of Tassis, quoted above, p. 456. The original document of the Convention itself is dated "ultimo die anni 1584." The first instrument is dated "diebus Calendis Januarii, 1585;" the second, on the 16th of January: according to Tassis, the latter is the true date of these agreements (446). The secret articles are wanting in Dumont, whose impression possesses in general but little authenticity: they have been overlooked up to the present time. A brochure, entitled "Ragguaglio delle Pratiche tenute con il Re di Spagna degli Signori Guisi," was circulated at the time, and may still be found in collections of political papers. According to its authority the greater part of the stipulated sum was not to be paid until the League had delivered either the city of Marseilles or Lyons into the hands of the King of Spain. There is no authentic proof of this condition, nor any trace of it in the actual treaty.

noticed above, under the idea that peace and war in Europe depended upon the course he might adopt; when he saw all of a sudden a warlike movement which he had not commanded in actual operation in his own kingdom. His first thought was to secure Henry of Guise in Joinville, and a division of the garrison at Metz was appointed to execute the design; but Guise was apprised of it at the critical moment, and fled to Châlons, where the gates were opened to him, in opposition to the royalist commandant. A great number of other places also fell into the hands of the Guises, either through the contrivance of the burghers or the consent of the governors.

Their manifesto appeared in the middle of April.

It is principally directed against the favorites, who had thrust all others from the administration of the State, and taken exclusive possession of it themselves. They had not only made the decree issued by the last assembly of the Estates, which was to have restored all France to its religion, of none effect, but, on the other hand, all favours were bestowed upon the persecutors of the Catholic Church. The setting up of a successor to the throne was in accordance with that disposition, but in the Most Christian kingdom it must never come to pass that a heretic should obtain the supreme authority. The subjects of the kingdom are in no way bound to recognize the dominion of a prince who is not a Catholic, for the first oath taken by the King on his coronation is to maintain the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion.*

Let us pause a moment to consider this manifesto, in which religious views are associated with various objects of a political character.

The spirit of the ancient autonomy of the French magnates animated the Guises in all its power. They could not live without exercising some influence upon general affairs, and their first object was to maintain their own position unassailed.

* I take this from a letter of Don Bernardino de Mendoza, April 5, 1585. The garrison at Metz was ordered, "que saliendo á la deshilada viniesse á Chamvilla á prender al Duca de Guisa." I have not been able to find any thing in contemporary documents of what Cardinal Ossat says concerning Guise's first intention to seize the capital and the person of the King. It appears to have been merely a proposal, and to have been rejected by Guise.

They represent it as one of the principal grievances that persons who had obtained places by meritorious services were compelled to give them up in consideration of a pecuniary compensation. They demand that such shall no longer be the practice, and that persons shall not be deprived of their offices except in the cases which were clearly designated, and by the sentence of regular judges taken from the Parliaments.*

They adopt as their own all the old complaints of the nobility, the clergy, and the towns. They ask for regular meetings of the Estates every three years, in which every one may bring forward his grievances in perfect freedom. The manner in which they express themselves respecting these meetings is worthy of remark. They are conferences, they say, between the prince and the people for the purpose of considering and taking account of their equally ancient and equally sacred mutual obligations.

In most of the great towns, as in Paris, the municipal and the Catholic interests had entered into a certain alliance with each other. As the Government had interfered with other customary laws, such as those of jurisdiction, for example, so did it now appear as a similar interference when it demanded tolerations for those of another creed. The Guises could reckon upon approval when they warned the towns against receiving royal garrisons.

Thus the attempt at reform in the year 1583, however justifiable in itself, now turned out to the disadvantage of the King. We are informed that the League was supported by the credit of a high finance officer, who had been compelled to resign his place in consequence of the examination which had been instituted regarding that administration, and who had fled into Franche Comté. In the Parliament they had, during the time of their authority, acquired a multitude of retainers, who now thought themselves threatened by the King, and regarded their ancient protectors as a refuge from his power.

In this way the Guises enlisted the selfish feelings of the

* Joannis Baptistæ de Tassis *Commentariorum de Tumultibus Belgicis sui temporis libri octo*: Hoyneck van Papendrecht, *Analecta Belgica*, tom. ii. pars i. p. 433.

Estates, of the administration, of the judicial authority, and of the great magistrates, in a struggle against the Government, not only against its abuses, but even against its justifiable proceedings.

The most extraordinary feature of the case was that those who called themselves "the better and sounder portion of the nation," for that is the expression they use, should, at the same time that they took up arms for the restoration of France, enter into a confederacy with the ancient enemy of the kingdom. The attempt to establish the monarchy within, and to give it freedom of operation externally, however weak it might be—and its weakness was probably owing to its want of energy—must now come to an end. But the religious principle embraced every thing, excused every thing, and concealed all contradictions.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE RENEWED WAR AGAINST THE HUGUENOTS.

THE determinate character of this opposition left no room to expect any other result than an internecine struggle between the two parties.

Had Henry III. known the entire extent of the confederacy formed against him, there was no resource left him but to join with the Huguenots in the interior of the kingdom, to direct his efforts to the maintenance of the pacification, and to oppose with their aid the pretensions of the Guises; and, as regarded foreign affairs, to accept the offers of the Netherlanders, and to come to an open rupture with the King of Spain. When we consider that the ancient antipathy against the Spaniards, which had exhibited itself very vividly a short time before, might have been easily again enkindled; that even among the Catholics all were by no means of one mind with the Guises,* especially the Bourbon princes of the blood, and a great part of the nobility, who felt a natural obligation toward the princes, or were accustomed to reside at the Court; that there were in the middle Estate many who held that a revolt on account of religion was not justifiable, and several who were old friends of the Guises, held back from them through conscientious scruples; it will be seen that the King did not want the means for a great and decisive resistance.

But this required a man of different character—more perspicacious and acute than the King, capable of resolving upon

* "Commentarii delle cose successe nel Regno de Francia," MS. in the Grand-Ducal library at Carlsruhe: "Parte de' Cattolici, aborrendo tal attione, come quella che pareva lor peccato di lesa maestà, si misero col Re e lo esortavano a far la guerra."

measures attended with danger, and inclined to war. Villeroi represented to him that he ought not on any account to allow before his eyes the rise of a faction which professed to be Catholic, and which placed the champions of Catholic ideas at its head. The King resolved rather to conclude a treaty with his enemies than to bring the matter to the arbitration of war.

It was his fate, and the fate of his whole house, ever to lose themselves and fall into confusion in the conflict of religious ideas with the power of the State, without being able to find the path that might have led them forth into safety.

The Guises, in their manifesto, had called on the Queen Mother, of whom they said that "without her wisdom the kingdom would long since have fallen to ruins," to avail herself of the present opportunity for its salvation, not without an intimation that she had now less share than she deserved in the management of affairs. The King himself committed the negotiations to her, and notwithstanding her age, her gout, and the cough by which she was shaken, she undertook the task. Catharine herself felt terrified at the prospect of Henry of Navarre's accession to the throne; she feared, as she said, that he would in that case cause her daughter, his consort, to be put to death, for the most contradictory elements had met in their union, and it is certain that Margaret was at that time set in opposition to her husband by the Leaguers.* Had Catharine, when she broke with her son-in-law, actually the design in view of setting her grandson, the Prince of Lorraine, upon the throne? It does not appear with complete certainty, but she said to Henry Duke of Guise that she believed he would be the staff of her age.†

The Guises themselves were already not indisposed to an arrangement; the money sent them by Philip II. was soon expended, and it would have been very agreeable to them to

* Letter of Guise to Philip II., asking for help: "Elle, que nous avons établie comme ostacle aux desseins de son mari, est instrument fort propre pour contraindre le Roi à la guerre."—Papers of Simancas.

† "Que havia de ser el bastion de su vejez, pues bien savia, que á ningun estariar peor que el de Navarre fuese Rey, que á ella, porque havia luego matar á su hija."—Papers of Simancas.

be able to secure, amidst the tumultuous agitation which their rising had every where excited, the advantages which an accommodation offered to them.

The difficulties of Catharine's negotiation lay rather in the personal claims of the confederates than in their religious requisitions; they complained loudly of the favorites, and wished, if they could not overturn their authority, at least to secure themselves in the best manner against its influence.

The Queen succeeded so far in her diplomacy that it was not necessary to deliver up Metz to the Guises, as they had originally desired: but in other respects she made them some very important concessions. Verdun, Toul, St. Dizier, and Châlons were given up to the Duke of Guise; Soissons to the Cardinal of Bourbon; and the strong places in Burgundy, Brittany, and Picardy to Mayenne, Mercœur, and Aumale. All were permitted to maintain their own life-guards, and to pay them out of the income of the provinces. As the chiefs, so did their most distinguished followers obtain important personal advantages.* An edict was issued, in which their armed rising was approved of, and described as agreeable to the King.

The religious interests of the dispute appear much more as the principal object in this edict than they do in the manifesto. All the edicts of pacification previously issued are revoked, the surrender of the cautionary places conceded to the Huguenots demanded, and the mixed Chambers abolished. The edict of July, 1585, goes still further than that issued in the year 1568, and after St. Bartholomew's Day. It forbids not only, like that, the exercise of any other religion than the Catholic, but it prohibits the Confession generally: "we have commanded, and command," it states, "that all who adhere to the new religion shall forsake the same, and within six months make confession of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, or, if they refuse to do so, that they depart from our kingdom and the lands within our allegiance." The most severe hierarchical laws, against which so long a struggle had been maintained, were renewed, and the simple confession of

* Articles accordés à Nemours au nom du Roi, 7 Juillet, 1585 (*Mémoires de Nevers*, which complete the *Memoirs of the League*, i. 688.)

a variation of religious opinion from the Catholic standard threatened, as of old, with confiscation of goods and the pains of death. The King, in accordance with the requisition of the Guises, caused this edict to be registered in his own presence in the Parliament, July 28, 1585.

He was not opposed to it in his heart; not only in his youth had he given expression to similar principles, but also in later years in the Estates at Blois. It appeared to him also a great gain that the whole kingdom should be brought back to religious unity. As in Blois all had been frustrated by the unwillingness of the Estates to grant the necessary pecuniary supplies for carrying on the war against the Huguenots, it now gave the King a secret pleasure to see them compelled by the movements of a faction to put forth all their power in efforts to provide for a similar war. He expressed this feeling with ironical humor on one occasion to the heads of the clergy and the deputies of the capital.* All ideas of reform and economy were thrown aside under these circumstances; the officers of finance purchased exemption from the investigation which had been commenced with large sums of money, the judicial offices which had been abolished were re-established, and fresh purchasers found for them.†

All was now in a state of preparation for war. The King of Navarre was very uneasy at this state of things. We may again call to mind the moment of extreme hopelessness which once possessed him.

King Henry III. did not concede every thing yet in reference to him. He did not acknowledge that the King of Navarre could never ascend the throne: but what the vivid feeling of legitimacy which he cherished would not permit him to concede was effected, and doubtless with far greater power, as far as the faithful Catholics were concerned, by the agency of Rome. A formal process was instituted at Rome against the two Huguenot princes of the house of Bourbon, the King of Navarre and the Prince of Condé, on the authority of which Pope Sixtus V., who had just ascended the chair of St. Peter, issued the bull which astonished mankind. In

* Speech in Dupleix, "Histoire de Henry III.," 118.

† Pasquier, *Lettres*, liv. x. i. 9.

this he declares the two princes not merely as heretics, but, as patrons and leaders of those who had relapsed once more to the crime of heresy, to have forfeited all their possessions, especially their claims upon the throne of France. This bull caused a discord between the new confederates. The Guises believed that they were bound to warn their friend Catharine de' Medici, as she was opening negotiations with Henry of Navarre, not to venture too near the abyss of excommunication. In case of any agreement which might yet take place between the two kings, they had, they told her, adopted a formal resolution at Orcamp to the effect that their religious duty relieved them from all the obligations of subjects.*

The course of the affair itself, however, did not include the sole ground of misunderstanding; another arose from the connection of the Guises with Spain. Philip II. was by no means satisfied with the peace which had been hastily concluded by the Guises, especially as they had promised to renounce all foreign alliances. Weighing the most distant consequences as well as the immediate effects of this act, he perceived a possible danger should Henry succeed in subduing the Huguenots; for how easily could he in that case, with the power of his kingdom now become entirely Catholic, turn his arms against Spain! Philip II. urged Henry of Guise to give him an assurance that he would never bear arms against Spain, nay rather revolt from his King, should he at any time attack a Spanish territory, and the Duke actually allowed himself to be induced to give it. He declared that when he renounced all foreign alliances, he only meant such as might be injurious to the kingdom, not such as might contribute to its advantage, like that with Spain.†

Though promises of this kind were merely made in secret, they destroyed every thing like unity of co-operation among the confederates. The existence of two distinct Catholic parties became daily more and more evident. The royalists were

* "Le devoir Chrétien les devoit transporter par dessus toute subjection," etc.—Bouillé, iii. 192.

† "Que lo de las ligas rinunciadas se entendia de las que eran contra el reyno, y no desta que era en bien dél y en servicio de Nuestro Señor, per lo qual la mantendrá siempre."

desirous of drawing over the legitimate successor to the throne and his adherents to their own creed, and to unite France in one religion, in that manner which would make the kingdom all the more powerful. The Leaguers desired to exclude the heir-presumptive under all conditions, to annihilate the Huguenots and to take possession of their estates. They held far more firmly by the idea of the universal church than they did by that of France, and were more attached to the King of Spain than to their own sovereign.

The year 1586 was marked by various warlike enterprises,* but the opposite views came into collision even in the Catholic armies. The King appointed subordinate commanders under the Duke of Mayenne, whom he never entirely trusted, and by whom he was never completely obeyed. The Duke of Guise endeavored, where he commanded, to remove the royalist officers, and to surround himself with such as were implicitly devoted to him. The tactics of the Guises were observed to be vigorous and decided in such cases only as furthered their own interests. When it was necessary to recover a town which had fallen off from them, as in the case of Auxonne, or to obtain for themselves a fortress of which the Protestants had become masters, as in the case of Rocroy, their chief efforts were, in accordance with the King of Spain, directed against Sedan and Jamets. In the south of France their object was more of a political than of a military kind: while they fought with the Duke of Montmorency in Languedoc, their intention was not so much to subdue him by force, which would have been to the advantage of the Crown, as to gain him over to their own views. United with him, they would, as they said themselves, be sufficiently strong to prescribe the law to the King himself.

But would Damville de Montmorency now unite with the ancient enemies of his house, and give up the design of bringing the adherents of both confessions to live together peaceably, which he had professed at the beginning? He held firm by Henry of Navarre. The assault of the Catholics,

* Guise to Mendoza, February 3, 1586: "Et seroit nécessaire que le dit Mr. (Montmorency) s'alliât avec nous plutôt qu'avec le Roy même, afin que d'un commun accord nous puissions donner la loi."

however threatening it might have been at first, was of little importance in its results; the Huguenots obtained possession of as many places as the Catholics did on their side.

The sympathy of the co-religionists in neighboring lands gave the Huguenots better prospects for the ensuing year.

It was not a light matter, however, to put the military power of the Protestants in motion. Queen Elizabeth must be solicited to send a subsidy in money; smaller sums were sent from the south of France to Switzerland, and from Rochelle to Hamburg, but they were seldom sufficient for the current necessities. But at the same time a more lively participation in the cause was exhibited. It was not forgotten in Germany, and Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg, then administrator of Magdeburg, expressly brought it to remembrance, that the Empire was indebted for its religious peace to a King of France, who had taken up arms to assist in obtaining its establishment. It was generally looked upon as merely the fulfillment of a duty imposed by gratitude, now to send the French assistance from Germany, in order to secure for them a similar peace. The Huguenots, in fact, desired nothing more ardently; Du Plessis Mornay said that the German army should be the midwife of the French peace; but a Swiss army now joined the German auxiliaries, which had so often come to the aid of the French. The evangelical cantons were thrown into a state of the greatest agitation by the alliance between the Catholics and King Philip: in case the forces of League should be victorious in France, they discerned not only a general danger, but also one that threatened themselves particularly. It thus happened that what had been always hitherto obviated through the ancient influence of the French Crown upon the Swiss confederacy now took place. The magistracy of Berne, Zurich, Bâle, and Schaffhausen allowed in their territories enlistments in favor of the Huguenots.* It was no longer mere single adventurers,

* That they allowed it, appears from all authentic papers; among others from the Memoirs of Sillery, 1587-1593, MS. at Berlin. It is there stated, "Ceux des cantons . . . s'étoient tellement oubliés que d'avoir permis à un grand nombre de leurs sujets à marcher," etc.

but three great corps amounting to sixteen thousand men, which commenced their march toward the Palatinate, where they formed a junction with the German troops.

John Casimir, out of neighborly respect for Lorraine, did not think it advisable on this occasion to lead the troops into the field himself, although the authority of his high rank and experience was greatly desired. He had in his service a Prussian nobleman, Fabian, Burgrave of Dohna, who had been introduced to him by Hubert Languet, and who had afterward accompanied him in his journeys to the Netherlands and to England, as well as in his enterprise at Cologne, on behalf of Gebhard Fruchsess. The Burgrave was a man inspired with the general Protestant zeal, and not without a knowledge of arms, and to him the conduct of the campaign was committed. The army that pressed forward into Lorraine, under Dohna, comprised four thousand German cavalry, a few squadrons of *Landsknechte*, and three thousand five hundred French; united with the Swiss they formed a very considerable army.

Henry of Navarre without hesitation acknowledged this force as his own; for it appeared to him lawful to bring in foreign assistance against his enemies of Guise and Lorraine, whose object was to overturn and ruin the kingdom of France; he believed it to be incumbent upon him to liberate the King of France from their power.

The intention of the King was now, however, by no means to allow himself to be thus liberated. He was conscious that there was truth in what Henry of Navarre advanced; for although he may not have comprehended the entire extent of the connection between the Guises and the Spaniards, yet he knew so much of it as that the former received Spanish money, and was perfectly aware that they contended for their own interests, not for his. So far Henry of Navarre appeared to him as his natural ally; but still he could not approve of his conduct in uniting himself independently with a foreign military force.

Henry III. still hoped to be able to subdue both—to damp the ardor of the Huguenots, to coerce the Guises, and to carry into full execution his own Catholic and governmental ideas.

He sent one of his favorites, Joyeuse, into the field against Henry of Navarre, intending to march himself against the approaching German and Swiss army. When he left Paris for this purpose, it was under the conviction that he was about to undertake a great task, fraught with infinite importance and difficulty. The Nuncio, in one of his reports, describes how the King rose from his bed, on the morning of his departure from the capital, and undressed as he was, threw himself upon his bare knees, and prayed for a long time; he then received the Eucharist; and, thus prepared, under emotions of a religious nature, took the field.

This campaign has been called the war of the three Henrys, for Henry III., Henry King of Navarre, and Henry Duke of Guise each performed his own peculiar part in it.

The King of Navarre had the good fortune, with the small but experienced body that accompanied him, to obtain a complete victory over the splendid army which Joyeuse led against him on the plains of Coutras. Joyeuse himself was slain. This was the first battle won by the Huguenots during a quarter of a century of civil war; the young Prince of Navarre taught them at last to conquer in the open field. Whether he had not sufficient authority over them to retain them together, when they wished to return to their homes with the booty they had acquired, or whether it was owing to himself, that he did not more completely follow up his victory, is an old question, which we will not presume to decide.

King Henry III. took possession of both banks of the Middle Loire, in order to prevent the junction of the Swiss and German army with that of the Huguenots of the south of France. He was completely successful. Fabian Dohna allowed himself to be deceived by the splendid hopes held out to him, and to be led away from the passages across the Loire, which lay higher up; lower down, however, he found the King. Proceeding constantly in a westerly direction, without meeting with any decided resistance—for the skirmish at Vimory, where he and Mayenne met personally, is hardly worth mention—but also without any success as far as Chartres; he was compelled at length to halt. King Henry III. had no inten-

tion of giving him battle, for these people would have fought with desperation; but he found other means to induce them to retreat. The enlistments were permitted in Switzerland chiefly on the ground that the troops, as it was averred, were not intended to act against the King, but against the Guises. Henry determined to make use of this principle to his own advantage. A Zurich captain,* who served in the army, has described how the King first gave him to understand his astonishment at seeing Swiss confederates opposed to him, contrary to the perpetual peace and the firm alliance established between him and them; and how immediately the resolution was formed among the Swiss to convince the King of his error, and for this purpose to send delegates to him; and how these, when they made their obeisance to him, were much better instructed by him in the character of their expedition. The King declared that it was not in his favor, but against him. He said it to them himself—he, the King. He was no phantom, he stood before them. They answered that they carried neither halbert nor sword against the crown of France. When the delegates returned to the camp, they imparted to the other leaders the change which had taken place in their views. Not one of them would have any thing to do with an enterprise against the French crown. They accepted money from the King; and thus he had the merit of putting an end to this irruption—which was as much dreaded in Paris as if it had been a new Helvetic immigration—in the very midst of its career, and without striking a blow.

Meanwhile it was the good fortune of the Duke of Guise to acquire the superior honor of the transaction. The relation in which he stood to the King was one of the most extraordinary character. It is certain that Henry III. wished to appear as strong as possible in the field, not only for the purpose of meeting the enemy, but also because he wanted to reduce Guise to his proper subordinate position by his

* John Haller, whose manuscript chronicle in the town library at Zurich contains much that is in general new. According to a letter of Catharine de Medici (November 8), the Swiss told the King, "que leurs piques ne piqueront ni leurs espées ne trancheront jamais contre le Roi."

own presence.* It is equally certain that Guise was supported by the Spaniards, in order that he might be able to maintain his position in presence of the King of France.† They gave him money for the express purpose of strengthening him in his opposition to the King, and for enabling him to satisfy his friends.

They might be compared with Bomilcar and Hanno, or with two Roman consuls who cherishing a mutual and deadly hatred, yet fight against the same enemy, were not their case rendered still more peculiar by the fact that here one of the two was king, while the other was only a governor and military leader.

Up to the present time Guise had not effected much against the enemy. Now, however, the effect of the royal declaration upon the Swiss troops suggested to the Burgrave the idea of marching with his army to attack Guise, against whom the Swiss felt no scruples in fighting. He hoped to defeat Guise in open battle, as Joyeuse had been defeated by Henry of Navarre. At the same moment Guise, who was eager for battle, and who better understood the nature of men and things in the country, set himself in motion to meet his enemy.

Dohna had the good-natured folly not to take military possession of the castle commanding the little town of Auneau, in which he took up his quarters one evening. Guise won over the commander with money and promises, and induced him to open the castle during the night. In the morning, when Dohna was preparing to resume his march, while the cavalry were either at their breakfast or engaged in accoutring their horses, and the streets were filled with baggage-wagons, Guise rushed from the castle. They were unable to collect more

* "Che (il Re) voleva per due fini presso di se il nervo maggiore: uno per sicurezza in ogni evento, qualor dovesse combattere; l'altro per tener in soggezione il Guisa, quando pur rimanesse per ventura vincitore degli Alemanni."—Tempesti, Vita di Sisto V., i. 320.

† "Volebat Parmensis iis auxiliis conservari et unionem et Guisios," Tassis, Commentarii, 477. Tassis was then again in the Netherlands, and shows himself much better informed concerning the affairs of the Netherlands than he does concerning the events which had taken place in France.

than a single company; the rest were surprised in their quarters, and either cut down upon the spot or made prisoners.* The Burgrave saved himself with his banner, and made every effort to collect the cavalry and Swiss out of the neighboring quarters, for an attempt to retake the town, but he was far from possessing sufficient authority to effect his purpose. The Swiss would not now fight even against Guise, and drew over some of the German captains and their troopers to join them in their design of marching homeward. Thus, in increasing confusion and want of counsel, and assailed on both sides by the royal troops and by those under the command of Guise, the invading army commenced its retreat along the Loire. They despaired of being able to join the Huguenots, and at last gave ear to the exhortations of the King, that they should leave the kingdom. He was well pleased to see them depart, and offered no obstruction, satisfied with the promises they had given never again to bear arms against him. The French who might desire to separate from them he permitted to remain in the country, under the proviso that they should submit to the edict which had been issued on the subject of religion.

In this manner the army returned from the field. The consequences of the campaign were so far important, that the Protestant German force was driven beyond the boundaries of the kingdom, pursued, and almost annihilated by Guise, who gave little heed to any capitulation. As regarded the French domestic question, it decided nothing. The government of the favorites was not abandoned. Epernon maintained his old and hated superiority, while the victory of Coutras had strengthened the feeling of self-dependence in the Huguenots. Guise's thoroughly open opposition prevented the King from undertaking any thing decisive against Henry of Navarre. When pressed to do so, he constantly answered that Navarre was not his worst enemy; he required that every one should obey him.

* According to Leuthinger (*De Marchiâ*, lib. xxiv. 528), Buch was also in the village. Vossius (*De Rebus Gestis Fabiani à Dohna*) expresses himself rather in an apologetic than in a narrative manner: p. 65.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE BARRICADES.

IN this conjuncture a hostility of the most formidable description manifested itself against the King in the very midst of his capital. The Catholic union had here assumed a new and alarmingly threatening aspect.

In the beginning of the year 1587 the intelligence of war-like preparations in Germany had excited all men's minds. It was said that an army of three hundred thousand heretics were summoned to take arms, and that they were about to invade France in order to annihilate the good Catholics, and that the hypocritical King was in secret a party to the enterprise. The idea was suggested that the Catholic princes alone were too weak to meet such a danger, and that a civic organization should be grounded in order to support them. A rich citizen, who was in the service of the Bishop of Paris, Charles Hottmann by name, was the first, as far as is known, who originated this notion.* He imparted it to a few preachers whose popular eloquence gave them great power, the chief of whom were Jean Prevost, Matthieu Launay, and Jean Boucher. They seized the idea with joy, and proceeded immediately to carry it into effect. According to the information dispatched to Rome, the new and as yet not numerous confederacy took shape on the 25th of January and the 2d of February, 1587. Sixteen men were first appointed, according to the number of quarters into which the city of Paris was then divided, each of whom was to conduct the affairs

* "Avea sentito susurrare, che veniesse contra Francia un esercito di trecento mila eretici, risolsi di unire insieme altrettanti Francesi Cattolici."—Anonymo Capitolino.

of the association in his own department. Ten more were then named, among whom were the four originators of the scheme, and who were to have the general management of the proceedings. No one was to be received as a member of the confederacy without their consent. The union progressed rapidly, in consequence probably of its absorbing the elements of one which had been previously formed in the year 1576, as well as through the influence of the better and more affluent middle class, to which Hottmann himself belonged. The chief obligation under which the members laid themselves was to pay into the funds of the union as much money as the Council of Ten should assess.*

Henry of Guise comprehended, at the first word spoken to him concerning this confederacy, what a powerful instrument it offered to his hand for any enterprise. In a short time Mayenne came to the city, and in the most profound secrecy effected an understanding with the citizens, who almost regarded it as an honor that the great nobles were willing to unite with them. An alliance was formed, with the twofold object of extirpating all heresy in France, and of abolishing the abuses of the judicial system. Those who held similar principles in other cities and towns, were to be invited to concur in the movement.

Even in the very beginning of their proceedings—that is, in the month of March, 1587—the idea was broached of deciding the whole matter at once by seizing the person of the King. It was intended to remove the favorites, and to compel him to adopt unconditionally the policy of the League. They did not, however, succeed in their design, whether it was that the King was warned in time, or that affairs were not yet ripe for the attempt.

* The "association faite particulièrement par aucuns bourgeois de Paris," of which mention is made in the records of the States of Blois, 1576, Des Etats Généraux xiii. 271. According to Doschius, "Vita Francisci Hottmanni," the family of Hottmann, which showed itself so active on both sides, came originally from Breslau. Lambert, the founder of the family, had two sons—John, who contributed greatly to obtain the funds required for the ransom of Charles I., and Peter, who held office in the administration. Francis Hottmann was son of the latter, Charles Hottmann was grandson of the former.

For some time the concealed and extensive union, which embraced an innumerable multitude, manifested itself merely in popular opposition.

There was a demagogue named Roland, who displayed his zeal chiefly against the peace with the Huguenots, and indulged generally in the fiercest language. When he was arrested, the League, both princes and citizens, resolved that they would not allow him to suffer any damage, and between them they compelled the Government to liberate him.* Another person, on the contrary, who had written against the League and the Papal Bull, remained in prison.

Master Prevost placed upon the church of St. Severin a picture representing the cruelties practiced against the Catholics in England, which set the people in a rage "against the Huguenots and the Politicians." The Government caused the picture to be removed. The act was replied to by placards of the most offensive character, and from the pulpits, which thundered with constantly increasing vehemence. An attempt to imprison one of these preachers, in September, 1587, aroused the quarters, in which it was made to a general insurrection.

In this disposition of the city, all the intelligence that arrived from the field was received with contempt for the King, and admiration for the Duke. To him the people ascribed the salvation of the city. His most trifling achievements were made the subjects of ballads, printed on flying sheets, and listened to with enthusiasm; but the surprise of Auneau appeared an extraordinary action. He was celebrated by the preachers as the Gideon of faithful France; they applied the words of Scripture to him, "Saul has slain his thousands, but David his ten thousands." It was held to be shameful, a species of treason, in the King, to come to a convention with the enemy, for it was owing to him alone that all these robbers had not been cut to pieces. But it was clearly evident that he had invited them at first, paid them for coming, and now sent them back again.†

* Compare Guise's letter, in Bouillé, 211, with L'Etoile, of June 4, 1517.

† L'Etoile, beginning of December, 1587: edition of Champollion, 234.

The King, who had really performed the decisive part in the campaign, and expected to receive honor for it, was astounded that the public voice should thus declare against him. The reception he met with on his return was cold, and the *vive-le-roi's* with which he was greeted, were purchased. Soon after his arrival in the capital he was induced to summon the insurrectionary preachers before himself, and to make known to them his displeasure and contempt; Pope Sixtus, he told them, would have sent them to the galleys for similar behavior; but that he would forgive them for this time, but advised them to amend.* He saw the storm brewing round him. Did he fear to bring it to an outbreak? or did he believe it possible to allay it by admonition?

The Duchess of Montpensier, *née* Guise, sister of Duke Henry, gave the preachers special encouragement. She boasted that she was able to effect more by their tongues than her brother could by his troops. The King showed her his displeasure, but he suffered her to remain in the capital.

The Carnival of 1588 was observed under these circumstances, and the city occupied and filled with careless and scandalous enjoyments, as if there were no League, no enemy of the kingdom in France. There was not an individual at the Court of whom the most shameful things were not repeated; all there was in a state of hostility and common antagonism.

"Distrust," said the Papal nuncio, "has crept into the council, the house, the very chamber of the King; no one is trusted except those with whom people are connected by the most intimate personal interests; every one seeks to deceive his neighbor, and then laughs at him. Even the Queen Mother could not maintain whatever remains of credit she possesses, in opposition to the ruling favorite Epernon." One day Epernon paid her a visit, and knelt before her with his head uncovered; she begged earnestly that he would rise, but he remained fixed and obstinate in his position, until he had informed her that he had never done and never contem-

* L'Etoile. "Il en demeurait là; habens quidem animum, sed non satis animi."

plated any thing adverse to her.* I do not believe that he either persuaded or convinced her.

Meanwhile fresh dissensions, having reference to possessions and authority, sprang up between the King and the Guises.

The government of Normandy was vacated by the death of Joyeuse: Guise, supported by his friends, and relying upon his merit, demanded it for himself; the King transferred it to Epernon.

The government of Picardy was also vacated by the death of Condé, who was believed to have died of poison at St. Jean d'Angely: the Guises demanded it for Aumale; the King handed it over to the Duke of Nevers.

Queen Catharine at this moment showed herself somewhat inclined to the party of the Guises, and is said to have approved of a serious enterprise against the King of Navarre; † but all her good counsel on that subject was steadily resisted by her son, and at last they came to an open breach in regard to it. Henry III. reproached his mother with the evil consequences of her former proposals, and told her at last that he wished for the future to act according to his own views, and begged her never again to meddle in his affairs. ‡

This was a remarkable, but at the same time a necessary turn of circumstances. The first rising of the Guises had rekindled the King's old anti-Protestant zeal, but it had also aroused his dislike toward them, and this dislike had been increased and strengthened by every thing that had since occurred, until it had at last become almost his ruling passion. He was in that condition that he was obliged to show favor

* Morosini, in Tempesti, Vita di Sisto V., i. 380.

† According to a rumor then widely circulated, "la Reine desseinait de faire tomber la couronne entre les mains des enfans de sa fille de Lorraine. M. de Guise n'y étoit employé que comme serviteur de M. de Lorraine."—*Mémoires Singuliers*, in Egerton, 297. I have found no proofs of this sufficient to remove all doubt; I therefore will not assert it, but I can not altogether reject it.

‡ One of the best informed authorities is Morosini, the Nuncio, afterward Legate, excerpts from whose dispatches are given by Tempesti; according to him Henry said, "Essendo io risolutissimo di voler fare e disfare, senza consigli, la prego a non volersi più ingerire in questi affari," i. 373.

to those against whom he was engaged in war, and to dread those who stood upon his side.

As the mediation of the Queen Mother was now also at an end, the state of things assumed daily a more and more threatening aspect. The Guises presented obstacles to Epernon's taking possession of the government in Normandy. They refused to admit royal garrisons in Picardy. In both provinces they had a large party; in the latter, the entire nobility were on their side. The King caused Aumale to be summoned to receive the royal garrisons in Picardy, and to quit the province, with the threat that if he did not obey, the King himself would come and cast his head at his feet.* Aumale replied, "that if he were to be forgotten, as well as his father, who had fallen in battle before the King's eyes, he had still heart enough and friends sufficient to defend both his life and honor."

The Nuncio had already informed the Pope of the increasing danger of a war among the Catholics themselves. The ladies of the palace remarked, that the whole affair might have a tragical issue.

On their side, the confederate nobles assembled first at Nancy, in the palace of the Duke of Lorraine, and afterward at Soissons, in just as hostile an attitude as ever. The contempt with which they regarded the proposals of the King may be seen from a letter of Guise to the Spanish ambassador. "He is determined not to allow the Picards to be injured further than by threats, and not even this shall they have to bear; the King shall not have traveled far from Paris, when he (Guise) will so order matters, that he will be compelled to return again."† A manifesto immediately appeared, in which the old demands of the religious and political opposition were advanced afresh. It appeared as if the confederates themselves intended to come to Paris, in order to present it with the greater publicity.

* "Altrimenti sarebbe egli andato in persona con tutte le forze, per gittarli la testa a piedi."—From the reports of the Nuncio, in *Tempesti*, i. 390.

† "Si le Roy part de Paris, je le feray plutôt penser à revenir qu'il n'aura approché les Picards d'une journée:" in *Bouillé*, iii. 260.

During these proceedings, the fermentation in the capital increased daily. There is nothing in the world blinder than the suspicion, so wise in its own eyes, which interprets all that happens in accordance with preconceived opinions. The city had not the most distant idea of the peculiar position of Henry III. in reference to the Guises. The people regarded him who had formed an alliance with a foreign king, and one opposed to French interests, as a defender; while the King, who had at least preserved the honor of France, they looked upon as a traitor and an enemy.

In April, as a preacher, who had delivered rebellious harangues, was about to be brought before the King, or probably to be put in prison, an armed mob assembled with the determination to prevent it. This resistance might without doubt have been suppressed, but the Court avoided violent measures, thinking it better to occasion no further alarm. This advantage, however, gave the members of the League still greater confidence. Much was said to the King of the military organization of the city in its five quarters, each of which had its own leader.* Upon the declaration of the Parisians, that they were strong enough, and prepared for any enterprise, and that they wanted nothing further, except the presence of Guise, he answered that they should not have long to wait for him. The city was now filled with men of suspicious appearance. The civic authorities made one attempt to remove persons of that description, but they found it impracticable.

The King was now in the greatest embarrassment. Should he leave the city, it would be lost to him; while by remaining in it, his authority, if not his personal safety, would be endangered. He resolved to bring into the suburbs of St. Denis and St. Martin a detachment of the Swiss and French guards who were quartered in the neighborhood. He counted upon finding a moderate party among the citizens, who ad-

* *Procès Verbal de M. Poulain*, at the end of the '*Journal de L'Etoile*;' *Petitot*, xlv. 434. This is the Polledro of Davila, and the Polinius of De Thou, who plays so important a part in the writings of this historian. The credibility of his statements has been always disputed, but that they are authentic has never been questioned.

hered to the chief magistrate, the *Prévôt des Marchands*, and among whom were a few of the *trainband* captains. The question which occupied all men's minds did not refer so much to the dispute between the Huguenots and the Catholics, as to the opinions of the Catholics themselves concerning the position they occupied in regard to the Huguenots. The one party insisted that the heretics should be exterminated with fire and sword—that the Church principle was the foundation, which should be maintained by all, and unconditionally. The others answered that that would result in the destruction of the country, and the ruin of the State, upon the order of which every thing rested. This matter was spoken of in all companies, and where men came together in large numbers it became the subject of debate. The King, driven for a moment from his usual policy, returned to it again, and appeared as if he wished to lean upon that moderate party which had been named Politicians; but upon this very point arose the excitement of the popular confederacy. A rumor was spread abroad that the King wished to make the Politicians masters of the city, and to expel the members of the League, nay to arrest the most distinguished and best affected of the citizens; a list of those who were said to be devoted to destruction was circulated from hand to hand. To the religious and political passions of the people was now added apprehension for their own lives; and, if it had not been done previously, the Duke of Guise was now requested to come to the capital and protect the true Catholics, his adherents.

Duke Henry of Guise, like the King, was the son of an Italian mother; they had grown up together, and, like their mothers, had been united with each other in good and evil, but the nature of the Duke had taken a development altogether different from that of the King. The Italians could not sufficiently admire the harmonious union of mental energy and corporeal vigor which was displayed in Henry Guise. On one occasion he was seen to swim against the current of a stream in complete armor. In the game of tennis, in pugilism, and all military exercises, he was unrivaled, and no hardship seemed to fatigue him. He was a tall and fine-looking man, with fair flowing hair and lively piercing eyes;

his countenance was not disfigured by a scar on one of his cheeks, the relic of a wound received in battle—it seemed rather to increase his soldierly appearance; in the judgment of many he presented the very type of a man.* Although brought up in the lap of luxury, he cheerfully put up with the privations and difficulties of the camp. We read nothing of great campaigns conducted by him, but he was a courageous and gallant captain, and successful in many daring adventures. He did not think long consultations and reflection necessary, for in war he believed that every thing depended upon rapid execution. Under the impression of concurring intelligence, perhaps at table, in the midst of a numerous company, he would form his plan, from the accomplishment of which he would not afterward allow himself to be diverted by any objection. As he was willing to share in the pains and labors of his soldiers, so was he also desirous of dividing with them his rewards and honors. In a poetic eulogy, the artist who painted his portrait is asked why he had not given him a laurel wreath around his brows. The poet himself answers his own question on behalf of the painter, by saying that the Duke would have plucked off the leaves and distributed them to his companions in arms. He never forgot either who he was or what he wished to be; but he avoided every appearance of overweening arrogance. His letters of which many remain, are redolent of Italian courtesy. He condescended even to those of the lowest rank, and seldom refused an invitation to a baptism, a wedding, or any other domestic festivity. He had been seen to cross the street, hat in hand, to salute an acquaintance, sometimes of mean condition. In a company of hundreds he distinguished, at the first glance, those of them with whom he had a particular connection, and could let them know, by a movement of the eye or a turn of the head, that he recognized them. In short, he possessed that quality which attaches men more than any thing else—carelessness for himself, combined with attention

* Description by an Italian who knew him, from a collection of letters in the Library at Stuttgard, No. 181; "*Di temperamento giovanile, benigno, grave, attraeva la gente di amarlo e di seguirlo.*" Compare Davila.

to others. He was also generous, though far from being rich. Let us figure to ourselves a man possessed of these qualities, and, at the same time, of illustrious descent and exalted rank, in the midst of an excited multitude, whose most passionate feelings he shared in hatred against the professors of another creed. How could it otherwise be than that all should cling to him? King Henry III. once said that it was true he wore the crown, but that Guise was the king of minds.*

There is no doubt that Guise's conduct, if conformable to his nature, was, at the same time, calculated for the production of such effects; for Henry Guise was, in the most distinguishing characteristics, a party chief. He united in himself, as men even then observed, the heroic qualities of his father and the subtlety of his uncle.

Of the manifold motives which determined him at any time in a particular course, he knew just as well as his uncle how to present those which were most consonant with the dispositions of those with whom he was treating. The others he reserved even from his most confidential friends—his own brothers could not extract them from him. His word or promise was not to be relied upon. We have seen through what a miserable subterfuge he considered himself relieved from the stipulations of the treaty of Nemours. He was not fond of regular preparation, even in political affairs; he was at home in disorder and tumult; and looked for all success as the result of his popularity and his star.

He obtained a certain superiority over the King by the fact that the latter, while prince, had belonged to the same party; that they had borne arms together against the Huguenots; prepared together for St. Bartholomew's Day; and that the League of 1576 was their work in common. The King had since adopted another policy, and while Guise set himself in opposition to it he retained a certain sympathy in the King's early reminiscences, and in the strict Church-maxims he had formerly recognized, and from which Henry III. could not emancipate himself. In the Duke, on the other hand,

* According to Morosini, it was once said to King Henry III., "Egli (il Duca di Guisa) è il Re nell' affetto, se la M. V. è Re nell' effetto."

all was consistent—his descent, conviction, party position, religious and political objects.

The contention between them had been enkindled afresh. Guise had offered conditions to the King, the acceptance of which would have fully secured the superiority of his party in France. He had also demanded the dismissal of the favorite who had just departed for Normandy in order to take possession of the government of that province. Guise was, in short, resolved to carry out his own designs. The King had given him an express intimation not to come to Paris; upon the requisition of the city, in the apparent pressure of the conjuncture, as well as from apprehension and ambition, the Duke resolved to pay no attention to this prohibition, and appeared in the capital on the 9th of May, 1588; his attendance was small, but he did not require a greater.

He alighted at the palace of the Queen Mother, with whom he was not without some connection. Catharine, who saw at one view all the consequences of his arrival, trembled as she gazed on him. She asked what had brought him to Paris so unexpectedly; he answered, with some warmth, that he had heard there was a design in contemplation to surprise the Catholics and destroy them in one night, and that he had come to defend them, or else to die with them. It has been said that he expressed himself in a similarly disrespectful manner to the King; but the most credible reports contain no proof of his having done so. Henry III. saw Guise, for the first time after his return, in the apartment of the Queen Consort, and, collecting himself for the effort, he spoke chiefly of Epemon, who he said was his friend, and therefore had claims upon the friendship of the Duke of Guise. The Duke replied, that Epemon must first learn to acknowledge the difference which existed between them, both in nature as well as birth, and afterward they might be friends.* Those who saw the King and the Duke together would never have suspected that there existed between them a feeling of discord, which was so soon to break out with violence. Even as late

* This is the report of the Nuncio to Sixtus V. It is as a version grounded upon distinguished evidence at least, and possesses in itself the greatest probability.

as the 11th of May Guise fulfilled his office of Lord Steward of the Household at the supper-table with all the duty and observance of a contented subject.

Uneasiness and apprehension increased however, each successive moment, through the arrival of zealous and authoritative members of the League, such as the Archbishop Espinac of Lyons, as well as through the boundless popularity which Guise enjoyed. On one occasion an old woman forced her way through the crowd, and told him that she was now willing to die, since God had vouchsafed her the grace of seeing, with her own eyes, the preserver of the faithful. A tiler, at the risk of his life, jumped down from the roof of a house upon which he was at work, in order to have a nearer view of the Duke, who was passing in the street below. What would have been the consequence if the address of Soissons had been presented under these circumstances, and Guise had undertaken to be the interpreter of the general desire? How could the King have ventured to offer any resistance? the universal voice would have overpowered him.

I do not find that Guise had any further object immediately in view, or that he contemplated the employment of force. The King was also far from being disposed to such a course. But the presence of so many strangers of equivocal position and character, and the doubtful fidelity of the civic militia—a division of which had abandoned an important post without orders—suggested to the Council, at a sitting held on the 11th of May, in which Catharine de' Medici took no part, the resolution to bring the French and Swiss troops, which were quartered in the suburbs, into the city. But where such hostile elements come into contact, there is soon no authority that can prevent a collision and the shedding of blood. The troops consisted of eleven Swiss companies and nine French. On the morning of the 12th of May they marched through the gates with fifes and drums, and took possession of the Halles, the Place de Grève, and the bridges and streets round the Louvre, and in the Cité. They also occupied the posts which had been deserted by the citizens. Altogether, with those which were already in the city, the troops might have amounted to about six thousand men. It is amazing that any one

could have dreamt of overpowering with so small a force a city filled with armed burghers. Paris had at that time probably half a million of inhabitants.* The arrival of these soldiers, however, made the impression that the real truth was that "more than a hundred honorable citizens were condemned to death, and that the hangman's assistants were already in the city to complete their execution; that should the slightest resistance be offered they would break into the houses and abuse the inhabitants, while the women would be given up to the brutality of the Swiss soldiers."† The population collected in their several quarters round their flags, and a few captains who remained faithful to the King were forsaken by their people. Large crowds took possession of the streets, in order to resist the advance of the royal troops. The tumult increased, the civic authorities in favor of the royal cause were expelled, and others appointed in their room who shared the views and feelings of the majority. The conduct of the whole fell into the hands of a few of the most resolute members of the League. Among these no one exercised a more powerful influence upon the course of the affair than Count Charles of Brissac, the son of that Brissac of Piedmont of whom it was said that he was a lion, and led a troop of lions into battle. The younger Brissac had been neglected by Henry III., and now wished to prove to him his importance by opposing him. He took his position at the head of the armed citizens in the Quartier Latin, where the students from the University joined him. The royal troops, on the

* Bernardino Mendoza, in a letter written during the siege of 1590, states that the usual number of inhabitants amounted to five hundred and fifty thousand souls, but that they had then been reduced to four hundred thousand.

† Of the three earliest reports, "*Audacieuse Entreprise de M. de Guise*," "*Amplification des Particularités que se passèrent à Paris*" (*Mém. de la Ligue*, ii. 308-315), and "*Histoire très-véritable de ce qui est venu dans cette ville de Paris*" (*Preuves de la Satire Menippée*, i. 40), the last-named contains the best information: it has been supposed to be from the pen of St. Yon one of the Echevins attached to the principles of the League. Yet the numbers from 76 to 83, in which he is mentioned, are manifest insertions. They break the connection of the narrative by suddenly passing over the Friday and then again returning to the events of Thursday. St. Yon is at most but the editor not the author.

other hand, took post on the Place Maubert, under the command of the brave Crillon, who, had he been allowed to act according to his own judgment, would probably have gained the superiority over the citizens. He had, however, received peremptory orders not to fire; and as leave was not given him at the critical moment, he retired. A plan had long since been formed by the citizens to defend the streets with barricades, as in earlier years they had been defended with chains—a plan which had often been attempted elsewhere in the fury of civil war. As far as we know, Guise himself was not for having recourse to this extreme measure. Brissac, as he asserted, ordered all and conducted its execution. There is no doubt that he erected at least the first barricade at the opening of the Rue Galande in the place from which Crillon had retreated.* The same was done in a moment in all the neighboring quarters, and with the most decisive results. By mid-day the troops were every where effectually separated from one another, shut up within barricades, and the citizens masters universally. Marshal Biron, the commander of the troops, said even then to the King that each street was a town, which must be conquered. Biron, with a few attendants, went on foot up to one of the great barricades in order to speak of peace. There however, when he would not concede the demands made, he found the arms of the citizens pointed at himself. The demand of the mob was the total removal of all the troops, and again it was Brissac who commenced hostile operations to compel them to yield. At the head of the armed men of the Place Maubert, he commanded the Swiss to extinguish their matches, and when they refused commenced an attack on them in front, and in the rear from the Rue St. Jacques.† The Swiss immediately exhibited their rosaries in their outstretched hands, to show that they were Catholics, began to beg for quarter in their broken French.

* "El papel, que dio el agente de M. de Brissac," in the Archives of Simancas, contains these words: "Le Compte de Brissac, contre l'opinion de feu M. de Guise, dressa les barricades avec les gentilshommes et le peuple de Paris, et dégarnit cinq ou six milles hommes de guerre... qu'il confesse être arrivés comme par miracle."

† "Jamais on ne vit chose mieux conduite, ny plus heureusement succéder."—Lettres d'Et. Pasquier, liv. xii. p. 334.

and allowed themselves to be disarmed; the same took place on the Marché Neuf; and the populace rushed at the sound of the tocsin upon the troops in all the posts which they occupied. The King, in order to save them, gave orders that they should all assemble round the Louvre; but this was not to be accomplished so easily; he was himself compelled to solicit the aid of his enemy Guise.

Guise had made preparations for defense in his palace on the same morning. The garden was filled with arms, and the ground-floor occupied by persons prepared for battle. In the court-yard his friends belonging to the nobility formed themselves into ranks, desirous of the opportunity to fight for him.*

By mid-day the idea of an attack was entirely abandoned. Guise was seen traversing the nearest streets in company with the Archbishop Espinac, in the midst of a double line formed by the mob. From time to time intelligence was brought to him from the central parts of the city, and the joy with which he received these accounts showed that he was confident of victory.†

Already, however, all was decided. Appealed to for assistance by the Court itself, he went at once to the scene of the struggle. He was on horseback, but without his cuirass or any arms, except a staff which he carried in his hand. Wherever he showed himself the uproar was immediately stilled. He first liberated the French guards from the house into which they had been forced; then the Swiss from the Marché Neuf, and afterward all the others. They were now able, under the guidance of Guise and his friends, to assemble round the Louvre. Through all this, however, no trace of arrogance or insolence was noticeable in his behavior; he only complained that people should have given him this trouble, saying that

* Luigi Davila found him thus when he had been sent to him by the Queen, and he himself showed him his preparations. (Davila, *Historia*, 496.)

† Young Augustus de Thou, the historian, saw him under these circumstances: "Mihi videri in vultu Guisii ac suorum eam fiduciam et serenitatem oris cernere," etc., lib. 91, iii. 187. The palace is the present Hôtel des Archives. It had formerly belonged to the Constable de Clisson, from whom it was purchased in 1553 by Guise's mother; it passed into the possession of the Prince of Soubise afterward.

those who kindled the fire should in all reason extinguish it. He did not even show any ill-will toward his antagonists, but treated them with that admirable courtesy which was peculiar to him. That danger and the victory were in truth equally unexpected by him.

It was thought in the city that all was now accomplished, and that Guise would for the future rule next to the King. The King was counseled to go through the streets in company with the governor of the city, the Duke, and perhaps his mother, and endeavor to persuade the people to remove the barricades. He could not, however, bring himself to take a step in which he would have to experience at the same moment the power of the detested party chief and the scorn of the multitude; nor could he be certain that things would remain in the state at which they had now arrived. It was told the King that Brissac had once more collected an armed crowd in the neighborhood of the University, with the intention of seizing the only gate in the King's possession—that next to the Louvre, and most probably of making an attack on that palace.* Must he at length fall into the hands of his enemies? He finally determined to use the moment while the keys of this single gate—the Porte Neuve—still remained in his hands, and his opponents had not yet appeared before the Louvre, and to quit the city. Accompanied by the courtiers and councilors who had the means of taking horse, he set out and took the road to Chartres.

Thus did this momentous event take place with but a trifling contest. The population of the city, which had once thrust out the Huguenots, and afterward, incited by the Court, so horribly butchered those who ventured among them, now turned their arms against the King himself. The prince who had helped to provoke the fury of St. Bartholomew's Day, saw, when king, the popular passions directed against himself

* "Ho saputo," said the King to the Nuncio, "che il Sr. de Brissac raunava gente nell' Università di scolari per muoversi il palazzo regio et impradonirsi della Porta Nuova, onde io rimaneva assediato et in potere di miei nemici, nelle mani di quali era risoluto di non cadere:" the Porte Neuve was between the Louvre and the Tuileries, not far from the quay. (Dulaure, Hist. de Paris, v. 45.)

saw his troops disarmed, and himself compelled to fly beyond the walls of his capital.

He was as good a Catholic as any of them. He had, as he once said, done more for the prosperity of the city than any ten of his predecessors taken together. But benefits received are soon forgotten; they bind none but those who have inborn feelings of gratitude, and least of all the multitude, among which, though they attain in the mass a flourishing condition, still each feels only in his own case what is still wanting to him. Partly through his own fault, and partly through that of others, the King had lost his personal authority; but he came into hostile collision with popular opinion chiefly through his tolerant policy and his efforts to establish peace. The rigid Catholic element, once aroused, victorious, and independent, now strove to obtain unconditional dominion. It deemed itself to possess an ecclesiastical and political right to an exclusive existence in France. That the King was compelled to take other measures against the partisan efforts of a powerful house and the influences of a foreign power, was not considered by the multitude; impelled forward by the fanatical preachers who ruled their party, they felt nothing, suspected nothing, but blindly followed their Guise, who was all the while in the pay of the Spaniard.

Had Henry remained in Paris, even had no worse results followed, he would have been compelled to govern in accordance with the views of the city and of the victor. Now that he had saved himself, and was acknowledged as king in the country, negotiation at least was still possible.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ESTATES OF BLOIS, 1588.

THE deliberations of the Estates, for the assembling of which at Blois, toward the close of the year 1588, the King caused the letters of summons to be immediately issued, can only be regarded as negotiations.

The King held it to be necessary previously, as it were, to adopt the notions of his adversaries, and to submit himself to them. In a new edict, promulgated in July, 1588,* he promises to destroy heresy, and requires from his subjects an obligation upon oath that after his death they will never accept for their king any one who shall be a heretic, or a favorer of heretics. He required another oath from them in addition, by which they were to pledge themselves to abstain from all other alliances and connections, whether within the kingdom or in foreign countries. He would not hear the word League any longer; under the term union he understood the legal connection and alliance between the Catholic subjects of the realm and their Catholic King. He so far controlled himself in this preliminary proclamation as to announce an amnesty for what taken place in Paris. Favors were even bestowed upon Guise; and when he came to the Court he was received in a gracious manner. Epernon lost his new government, and was removed, and the whole Council was dismissed, because it appeared indissolubly associated with the previous political administration of affairs. All questions were to be freely investigated in the Assembly of the Estates, and new forms of government decided upon.

* Edit du Roi sur l'union de ses sujets Catholiques: Mém. de la Ligue, ii. 336. Articles accordés au nom du Roi, ib. iii. 52,

When the Estates assembled at Blois in October, the King flattered himself that the free elections would have brought together in the Assembly men who were not connected with the League, and who would lend a willing ear to his representations. I know not that ever a French King delivered a more remarkable discourse than that with which Henry III. opened these Estates. It was animated throughout with a feeling that an understanding, in the Catholic sense, as well as in accordance with the monarchy and the Estates, was still practicable by means of consultation.

Henry III. commenced with a eulogy upon his mother, who sat upon the highest step immediately below the throne. He promised again to oppose heresy, even at the risk of his life, as he had done before in battle; he could not find a prouder grave than amidst the ruins of heresy. He promised, in addition, a searching reform in reference to the finances as well as in the appointment to official places, for he said that his honor depended upon the prosperity of his subjects and the welfare of the kingdom. Some of the abuses complained of he declared to be abolished on the spot. He conjured the Estates to unite with him for the purpose of putting an end to all disorder, by the memory of the ancient Kings his predecessors, by whom they had been happily and mildly governed, and by the name of true Frenchmen, who always passionately revered their natural and legitimate kings.

"I am your King," said he: "I am the only person who can say this. In this monarchy I desire to be nothing more than what I am. Monarchy is the best form of government. The monarch inherits from his predecessors not only the highest dignity, but also the zeal to use it for the honor of God and for the preservation of all."

"He had been told, it was true," he continued, "that an Assembly of the Estates could easily shake the royal authority; such an event could happen, however, only when that authority was exercised to promote bad objects; but when its objects were pure, as in the present case, an Assembly of the Estates would rather strengthen the legitimate power, and, therefore, he had called them together in spite of all

such objections. The object of the Assembly he placed in the good advice of the subjects and the sacred resolutions of the prince.*

"The decrees which should be agreed upon in this manner, he promised to swear to upon the Evangelists, and never under any pretext to violate. It might, indeed, appear that by giving these pledges he compromised the royal authority, which by law was made superior to the law itself; but he knew that the true magnanimity of a good prince consisted in regulating his intentions and proceedings according to good laws. Should he, however, by his present conduct diminish the royal power, he would only have made what remained of it the more firm and enduring."

There is no reason to think that King Henry III. was guilty of either untruth or hypocrisy in these declarations; his meaning was to limit the Crown, whose original independence he firmly maintained, by subjecting it to laws which he himself should adopt freely. In this manner he thought to mediate between the monarchy and the Estates, in the ancient dispute which had agitated previous ages, and which was to agitate later times still more fiercely. The fundamental laws of the kingdom were to be renewed, or newly established, by a change freely concurred in by all its authorities; and upon these fundamental laws, thus altered, the monarchy was to be bound by an inviolable oath.

Never did a French King approach nearer to the demands of the Estates than Henry III. at Blois. Was he not, it may be asked, taken at his word, and the difficulty of his position made use of in order to limit definitively the mutual rights of the Throne and of the Estates?

But there prevailed in the Estates ideas not only extended much further than the King's, but that rested upon grounds

* "Cette tenue d'Etats est un remède pour guérir, avec les bons conseils des sujets et la sainte résolution du Prince, les maladies que le long espace de temps et la négligente observation des ordonnances du royaume y ont laissé prendre pied."—Harangue faite par le Roi, etc. : also in the *Mém. de la Ligue*, ii. 481. It has been said that the speech was not published exactly as it was delivered, that there were in it some strongly offensive expressions in reference to Guise. I leave this undecided; it does not affect the principal matter.

altogether different. We learn them especially from the schemes proposed at Paris.*

The declaration of Henry III. that there could not be a Protestant, or, as it was said, heretical King in France, was not, according to their scheme, satisfactory. The view propounded was that should a King only favor heresy, it mattered not whether directly or indirectly, by the very fact he forfeited his right to the Crown, and the French people were released from the oath of allegiance which they had sworn to him. In order to establish this view, the following theory was advanced. Kings are not Kings naturally, but by the grace of God, namely the sanction of the Church, as it was made out to be, after an exposition replete with false history; this grace of God, imparted by anointing and consecration, gave them more right to the Crown than either nature or birth. Should a King refuse to bind himself by the fundamental laws of his kingdom, his authority at once reverted to the successors of those who had at first invested the royal race with royal authority, that is, to the Estates themselves.† It is a singular compound of the sovereignty of the people and of clerical pretension, from which they seek to derive the power of the Crown. Without the Estates, the King was neither to declare war, to conclude peace, nor to levy taxes; the pardons he might grant, or even the powers and authorities he might confer, they were to have power either to confirm or to recall. They were to have their procurators at the Court, in order that all their grievances might be brought instantly before the Council. In each of the superior tribunals there was to be a Chamber elected by the Estates, whose duty should be to decide in the last instance upon the limits of their jurisdiction, and to control any excess in their sentences and judgments. A hierarchy, as it were, of the Estates, was to exist alongside of the royal tribunals and the Privy Council.

Two systems of limited monarchy here stand in opposition,

* "Articles pour proposer aux Etats et faire passer en loi fondamentale du royaume," in Cayet, *Anc. Coll. des Mémoires*, 55, 193: Michaud, xii. 62.

† "L'autorité, de laquelle ils ont premièrement revestu leurs roys, leur seroit dévolue."

both Catholic, and both intended for the reform of abuses, and therefore not essentially contradictory, yet separated from each other by an impassable chasm. The ideas of Hottmann and of Bodin meet, as it were, on another grade. While the King sought to preserve the original and hereditary rights of the Crown in their integrity, and would have made every limitation dependent upon his own resolution, and its duration upon his oath, the Estates laid claim to all original rights for themselves, maintaining that the King was intrusted with the exercise of those rights by them with the sanction of the Church, and that therefore it devolved upon them to take the largest share in the administration and superintendence of affairs.

These are precisely the antagonistic principles which have always contended for the ascendancy in the monarchies of Europe.

Had it depended on the consultations of the Estates, what system should henceforth prevail in France, their decision would not have been equivocal. In these Estates the only principles represented were those of the League. When it was spoken of at first as possible that other opinions besides those of the League might have influence in the Assembly, Guise declared openly that his friends in the provinces would know how to prevent such from being the case. In all the three Estates the most zealous adherents of the League were chosen presidents: the clergy elected the Cardinal of Guise; the nobility, the Count de Brissac, whose acquaintance was made at the barricades; and the third Estate, the most enthusiastic member of the Council of Ten, Marteau, the *Prévôt des Marchands*. The propositions also of the Estates are in every respect correspondent with the ideas of the League.

The first and most important was that their decrees should have an immediate validity, and that the Parliaments should no longer verify but simply register them; that above all things they should not be first submitted for approval to the Royal Council, but that they should be published as resolved upon. They cited the examples of Poland, Sweden, and England, and other neighboring nations, where that practice was

customary. The King remarked, that in Spain, where the Crown had never possessed so much power as in France, the custom and manner was different. He caused proceedings of the Cortes to be printed, in which the grievances of the Estates' deputies appeared by the side of the King's instructions; what profound reverence did these documents display toward the Sovereign! We may venture to suppose, however, that no one conceived himself to be refuted by this.

Another claim made by the Estates was that they should have the supervision of the finances, and that, in order to put a stop to the violence of oppression and exaction practiced by the partisans and other revenue officers, and to punish them for their excesses, a chamber of inquiry should be established, in the organization of which the Estates would have a preponderating influence. The King might appoint six of its members, the Assembly of the Estates eighteen; the Procurator-General was also to be chosen by the three Estates, and this officer should be an upright and impartial man, who should receive information from all the provinces of the acts of oppression, with the names of the transgressors; but they were to receive an income according to what they had paid, and which had not been already returned by the produce of the lands.*

The next subject that occupied attention was the immediate alleviation of the public burdens; and here measures of a most extensive character were proposed. All the alienated domains of the Crown were to be resumed from the purchasers. The taxes introduced under the present government were to be immediately abolished, as well as all the other extraordinary imposts except the *taille*, and that was to be reduced at once to its amount under Francis I., and in time to that which it bore under Louis XII. It is manifest that the Treasury was here threatened with a deficiency which could not be calculated. The King represented to them the condition in which he was already placed, and the few favors he bestowed

* "Et que la nomination d'un Procureur Général seroit faite par les trois ordres, pour faire choix d'un homme roide et entier, qui auroit un substitut en chaque province de la France," etc. Des Etats Gén. xv. 41.

upon his attendants. He showed them his clothes, which must last him three months more. He was certainly no longer a spendthrift; his household was maintained upon a very humble footing; if two capons were thought too much for his table, he would content himself with one. He had not at the present moment a single sou in his purse; sometimes the money was wanting even for dispatching a courier. If they were not willing to find some substitute for the imposts they were about to abolish, then their proceedings involved his destruction; but that which happened to the King happened to all. The Estates, however, insisted that the welfare of the people was the supreme law, and threatened to leave Blois if he would not consent to their views, and Henry, about the beginning of December, 1588, found himself at last under the necessity of complying. Although, he said, it had been represented to him that, in doing so, he reduced himself to the position of a Doge of Venice, yet he was determined to do it. He must be either very good and very gracious, or very bad and obstinate. He also consented to the reduction of the *taille*, but on condition that the necessities of the State should be supplied in some other manner. The present income of the Government might amount to about nine million and a half of crowns. If his debts were assumed by the Estates he would endeavor to carry on the administration with five millions, and this he thought they ought at least to do. Meanwhile, however desirable and easy it might be for the Estates to point out the necessity of abolishing the imposts, it exceeded both their power and their intention to find a substitute for the revenue they produced. They fell upon the expedient of securing the public income by means of the personal security of the richest members of the Assembly of the Estates, which was neither more nor less than a republican idea, only that there were no men there who were republicans enough to carry it out. The subscriptions which were collected proved very scanty. In fact, every one desired to live by the State, rather than by previous personal sacrifices to make it possible to do so. The greatest embarrassment was the natural consequence; every thing came to a standstill, and all proceedings were paralyzed.

The Duke of Savoy availed himself of the helpless condition of France to promote his own interests. At the very commencement of these difficulties he had entered into the closest connection with Philip II., for the purpose of invading and taking possession of Saluzzo, which was most conveniently situated for him, but which at that time belonged to the French.*

In the Assembly of the Estates some declared it to be their opinion that every thing else should be postponed until the Duke was punished as he deserved, for having dared to give offense to France with so disproportionately insignificant a power. It is not true, as some maintain, that Guise had a full understanding with the Duke of Savoy in regard to this enterprise; he considered it at least very unseasonable. But as Savoy was a member of the great European League, to which the King of Spain and Sixtus V. also belonged, Guise had no wish to take arms against the Duke; such a step would have given his policy a totally different character.

The disposition of the predominant party in the Estates was much more to renew with all vigor the war against the Huguenots and the King of Navarre, and to commit its direction to the Duke of Guise. They would not listen to a proposal that Navarre should for form's sake be once more requested to return to the bosom of the Catholic Church; he had been sufficiently often requested, and always in vain, and now, that he was openly in arms, it was not the time to negotiate with him. They declared Henry of Bourbon to be a notorious and relapsed heretic, guilty of offense against the Divine and human Majesty, unworthy of succeeding to the throne, and that his present and future heirs had forfeited all the rights of a Prince; he and they urged the King to remove him from his government of Guienne.

They felt no embarrassment as to the cost of this war, for they intended that the estates of the Protestants should be confiscated, and applied to that purpose. They even laid down a plan, in accordance with which one of the most con-

* He was in Spain at the close of March, 1585. "Ha lasciato," says the Venetian ambassador of him when he had taken his departure, "opinione in tutti non più di Piemontese, ma di Spagnolo."

siderable of the inhabitants in the chief town of each district was to be appointed as receiver of the funds to arise from the sale of the estates.* The third Estate, which had at first hesitated at describing the King of Navarre as a heretic, as they considered that it did not belong to the laity to judge of such matters, adopted the word at last, because it involved the loss of property and hereditary rights. A general confiscation of the estates held by Protestants was contemplated, in consonance with the severest decrees of the ecclesiastical law, similar to the sentence which had been formerly executed upon the Albigenses.

Henry of Guise had a leading hand in all these proceedings. His conduct at the opening of the Estates was remarkable, when, in discharging his office of Lord High Steward, he knelt at the foot of the throne, and cast upon the assembly round him a glance which expressed his assurance of the general admiration and devotion with which he was regarded as the commanding chief of a great party. He was master in the Estates, as well as in the Council of the King. The leaders in the Assembly consulted him upon every step they wished to take, while in the Council no one presumed to contradict him. He leaned upon the great principles both ecclesiastic and popular, which alike excluded absolute government founded upon the right of birth. Whither then tended his designs? Was it really, as is asserted, his ambitious intention to set aside the King, and shut him up in a cloister, as the Carlovingians, from whom he was descended, did the last monarch of the Merovingian race? In a *pièce* addressed to Guise, and written immediately before the assembling of these Estates,† mention is made of Charles Martel, who, after he had raised himself to the dignity of Major-domo, made use of that post, as a means to raise himself to a more exalted

* "Que tous hérétiques, de quelque état, qualité, ou condition qu'ils soient, soient punis de peines indictes et portées par les ordonnances des défunts rois de France, François I. et Henri II., et leurs biens employés au frais de la guerre," etc.—Cahier du Tiers Etat, Etats Gén., et autr. Ass. Nat., tom. xv. p. 156.

† "Instruction à M. de Guise retourné en Cour, par l'Archevesque de Lion," somewhere about August, 1588, in the Memoirs of Villeroy, 1665, ii. 266.

position; born a private man, he had left his children heirs to a throne. Did Guise actually aim at the high object of founding a new dynasty? I think I may assert that this was not the case. Moreo, who conducted the first negotiations with the Guises, asserts that Guise had promised the King of Spain that he would not for himself make any attempt upon the French crown.* It may have been that Philip II. reserved some claim of this kind for his own house, or that the elevation of a private man to a crown, even though a confederate of his own, was displeasing to him. It is enough that Guise, who could not for a moment dispense with the assistance of the King of Spain, was fettered by the promises he had exacted. His ambition was not of that aspiring kind to which imagination gives birth; but the cool and practical ambition of a man of intellect, who always seeks to attain what lies nearest to him first, proceeds from position to position, and allows his efforts to be directed by the course of circumstances. Even the King did not regard him as a rival of his dignity, so much as of his power. He had formed the idea that Guise aspired after the place of Constable, and would if necessary accept it even on the nomination of the Estates, in order that once invested with that authority, he might at their command undertake the war of persecution against the Huguenots. The King was apprehensive that he would be forcibly compelled to return to Paris, and there, in the midst of his rebellious subjects, be made the instrument to carry out their designs.

The most extraordinary scenes took place at Blois. On one afternoon a sanguinary affray occurred between the pages of both parties. Guise was at the residence of the Queen Mother; the noise of the riot reached him from the castle, and at the same time some of his friends appeared to receive his orders. He sat on a stool by the fire-place, never altered a feature, did not look round on any one, but kept his eye steadily fixed upon the fire. The King meanwhile armed himself in his own chamber with a coat of mail, firmly

* He told the assembled Leaguers at Rouen, "que uno de los artículos de la capitulation era, que el dicho M. de Guisa no avia de intentar alla corona."—Papers of Simancas.

persuaded that his rival would make an attempt on his life.

Such was the condition of affairs. Henry III. was not himself fully convinced of the truth of his own notions of a power limiting itself by law, yet still firmly retaining the ideas of the monarchy; all the resolutions of the Estates proceeded upon the ideas of a limitation which derived the origin and sum of power from another source. He perceived a systematic attempt to annihilate his authority, and to force him to the adoption of measures which of all others were the most odious to him. He endeavored once more to bring Guise to coincide with his views. While walking with him in the garden, he spoke to him of the two most important requisitions of the Estates—the adoption of their decrees without considering them previously in the royal Council, and the war against Henry of Navarre without summoning him anew to return to the Catholic Church—and sought to convince him of the impossibility of his agreeing to them. Guise, however, not only remained unmoved in his opinions, but appeared to be irritated, and let fall words concerning the secret whisperings to which the King lent an ear, and which rendered the regular course of affairs impossible, and finally held out a threat of demission.* Had this threat been put in execution, it would have been most probably the signal for a general insurrection against the King. Henry III. controlled himself while speaking with Guise; but when he returned to his own chamber, he gave free vent to his passionate emotions. The Italian blood boiled in his veins, and he conceived the idea of getting rid there, in the very palace, of the man whom he regarded as his most dangerous personal enemy.

A dream, which had formerly made a deep impression upon him, rose to his remembrance: he thought he was attacked by the wild beasts of a menagerie; and now this vision seemed to be fulfilled. He regarded the Duke as the lion by which he had feared in his dream he was about to be torn in pieces, and he was determined to be on his defense against him.

* Cayet, "Chronologie Novenaire, in Michaud, Nov. Coll., xii. 78. There is a little variation in Miron's "Relation de la Mort de Ms. de Guise," in Petitot, xlv. 464.

In this he was confirmed by his most trusted attendants. The old expression of a Pope in reference to the last Hohenstauffen and the first Anjou in Naples—that the death of the one was the life of the other, and the life of the one the death of the other—was applied to the present case. The Italian proverb, "with the serpent dies its poison," was quoted. The King was reminded of the monition which once reached him from the Papal court, that he should punish those by whom he was injured; and this, it was added, was no longer possible according to the usual forms; for although Guise had committed a number of actions each of which deserved to be punished with death, yet so numerous and powerful was his party in the kingdom, that any attempt to proceed against him in a judicial manner would only create new disturbances and fresh confusion.

The King himself gave expression to this thought subsequently, and added that he had struggled with himself for six whole days* before he could come to the resolution to take the Duke's life, for he feared it would be an offense in the sight of God. At last, however, he considered that, as a king by the appointment of God, it was his duty to secure obedience to his authority. "I resolved," said he, on another occasion, "rather to allow him to be killed, than to wait until he killed me."

Formerly a great chief of the Huguenots attained a position in which the exercise of the supreme power appeared to rest in his hands. Now their hereditary foe, the champion of the Catholics, was ascending with deliberate progress the very steps of the throne, and his adherents looked forward to his actually taking his place upon it. Then Catharine, in order to destroy Coligny, let loose the fanaticism of the capital to which she had invited him. Now her son, in his own palace,

* To Morosini: "Per sei giorni continui ero stato risolutissimo di non volerlo fare, temendo di offendere Dio:" in Tempesti, ii. 135. The fate of Martinuzzi, of Escovedo, and others, appears to set forth a theory of those times according to which transactions of this kind were lawful for crowned heads. (Compare St. Priest, "Les Guises," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May, 1850, p. 810.) We perceive, however, that Henry III. did not, properly speaking, shelter himself under this theory.

resolved to lay violent hands upon Guise, who was a guest beneath its roof.

Guise, like Coligny, received a warning, but, like him too, he thought himself too strong for any one to make an attempt upon him. He was acquainted with the revengeful disposition of the King, but he considered him too irresolute and too much of a coward to undertake any thing against him. "And should it be attempted," said he, in one of his letters, "I shall carry out my design with more vigor than at Paris: let them beware of me." Against secret plots he believed himself secured by the personal influence he had acquired over some of the King's immediate attendants. By nature he was to a certain degree careless. While he bade defiance to his King, he maintained a connection of illicit love which fully occupied him. How was it possible he could have anticipated that his own brother, Mayenne, should have sent to the King the most urgent warnings against him and his designs? Without apprehension of either secret or open foes, he went about, trusting in his position and in the condition of affairs, and despising his antagonist, who was preparing every thing meanwhile to destroy him.

Henry III. had forty-five body-guards, whom he kept round him for his personal security: all resolute men, and devoted to him for life and death. From these he chose, as the executioners of the deed upon which he had determined, such as appeared to him most suitable, either through their skill in arms or other qualities, and appointed them their place in or near his old cabinet, and not far from the chamber in which the Council held its deliberations. He was perfectly secure of his victim. When Guise appeared in the Council on the morning of December the 23d, he was called to the Cabinet. The guard answered his salutations as he passed along, with a dead silence. As he opened the curtain which led to the Cabinet, he was attacked with the cry,

* In the "Déclaration contre le Duc de Mayenne" it is fully shown that Henry was warned by Mayenne himself of the speedy execution of an attempt upon him: "Que nous prissions bien garde à nous . . . que le terme étoit si bref, que s'il ne se hâtoit (*i. e.* the messenger), il étoit bien à craindre qu'il n'arriveroit pas assez à tems."

"Ah! traitor!" thrown to the ground, and while all at once comprehending the affair, he defended himself with his teeth and hands like a wild beast, for he had not time to draw his sword, murdered at the foot of the royal couch. Henry was waiting for the execution of his order in a room lying further back, in company with the Corsican, Alfonso; in the chamber underneath lay his mother, Catharine de' Medici, on her death-bed. The noise was heard in the hall where the Council was sitting; at the same moment the Cardinal of Guise, who was there, was arrested.

The fate of Ætius was involuntarily remembered, who, because he had grown too powerful, was, out of fear and hatred, murdered by the Emperor and his attendants in the palace at Ravenna.

The constitutions of the Romanic-German kingdoms, which associated the monarchical authority with the right of descent, were originally designed to avoid the violent struggles for it which incessantly shook the Roman system, and to set insuperable barriers to the ambition of powerful and aspiring men. When, however, such attempts were made, the most frightful actions were the result. Without any regard to his ecclesiastical dignity, the King caused the Duke's brother, the Cardinal of Guise, to be executed also: he deemed that a King of France had a prerogative which set him above excommunication.

Catharine de' Medici, who had not been in her son's confidence, collected all her strength, and made a visit to the Cardinal of Bourbon, who was also arrested, though not yet condemned to death. He attributed all the blame to her, and told her she could not rest until she had brought them all to the slaughter-house. She was deeply affected; and, under the impression made upon her by these words, as well as in view of the dangers which menaced her son, with respect to which she was not deceived, she breathed her last.

Liberated from his antagonist, Henry III. might have once more for a moment felt himself as sovereign and master. At Blois, in his neighborhood, all was submissive. But it was not possible to prevent the politico-religious elements that

filled his kingdom from exhibiting a fiercer agitation against him after such a deed.

The chief had fallen, the Estates were fettered, but the hatred of the excited people now for the first time broke out in general and uncontrolled rage.

CHAPTER XXV.

RESOLUTION AND CATASTROPHE OF HENRY III.

No sooner did the authorities at Paris receive intelligence of the event, than they shut the gates of the city, and held a council under the presidency of the Duke of Aumale. It was just in the Christmas holidays; the preachers began to rouse the people, and the fury of the mob was directed immediately against those who were regarded as friends of the King—the party named Politicians—both in the Parliament and among the clergy. In the Sorbonne, the younger members, who were imbued with the doctrines of the Jesuits, and carried away by the tide of popular opinion, obtained the predominancy. Without at all considering that the right of excommunication belonged to the Pope, and not to the faculty of a university, the Sorbonne, upon the question being submitted to it by the city, decided that because the King had broken the public faith to the disadvantage of the Catholic religion, the French people were absolved from their oath of allegiance to him, and justified in uniting and arming themselves against him.* After this, they no longer gave the King his title, and they refused to receive his heralds.

What had taken place in Paris was repeated in nearly all the great towns of the kingdom. In Picardy, the towns of Amiens and Abbeville—in Normandy, Havre and Rouen—in

* When Argentré (ii. 483) remarks that there is no trace of this sentence or of four similar ones in the books of the Faculty, it merely shows that they were erased from the books. The Procurator-General, to whom the champions of the Sorbonne appeal, denies not the fact, but the guilt of it: "Virus novitii ac feri domatis à recentibus scholis susceptum," Ib. 489.

Champagne, Troyes, Rheims, and Sens—Burgundy, Brittany, and Provence, were nearly unanimous in following the example of Paris. Toulouse carried the cities of Languedoc in the same direction; Orléans requested that the King would remove the governor of the citadel, and when he refused to do so, the city rose in full insurrection, paying no attention to his threats. The mayor, aldermen, and Catholic inhabitants of Lyons, came to a resolution to obey no commands, from whomsoever they might come, to the disadvantage of the holy Union. In their manifesto they mention the deposition of Saul by the Prophets, and the mission of Jehu against Ahab; for men's minds were every where filled with that singular mixture of popular and spiritual notions which inflamed their zeal to resistance, and appeared to justify it.

In Paris meanwhile they proceeded to the establishment of a new government, not without the participation of the Spanish ambassador. On the 17th of January, 1589, a general council of the Union was held at the Hôtel de Ville. It comprised a few of the Catholic princes, the most zealous of the bishops, and the most distinguished theologians and parish priests, members of the Parliaments and of the nobility, and a number of citizens, the intention being to constitute something like a committee of all the Estates.* The deputies from the different towns had places in the Council also. The Duke of Mayenne—who, although he had warned the King to be on his guard against the Duke of Guise, never imagined that it would have resulted in his brother's death—did not hesitate, now that that event had occurred, to place himself at the head of the confederates. The King made one more attempt to bring over him and his house, and made him offers of the most extensive and valuable nature.† Was it, however, in his power to offer any thing corresponding with the prospects which the leaders of a universal movement in a contest against him might have contemplated? Beside this, his word had now lost all credit. Mayenne replied to all the

* Maheustre et Manant: "Ils firent élire par le peuple un Conseil Général de l'union des Catholiques."

† Cayet, 418, gives a slight, Morosini, in Tempesti, ii. 183, a satisfactory notice of these negotiations.

advances made to him through the Papal legate, with invectives against Henry III., whom he no longer dignified with the royal title, but called him a miserable wretch, a pitiful creature, who by his last treacherous act had rendered any thing like an agreement with him impossible, and added that he must be met openly, and opposed in arms by all who desired to save themselves from destruction. In a short time we see the Duke of Mayenne at the head of the army of the Union, taking the field against his King.

Thus commenced the open war between the King and the League. At the moment it appeared as if the former could not possibly resist his enemies; his entire power was limited to the possession of Blois, Tours, and a few places in the surrounding district.

It was of incalculable advantage to him that there was still a power in France which was unaffected by the general agitation. The army of the King of Navarre was not large; it consisted of five thousand ordinary infantry, five hundred arquebusiers, and five hundred cavalry, but they were all brave soldiers, inured to war, excellently disciplined, and full of devotion to their leader; among the troops of the time they always appeared the most important. In the beginning of March, 1589, this army directed its march from Guienne toward the Loire. A feeling immediately prevailed among the troops on both sides, that they were no longer enemies, and whenever they met, they mingled with each other in a kind of military fraternity. In fact, this could not have been long delayed, for the two princes had but one and the same enemy. On the 3d of April a treaty was adopted, in the form of a truce for one year, between the King of France and the King of Navarre, but this truce signified a full community of interests and of arms. Henry III. acknowledged that, in coming to his assistance, the chief of the Huguenots, who might otherwise have carried on the designs of his party far and wide to the destruction of the Catholics, had given a proof of his duty as a true subject, and of his principles as a genuine Frenchman. He returned to that state of the Pacification, which, though perhaps not in exact accordance with his opinions and wishes, was the best suited to his na-

ture and to the condition of the country. and declared the free exercise of the Reformed religion to be lawful in all places where his confederates might happen to be, in the camp, as well as in appointed places in each district of the kingdom.* The stipulation for a secure passage over the Loire, made by the Reformed, could not be fulfilled without difficulty, owing to the independent manner in which the authorities of the age exercised their power. At length it was accomplished. Saumer was delivered up to Duplessis-Mornay, who had chiefly conducted the negotiations, and was one of the most trusted servants of Navarre. He swore to maintain this place for the two kings, and restore it in a better condition than it was when he received it into his possession.†

The meeting of the two kings in the park at Plessis-les-Tours was looked upon as a great event. Not only were the banners united, but from out of the tumultuary contests of the time at last arose ideas in which men of different religious views might unite. Henry III. declared that he would no longer allow the Protestants to be called heretics, the word was not so used in former times; whoever confessed the Gospel was a Christian, and petty differences ought not to occasion enmity and hostility. The Protestants, in return, revived the strict principles of royalty. They maintained that the Christian doctrines required obedience to the temporal authority—that the Prince rules through the will of God—that God directs his heart according to his own will—and that whoever resists the Prince is a rebel against the law of God. They excused the murder of Guise upon the grounds that his crimes and treasons against the King could not have been punished had the insurrection been let to break out; and that the King was answerable to God alone for his proceedings. As on the other side anti-royalist and exclusive Cath-

* *Mémoires de Mornay*, i. 906. What appears in Isambert, xiv. 645, as "*Lettres d'Armistice*," is rather an account of it than the treaty itself.

† According to the *Biography of Duplessis-Mornay*, 131, Henry received the intelligence in the house of M. de Menu. In the itinerary to the edition of the *Letters* it does not appear when he was there; it may have been the 13th or 14th of April.

olic doctrines were closely associated, so on this the principles of royalism and of tolerance were united.

It was the bravery of the Huguenots that now mainly saved Henry III. from the hostile attempts of Mayenne. How frequently in the skirmishes that ensued have they appeared in their white scarfs at the critical moment, and decided the affair in favor of the King!

Henry III. obtained other assistance also, and still from the side of the Protestants, from Switzerland. That which was a matter of doubt among the Swiss in 1587—namely, whether they would not be damaging the King by marching against Guise, was doubtful no longer; affairs had come to maturity; the cause of the French Crown now coincided with the proper interests of the Protestant cantons. After the Duke of Savoy had made himself master of Saluzzo, he began to entertain the old design of reducing Geneva and Vaud; he was observed to be strengthening his garrisons in this neighborhood. The provincial nobility took part with him, and a formidable conspiracy sustained by him was discovered in Lausanne. Geneva solicited aid from the Swiss confederacy. Harlay de Sancy, who had been sent as Envoy Extraordinary from Blois, at a time of the greatest distress, when they had not even the means of living, in order to enlist Swiss auxiliary troops, had, though destitute of money, the ability to turn these circumstances to advantage. He mediated an alliance between Berne and Geneva, in consequence of which he was permitted to enroll a considerable body of troops, and was even granted a subsidy in money by Geneva.* It was evident to the Genevese that unless France were strong enough to counterbalance the power of Spain and Savoy, they must be lost.

* "*Ceux de Berne et de Genève, désirans prendre cette occasion pour se revancher des torts à eux faits par le Duc de Savoye, monstrent avoir quelque volonté d'assister le Roy en cette affaire et le secourir en sa nécessité de quelques deniers comptans, et autres inventions nécessaires à cette entreprise.*"—From the "*Mémoires de M^r de Sillery*" (MS. at Berlin), which gives the best view of the state of things in Switzerland. There exists a "*Discours fait au Roi sur l'Occurrence de ses Affaires*," by Sancy, in which he gives the prominence to his own skill and activity, which have, however, been since the time of Mézeray passed over by historical writers.

Sancy led his force first against Savoy, captured Thonon and the strongly fortified Ripaille. Considering that he had thus done enough to give employment to the Duke, and as the other Swiss cantons did not wish to see the power of Berne too much increased, the whole army was satisfied when he suddenly led them toward the Upper Rhine. Here they formed a junction with a body of German cavalry and harquebusiers, and then directed their march toward the interior of France. Had not Henry III. been certain of this assistance he would hardly have ventured to pass the Loire.

And now that he had not permitted himself to be oppressed he found a third source of aid in the reviving allegiance of the nobility. From all sides the Catholic Royalists now joined his banners; among them were observed the well-armed squadrons of Epernon. At Pontoise the King saw himself once more at the head of an army of forty thousand men. For the first time in his life perhaps his heart was elevated to the decision of great designs emanating freely from his own mind. His nature was like that of Sardanapalus, which in seasons of prosperity abandoned itself to enervating luxury, but in adversity became courageous and manful. He took his way directly toward Paris, for, said he, the enemy must be wounded in the heart, and Paris is the heart of the League. He appeared before the city at the close of July, expecting in a short time to enter it, and take vengeance upon his enemies, for he knew well that he had a great number of friends and adherents within the walls.

This termination of the campaign did not appear impossible even to those who were within the city. As the King continued his march without interruption to Paris, the Politicians raised their head once more, and the civic magistrates held it advisable to disarm them, and to double the guards. The King, however, conquered Senlis and Pontoise, and encamped his army at St. Cloud. Upon this it was thought necessary in the city to make sure of the persons of the most distinguished Politicians, who were placed in custody in convents and strong houses, while the less dangerous, whose number was said to be six hundred, were forbidden to leave their dwellings. In the Sorbonne even there were some dis-

sentients; but in general the extreme opinions prevailed, and another decree, of the most disrespectful and wildest character, was agreed to. It was not enough that the legitimate King was not to be mentioned in any of the prayers of the Church;* it declared that there were two species of tyrants—the one which only exercises violence against private persons, the other which injures at the same time the common weal and religion; that Henry III. belonged to the latter class, and that, according to the maxims of the ancient spiritual doctors of the Church, he might be lawfully put to death by a private hand. This decree gave the tone to the discourses delivered in all the pulpits; an avenger was demanded for the murder of Guise, and the slaughter of the tyrant proclaimed to be a meritorious work. Often were the relics of the saints belonging to the city, whose service was imperiled by the treacherous King, carried through the streets; the people followed in multitudes, and with a devotion which astonished even the Spaniards.

From this, however, it was not to be concluded that they would defend themselves with equivalent bravery. When the aid promised them by the Duke of Parma from the Netherlands delayed its appearance, a sensible diminution of courage was perceptible. The citizens refused to man the walls, and the soldiers, badly paid, showed no ardor; many went over to Henry III., in the hope of being able to return with him when the city should be plundered. The Spanish ambassador himself was of opinion that Paris could not hold out longer than for a fortnight.

Fanatical opinions, in general, exercise their full power on individuals rather than on great corporations. From the midst of the common fermentation there now arose a monk, who resolved to perpetrate a fresh deed of horror. This was a young man, named Jacques Clément,† of the Dominican

* *Arrest et Résolution, Mém. de la Ligue*, iii. 540. In Buleus and Crévier the search for these affairs is vain.

† In Boucher's book, "*De Justitiâ Henrici III. Abdicatione*," which appeared after the deed, there are some remarkable notices of Clément, especially at page 451. I have followed chiefly the narrative sent to Spain by Mendoza, "*Relacion del subcesso de la muerte del Rey Christianissimo de Francia, Henrique III.*, 1 Aug. 1589."

order, who had been recently ordained a priest; to persons of his own age and to his friends he was an object of ridicule rather than of respect; he was weak in body and simple in mind: but such are the natures upon which fanatical doctrines make the most profound impression. Clément felt himself so filled with the notion that a tyrant who sought to destroy religion and the common weal might be lawfully killed by a private hand,* which was then promulgated especially by Boucher, that his priesthood alone made him feel any scruples. He laid before his superiors the question, whether it would be a mortal sin for a priest to kill a tyrant. The superiors answered that it would be an irregularity, but no mortal sin.† Nothing, however, confirmed him so much in his design as the monitory of the Pope against the King, which resembled an excommunication. The King appeared to him as a monster, who was eager to swallow up both religion and the State. He believed he should perform an infinitely meritorious act, if he saved them both from him. He was desirous of falling in the service, for he feared that if he succeeded and remained alive, the admiration of the French nation would be unsalutary to the state of his soul. With cool blood, and the most serious deliberation, he bathed his knife in a decoction of herbs, which he himself at least believed to be poisonous. He then provided himself with a letter directed to one of the King's attendants, for the purpose of obtaining access to his presence; and having left a little money to pay some trifling debts, he set out upon his journey with a few companions. When he came within side of the lines he took leave of his friends, loosened his frock, and with rapid strides directed his course toward the enemy's camp. He succeeded in obtain admission to the King's presence on the following morning. Henry was sitting on his close-stool, and hoping to hear some proposals for an accommodation on the part of the city; he caused the monk to approach: he did so, and immediately stabbed the

* Boucher, 266: "Tyrannum qui communis se boni, id est religionis ac patriæ, hostem præbuerit, talisque à republicâ judicatus sit, et publicâ et privatâ auctoritate de medio tolli posse."

† "Question. Si peccava mortalmente un sacerdote que matasse á un tirano? Answer. Que quedava el tal sacerdote irregular."

King in the abdomen. Clément was instantly killed, but he had secured his victim; and eighteen hours afterward the last of the House of Valois ceased to exist.

In the trenches before Paris an attack of the royal troops was momentarily looked for; the Spanish ambassador had appeared there, to animate the citizens to resistance, when the tidings of the King's death were announced. The green scarf of Lorraine was immediately displayed; Jacques Clément was celebrated as a martyr in the pulpits; the Catholic popular faction carried its head higher than ever, and hoped yet to triumph.

BOOK VI.

HENRY IV. IN CONTEST WITH THE LEAGUE.

CHAPTER XXVI.

ELEVATION OF HENRY THE FOURTH.

SAINT LOUIS left two sons, from the elder of whom descended the last Capetians, and the line of Valois ; from the younger the Bourbons. Of these there were also two lines : to the one belonged the Constable, in whom it terminated ; to the other, his contemporary and antagonist, Duke Charles of Vendôme, who did as much for the defense of France as the Constable did to endanger it. The sons of Vendôme were Anthony, who became King of Navarre by his marriage with Johanna d'Albret ; Charles, Cardinal of Bourbon ; and Louis, first Prince of Condé. Anthony's son was King Henry of Navarre ; he was descended from St. Louis in the tenth generation, and was, by the same hereditary right to which the house of Valois was indebted for its elevation, the undoubted heir of the French throne.

When Henry was born, in December, 1553, it could not have been supposed that he was destined to occupy the throne of France, for the house of Valois was then flourishing in its full strength. His grandfather greeted in him the heir of Navarre and Béarne, the maintainer of the ancient independence of the French provinces united under his dominion, and of the Crown of Navarre. It has been narrated a thousand times, how he summoned his daughter Johanna, when her time was near, to his mountain castle at Pau, on the Gave ; how she, in accordance with his wish (for she was vigorous as the native women, and every thing was to be conducted after the manner of the country), while in the pains of childbirth, joined in the prayer in the traditional tune customary in Béarne ; and with what strange ecstasy the grandfather

received the new-born infant; how he carried him to his own chamber in his ample mantle, filled a golden cup with native wine, allowed the perfume of it to approach the nose of the babe, let fall a drop of it into his mouth, then kissed him, and prophesied that he would be a true Béarnais.* A peasant woman, who lived near the castle park, was the first nurse to whom the boy was intrusted; he was afterward sent to Coirraze, in the mountains, where, in company with boys of his own age, bare-headed and bare-footed, he ran through the mountains, and became familiar with their steep paths.

His mother Johanna too, who was naturally of a lively and cheerful temperament, and possessed indomitable energy, cherished a feeling that her native land would not be annihilated, as it was sometimes threatened to be by the great powers which surrounded it. But she also contemplated another mission for her son. The early death of Anthony, who, as in other matters, vacillated as regarded the religious instruction of his son,† left her at liberty to conduct it as she thought best. She did not hesitate for a moment, but brought Henry up in the Protestant faith, which she had made the prevailing religion in her territories. She taught him to sing Marot's Psalms; she appointed a learned Protestant to be his tutor, who also read with him the classics, such as Plutarch and Cæsar, and, proud to think that he was trained in accordance with the pure word of God, she conducted him at the age of fifteen to Rochelle, among the Protestants, who were there united to resist their enemies. Young Henry was received with a pompous figurative oration. "I do not know how to speak as well as you," he answered, "but I assure you that I will act better than I speak."‡ He was immediately drawn into the midst of the war, and after the death of his uncle, the Prince of Condé, acknowledged as the head of the Huguenots. His

* Favyn, "Histoire de Navarre." A manuscript contemporary biography of Henry IV., in the Bibliothèque Nationale, contains some notices of the earlier events of Henry's life and of his education; not so much new matter, however, as might be expected, but in other respects it is valuable.

† Ippolyto d'Este, April 4, 1562, notices this.

‡ From the notes of Amos Barbot, in Arcère's "Histoire de Rochelle," i. 370.

mother girded on his sword with joy. She took pleasure in narrating how she had once, during her pregnancy, dreamt that she had brought a young cock into the world, with strong colored feathers on his neck and wings, and his comb erected for battle. After the battle of Moncontour, Henry accompanied the Admiral, whom he regarded with unlimited reverence, in that adventurous cavalry expedition through France which brought about the pacification of 1570. It was, as De La Noue says, a good school for the formation of ideas and plans according to the state of things.

During the peace, the Prince felt animated by another wish, springing from the desire for more exalted renown. Charles IX., who felt a stronger personal attachment to him than to his own brothers, promised him that he would, as it were, share with him the exercise of his authority, and make him, as he expressed it, his right arm. Henry, in consequence, contemplated measuring himself with the Spaniards, whom he would not suffer to retain Navarre, of which they had taken possession, and with the Turks, who were encroaching upon Christendom. Upon no one did the victory of Don John of Austria, at Lepanto, make a deeper impression than upon young Henry. He envied the Bastard in being celebrated as the hero of Europe. To appear at the head of a French army, and to win two great battles, one against the Spaniards and the other against the Ottomans, was the dream of his youthful imagination, and the object that occupied his soul.

His course was, however, turned in a totally different direction, by his union with the Court of the house of Valois.

Henry's marriage with the sister of Charles IX. was the Bloody Wedding. The proud companions with whom he hoped to perform such glorious deeds were murdered before his eyes; he was spared himself only through his near relationship and his change of religion; on no account, however, would he be allowed to return to his home. What a contrast was this residence at court to his mountain-life, by the side of his mother, with her faultless morals, and the aspiring Admiral, who associated the loftiest principles with all his enterprises! Henry was compelled to take part in campaigns which in his heart he execrated; he was implicated in the

movements of Alençon, whom he disliked, against the dark power of the Queen Mother, who held every one in control; he was united to a clever but unchaste woman, against whom he could never, even with a word, testify his displeasure. The servants which were placed round him were spies, if not enemies, whose wickedness he was compelled to evade continually. It was another school where was to be learned to suppress the moral sentiments, and to restrain the internal feelings from rising to the surface. But there was something in Henry IV. which corresponded with the life at court: he plunged into the very whirlpool of passion and of pleasures; he appeared to live only for the chase, the tennis-court, and love; and those pleased him best whose folly seemed most extravagant.* He formed the centre for all the gay and pleasure-seeking youth of the Court. From time to time, however, the religious impressions of earlier years would return: a trusty servant heard him once, in the loneliness of the night, complain, in the words of the Psalmist, of the darkness into which he had fallen; he must also have felt the prospect of living for the future in a state of semi-captivity, as at present, intolerable. When the general state of things was favorable, in 1576, he seized the opportunity, which his apparent self-abandonment procured him, of escaping, and returned once more to his former friends and his old religion.

We have noticed how he afterward assisted in bringing about the pacification which gave France repose for a period. He then in reality took possession of that post for which his mother had long destined him, as King of Navarre and protector of the Huguenots.

The power and authority which he now possessed was by no means unimportant. From his small kingdom, which the care of his mother and grandfather had brought into a prosperous condition, he could bring into the field three hundred mounted gentlemen, and six thousand harquebusiers. He had an arsenal at Navarreins, and a university at Orthès. With the sums accruing to him from Foix, Armagnac, and the Bourbon hereditary estates, his whole income might have amounted to 300,000 francs. His position as protector of the

* *Mémoires de Villegomblain*, i. 317.

Huguenots gave him still greater consideration, since their military force was at his disposal. There were now what may be called three strongholds of Protestantism in France: Béarn, which was regulated after the manner of a German principality; Rochelle, powerful at sea; and the Cevennes, important for their strong places and brave population. But besides this the whole south was studded with Protestant communities; it was stated that one might have traveled from the Pyrenees to the Alps through places connected through the new religion alone. In Dauphiné there were four hundred gentlemen, and in Poitou and Saintonge five hundred, ready at any moment to take horse for the cause of religion. A few councilors from these provinces attended the King of Navarre in order to assist him in the political affairs of the party.

The little court which he established at Nérac emulated the court at Paris, especially when his consort, Margaret of Valois, whom Henry III. would not allow to remain in the capital, made her appearance there; and this rivalry was not always in the most praiseworthy things. There was, however, still a great difference. At Nérac there was nothing heard of favorites or of wasteful extravagance. The court was also a school for captains; merit in war gave to each his rank; the ladies incited their knights to warlike enterprises: a petty war took its name from that circumstance. Henry won his first honors in a street-battle at Cahors, in which he took part, for personal bravery was still the foundation of the most distinguished renown. In the middle of his guards he scaled the barricades which had been erected for the purpose of resisting his attack, his feet cut and bleeding from the sharp stones with which they were formed. But he also showed himself already as a skillful leader. He thoroughly weighed the probabilities of each enterprise, and occasionally decided upon a course opposed to the advice of his captains; he knew his people personally, and addressed them by their names; he was the first on the field of battle, and the last to leave it.

By degrees he erased the opinion which had been formed of him on account of his conduct at Paris, and which attrib-

uted to him levity of character, dependence upon others, and unworthiness of trust. An author whom he asked to write his life, and who answered that he must first accomplish something worth recording, found in the course of time ample materials for a biography. In the conduct of affairs Henry showed both decision and expertness, and in personal relations the natural gift of managing men—in all things an original and just comprehension, which gave every one satisfaction. His conduct gave rise to the opinion that he was born for the accomplishment of great things. As one of his most prudent friends, Duplessis-Mornay, expresses it: here was what the world longed for, what it thirsted to behold—a true king; it only required that he should stand forth, to be acknowledged.

In this Mornay shows that he did not know the world, whose admiration and recognition must be forced from it by great deeds: before his prince there was still a struggle of the most painful and difficult nature.

The union between the Guises and the Spaniards was directed against him personally. At first the King of Navarre, who, while at the French Court, had been very intimate with the Duke of Guise, offered to decide the whole affair with him in personal combat; the inequality of their rank was not to be any hindrance. He was content that it should be a duel between them both, or between two against two, ten against ten, or twenty against twenty, with the arms usual in affairs of honor between knights. Guise was at liberty to appoint the numbers, and to choose the place of battle, even out of the kingdom if he wished, provided only that it were neutral and secure. The King's friends entreated that he would not forget them if it should come to a trial of arms between numbers. Guise, however, declined the proposal, stating that he did not fight for personal matters, but for the cause of religion.

After some time Henry was destined to experience another disappointment, when even his king and master, with whom he thought he stood on the best terms, made common cause with Guise. We know, from his own reminiscences, that the intelligence of this change nearly unmanned him. Many a one will recognize that self-torturing anguish of soul which

ances when we despair of all earthly things, and see in our fellow-men only enemies; threatening and urging forward our destruction. When the tidings reached Henry he laid his head upon his hand, and when he aroused himself from the benumbed state into which they had thrown him, a portion of his hair had turned gray.*

In the year 1586 a great military force was put in motion against the Huguenots in the provinces generally, against him and his government in particular. He was advised to give way to the storm for a moment, to betake himself to Germany, where he might obtain some auxiliary forces, and then come back and march immediately upon Paris. Others, however, represented to him that in doing so he would cast the sword from his hand, and become a Don Antonio of Portugal, and with them he agreed.† "They have surrounded me," he says in one of his letters, "like a wild beast of chase, but I will make myself a way over their bodies."‡ He was desirous of terminating the affair rather in the bloom and vigor of his youth, than when he should be laden with years and infirmities.

Among the Protestants he had in this determination no ally more enterprising or powerful than Lesdiguières in Dauphiné. While a student in papal Avignon, Lesdiguières had renounced both his studies and Catholicism, and thrown himself into the Huguenot war, persuaded that by resisting the Guises he would render the best service to his king and to his native land. He acquired reputation and authority by the side of Montbrun, who among many others who deserved the same distinction, acquired the title of The Brave by his gallant actions and great authority in Dauphiné. When he was at length taken prisoner and put to death, Lesdiguières appeared as his natural successor. He was indebted to the influence of Henry of Navarre for his recognition by the prov-

* Mathieu, to whom he told it, Henry III., 501.

† The considerations were Duplessis-Mornay's originally, "*Vie de Duplessis-Mornay*," 95; but still they were those which determined the King's resolution: "A souvent témoigné le Roi qu'il (Dup.-Morn.) luy avoit été auteur de cette résolution." The resolution was embraced spontaneously, not as the result of a debate.

‡ To De Batz, March 11-12.

ince and received from him the half of a broken piece of gold, and he promised that as soon as the other was sent to him he would immediately take arms.*

Of still greater value was the resistance made by Damville de Montmorency, the leader of the party called Politicians, to the attempt made by the Guises to draw him over to their side. This may be looked upon as one of the most important effects produced by the hatred between the two houses. Montmorency caused the union between Protestants and Catholics to be confirmed in an assembly at Pézénas, and the Court of Justice at Béziers to pledge itself on oath to the observance of the edict of 1577, without any respect to that last issued by the League;† and having done this, he mounted his war-horse to place himself at the head of his troops. He bore on his black cloak a white cross, adorned with the lilies of France, and said that this campaign would result in either the complete victory of the house of Montmorency or in its extinction.

When it is remembered that Henry IV. also had contemplated a similar equality of condition between the two religious parties in Guienne, and had taken Catholics into the provincial council which he assembled, it will be seen that the resistance offered to the League was founded, not upon the one-sided interests of party, but upon the expediency of enabling those who held different religious views to live together.

This direction of men's minds, through the gradual course of events, now opened a grand prospect for the whole kingdom.

It had been long regarded in France as a decree of Destiny that the house of Valois should become extinct. It was related that Catharine de' Medici practiced those arts by which it was believed that what was removed in time and place could be regarded as present, and that, while staying at the castle of Chaumont on the Loire, on one occasion she caused the whole series of French kings to pass before her, and that each of the shadows, as it was called up, made the round of the magic circle as many times as there had been years in his reign. After all the others came her own sons; and last

* Videt, "Histoire de Lesdiguières," 92.

† Vaissette, "Histoire de Languedoc," v. 410.

of all Henry III., who was still living, made his appearance. He passed round the circle fifteen times, and then suddenly vanished. His mother still continued to gaze with eagerness to know whether another king of her blood would arise, when the Prince of Navarre, vigorous and active as she knew him, stepped forth to view.

Many prophecies of a similar import were circulated, and their fulfillment observed to take place by degrees for five-and-twenty years, until at last the death of Alençon brought it home to the general consciousness of the nation. From this time it was also observed that the ideas of Henry of Bourbon, perhaps involuntarily, far more than previously, were directed toward the State in general. He had never as yet communicated to any one an idea that the throne of France was destined for him; on the contrary, he often stated that there was no probability of such an event, since the reigning King was of like age with himself, and could take better care of himself than he could who was in arms.

Who can doubt as to the genuineness of the dynastic feeling which animated him at that meeting in the park of Plessis? Great tears rolled down from his eyes as the King, who was once more his friend, came in view; his ambition went no further than to be acknowledged as first prince of the blood, and to fulfill the duties of that position by the side of the King.

The fortune of his arms soon brought him to Blois, where a short time before it had been formally declared by the Estates of the kingdom that he had forfeited all his rights and possessions. "What has more authority," said Henry, "than a decree of the assembled Estates of the kingdom? But the Almighty has revised the process and re-established me in my rights." The letter containing this unpremeditated effusion is directed to the Countess de Grammont, at that time his mistress—for in every act of his life his passion accompanied him—who, after the manner of such ladies, added some very cool and very selfish remarks.

Another trait in the character of Henry was displayed in the fiery impulse which urged him forward to the siege of Paris. The reputation of such an enterprise, he said, would

be a magnet which would draw all the iron in France round him; boldness is the mother of opinions, from this springs power, from power victory, and thence follows security. King Henry III. was complaining one day that he, a good Catholic, should have been excommunicated, a proceeding which had not been taken even against those who had once taken Rome itself by storm. "That is," said Henry, "because they were victorious: only let us conquer, and the sentence of excommunication which has been spoken over us will be speedily recalled."

And yet there is no doubt but that even a victory might have been dangerous to him, for Henry III. was pleased at the service rendered him, but not with the honor and personal confidence which they acquired who rendered him the service; and besides he adhered firmly to the principle that the first prince of the blood must be a Catholic; and as Henry of Navarre was not disposed to yield to him, it was evident that after the conquest of the capital he would be compelled to return once more to Guienne, and to re-occupy the old party position.

Meanwhile Henry III. was slain. The monk who murdered him because he was not Catholic enough, prepared the way to the throne for the Huguenot prince.

The French nation had once gathered round the house of Valois in a mighty struggle for its independence. With the manifold phases of that struggle, however, arose internal discords which the Princes had not the power or skill to master so easily. These were, first, such as sprang from the Estates, then the towns, and those of a clerical and religious nature. Through the confusion in which the last members of that house were implicated, they sought more than once to make their way by deeds of the greatest violence, until at length, from the midst of that orthodox party which they in general defended, arose the blood-avenging arm which terminated their existence.

In what condition did they now leave the country! A Spaniard compared the French monarchy at the time to a pomegranate whose shell was burst open, leaving only the kernels to be seen, with something of the partitions that di-

vided them; for unity was not to be thought of. The powerful magnates exercised the authority formerly intrusted to them by the kings, as they thought proper, for the promotion of their individual interests; their designs tended to the formation of provincial satrapies. The leading men in the towns held it possible to become free commons.* A great clerical party developed the idea of independence—upon which all ecclesiastical union necessarily reposes—until it reached the character of hostility against the Crown, and was supported in the attempt by the richest and most powerful prince in the world, as well as by chiefs and leaders of the hierarchy.

With all these the contest of the new Prince was more severe than that of his predecessor. The religious party had been formed expressly in opposition to Henry of Navarre, but other adversaries also arose against him. The first question laid before him affected his connection with his confederates.

The Royalists, who had adhered to Henry III., did so because they were convinced of the soundness of his Catholicism, and that they might expect from him the preservation of the Catholic religion in the kingdom. Now, however, they gave expression to the fiercest opposition against the Huguenot who was making preparations to take possession of the throne of the Most Christian Kings.

A few monks, with torches in their hands, were performing their ceremonies over the body of the murdered King, when the new monarch, accompanied by his most trustworthy attendants, with his cuirass, however, under his doublet, entered the chamber. He was not received with any acclamation; those present, who had all belonged to the household of Henry III., spoke among themselves in a state of high excitement: they were seen to clench their hands and pull their hats down over their faces. They swore that they would rather surrender to the Leaguers at Paris than acknowledge a Huguenot King, and this they said aloud within a few paces of him, so that he must have heard their words.

Henry at the first moment feared that the Catholics in the

* *Commentarii*: "I ricchi e potenti delle città pensarono a una istituzione di repubbliche in loco di monarchia, et li nobili avevano la mira di aver delle satrapie particolari."

camp would unite against him with the people of Paris, and there was in fact a meeting in the city of the chiefs on both sides, and a common consultation proposed, so that Henry's friends recommended him to withdraw himself with his trusty Huguenots, from the rage of the enemy, until the approach of more favorable times.

Had he done so, however, he would have given up at the very first moment the claim to the sovereign authority, the possession of which devolved upon him by the law of the nation, and have failed in his duty to maintain that authority; but it soon became evident that there was no reason to fear a union between the Royalist Catholics and the Catholics of the League. Mayenne would hear nothing of the proposed meeting, and it is difficult to see how the Royalists could have made common cause with those among whose number had been the murderer of the King. They contemplated rather avenging that deed upon their adversaries.

It was always a circumstance of importance that there were in the camp so many Swiss attached to the European anti-League interests. They were more attached to Henry IV., who shared their creed, than to his predecessor, and did not hesitate, upon the requisition of Sancy, who had hitherto led them, to acknowledge the new King.

They were, however, foreigners and Protestants, and had no power to decide the principal question. This depended upon the resolution of the Council, which had assisted Henry III., and through which the royal authority had been administered. From this Council all public ordinances had hitherto issued. It was invested with great authority, from the fact that it consisted not merely of ministers, but of the most powerful political and military chiefs.

It has been stated, upon credible authority, that the opinions of the Council in reference to the hereditary right were in a few instances somewhat unexpected; * that the remote-

* We are not sufficiently informed concerning the particulars of these transactions. Angoulême required to be much more full, in order to justify his pretension to a thorough investigation of the matter. Duplex and Mathieu contain some particulars, but they are guided by the discourse of Sancy, whose truth I do not question, but who maintains merely a special and personal position.

ness of the relationship between the King of Navarre and the house of Valois was discussed, and the proposition made that at first he should only be acknowledged as chief director of the war. But even in the midst of the greatest disorder and confusion, those laws which prescribe limits to the desires of individuals, make their influence felt. One of the chief causes of this war was the refusal of Henry III. to subject the fundamental law of legitimate succession according to birthright, to the pretensions of the Church. Those, therefore, who had drawn the sword to maintain this fundamental principle, could not deny its practical application at the very first moment it became practicable.

It was another thing, however, with the difference of religion. Henry III. had assumed that his successor would come over to Catholicism. A separation of the Crown from its old union with Catholicism did not appear admissible to him or to his adherents. The latter now lost no time in demanding that the lawful heir to the throne should make this change without delay. They gave two special reasons for this: the one, that if it were not complied with, a great number of their present confederates would go over to the League; the other, that the rights of sovereignty might perhaps be exercised by the new King in favor of the Huguenots: from these dangers they urged him to secure himself.

Henry's decision of this great question, the influence of which extended far beyond the fleeting moment and the men then living, was not to be embraced definitively, but only provisionally.

Had the object to be effected been merely his recognition as first prince of the blood, he would never on that account have changed his religion, for the duty of self-preservation would have always predominated over every other. The crown was a higher prize, and Henry may have said then or subsequently that it was worth a mass. But the right thereto which had now immediately fallen to him imposed on him a more comprehensive duty: he must save royalty in the midst of the general confusion, in order that the whole nation might once more unite round it; he ought not to reject the only means by which this could be effected, unless his religious convictions were essentially opposed to the change.

To his companions in arms, who urged it upon him, he declared, as he had already frequently hinted, that the religion which he had professed in his youth he might probably give up in his manhood; not however upon compulsion, not from the force of violent pressure, but only if he should be better instructed. He gave some expectation of his accepting such instructions from a national council, to be called within six months—a doubtful promise, and but of slight obligation, according to the significancy of the words, but at the same time of profound meaning. The legitimate hereditary King did not reject the notion that the Crown must be indissolubly united with Catholicism. His Protestantism was neither so well defined nor so immovable as to prevent him from making so strong a theoretic approximation. Besides this, Henry allowed two other generally restrictive practical obligations to be imposed on him. He promised to allow the exercise of the Protestant religion in those places only where it might have taken place by virtue of the last agreement with Henry III.; and, further, to fill the offices about to be vacated with professors of the Catholic creed only. In order to understand Henry's proceedings at this time, we must remember that the party with which he came to this understanding was not that of the League, which persecuted the Huguenots for life and death; but rather the middle political party, with which he had always been in alliance. They were the ruling party, with more or less consciousness, in the Council, in the army, and in the anti-parliaments constituted by Henry III. at Caen, Romans, and Tours. The Council, which had hitherto exercised the royal authority, controlled all these; it adopted the King, rather than subjected itself to him and to his designs.*

* In the Collection of Sillery there is a letter, directed to the Swiss from the members of the Council, in which these views are expressed. They have acknowledged "*notre dit Roy estre légitime successeur, et que le droit naturel nous obligeoit à lui rendre fidélité et obéissance. Nous aurions, en luy prestant le serment, pourvu à la seureté et conservation de nostre religion Catholique par la promesse qu'il nous auroit faiste, par lui signée et jurée, de n'y rien innover, ainsi la maintenir et conserver;*" by which even the damage otherwise to be expected from despair was warded off from religion.

Thus was a union established between the legitimate royalty which had devolved upon a Protestant, and the Catholic Royalists. It was, however, only a very loose connection—one that contemplated a distant object, and a preparation for future power, rather than a foundation for present authority. Who could say whether it would ever consolidate itself into such an authority? The agreement by no means satisfied all those who had hitherto fought together. The most powerful of the magnates of the day, Epemon, quitted the camp, and it was a matter of satisfaction that he did not immediately join the League, as many others did.

The military undertaking in which the army was engaged was given up of necessity. In the first sitting of the Council it was proposed to proceed with the beleaguering of Paris; but, with so many secessions from his side, Henry could not consent to that enterprise. He said he would first withdraw beyond some of the rivers, and then he would be able to give his confidence to those who remained steady to him. A portion of his troops marched to Champagne, another to Picardy, and with the third Henry betook himself to Normandy, where he was acknowledged by Caen, Dieppe, and Pont-de-l'Arche. It was a vast advantage to him that he was not at the other side of the Loire, hemmed in in the distant south, but that he had a firm footing in the north of the kingdom; still this was very far from being what his title indicated him to be—King of France; and his enemies had already placed in opposition to him another, whose claims to the same title they acknowledged.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1589 AND 1590.

THE population of Paris, on the intelligence of the death of Henry III., abandoned themselves to joy and hopes. The authority of the preachers was augmented by the event, since the Prince, whom they had overwhelmed with their curses, had been actually destroyed in accordance with their predictions. They spoke of Jacques Clément as a martyr, and likened him to Judith. They declared every one to be excommunicated who should acknowledge Henry of Navarre.

But, as in the camp, so in the city, the adoption of a great resolution was now indispensable. The Duke of Mayenne was nominated Lieutenant-General of the kingdom and of the crown of France in opposition to the living King, after whose death the office was not to continue.

It was even very seriously discussed whether Mayenne, disregarding the old and infirm Cardinal, should not declare himself king: by the boldness of such a step he was told he would carry away the Nobility and the Estates, and unite all France around him. In Mayenne's council, however, it was thought that such a step was surrounded with too many difficulties, and above all, that the Spanish ambassador's opinion upon it must be heard.

This ambassador was Don Bernardino de Mendoza, who was once compelled to leave England because Queen Elizabeth found his presence too dangerous for the peace of the kingdom. He lived and moved exclusively in the great Catholic combination which embraced Europe. The failure of the attempt upon England in 1588 deterred him as little as it did his master from contemplating a second. The anni-

hilation of the heretics in the Netherlands, the union of the English crown with the other Spanish crowns, the settlement of France in a similar manner—all these were to him objects which it was desirable to accomplish, either simultaneously, or one after another.* He had already remarked how necessary a condition it was of the possession of America by Spain, that England should not remain in the hands of heretics. In order to maintain in France a condition consonant with these views, he did not consider any expense too great. The rigid Catholic principle, from which he derived all his notions, and which led him to a political orthodoxy, from the consequences of which there was no escape; the power of the Prince whom he represented; a natural talent for popularity, and finally, the money he expended, secured for him an overwhelming influence.

When the attack upon the city was apprehended, he repaired to the walls, which he found full of monks and priests, and told them he would die with them. Upon receiving intelligence that the Béarnais, as he always called Henry of Navarre, had assumed the title of King of France, he paid the Duke of Mayenne a visit, and declared to him officially, as Spanish ambassador, that his master would never recognize a heretic as King of France; and at the same time he offered on the part of his master to the French Catholics all the power of his kingdom, in order to prevent such a succession to the throne.†

The proposal which was now made, however—that in constituting the League such a political power as was necessary under present circumstances, no further notice should be taken of the Cardinal of Bourbon, but rather that Mayenne

* "Estirpar las heregias en desarraigarlas de los Países Baxos, y ganar la Inglaterra (empresa que no puede impedir Francia en el estado que se ve), lo uno (the Netherlands) patrimonio y lo otro (England) conquista, que se puede tan justamente encorporar con las demas coronas . . . en beneficio de las de España, para la conservación de las de Indias, que hereges no poseen á Inglaterra."—Papers of Simancas.

† Mendoza's Letter to Philip, August 8: he had declared "que V. Md. de ninguna manera permitiría que esta corona viniese en manos de hereges, y que como Ambr. suyo ofrescía á el y á los demas Católicos deste reyno sus fuerças y armas para impedirlo."—Papers of Simancas.

himself should be left in possession of the power which he might exercise under the authority of the King of Spain—was one with which Mendoza was not at first inclined to concur.

He did not wish the Cardinal of Bourbon to be put aside, because in the original bond of the confederacy he had been described as the future King of France, and in that capacity had taken upon himself definite obligations, especially in reference to Béarn. Mendoza did not consider it advisable to urge the immediate submission of the French to the King of Spain, for he believed that they would perceive by-and-by, that without such submission they would be unable to destroy heresy in France—that it was, in fact, their only means of safety. The French, in his opinion, must be dealt with as the physician treats his patient: the most nutritious food must not be permitted at first, in order to restore his strength, but that which is weaker and better suited to his powers of digestion.*

The more cautious of the French Leaguers also declared themselves in favor of this view, though upon different grounds. They found that it concurred with the resolutions of the last Estates, which they were of opinion should be firmly adhered to. One of the ministers of Henry III., during the earlier part of his reign, and perhaps the ablest of them all, Villeroy, had now a seat in Mayenne's council. He was opposed to Mayenne's arbitrary proceedings, and declared that he would separate from him if he should attempt to disturb the arrangements already effected.

Urged by representations on both sides, Mayenne at length yielded. The Cardinal of Bourbon was proclaimed King, under the title of Charles X., in solemn edicts, by the Parliament, the Council of the Union, and the civic authorities. Thus was the public authority in some measure arranged, but unquestionably in a most anomalous form.

* To this, he writes, his King had moved him: "El considerar, que el nombrar al Cardinale pour Rey no derogasse los contratos secretos de Bearne y Cambray, que se hizieron quando la Liga en favor de V. Md. né la pretension de V. Md. al ducado de Borgoña, ni la de la Señora Infanta al ducado de Bretagna."—Compare Villeroy, *Mém.* i. 130.

A prince was acknowledged as king, whose right was doubtful, and who was himself a poor prisoner, in the power of the very man he was set up to oppose. His substitute was a powerful magnate, who was himself only deterred by the difficulty of the enterprise, from stretching forth his own hand to the crown, and who was at the same time dependent upon foreign subsidies. Henry of Guise had received at one time or another three millions in gold from Spain; the Duke of Mayenne also had already received about eight hundred thousand gold-scudi. Without this money, neither would the former have been able to elevate himself to the authority he had possessed, nor the latter to maintain himself in the position he occupied. It had always been the principal object of their solicitude, to have the Spanish money placed in their own hands, and not to have it distributed immediately among their companions in arms, lest such a course should weaken their personal authority.

It was upon this very connection, above all others, that the influence of the Spanish ambassador rested; yet he agreed with Mayenne in generalities only; he did not pursue any object which could be properly called French, his aim was altogether of a universal character—the dominion of the rigorous Catholic idea, and still more that of his King, over the whole world. He was mysterious and subtle in his proceedings, and immovable in his designs, for the accomplishment of which he neglected no means. The clergy and the mob were dependent upon him: the former for the sake of the clerical maxims; and the latter, tumultuous and movable, more eager for freedom than capable of appreciating it, easier to be induced to submit to privations than to yield contributions, and perfectly content that these should be made by others.

However little this deserved the name of an organization, it yet had the superiority of power in the beginning. The army which left Paris in order to take the field in September, 1589, and which was composed of Swiss and Germans collected together by means of Spanish money, might have amounted to about twenty thousand men. Mayenne boasted that the Béarnais must either fling himself into the sea, or he

would in a short time lead him in chains through the Faubourg St. Antoine.* In Henry IV., however, he found an enemy who was not only prepared for the worst, and determined to defend himself to the very last, but also one who, beneath the appearance of levity and carelessness, possessed a profound, almost religious conviction of his rights. It was no mere phrase with Henry, when he replied to a friend who drew his attention to the disproportion of his force compared with that of his enemies, that they must take his allies into consideration—God, and his good right. But he was at the same time a captain, who lived and moved in his camp—all effort, nerve, and courage. Behind his intrenchments at Arques, which he had thrown up with skill, and which he frequently defended himself, pike in hand, he was invincible even when assailed by a force four times stronger than his own. The enemy found himself compelled to give way before Henry, not only at Arques, but also at Dieppe, where a previous attempt had been made.

It soon came to Henry's turn to take the initiative. The military men whom he had left before Paris now drew round him in greater numbers; the English supported him, and by these means he found himself strong enough to appear once more in the open field. In the beginning of November he approached Paris again, and took possession of a portion of the suburbs, and even his enemies were of opinion that it was possible for him to force the city to a surrender.† But his little army would have lost itself in the mazes of Paris, and his views lay not in that direction. His idea was first of all only to get possession of the towns on the Loire, which had always been steadily attached to his predecessors. Meanwhile he had the satisfaction of being recognized, more solemnly than hitherto, as King of France by the parliament of

* The "Vrai Discours de ce qui s'est passé en l'armée jusqu'à la fin de 1589," *Mém. de la Ligue*, iv. 49, contains an original and contemporary narrative of this circumstance: it is given nearly verbatim in Cayet's "Histoire Novenaire," as well as in the "Histoire des Troubles," of Mathieu. Thuanus, 97-319, rests upon it also, and is frequently only a translation.

† *Commentarii*: "Se havesse fatto un poco di sforzo, haverebbe presa la città."

Tours, and at the same time by a European power, the republic of Venice. After he had cleared Anjou and Maine of the Leaguers, and taken fresh assurance of Epernon's peaceable intentions, he directed his course once more toward the north of France. He relieved and besieged towns, he conquered some, others he lost again, but upon the whole the advantage was his. His friends remarked with admiration and astonishment that within the space of two months he had traversed with his artillery one hundred and forty leagues. In the beginning of February he commenced the investment of Dreux.

For a town so thoroughly devoted to the League, Mayenne felt that he must venture something, especially since its fall would have endangered the capital. At the order of the King of Spain some Italian and Spanish troops, as well as some heavy Low Country cavalry and Walloon hackbutters, marched to his assistance from the Netherlands; he therefore resolved to risk a battle.

In Paris the doctrine that there could be no communion with heretics was renewed, and on the special ground that the Church had even commanded that they should be put to death. In the camp of Henry IV., on the other hand, both Catholics and Protestants prayed for the legitimate King. In the districts which obeyed him processions took place as well as preachings. Henry himself regarded the coming conflict as the medium of God's judgment, almost in the same manner as the ancient Franks at Fontenoy. He prayed that God might bless his arms if it should conduce to the welfare of France and of the Christian world, but, if otherwise, not to give him success.

On the 14th of March, 1590, the two armies approached each other upon the plains of Yvry. A battle ensued, in which, although the resources of modern warfare were brought into operation, the decisive force consisted, as of old, in the cavalry. It appeared as if Henry IV. must succumb to the superior force of the enemy: further and further backward was his white banner seen to retire, and the great mass appeared as if they designed to follow it. At length Henry cried out that those who did not wish to fight against the enemy

might at least turn and see him die,* and immediately plunged into the thickest of the battle. It appeared as if the Royalist gentry had felt the old martial fire of their ancestry enkindled by these words and by the glance that accompanied them: raising one mighty shout to God, they threw themselves upon the enemy, following their King, whose plume was now their banner. In this there might have been some dim principle of religious zeal, but that devotion to personal authority, which is so powerful an element in war and in policy, was wanting. The royalist and religious energy of Henry's troops conquered the Leaguers. The cavalry were broken, scattered, and swept from the field, and the confused manner of their retreat so perplexed the infantry that they were not able to maintain their ground; the German and French were cut down; the Swiss surrendered. It was a complete victory for Henry IV.

"We have," said the King in one of his letters, "broken through the enemy, dispersed his cavalry, taken his infantry prisoners, and captured his cannon and his white banner. How roughly we have handled his Burgundians! (meaning the Spanish Netherlands); God has shown that he favors right more than power."†

The letters and poems in which others announce this victory sound like one great shout of triumph. Du Bartas composed an excellent and elaborate politico-religious admonition to the enemy in his military song of victory.‡ Henry IV. now directed his course toward the capital in real earnest. It was, according to an expression of the time, the black in the target at which he aimed. By means of the garrisons of Mantes and Vernon he had interrupted the connection between Paris and Normandy. Soon after he took Corbeil, upon the upper Seine, which was regarded as the key by which the city was supplied from the interior. He then captured Lagny, by

* So in the "Discours Véritable," from which Cayet derives his notices; his variations seem to be arbitrary. The best description by far is in the "Mémoires de M. Duplessis-Mornay," ii. 55.

† "Dieu a déterminé selon son équité."—Receuil de Lettres Miss. de Henri IV., tom. iii. p. 169. "Dieu a montré qu'il aimait mieux le droit que la force."—To De la Noue, March 14, 1590, p. 161.

‡ Cantique sur la Victoire d'Yvry: Œuvres, 687.

which he was enabled to close the Marne, and Creil, by which the Oise was commanded. By the end of April the bridge of Charenton was in his hands, and his cannon planted upon Montmartre. The Parisians, he said, were disobedient children: so he must show them the rod in one hand and the apple in the other, and then they would yield to him. He could not conceive how they could prefer to him, in the bloom of masculine vigor, with a victorious army before their gates, the old Spaniard, already broken with deadly diseases, Philip II., at a distance, whose death was approaching, and whose kingdom after that event must fall in pieces.

Before the battle many of the affluent inhabitants of the city, and even a few members of the Government, had given expression to similar sentiments,* but the old hatred animated the mass of the people with undiminished power. It was said that Henry IV. would come and take vengeance for St. Bartholomew's Day, and bathe his arms to the elbows in blood. The new Papal Legate, Gaetano, whose views coincided with those of Mendoza, caused the oath of union to be renewed just before the battle, after a solemn religious service by all the city officials, from the Prévôt des Marchands down to the standard-bearers in the different quarters. They swore never to acknowledge a king who should not be a Catholic, and the population of the quarters repeated the oath. The theological faculty declared that Henry of Bourbon, even should he receive ecclesiastical absolution, could never be acknowledged as King; and they held by this opinion now during the progress of the siege. The distress caused by it in the city only helped to exalt the influence of the Spanish clerical party. The monastic orders made extraordinary efforts for the support of the poor, and the impression these made was doubled by the emaciated figures of the monks as they were seen coming out of their cloisters. Bernardino Mendoza sold his plate to purchase bread for the poor; as

* Letter of Mendoza, March 5: "Siendo los ricos deste lugar los que mas dessean el acordarse con Bearne, y los de mediano estado y comun pueblo son contrarios á ello y fervientes en la defensa de la religion." May 6, he remarks: "Yr crescendo en los mas principales siempre el deseo de acordarse en que inclinan los mas que tienen voz en cosejo y mano en el gobierno."

the scarcity became more intense, he taught the people how to make food from oats, after the manner of the Scotch: he caused great caldrons to be set up before his own house for cooking oatmeal porridge, and thus preserved the lives of thousands. As he passed through the streets he was greeted with cheers for the King of Spain. In May intelligence arrived that the Cardinal of Bourbon was dead; and the effect of this upon the population was to revive, with redoubled power, their wish to subject themselves to the King of Spain.

The opposite ideas, however, exhibited themselves also. A Huguenot woman wandered through the streets, and reproached the monks with their sins. She would no longer wear any thing red, because the Legate appeared in clothing of that color. She sang her psalms with a loud voice, and the clergy, who tried to stop her, were astonished at her knowledge of the Scriptures; she poured out her aspirations in the most vehement and beautiful prayers; she asserted that she had seen a human figure in the clouds, with a sword in his hand, and that he had commanded her to tell the Duchess of Montpensier that she ought not to use paint, and the Cardinal Legate that he ought to make peace. She was one of the most beautiful women in Paris, and closed her career by dying in the hospital.* Among the multitude the Catholic and Spanish notions retained their great predominance.

In the beginning of August the famine had become so intolerable, that it was resolved in the city to send a deputation to Henry IV. The object was not so much to propose submission to his demands, as a general pacification, in which the King of Spain should be included. Henry IV. answered, that he did not wish his subjects to be indebted to the King of Spain for the peace they desired.†

The chief cause of the resolution which the people maintained, was the intelligence promulgated by the preachers,

* *l'Etoile*, ii. 40.

† "Recueil de ce qui s'est passé en la Conférence du Sr. A. de Gondî et Archevêque de Lyon avec le Roi."—*Mém. de la Ligue*, iv. 317. Cornejo's "Discours bref et véritable des choses plus notables arrivées au siège de Paris," is credible as far as concerns what was spoken publicly, but the manner in which he mentions this mission shows that he was unacquainted with the negotiations themselves.

that the prospect of Spanish assistance was near. Yet his assistance was constantly retarded, almost to the despair of Mendoza. At length, in the most critical and urgent moment, it appeared.

Philip II. had given money and enlisted foreign troops; he had also, again, sent a force of his own. Now he did more: he ordered his nephew Alexander Farnese, of Parma, who was then engaged in subjugating the Netherlands, to postpone his proceedings in that country, and to march into France with his whole army.

As regarded himself, Alexander Farnese was not favorable to such a step. According to his view, France and Spain ought to maintain friendly relations, and for a hostile movement against Henry IV. the present moment appeared to him, at least, unsuited. Besides this, he intended, in the course of the summer, which was very dry, and therefore favorable for his operations, to make an attempt upon Holland and Zealand. It was impossible for him, however, at the same time to invade France, and to overpower the Netherlands; and should he attempt both objects, he would be unable to attain either of them. At the Spanish court, meanwhile, that vast complication of all the Catholic interests was the object of steady contemplation. King Philip and his Council of State fostered, moreover, the opinion that Spain could never have peace with Henry of Navarre. Should he win Paris, and with the city the crown, nothing could in that case prevent him from rushing with his Huguenots, intoxicated with victory, upon the Netherlands, or Italy, or even upon Spain itself; while by attacking him in France, the Netherlands would be most effectually defended.* The Duke of Parma was somewhat displeased that the necessities of the

* For this I have drawn from "Gulielmi Dondini Bononiensis e Soc. Jesu Historia de rebus in Galliâ gestis ab Alexandro Farnesio, Parmæ et Placentiæ Duce III., supremo Belgii præfecto (Nuremberg, 1675), p. 118, who had valuable sources of information; according to page 259 he had access to the Diary of Alexander of Parma. "Hispani triumviri (namely Mendoza, Moreo, and Tassis) ita cum federatis agebant ut ad Alexandrum referent omnia, communicatisque inde consiliis communes ad Regem literas darent; quæ nobis literæ ad intima consiliorum pernoscenda adjumento fuere."

war should be judged and decided by the cabinet at a distance from the scene of operations; but when the will of the King was decisively announced, and the necessary funds sent, he had no alternative but to obey.

He first of all put Mayenne's army, which had not let itself be shut up within the walls of Paris, into a condition for taking the field, and then he himself passed the French borders in the middle of August, 1590.

He was received every where as the principal leader of the League, and the money destined for its support passed entirely through his hands; upon his approach to Laon, the keys of the city were presented to him upon a silver salver. On the way to Meaux, he was met at Lizy by Mayenne, and a general review of their troops took place; the numbers of the army amounted to seventeen thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry.* The Spaniards showed a certain military elegance which astonished the French, and many of them seemed to be aware, for the first time, that there was a civilized world beyond the boundaries of France. The united army now moved in the direction of Paris. Alexander Farnese was commissioned either to relieve the city, or, if he should find it already captured, to seek out the enemy amid its smoking ruins.

But his mere approach was decisive, and the inhabitants of Paris were astonished when, on the morning of the 30th of August, the enemy was no longer visible before the city. All rushed to the walls, in order to convince themselves of

* "Spectaculi frequentia major ad oppidum Lisiaci fuit, ubi ut lustraretur fœderatorum exercitus primi et secundi agminis copię inter Farnesium et Maineum . . . convenerant."—*De rebus in Galliâ gestis* ab Alex. Farnesio, p. 218. Tassis, who did not know the name of the place, describes it as "*pagus quidam, qui est in mediâ quasi Meautii viâ,*" i.e. between Meaux and La Ferté Milon. (*De Tassis, Commentarii*, p. 505.) We see here also how difficult it is to ascertain numbers. Tassis, in a letter dated Lagny, September 3, gives the army of the prince at 12,000 infantry and 2400 cavalry, and that of Mayenne at 6000 infantry and 2000 cavalry; the musters were not complete. Tassis remarks that so powerful an army had not been seen in France since the last great war (1559); he calculates the army of the King at 16,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry; others make the cavalry amount to 7000.

the fact; some immediately joined processions, which were formed without delay; others betook themselves to the camp, where they rejoiced at finding a few tents not altogether empty, while innumerable wagons laden with supplies of provisions covered all the roads leading to the gates of Paris in unbroken lines.

Henry had found it impossible to continue the beleaguering of the city, and at the same time to withstand the advancing enemy. The latter object appeared to him the most urgent and promising, and he therefore broke up his camp, determined to force the Duke of Parma to a battle in the open field. Henry's infantry was not quite so numerous, and far from being in as good condition as that of the enemy, but he placed all his hopes in the superiority of his cavalry. There were in his camp four thousand French gentlemen, who wished for a pitched battle with no less eagerness than their ancestors in the old Flemish and English wars. Henry IV., who himself ventured very close to the enemy, in order to observe his movements, encamped upon the heights of Chelles, directly opposite to him, and in his way. He felt himself fortunate when he saw a detachment from the enemy take post upon the opposite heights on the morning of the 2d of December, and putting themselves in order as if determined to accept the battle. He believed that he saw the Star of Yvry beaming upon him. We perceive from his letters that his whole soul was resolved upon the impending event—that he was fully determined to keep his ground, and to die rather than yield to the enemy. With these intentions he advanced into the plain, in order to give the enemy a better opportunity of commencing the attack.

It had never been Farnese's intention, however, although he was vehemently urged to it by the impatience of the French Leaguers, to risk the fate of the whole enterprise upon one battle. He was not indebted for his previous successes to the fortune of the battle-field, but to well-chosen positions in strongly fortified places, skillful movements, and persevering sieges. Although the constituent elements of both armies had much in common, yet were they almost the representatives of two distinct systems of tactics, standing opposed to

each other. In the army of the King the chief strength consisted in the French nobility, who came into the field voluntarily, and, without pay, attached themselves to the service of their lawful sovereign with unconditional devotedness, and thirsted for the renown of battle only. The strength of Farnese's army consisted, on the other hand, in paid veteran troops—Spanish, Walloon, Italian, and German regiments, which constituted a firmly united and easily directed military body. The object of the Duke's movements was merely to occupy the King, and meanwhile to capture Lagny, one of the most important places in his possession, and which prevented the approach of supplies to Paris by the Marne, as well as from the camp. Having succeeded in this, he coolly left things to take their course. He remained immovable, even when Henry made a rapid movement upon Paris, and attempted an assault upon the suburbs; he knew well that that could lead to nothing further. Henry meanwhile could not sustain a war of this kind; his talent was not developed for it, and the condition of his troops rendered it impossible. The impatience of the nobility to leave the army, now that the prospect of a battle, which they desired so eagerly, and which had drawn them together, vanished, was equal to their former alacrity.* The letters remain in which they represent to their king and leader how much they had done for him, what losses they had suffered, and how necessary it was for them to return to their homes for the purposes of ordering their domestic affairs, and promising to return to him again. Henry IV. knew by experience that it would be vain to endeavor to withstand such a desire, and therefore, although it was but the middle of December, he divided his army. He dismissed the nobility to their several provinces; with the auxiliaries he garrisoned the fortified places, and a body of select troops he kept by himself in order to maintain the petty war to which his operations were reduced. In this manner did the cam-

* To Montmorency, October 8, Lettr. Miss. iii. 266: "C'est une humeur que je ne suis pas à cette heure de reconnaître, m'estant aperçu assez de fois qu'ils n'en reçoivent jamais et ne s'en sert rien de les y contraindre." In the semi-official narratives he rather seeks to conceal the true reason.

paign, in despite of all his efforts and victories, turn out to his disadvantage. A few simple observations will show how large and overwhelming a share the Spaniards had in bringing about these results. Bernardino Mendoza held the Parisians together during the siege. The arrival of the Prince of Parma raised the siege of the capital, and his strategic movements occasioned the dissolution of the royal army. In Paris preparations were made, by the advice of Mayenne, to receive the victorious general with the greatest festivities; and many a lady flattered herself with the prospect of making a conquest of the hero around whom beamed the double glory of victory and religion. Alexander of Parma withdrew from it all. Once only, and that *incognito*, did he visit the city. It was enough for him that by the conquest of Corbeil he had made the Seine free, and thus provided for the supply of provisions to the capital. Having accomplished that, he directed his march once more toward the Netherlands. Henry followed him on his return, and occasioned him some loss. He had maintained his position in the provinces, and now again took possession of Corbeil, and conquered Chartres, but he was not yet King of France, nor could he by any means be regarded as the first military leader in the world, as his flatterers would have had him to believe.

He said that it was money only which made the difference between him and the Prince of Parma, and that with better pecuniary resources he would also have been able to maintain his army in the field.

It is very certain that an army like that of the Spaniards, and a general like the Prince of Parma, would have been impossible without regular pay. The silver of Potosi contributed to develop the spirit of standing armies in Europe; but an organized state system, and stable political arrangements, were also necessary to it. At this period how greatly did the Spanish monarchy appear to transcend the French kingdom!—the former embracing South America, Eastern Asia, the Pyrenean and Apennine peninsulas, proceeding on the continent from victory to victory, united by a great principle, armed and prepared in the best manner; the latter without subordination, troops, or money, torn with internal contentions,

vacillating between two religious parties. After the Duke of Parma's successes, things wore in part an appearance as if the French kingdom were about to be absorbed in the system of the Spanish monarchy, and to become a dependency of the Spanish crown.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PREPONDERANCE OF THE SPANIARDS IN FRANCE.—PRINCIPLES OF THE LEAGUE AND OF SPAIN.

BERNARDINO MENDOZA had formed the design of making France a province of the great Catholic monarchic system, which, under his king, was to govern Europe and the colonies.

Since the death of Henry III. the idea of making the King of Spain Protector of France had been mentioned in all the negotiations with Mayenne, who in general appeared to concur in the proposal. A formal act was already prepared and submitted for signature. The negotiations were especially difficult with regard to defining the rights of the Protector. Mendoza required that he should have almost sovereign authority. The Minister of the Protector was to take part in the Council in affairs of state, of war, and of finance; and, after the death of Charles X., the succession to the throne was to be regulated in accordance with the will of the Protector, whose rights were still to continue.*

It is easy to conceive that though Mayenne and his council, especially Villeroy, might make some difficulty in sub-

* "Puntos que se apuntaron para concierto en las juntas que ha auido entre el Duque de Umaine y nosotros;" in the papers of Simancas. The first clause indicates, "que el partido Catolico pede la proteccion de S. M. como remedio unico de su salvacion;" another, "que se pongan en execucion los puntos á que obliga la Liga;" in the same manner the promises concerning Béarn. Further, "Anadiesse á esto la intervencion de ministros del Protector en los consejos de estado guerra y hacienda; la obligacion de nunca tratar ó determinar cosa de la sucesion del reyno en caso de muerte del Cardinal sin intervencion del Protector, et estendar á proteccion en cabeza de la corona de España." I leave it undecided, whether Mendoza actually proposed all this in so many words.

scribing to articles which involved their own subordination to the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza did not give up his object on that account; he still hoped to accomplish it through the aid of the multitude.

From Mendoza's letters we learn the nature and mode of his diplomatic demagogic activity. The members of the civic association and the *Prévôt des Marchands* used to visit him, in order to ask for his advice. His transactions with them were, however, very cautious. What he wished to accomplish he never proposed as his own idea; "for the French," said he, "are jealous of every thing that does not come from themselves."* He spoke to them of what he wished to propose, as if it were a report he had heard. His friends then repeated it in the meetings of their party; and, in a short time, others made their appearance at his residence, to lay before him as something they deemed advisable the very opinion that had at first proceeded from himself. He then spoke in favor of it, and the matter was afterward debated in the more numerous assemblies, where it assumed by degrees the form of a resolution. Mendoza swayed the members of the Sorbonne in a special manner: they were, at that time, men of little learning or intellect; but they possessed a certain fluency of speech, and in that their whole talent consisted: they thus furthered his views. His influence was all the more effective, the more completely it was concealed.

Soon after the re-appearance of Henry IV. in the suburbs of Paris, on which occasion a few of his adherents had displayed some activity, the question was examined in the assemblies of the League, whose chief and fundamental principle it was that under no circumstances could a reconciliation take place with him, in what manner they could defend themselves against him by force. It was observed, that for this purpose, there were only two resources, either to unite all the French Catholics, or to intrust themselves wholly to the King of Spain; and that as the former was unattainable, on

* Mendoza, October 30, 1589. The disposition of the nation was "estar sospechoso del extranjero, por mas que aya menester su amistad, no satisfaziendoles nada que no sea de su nacion."

account of the oblivion into which the interests of religion had fallen with so many, the latter only remained, and they must assure themselves of the King of Spain's protection. Here, too, it was proposed that King Philip II. should in all form be named Protector of France.* Objections were not wanting to this course, but they were all removed by Mendoza and his friends.

It was objected that King Philip would introduce the Spanish Inquisition, fill the offices of the state with foreigners, demand unusual subsidies, and oppress the country with his troops; that he might perhaps make himself master of the French towns, and that there would be a danger of the entire nobility's renouncing his authority.

To this it was answered that the boards of hearth-money were more severe than the Spanish Inquisition; the native troops often more violent than the Spanish; as to other attempts, they could be warded off by means of the Estates General; and that, as to the French towns, they had more to fear from England than from Spain. Among many of the French, whose religious feelings were excited to a high pitch, ecclesiastical zeal so completely predominated over their wonted national ambition, that they could calmly contemplate the possibility of a great loss of territory. With less extent, it was said, the kingdom, if once purged from atheism and heresy, would be able to do more for itself, and to contribute more to the welfare of Christendom than it otherwise could, even if it possessed all Asia.†

There was still one cause of hesitation; the possibility that by adopting this course the French might fall under the government of the Spaniards. Mendoza endeavored to remove it by saying that the administration of a great monarchy was conducted something like the government of a monastic order, which was constituted out of many nations, though united

* "Incommodités, qu'aucuns disent pouvoir advenir si on appelle l'Espagnol comme protecteur de nostre Roy et royaume," 1589: Archives of Simancas.

† "Quand le royaume seroit de moindre étendue qu'il n'est, si est ce qu'étant repurgé d'hérésies et d'athéisme, il pourroit plus faire de bien à république et à soi-même, qu'il ne pouvait faire avec la corruption présente quand il seroit plus grand que toute l'Asie."

under one head. An Italian guardian could not issue orders to the French; nor a French to the Germans; each brother was a foreigner to all who were not of his nation, and yet all unanimously acknowledged the supreme chief of the Order. The Constitution of Spain, he said, was similar to this; and that to the great advantage of the provinces. It was manifest, for example, that the "county" of Burgundy was more prosperous under the Spanish government than the "duchy" of Burgundy under that of France; and that the inhabitants of Artoise were in better circumstances than those of Picardy. It is in fact extremely probable that the condition of the neighboring French-speaking Spanish provinces, which was in general satisfactory, lent weight to the representations of Mendoza; at all events he succeeded in bringing the citizens by degrees to a complete adoption of his opinions.

He hoped that he would be able to win the Catholic nobility also, and reckoned especially upon the example and influence of the Count de Brissac, for the accomplishment of that object. He recommended him to the King for a reward, and also the *Prévôt des Marchands*, who had formed a party through his friends among the citizens. He recommended the citizens simply to guard themselves against the nobility, but not to arouse the ancient hostilities, which might be in the highest degree ruinous.

The question was discussed very seriously with Mayenne and his council. The Duke attached great importance to his being acknowledged as the head of his house, and once actually said that he would be an obedient subject to King Philip II. The other members of the council which he had recently formed, gave the prominence to general principles. They were not opposed to the recognition of Philip II. as Protector of France; but they required that he should then come forward, not merely as an ally, but formally as *generalissimo*, and take the cause entirely into his own hands, Mendoza answered that that would occasion such prodigious expense, that the King could not in return be content with being simply acknowledged as Protector, but must require certain prerogatives of sovereignty. The French hesitated to bind themselves to a definitive confirmation of such rights; they remarked that all which

Philip did for France conduced to the advantage of the Catholic religion, and so far to his own advantage. Mendoza answered, that the cause must, beyond all comparison, be of more interest to the French; he presumed they did not wish to cease to be Catholics, or that they desired to abandon Paris to the enemy; but where, he asked, was the man among them, who could at the same time preserve religion and the state?

Mendoza had no doubt but that he would at length attain his object. Sometimes he appears full of enthusiasm at the prospect about to open for his prince; the gates of a foreign kingdom would be opened to him by its own citizens; he would speedily unite it with his other Crowns, or, if he preferred that course, he might bestow it upon a third party.

The notion of the Spanish protection met among the civic members of the League with unconditional approval, unrestrained by any long investigation. As long as the King-Cardinal Charles X. lived, the ambassador discouraged every manifestation, for during the lifetime of one who had been acknowledged King by himself, Philip II. could not receive them as his vassals. After the death of Charles, during the siege, every thing appeared ready for the subjection of France to the King of Spain, and Mendoza only complained that he was not commissioned to carry it into effect.* The influence of the Duke of Parma did not operate altogether in accordance with the ambassador's views. Mayenne effected arbitrary alterations in the city; still all this did not prevent a formal offer of submission to Philip's authority from reaching Madrid in 1590. The instructions are in existence with which the Sorbonne sent the Franciscan Matteo Aguirre to King Philip, furnished with full power to entreat him to take under his protection the city of Paris, true to God, obedient to the Apostolic See, devoted to the King of Spain, and the Mother of Learning, and to preserve it from the cruel enemies of the Catholic religion. The members describe themselves as the

* March 22: "Esta villa y á su imitacion otras muchas braman por echarse en las manos de V. Md." May 19, he interrupted the negotiations with the Catholics, who only wished "de entregarse á V. Md. sin por no tenir orden V. Md., ni dar me de Flandes claridad del tiempo preciso en que podran venir las fuerças."

theologians whom God had set over his people. Aguirre asserted that the cities of Paris, Orléans, Amiens, Beauvais, Peronne, Sens, Soissons, Meaux, and Chartres, had through their delegates requested the doctors to consider the means of saving them, and certainly it would be difficult to express themselves more submissively than he does in their names. "They have commissioned me," he says, "to cast myself at your Majesty's feet, and to implore you to take pity upon them, to forget the many injuries their forefathers have done to the Catholic Crown, to turn upon them an eye of favor, to accept them as your vassals, to come to their aid, and henceforth to govern them."*

The distress and danger of the city, which continued after the siege had been raised, contributed not a little to this step. As Henry continued to repeat from time to time his attempts on Paris, the prevailing faction of the Sixteen determined, in February, 1591, not altogether with the goodwill of Mayenne, that a garrison of Spaniards and Neapolitans should be received within the walls; their safety from the enemy, and at the same time the defense of the city, appeared to depend upon Spanish assistance alone. Affairs proceeded in a similar manner in the provinces; in the majority of places the League was able to maintain itself only by the assistance of Spanish and Italian forces.

Charles Emmanuel of Savoy had, before the catastrophe at Blois, promised to come to the assistance of the League, as soon as Henry III. should unite himself with the King of Navarre. It was only the successful progress of the Royal arms in the spring of 1589, and the dread of a day of vengeance, that held him back at that time. After the murder of Henry III. he gave free course to his ambition. He even fancied that as grandson of Henry II. he might lay claim to the Crown itself. He caused homage to be rendered to him in Saluzzo, and the lilies every where vanished before the white crosses. Meanwhile the Estates of Provence, closely pressed by the adherents of Henry IV. and only sustained by the assistance of the Duke, formally elected him as their Count and Sovereign.

* "Reciba de baxo de su proteccion á la ciudad de Paris, ponga los ojos de la clemencia en ellos, y los reciba por sus vasallos."

On this occasion they never thought of their ancient connection with the German empire—of their relations with the house of Lorraine, from whom the province had been wrested with violence, for the purpose of uniting it in a tyrannical manner with the Crown of France. They now, as they declared, knew no one who could protect them from the heretics and their patrons, except the Christian and Catholic, the victorious and good duke of Savoy: they entreated him to accept them as his vassals, to protect their freedom, and to maintain the Catholic faith.* In the middle of November, 1590, Charles Emmanuel made his solemn entrance into Aix as Count of Provence and Forcalquier. Although he declined all marks of honor reserved for the Kings alone, in other respects he acted as Sovereign of the country; he formed a council, appointed officers, and summoned the Estates. The royalist governor of the province, La Valette, was not, however, thereby deposed; although it was impossible for his master to come to his aid, yet Montmorency from Languedoc, and especially Lesdiguières from Dauphiné, rendered him assistance. In order to overpower him, the Duke betook himself to Marseilles, where he was joyfully received, and set sail for Spain, whence he returned in July, 1591, with fifteen galleys freighted with Spanish auxiliary troops. He reduced the strong place of Berre, and made himself, if not master of the province, yet, with his adherents there, very powerful.

Languedoc presented a complete example of the manner in which the provinces were broken up into parties, and how they waged war with one another.

The Leaguers, under the Duke of Joyeuse, held some of the principal towns, such as Toulouse and Narbonne; a portion of the provincial nobility was on their side. On the other hand Montpellier, Béziers, all the Protestant towns and

* The speech from which these words are taken is given from the *Mémoires* of Von Mauray, secretary of La Valette, by Dupleix, Henry IV., 61.—He asserts that Charles Emmanuel made this appointment the sole condition of his further assistance, a circumstance which Guichenon, who otherwise follows him (726), did not deem it advisable to repeat. Papon, "*Histoire de Provence*," is not so well informed as might have been expected. He makes too much literary pretension for a provincial history.

districts, with the most renowned names among the ancient nobility, attached themselves to Montmorency, who was so closely connected with Henry IV. Each party held an assembly of their estates twice a year, which exercised authority in their districts over the ecclesiastical and secular revenues and the domain of the King. They also granted some supplies, so that the governors were able to maintain troops, both horse and foot, and even some ships upon the coast. Montmorency was the more powerful of the two, for he obtained a large amount of money from the salt-works in his district; he maintained four thousand cavalry, about four thousand infantry, and four vessels of war, which cruised in the neighboring waters; he also possessed the greatest number of havens. His aggressions provoked Philip II., and in the summer of 1590 he sent a body of German mercenaries, under Count Jerome Lodron, to Narbonne, to assist the Catholics.* Among the troops were a number of German gunners, whom the Archduke Ferdinand had enlisted—artillerists and founders from Nuremberg and Augsburg, and all descriptions of High-German artisans. In order to teach the French how to deal with heretics, a regiment of Spaniards were also sent by way of Roussillon. With the auxiliaries Joyeuse obtained the superiority, and took a good number of royalist castles. Carcassonne also, on account of which so many battles had been fought, fell into his hands.

In a similar manner the Duke of Mercœur and the Prince of Dombes contended for the mastery in Brittany. Here also there were two assemblies opposed to each other, that of the Leaguers at Nantes and that of the Royalists at Rennes; nor was the interference of the King of Spain wanting: he sent a corps of five thousand men, under Juan de Aguila, to the

* In the Archives of Simancas (at Paris) these reports may be found, directed to the King, and composed in the Italian language. The following extract will cast a light upon these transactions;—"Questa mattina," he says, on September 24, 1590, "trattando con il Duca di Joyosa e suo luogotenente generale sopra il particolare di Leucate, gli proposi, in caso che la si pigliasse, se si consentiriano che segli mettesse presidio di Alemanni o che si ispiassasse, mi hanno risposto che in questo caso farebbono quello che S. M. comandasse." He sent at the same time a plan of "Leucate, essendo frontiera buona per la Spagna."

assistance of the League. It is very remarkable that the Duke of Mercœur, who considered that he had hereditary claims upon Brittany in right of his consort, should have attached himself to the King of Spain, although he knew that Philip, after long consultation with doctors of both the civil and canon law, had resolved to claim this duchy also for his daughter. The contradiction is, however, not so glaring as it appears to be. The Duke declared that he only wished to see the claims of the Spanish Court made out clearly, when he would acknowledge them, and serve the King with perfect fidelity; but, on the other hand, should Philip be triumphant in the great contest, he would be just and fair enough to take the claims of the Duchess into consideration, and would no doubt leave him the government of the province, with full authority. To these proposals the Spanish Court was very ready to agree, for it was desirable to establish the Infanta's right of succession, even if the other objects contemplated should not be accomplished, for in that case Mercœur, as deputy of Philip II., would be able to preserve the independence of the duchy under Spanish protection.* Under these conditions the Duke opened the port of Blavet to the Spanish auxiliaries. The fort of Port Louis arose afterward from the fortifications which they erected there.† The Duke then obtained the superiority over his antagonist in the province, and his assembly of Estates was much better attended. Notwithstanding some assistance from England, the Royalists lost one place and one leader after another. Among others who fell was De la Noue, a Breton by descent, and the man in whom Henry IV. placed his greatest confidence. He was slain at the storming of the Castle of Lamballe; on the day on which it took place, he adorned his helmet with a branch of laurel, remarking that that was the only reward to be expected from this contest.

* "Copia del papel, que dio en Frances Fray Marcellin, Cornet de la orden de San Domingo, embiado por el Duque de Mercurio," as well as a ministerial resolution, expressly approved of by Philip II., in which it is stated that if Béarn should obtain the crown, "Mercurio no se podria conservar y mantener, si no teniendo el governo en nombre de cuyo es de derecho el ducado, y debaxo del amparo y fuerzas de S. M."

† Daru, "Histoire de Bretagne," tom. iii. p. 310.

In Normandy treaties were entered into here and there between the Leaguers and the adherents of Henry IV., so that each party might cultivate their lands undisturbed. A fresh division arose among the Leaguers themselves: Villars, who held possession of Havre-de-Grâce, and Tavannes, who was master of Rouen, regarded each other with the most deadly hatred; each wished to expel the other from the province, and they vied in calling on the Spaniards for aid.*

As the League was originally a union of the Spaniards with the independence of the powerful governors, so it continued. All these men were greatly disposed to acknowledge King Philip either as Protector or even as King of France, and at all events to recognize his authority over the Crown. Tavannes said that nothing could be more just, since Philip was descended originally from a French house. Villars promised at least not to oppose it. Mercœur and Joyeuse were bound to him by their position. The Duke of Savoy could desire nothing better; the authority of a friendly and nearly related monarch would have powerfully sustained his own.

But the principal question, and that which generally occupied the thoughts of the party, was what should be done with respect to the Crown itself.

The most extraordinary notions were passing through the minds of the members of the Sorbonne. As the calling of an Assembly of the Estates would be accompanied with great difficulties, they held that it was not impracticable that a king should be chosen in the camp by the soldiery, as in the times of the Romans or the Franks. Were it for the advantage of religion, they would not shrink even from the idea of allowing monarchy to fall altogether, and dividing the kingdom into a few great principalities.†

* Salazar: "Desde luego por su parte nombrará á V. Md. por protector de aquel reyno, ayudará que la villa y lo demas de su gobierno lo sigue, y á su tiempo, quando aya fundamento, tambien entiende de nombrar V. Md. por protector de aquel reyno."

† "Si cogi non possunt solita comitia, res transigi posset castrensi electione more Romanorum et priscorum etiam Francorum. Quicquid fiat, omnino procurandum hostis exitium, sive de monarchia conservanda sive de dividenda agatur."—"Discursus Facultatis Theologicæ," in the Papers of Simancas.

This last notion was rejected by the entire University, because the partition would be the cause of incessant domestic war. The choice of a monarch they declared to be in their opinion indispensable, for the nobility would only reunite around a king. The right of election they adjudged to the Estates, even if these could not be brought together out of all the provinces.* Were Philip II. a younger man, they continued, the crown should be offered to himself, or, if he had two sons, to one of them; but as the case now stood, the proper course was to raise to the throne some prince who would be agreeable to the King of Spain, and to whom he might give his daughter in marriage.

The council of the sixteen united quarters of Paris expressed opinions almost identical with those of the University. They declared to King Philip that the Catholics had but one wish, and that was to see him rule over them; but if this could not be, he might at least send them his daughter Isabella, and select a consort for her. They were persuaded that she would prove as fortunate a queen for France as Blanche of Castille, the mother of St. Louis, in former days.† Among the subscriptions to this resolution the name of Boucher stands prominent, and attracts attention by the large characters in which it is written. Nor does it appear that opinion was different in the other towns. The Provincial of the Jesuits, and the Guardian of the Franciscans of Orléans, traveled to Spain and assured King Philip of the adhesion of all the towns.

If it be asked how it was possible that opinions of this kind could have met with approval, the fact may become in some measure comprehensible when we consider that the ancient principle of government by estates now co-operated with the religious notions of the time. They had no wish to subject themselves to the absolute authority of the King of Spain, but rather under his protection to carry into practice their own ideas of reform, and of a system of estates. Even in the agreement with Mayenne mention was made of that reform

* Discursus Universitatis: "Neque ob stare debet difficultas convocandi Status, cum ii sufficiant qui ex unitis populis facile possunt convocari, nec forsitan expediret ut ex universo regno convenirent."

† Compare Cayet, Anc. Coll. lvii. 239.

in the judicial and finance administrations which had been previously demanded a thousand times. There were other proposals which contemplated the firm establishment of the freedom of the Estates upon a secure basis for the future. According to these the States General should be assembled at regular intervals, and should not only exercise the power of legislation in its widest extent, but also regulate the finances. The King was to have no power to raise troops without their consent, nor was he to appear in their assemblies until their resolutions had been completed; and these resolutions he was not only to confirm, but to swear to clause by clause. The exclusive Catholic ideas formed an essential principle of this constitution. All alliances with un-Catholic powers were prohibited to the King under pain of losing his crown, and especially any connection with the Ottomans. Upon the requisition of the Estates, he was to place himself at the head of a crusade against either the former or the latter. The nobility were to render their services on such an occasion at their own charge, and on this condition only should they retain their privileges. It appeared as if the ecclesiastical idea were the only foundation for all political regulations.

The sketch of a constitution laid before the King of Spain in the year 1591, and which was recommended for his adoption in the event of his accepting the crown himself, is worthy of notice. Its articles were to be confirmed in authentic charters immediately upon his accession. Here also the religious tendencies predominate over all others.* The first thing demanded was the introduction of the holy office of the Inquisition, which would be so formidable to the wicked in France. The King was to bind himself not to appoint foreigners either to bishoprics, archbishoprics, or to any civil or military offices. No offices were to be sold. All imposts which had been laid on since the reign of Louis XII., with the augmentations of the *taille*, were to be abolished. The administration of the finances was to be so regulated that the income should be applied to the most urgent cases only, especially to the payment

* Articles de chose qu'il faudroit que le Roi Catholique accordast, permist, et en passast, chartres authentiques, aux Etats du royaume de France, acceptant la couronne de France." Papers of Simancas.

of the military force. Church ideas are associated in the most intimate manner with the views of reform. It was made imperative upon the King to redeem the domains of the crown, and to liquidate the national debts which were acknowledged by the Estates. If it were asked from what resources the means were to be obtained for effecting all this, the reply was, the estates of the heretics, which the national creditors must accept in satisfaction of their demands, for strict Catholics only were recognized as members of the State. With respect to these, expression was given to an idea of political mildness which has been realized only in modern times. According to this, confiscation of every kind was to cease for the future. The punishment of crime was to affect those only who had committed it.* It was also contemplated to confine the authority of the King and of his government within narrow limits. One of the articles sets forth that "the Estates shall be assembled every fourth year, in order to examine and regulate all the affairs of the kingdom, and to inquire whether the King has fulfilled or violated his promises.† In the latter case he must make good his failures; or, if he be unwilling to do so, the nation shall be absolved from its oath of allegiance to him, and shall be justified in proceeding to a new election." Nor were the French Catholics willing to transfer their crown to the King of Spain without concessions on his part. He was in return to open to the French the navigation to the East Indies, as well as to America. In Havre, St. Malo, Nantes, and Bordeaux, regulations were to be established similar to those which existed at Seville and Lisbon, for commerce with the colonies. He was also to unite with the French crown all the territories in his possession which had at any time belonged to Gaul, and as sovereign of them assume a new title, somewhat resembling perhaps that of the Great King. The scheme concluded with an exposition of the advantages of these regulations. For the

* "Cessera toute confiscation, et sera la punition des délits sur les personnes et payement sur leurs biens meubles et immeubles."

† "Les Etats se tiendront de quatre ans à quatre ans, où on advisera à réformer et régler toutes choses appartenantes à l'estat, de voir si S. M. aura contrevenu à aucune chose."

future, no one would be excluded from ecclesiastical offices; for when elected in a regular manner, the spiritual person would have the assistance of the Holy Ghost.* The nobility would again have access to all places and offices. The third estate would no longer be oppressed with imposts, nor divided from the other estates. In this manner it would be possible at the same time to re-establish the general peace of Christendom, to overthrow the Turks, and once more to conquer the Holy Land. The limitation of the throne, the establishment of the Estates in their original equilibrium of power, the definitive triumph of the Catholic Church upon earth, were all united in one liberal Catholic system. It is easy to conceive that this scheme was viewed with enthusiasm.

The ancient ideas of municipal freedom were meanwhile extending themselves. The towns, as we have mentioned, would not receive any royal garrisons nor governors within their walls. They raised the public taxes and applied them, and set up popular tribunals for themselves. Many even of the distinguished clergy were expelled for not concurring with the Commons in every thing. Such of the nobility only as held the principles of the League were tolerated, but even they dared not to resist the commonalty. The object of the towns was to secure for themselves a condition resembling that of the free imperial cities of Germany; and this they hoped to attain under the Great Catholic King, and at the same time to obtain other objects which it was not right and fit they should wait for any longer.† In the memorial of Salazar, who asserted that he had been commissioned by the Sorbonne, and indirectly by the towns, we have an insight as to the extent of their views, which is really astounding. He counsels the King to garrison those fortresses which could

* "Le clergé appelé à sa fonction canoniquement seroit assisté du Saint Esprit; ce premier état n'excluerait aucun, fût-il noble ou roturier, et seroit un lien pour joindre ensemble les deux autres Etats;" as Canossa formerly pointed out.

† Vendramin, *Relatione di Savoia*: "Essendosi vedute in un tratto tante sollevazioni e tanti gridi de' popoli e di quelle principali provincie con un solo fine, è risoluto di voler cambiar forma al suo governo e di voler separarsi dell' obediencia del suo principe, per governarsi a repubbliche popolari, imitando le terre franche di Germania."

impede the communication between Flanders and Picardy, and then to march into France at the head of a great army and take the title of Protector. He might then disperse Mayenne's council, reform the Parliaments and the tribunals, and appoint new presidents as well as new bishops, who would submit to the decrees of the Council of Trent, in order to improve the clergy. This was not all. He was to raze all the castles in the country, so that the nobility should no longer have any lurking-places, and that the towns might remain masters of the field, with power and justice. He was to take care that only such preachers as agreed with his views, and whose services were to be remunerated, should be allowed to officiate in the towns; to free the towns from every thing that impeded their trade, whether at their gates or at the passages of the rivers; to allow no fortresses except such as commanded these passages, a few perhaps excepted, in which there were to be placed devoted governors.* When he had thus taught all the provinces to appreciate the advantages of the union with Spain, and had, if possible, found devoted persons in each district, then, but not before, he might summon the Estates to complete the whole. It looked almost as if it were contemplated to renew the ancient war of the towns against the nobility, and to carry it on with the aid of the Burgundo-Spanish power.

These were the views by which men's minds were occupied, for every one readily associated his own wishes with a general prospect. It only remained to ascertain the light in which Philip II. would view the matter.

This prince had interfered in the affairs of France, originally, on two grounds: the one to prevent the French from lending assistance to the Netherlands; the other lest he should be disturbed by the French in carrying out his plan for securing to himself a universal supremacy. Events had, however, led him further; and now he could even contemplate uniting, in some manner, the French crown with that of Spain, and becoming sovereign and master of the Catholic world. The prospect upon which he gazed was immeasurable.

When we peruse the original papers, we are struck with

* "Personas de valor y religion, y que entienden y desteen su servicio."

the fact that Philip II. was not himself the first promoter of these world-wide plans and enterprises. The leading thoughts were those of his statesmen, envoys, governors, and plenipotentiaries, rather than his own. For every power is moved by the impulse of those ideas on which it is founded, and in the progress of which the zeal of their adherents sees the promotion of their fortune. Philip yielded to these views rather than originated them. He displayed his peculiar satisfaction when the Catholic religion was benefited by them. For the rest, he allowed things to take their course, and for a long period to pass along, not deeming it necessary to express an opinion either in general or as regarded particulars.

Now, however, it could continue so no longer. In France, matters had reached that point that he could no longer defer coming to a positive resolution concerning his relations with that kingdom, and the policy it was necessary for him to adopt.

He had been frequently spoken to concerning the rights of his daughter Isabella, the grand-daughter of Henry II. and Catharine. These rights were of a twofold nature. Bernardino Mendoza always specially insisted upon the claims which the Infanta might make as heiress of her grandfather to the Duchy of Brittany, which had descended to her from her mother; and also as heiress of her grandmother, to the possessions which were hers in her own right, and which were by no means inconsiderable. The French, on the other hand, both the great nobles and the towns, put forward, in preference, her right to the crown itself. The question was in effect whether the monarchy should be diminished or perhaps disintegrated, or whether it should be preserved in its entirety. The Spaniards were in favor of the former alternative, especially at the commencement of the League; the latter appeared to the French who were of the Spanish party to be preferable. They maintained that the Salic law was not unalterable by right; that the throne belonged to the eldest female descendant of the house of Valois, and on that account she would be acknowledged without difficulty, for she was, as every one knew, of a disposition akin to that of the French, and, above all, she was yet unmarried: all the princes of Christendom would be rivals for her hand, and an

alliance might be concluded through which the military force could be doubled. Bernardino's intentions had always been to enforce, at the same time with the provincial claims of the Infanta, the right of the Protectorate for the advantage of the King and of the Crown; France would then be still more disunited, and reduced to a dependency of the Spanish monarchy. While the French desired to unite the supreme power with the claims of the Infanta, they exhibited also a profound and unshaken attachment to the dynastic principle, but they postponed it in favor of what they deemed the future prosperity of France.

After long hesitation, Philip at last resolved to concur with the scheme proposed for his adoption on the part of the French. He made to his adherents in France the double proposition that they should immediately acknowledge his daughter Isabella as Queen of France, and, further, that they should leave it to himself to select a husband for her, who should be acknowledged as King of France.*

He did not consider the special advantage of Spain as a state, but he took the entire disposition of the crown of France into his own hands. His designs were not directed so much to the dominion of Spain over other countries, as to the universal sovereignty of his house by means of the power of Spain.

He had reflected upon the choice of a husband for his daughter—a prince whom he should at the same time give to the French as their king—but he had not come to an irrevocable determination. He mentioned several names to his plenipotentiaries, but always with an intimation that they were not to insist upon any of them in opposition to the French; for he did not deceive himself in supposing that, with all the inclination of the French nobles, it would not yet require a very difficult and critical negotiation to bring them to a definitive agreement.

In addition to all this Henry IV. was by no means yet set aside; the issue of the negotiations was still dependent upon the future results of a trial of arms.

* As it is stated in a note of Tassis: 1, "que declaren por reyna á la S^{ma} Infanta;" 2, "que remitan la election de rey á S. Md., pues se trata de que le tome por hyerno."

CHAPTER XXIX.

CAMPAIGN OF 1591 AND 1592.—ASSEMBLY OF THE ESTATES OF 1593.

WHEN men like Mendoza regarded the operation of the Spanish influence upon France as part only of a plan for the universal re-establishment of Catholicism in Western Europe, it is easy to conceive that the prince whom they sought to expel from France would be likely to find assistance among those who would be immediately endangered by his fall. Queen Elizabeth of England at once formed an intimate alliance with Henry IV. The relations which existed between them sometimes took the form of personal courtesy. The Queen had the King's portrait placed in her cabinet; she spoke of him in remarkably warm terms, and sent him a scarf wrought by a skillful hand. The King said he was determined to wear it in battle for her honor; that all he was and all he had belonged to her: and that, sailing under the auspices of her favor, he hoped yet to reach the port.* They did not, however, exchange mere empty words. The Queen supported the King in reality to the extent of her power. She sent him troops armed and paid by herself, powder and ball, and, what was more necessary than any thing else, money; sometimes she even anticipated Henry's requests for aid, and it may well be doubted whether, without her assistance, he would have been able to maintain his position in the north of France.

The interests involved in the approaching struggle were not quite so decisive as regarded the German Protestants. The Lutherans, who were aristocratic, with Estates, and hos-

* Dispatch of La Noe, January 20, 1590: "Avec telle démonstration qu'il nous cuida sembler qu'elle en aimeroit mieux le vif."—In the Egerton Collection, 305.

tile to Calvinism, had made their peace with the Empire, which had either inclined to milder views, or was fettered by its own weakness; they now expected to enjoy perpetual security under the forms of the Empire. There were individuals, however, who saw in the rise of the Romish-Spanish tendencies a common danger, and who felt that although the Reformed might be the first whom they would affect, yet when the one had fallen they might reach the others. Even in Germany we now hear of the designation of Politicians. It indicated men who were not unconditionally bound by the definitive dogmata of the Church, but who comprehended in their view the general relations of Europe, and regarded the preservation of the independence of the French Crown as a necessary condition of the religious and political freedom of the German States and Orders, as well as of the rest of Europe.

The Chancellor of Saxony, Nicholas Krell, was a man of this disposition, who afterward had to expiate with his life his departure from the ordinary paths—a meteoric phenomenon in Albertinian Saxony. We need not examine how far the Calvinistic inclinations of him or his master, the Elector Christian, extended, and have only to observe, that under their influence Dresden became the centre of French negotiations, which extended over the whole of Northern Germany, and were by no means, in general, dependent upon the doctrinal opinions of the parties in treaty. At a congress in Cassel a design was formed in accordance with which even the strictly Lutheran powers, such as Würtemberg, Hesse, Holstein-Denmark, and the Dukes of Saxony, bound themselves to contribute to the assistance of the Bourbon King. Krell expressed his astonishment at the conduct of the warlike knights, who could still hesitate to take arms: "were he free," he said, "he would take the field had he but twenty horse, for the salvation of Henry IV. was the salvation of both the State and the Church."*

* Compare "Aus dem wider den Verhaften Dr. Nicolaus Crell verführten Inquisitionsprocess, verfasste Deducirung bei Kessling;" Continuation of the "Historia Motuum." The report, according to an Italian MS., was that these troops were "pagati per la maggior parte dal Duca di Sassonia."

In August, 1591, a splendid army, composed of High-German *Landsknechte* and North-German cavalry, under the command of old and approved officers, commenced its march through Lorraine in the direction of France. Fabian Dohna was there also, and it fell to his lot to lead the van and prepare the way for the others. The chief command was on this occasion, however, intrusted to a German Prince of the Empire, Christian of Anhalt, whom the other princes and nobles obeyed, without difficulty.

Queen Elizabeth had this time also sent a portion of the necessary funds, and the troops were mustered in the presence of her ambassador.

It is remarkable that the declaration made by Henry IV. on his accession, as to the possibility of a change in his religious views, had no effect whatever. The Protestant sympathies for him were in no degree diminished by it; the present expedition bore precisely the character of those by which it had been preceded.

Henry IV. had just reduced Noyon, when there came to his assistance, on the one side, the Earl of Essex with four thousand English troops, whose pompous entry into Compiègne attracted much attention, and, on the other, the German army. Michaelmas day, in the year 1591, was solemnized by a great review on the plains of Vaudy, on the Aisne. The Germans posted themselves in eight divisions, four of cavalry, and four of infantry, which formed a semicircle; their cavalry might have amounted to six thousand, and their infantry to about ten thousand men. They attracted the special admiration of the French by the skill which they displayed in firing the great and small guns which they brought with them.* The King went from company to company and from troop to troop, in order to see and be seen. He found a great number of old acquaintances among the officers, and welcomed them cordially. He also expressed his gratitude to the German Princes for such splendid aid.

And indeed he had good reason to do so, for just at this time was formed in his vicinity a union of forces against

* Report of Cayet, worthy of notice for military history; "Chronologie Novenaire," Michaud, xii. 308.

him which might otherwise have been highly dangerous to him.

The Chair at Rome was at that time occupied by a man who, without any of those views which occasionally influenced the earlier Popes, united himself unconditionally with the system of the Spaniards and the League. This was Gregory XIV., who was a member of a distinguished Milanese family. It appeared to him to be the greatest misfortune that could befall the Church, should Vendôme, as he called Henry IV., come to the actual possession of the throne, since in that case France would fall into the hands of the heretics. He summoned the King of Spain to apply the wealth brought to him by the last Plate fleet to that purpose for which God had undoubtedly bestowed those riches, namely, to the defense of Christendom from so great a mischief. He himself did not hesitate in making use, for this object, of the treasure laid up in the Castle of St. Angelo by Sixtus V., for never, said he, could a more urgent necessity come on the Church. He was of opinion that the Pope and the King would be strong enough to terminate the affair by themselves, and that as yet it was not necessary to seek for assistance from the other Italian princes; should that be wanted, however, he pledged his word that they would not fail to render it, when it was demanded. He had never expected much from previous enterprises of the kind, but he was convinced that this would be successful.*

In the beginning of March the Pope had already made known his intentions to the French. He threatened the clergy in sundry monitories with excommunication, and the nobility and third Estate with his displeasure, if they did not instantly separate themselves from Henry IV., whom he once more pronounced to be a relapsed heretic, deposed by law from all his royalties and dominions. In short, Gregory renewed, in the interests of the Spaniards and of the League, the ancient pontifical pretensions to absolute and supreme authority.

A Papal army made its appearance in France in the sum-

* "De quoi il assure et en répond."—Extract from a Letter in the Egerton Collection, 323.

mer of 1591. It was composed of Italians and Swiss, and commanded by a nephew of the Pontiff's. It joined at Verdun the forces of the Duke of Lorraine, who was now entirely on the side of his French relatives and the League. After a junction had been formed with Alexander of Parma, the intention was to make a new and more effective attempt for the establishment of a Catholic king in France, to which end the Pope had expressly enlisted his Switzers.*

Here again we meet with the complete antagonism between the rigid Church idea in the spirit of the Middle Ages, and the Catholic as well as the Protestant deviation from them. Gregory XIV., like Philip II., was resolved with all his power to re-establish the old system in France. Henry IV., besides his Protestant confederates, had also in his favor the Catholic party, which had always resisted these arbitrary demands, and which now, instead of being terrified, was roused to indignation by their revival.

It was not, properly speaking, as yet a contest between the King and the Pope. Possessed of the superiority, by means of his German auxiliaries, Henry IV. wished to bring the Pope's nephew immediately to battle, and with this view advanced to within half a league of his head-quarters; but the only result was a slight skirmish which took place on the heights near the camp, and which was beheld by the Germans present with an almost uncontrollable desire to join the combatants. The Papal army had a different destiny.

It must be regarded as an event of great importance that Gregory XIV., who held the principle of Catholic restoration in its entire strictness and unaffected by any political considerations, died at this particular conjuncture, in which that very enterprise was about to commence, which he regarded as the salvation of the world. His death rendered the mission of both the army and its leader doubtful. The remittances from Rome ceased; and after a few months all that remained together of the Papal force were some hundreds of Italian cavalry and fifteen hundred Swiss, which were incorporated with the army of the Duke of Parma; for it was

* Sillery: "La prétexte de la demande estoit pour servir à l'eslection et établissement d'un roi Catholique."

between the French King and the Spanish general that the affair was to be decided.*

Through the marriage of the heiress of Sedan to Turenne, who had led the Germans to Henry IV., he succeeded in gaining possession of that important position on the Meuse, and soon after, with the assistance of the German troops, in conquering St. Valéry, at the mouth of the Somme. He now undertook the siege of Rouen, the possession of which would have involved that of all Normandy, and given him the complete mastery over the whole of northern France: by December, 1591, the siege was considerably advanced, and the King hoped in a short time to be master of the strongest of the forts—that of St. Catharine—he expected that Villars, who took council chiefly with women and a priest, would then make proposals of surrender.

At this moment, however, Alexander of Parma made his appearance once more in France, at the head of an army, which, though not numerous, was distinguished for its experience, and which, even without any special assistance from Rome, gave great strength to the efforts of the League, and to the principles of his King. The emulation between the French and Spanish systems of warfare was here renewed once more, but the latter still preserved its superiority.

Henry resolved on this occasion both to continue his siege and to meet the enemy.

He came in view of the Spaniards at Aumale, and the opposite qualities of the two generals were clearly shown in their conduct on the occasion. Henry was bolder, Farnese more circumspect than ever. The former was wounded, and very nearly taken prisoner, in an assault made with little deliberation. The latter neglected out of circumspection to follow up his advantage; it was enough for him to have thrown relief into Rouen.

The armies were as distinct in their qualities as the generals.

When Henry, in the progress of the siege, in which he was assisted by English pioneers among others, had brought the

* Henry to Nevers, December 13, 1591: *Lettres Missives*, iii. 547.

town once more to a state of the greatest distress, Alexander Farnese resolved to advance from the Somme, where he had taken up a position, a second time toward Rouen. He was now more successful; the King was obliged to raise the siege in reality. Farnese appeared to the multitude to be the greatest man in the world; as he had once relieved Paris, so now did he Rouen, and was received there with the most tumultuous joy.

If the reasons of his success be investigated, they will be found to consist chiefly in the fact that he had thoroughly calculated all circumstances, and did not put his troops in motion until, according to the custom of the time, Henry had dismissed the greater part of his nobility. These, however, now assembled round him again without delay; within five days fifteen hundred gentlemen from Normandy alone entered his camp fully armed,* and all the other provinces emulated this. The infantry could also be strengthened from the neighboring garrisons, and in a short time Henry found himself strong enough to take the field, and to march in search of the enemy.

Farnese had allowed himself, at the very moment of victory to be led aside from his system, and, against his own better judgment, yielded to the urgent request of his French friends, and marched upon Caudebec, for the purpose of opening the Seine by the capture of that town; he was wounded while conducting a reconnaissance, yet with his bleeding arm he traced the orders which led to the taking of the place. This did not, however, prevent the danger which he incurred by the approach of the royal army—which was much superior to his own, and was supported by several Dutch transports from the Lower Seine—from being most imminent; and the conqueror suddenly found himself besieged in his camp, while provisions were already beginning to run short.

The French expected that the proud Duke would endeavor to force his way by an open attack; but he was not in a position, at such a distance from the Spanish provinces, and with-

* I take this notice from an ephemeral brochure, "Utile et Salulaire Advis au Roi pour bien régner," addressed to Louis XIII. about the year 1617; it is the work of a very well-informed person.

out any certain support to fall back upon, to run the risk of a pitched battle.

We should read in the Italian historians, who admire in Farnese the reviver of the ancient Italian military renown—the accounts of his passage of the Seine,* for this was the course upon which he determined as the only one which could save him. It has been regarded even in later times as one of ablest military movements of the century. In the face of two superior and watchful enemies, he crossed the river with his army, and then, by rapid forced marches, unretarded and uninjured, passed through the Isle of France and Artois, and reached the Spanish provinces in safety.

Thus did these generals carry on the contest: the one at the head of a body of feudal troops and auxiliaries, who were perpetually divided from each other by a certain nationality, and whom he yet succeeded in keeping together by his own energy; the other, the leader of a completely organized force, which enabled him to give free development to his strategic principles.

Henry was indebted to the support of the Protestant powers, and to the devotedness of the French nobility, which, though often interrupted, always revived again with fresh fervor, for his not being defeated by the hostile force; still, however, he had not been able to make himself master of Normandy. Though not conquered strategically, he was out-generaled; and his attempts to break up the League had not been successful.

The League, on the contrary, renewed, even under altered circumstances, the attempt to set him aside, and to settle the kingdom according to their own views.

Mayenne, who still occupied the most important position among the great nobles of the League, had never yet been able to come to a full understanding with Mendoza; and it appears, from the correspondence of the latter, that they dis-

* From a letter of Don Martin de Guzpidé to Philip II., May 25, 1592, it appears that Farnese was not universally admired by his contemporaries. They assert that the enemy "nos hizo algunas entradas y nosotros ninguna, aunque la gente de V. Md. estava con grandissimas ganas;" and that all had fallen again into the old condition.

liked each other personally. Mendoza is unjust toward the Duke when he charges him with never knowing his own mind, and listening to others with but half an ear, and with a species of distraction. Mendoza had rested his success entirely on the support of the multitude. Mayenne made no claims on popularity; in this he differed totally from his brother; he could not bring himself to seek the favor of the people, and, had he done so, could not have obtained it. He did not possess any of those remarkable qualities which sway mankind, nor that energy by which they are carried away. His enterprises were neither bold, rapid, nor even fortunate; he was a man of a full habit of body, to whom repose and enjoyment seemed necessary; in his domestic affairs he was economical, generally reserved; by no means liberal; circumspect, calculating, and yet not without the loftiest and most ambitious notions. The wild impulses of the popular leaders had long been distasteful to him; yet he bore with them, until at length one of their most monstrous excesses occasioned a general cry of indignation. The learned and estimable Brisson had allowed a person suspected by them to go at liberty; for this they could not forgive him, and, without even hearing him in his own defense or making use of the form of law, they condemned and executed him. The party called Politicians—that is, the most moderate of the inhabitants—began to fear that the ruling faction would endeavor to get rid of them by some great act of violence. A red paper was circulated from hand to hand, containing the names of all those who were destined to death, or banishment.* Mayenne seized this moment to come from the camp to the city, for the purpose of teaching the Sixteen the limits of their authority. He caused the principal authors of Brisson's execution to be arrested and punished with death, and, at the same time, took possession of the Bastille. The Spaniards were not at all satisfied with these proceedings; but the military spirit of the garrison prevented them from making any opposition, and Mayenne contrived to prevent a

* L'Etoile, November 25, 1591, in Champollion, 69: "En leurs rôles ils les distinguoient par ces trois lettres, P. D. C., qui étoit à dire, Pendu, Dagué, Chassé."

rising of the populace. He paid a visit to the Sorbonne, in order to mollify its members, and allowed the preachers to proceed in the usual style of declamation; he was satisfied with having shown them that there was a law superior to them, and a power to administer that law.

While he kept aloof from Mendoza and the popular movements, however, he entered into earnest consultation concerning the definitive settlement of France, with Alexander of Parma, who, as a soldier by profession, had no great liking for them either. A conference upon this subject had been held at the commencement of the last campaign; the parties to it were, on the side of Parma, his chief counselor Richardot, and the Spanish Ambassador, Don Diego Ibarra; and, on the part of Mayenne, a statesman named Jeannin. The Spanish statesmen were in favor of proceeding in a legal manner, and demanded an Assembly of the Estates, that they might proceed to the election of a King. Jeannin remarked, on the other hand, that such a step could only be of service to give the stamp of legality to what the great nobles might agree upon; that the King of Spain must first of all have a full understanding with them, and especially with the house of Guise; that the affair was surrounded with difficulties, and the only means by which they could be overcome was money. The offers made by Don Diego were very considerable, but they were not deemed sufficient.

Whatever difference of opinion might have prevailed, however, Mayenne, in accordance with the desire of Farnese, at last concluded upon calling together, in the beginning of the year 1593, the Estates, which had been so often promised, a few of the deputies having been elected in different places. Some of the instructions given to the delegates are still extant, those, for example, of the clergy at Auxerre, and of the third Estate at Troyes. The former establish it as an essential principle that there should never be tolerated more than one religion in France, since there was but one baptism and one God; an inviolable fundamental law must exclude from the French throne any prince who may be a heretic or a favorer of heretics; the new King must, if possible, be descended from the ancient royal blood, but his elevation must depend

upon election, and upon the approval of the Pope as well as of the King of Spain, who is to give him his daughter in marriage.* At Troyes Henry of Bourbon was excluded by name, even should he profess to have turned to the Catholic religion, for he was a relapsed heretic, excommunicated by the Pope, declared unworthy of all royal prerogatives, and rejected by previous assemblies of the Estates.† The only condition here made regarding the new King was that he should be a Frenchman, that he should carry on the government through a council selected from the great nobles of the kingdom and the deputies of the provincial Estates, and that all which had been resolved upon by the Estates of Blois should have the force of law for the future.‡ In fact it could hardly be otherwise than that the Catholic views, and those of the Estates, which had operated so powerfully throughout the whole movement, would preponderate in the new Assembly also. The nature of Mayenne's views at this time can not be ascertained with precision; at times he even negotiated with Henry IV.; the Spaniards showed considerable dissatisfaction at his conduct during the elections, for he kept his eye upon his own advantage only, and persecuted those who held opinions favorable to Spain. They thought it necessary that Philip II. should send a new army into France, in order to give courage to his adherents, and especially to the towns, which would then declare themselves openly. The nuncio of the Romish court, if not the court itself, expressed similar opinions. He summoned the King of Spain to unite the terrifying power of iron with the attractive power of gold—to do all his utmost to bring the French over to his views, whether they were willing or unwilling.

Philip II. was now in fact determined to act with all his power. Alexander of Parma, who had resided at Spa during the summer for the purpose of establishing his health, prepared to return to France at the head of a new army in

* "Articles des Remonstrances du Clergé d'Auxerre pour les Etats," in Bernard, "Procès Verbaux des Etats Gén. de 1593," p. 785.

† Memoirs of Troyes, December 11, 1592. Ibid. 780.

‡ M. de Guzpie, October 20, 1592: "Si el exercito de V. Md. (es) en aquel reyno poderoso, le (for Mayenne) será fuerça andar á derechas, pues con esto podran los bien intencionados y muchos pueblos descubrirse."

the autumn. Bodies of German *Landsknechte*, under Kurz and Bernstein, the old bands of Italy and Spain, under Capizucchi and Zuniga, with Walloon regiments from the Netherlands, were already assembled on the French frontiers. The remittances from Spain being delayed or having failed, Farnese raised the necessary funds upon his own credit in Antwerp. He even hired a mansion for himself at Paris, and had it prepared for his residence. He wished, as they had requested him, to secure the city from the assaults of the King of Navarre and the contrivances of the Politicians, but at the same time he was desirous of keeping the members of the League to their duty, and of giving confidence to the great Spanish Catholic party in the Assembly of the Estates.

It was the last great blow; every thing was expected from it. The Duke of Parma, honored by all for his merit, feared by all for his power, he to whom the capital and the party generally were indebted for their salvation, would, as he had done the most eminent service in the field, now by an armed diplomacy bring the great cause to a successful issue. If any man were capable of effecting this, it was he.

How vain are human calculations! Divine Providence mocks at them! When Alexander Farnese was on the point of setting out for France he was snatched away by death.

For fourteen days he had been seen almost constantly on horseback at Arras, for the purpose of mustering the troops that were to accompany him into France. On the first of December he was taken ill, but still continued to sign the military orders, though with a trembling hand. His attendants entreated him to conserve the last spark of life by taking some repose. He answered that even if it were the last spark, he would devote it, as he had done his whole life, to the public interests. He expired on the 3d of December. Alexander of Parma had just made every preparation for the execution of plans which were expected to determine the future destinies of the world; the next moment his dead body was gazed upon as it lay in the church of St. Vedast, enveloped in the dress of a Capuchin friar, and surrounded with three hundred torches. His death was an event of no less importance than that of Gregory XIV.

In the beginning of the year 1593 the deputies to the States General entered Paris by degrees. They were by no means complete, but yet in such numbers as to allow of the opening of their sittings at the Louvre on the 26th of January. They were received, in the spirit which prevailed at their election, with sermons, in which their right to depart from the observance of the Salic law was proved; and with Papal admonitions, in which, on the principle that God raises and deposes kings, and that the voice of the people is the voice of God, they were urged to proceed to the election of a true Catholic king.

The great combination of Philip II. was not, however, accomplished by these means. The old conqueror and liberator being dead, the Spanish army, which was personally attached to him, did not proceed into France. Instead of Farnese appeared, as if to carry on some ordinary negotiation, Lorenzo Suarez Figueroa, Duke of Feria, whom nobody knew, in company with a Spanish lawyer, Inigo Mendoza, appointed to show the nullity of the Salic law upon juridical grounds.

Mayenne thought it advisable to meet this embassy, with which Tassis also was associated, on its way at Soissons, in order to come to an agreement with it beforehand. The two Spanish statesmen thought it would be a decisive advantage could they succeed in bringing Mayenne into their views, though the lawyer did not share in that opinion. They considered that should the Duke enter Paris with them in the desired disposition, he would win over all the others to himself and to them.*

The first topic discussed in the negotiations was the claim of the Spanish Infanta to the French crown. Mayenne had no objection to it: he declared frequently that her right was complete and unquestionable, but he repeated that to enforce that right would be infinitely difficult, and made the most extravagant demands for himself. Many warm words may

* Tassis gave his view very directly: "Viendo quan mezclado anda lo de Dios con lo del mundo, y que es permitido y conveniente ayudarse desto postrero para salir con lo primero, seria bueno, entrar en estados teniendo comprados á los que mas al caso hizen, y en particular al de Umena."

have been exchanged during the conference, but it resulted in a common understanding. To the Duke were promised the government of Burgundy, with reservation only of the sovereign prerogatives of the King, and the government of Normandy, under the usual conditions attached to such offices. He was further to receive immediately a large present, and considerable rents in perpetuity; his debts were all to be paid; until the arrival of the Infanta he was to be her Lieutenant-General, and to receive on her arrival one of the greatest offices in the kingdom. In return Mayenne pledged himself to make use of all his influence in the assembled Estates, in order that the illustrious Infanta should be declared Queen of France, since he knew very well that that would be the most effectual way to destroy heresy and to maintain religion in the kingdom.* He promised verbally to give his vote at once for the Infanta. Thus the most important point appeared to have been attained, and the ambassadors were of opinion that they would be able to effect all the rest, either by present liberality or by promises for the future. The French in general were visibly in a state of great misery, and few of them virtuous enough to bear it with firmness; they were determined to better their condition in this world, and neither to perish nor to suffer for their salvation in the world to come. The ambassadors arrived in Paris on the 9th of March, and found the general disposition sufficiently favorable to their purpose. A speech made by Feria to the Estates, in support of the Infanta Isabella's claims, was well received. No one ventured to declare for Henry IV., and although the other Pretenders were spoken of by some, the Infanta held the highest place among them all. Mayenne returned to Paris on the 6th of May, and then the official negotiations commenced. A Junta was formed, comprising the great Catholic nobles present, and the delegates of those who were absent, six deputies of the Estates, two from each, and some of the members of Mayenne's council. The Spaniards again minute-

* The originals of this agreement are printed in the Commentaries of Tassis, viii. p. 524. Concerning the negotiations there is, besides his narrative, the report of Inigo Mendoza, in the papers of Simancas. Inigo adds the verbal promise also.

ly expounded to this Junta the claims of the Infanta, expressing themselves intentionally in the most moderate terms, and stating that if it were deemed necessary they had no objection that election should be added to the right of birth. The French hesitated to agree to the pretension of a right. They required above all things that the support they were to receive should be named, in order that they might be able to reckon upon it. Two days afterward the Spaniards stated what was to be expected from their King, although they had no definite instructions from him on the subject, but were obliged to make use of older papers.* Every thing now wore an appearance as if all parties were about to come to a full and thorough accord.

Whether it arose from neglect, or a general hesitation to touch the last great difficulty, there had been nothing settled as yet regarding the person who was to be the husband of the Infanta should she become Queen. It may have been owing to the vague manner in which this point was passed over, that the scheme of her succession to the throne did not from the first arouse a greater resistance than that which now appeared. There were in the house of Bourbon, as well as in that of Lorraine, a whole crowd of unmarried princes, who indulged in hopes of the Infanta's hand, or in favor of whom such hopes were cherished by their nearest relatives. The silence upon this subject therefore, however long preserved, must at length be broken.

The ambassadors then announced that it was the wish of Philip II. to marry his daughter to his own cousin, the Archduke Ernest, and place them both upon the throne. The Infanta Isabella had been long before intended for the Emperor Rudolf, but in the strange state of mind into which he had fallen, he could never bring himself either to fetch home his bride or to renounce her. Philip II. then cast his eye upon the Emperor's brother, the Archduke Ernest, to whom he transferred the government of the Netherlands after the death of the Prince of Parma;† and Ernest entered into the King's views with joy. King Philip was therefore in a cer-

* "Sin precisa y clara luz de V. Md.," as Tassis says.

† Compare Khevenhiller, "Annales Ferdinandei IV.," 1072.

tain degree bound to propose the Archduke to the French. Yet he had often received assurances out of France that the French could only be governed by the authority of a prince descended from the royal blood of France. But beside this lay, in this project, the further development of the idea of a Catholic dynasty, possessing the supremacy over Europe. It was looked upon as a future possibility that the Archduke Ernest might unite with the Imperial dignity the possession of the Netherlands and of the French crown.

Would the prudence and authority of the Duke of Parma have been sufficient to have made this proposal agreeable? It may well be doubted. Probably if he had not noticed it at the commencement, as was afterward asserted, the affair might not have been impossible, but the Archduke should not have been named in the first instance. The moment the proposal was made, it awakened a fierce and general opposition.

Philip had foreseen the probability of this result, and named three others, any one of whom would have been acceptable to him—Charles of Guise, who was son of the Duke of Guise, assassinated at Blois; he had recently escaped from prison, almost as if by miracle, and possessed the confidence of his party universally; or one of the sons of the Duke of Lorraine, under the condition, however, that Lorraine should not be united to the French Crown; or, finally, the son of the Duke of Mayenne. The name of the Archduke having aroused general opposition, the ambassadors were under the necessity of proposing another, and Feria decided, not altogether with the concurrence of Inigo Mendoza, in favor of the Guise first named above, for whom he felt a personal predilection. He met a friend of the Guise family in a Franciscan convent, and with the most profound secrecy confided to him the intelligence that Philip II. would be satisfied that the French should elect Guise for their king, and that his daughter would accept him as her husband. This proposal was received with loud and universal joy among the members of the League, as the proposal of the Archduke had awakened their dissatisfaction; and though the communication was made in private, it was rapidly imparted from one to another in confidence, until

it was known to all. On the 18th of July, 1592, the preachers announced in the churches that God had at last pointed out the future King, a young prince who had never departed from the faith, of good lineage, a new David.

The only question now was one raised by Inigo Mendoza—whether Mayenne, who guided every thing, would be content with this choice.

From the obscurity in which Mayenne hid himself, there flashed from time to time gleams of the loftiest ambition. He had formerly given the Duke of Parma to understand, without circumlocution, that he himself cherished hopes of being King of France, and wrote to him that he would prefer the King of Spain to all others as Sovereign of France, but that, should he not accept the crown, Mayenne considered that he had deserved so well in promoting the Catholic cause, that he expected no one else would be chosen in preference to him. He gave hopes that if the Spaniards would assist him to the French throne, he would cede Burgundy.* Philip had been displeased with this, and did not agree to it, but Mayenne could not retract the words he had once uttered. It is possible that the affair might have been accommodated had Inigo Mendoza's advice been followed, and Mayenne's son proposed by the Spaniards. Of the elevation of Guise to the throne he would on the other hand hear nothing: he said he loved his nephew as much as he did himself, but not more; he wished him as great fortune as his own, but not greater, and superior to himself he did not wish to see him. The Papal nuncio, Sega, remarked to Mayenne, that even the sculptor prostrates himself before the crucifix which he himself had made; and reminded him of the example of Lycurgus, who, when he had re-established the throne of Sparta, left it to his nephew. But how could it have been expected that representations of this kind would have any influence upon a man who had adopted the Italian notion of

* "Petere, ne sibi in conservandâ vetere religione laboribus paternis, fraternis et suis, reliquos omnes antegresso præripi à quoquam meritum tantorum pretium pateretur; spondere autem, si auxiliis fultus in solium Gallicum scanderet, Burgundiæ ducatum Philippo regi."—Dondinus, *De Rebus in Galliâ gestis*, 463.

the supreme power, and believed that in order to attain it all means were lawful, and that no promise, no oath, had any force to bind a man who was striving for its possession? * He was said to have declared that it was impossible to be at the same time a good statesman and a good Christian. It appeared to him a humiliation to accord to the elder branch of his family prerogatives of superiority over his own descendants. He declared to the ambassadors that it was not a king which was now wanted, but troops and money, and that until these were supplied he would hear nothing of an election to the throne. In short, he postponed or evaded every proposition upon the subject.

Montaigne expresses his astonishment, that the Guises should have, one after another, ascended the steps of the throne, and yet not dared to take possession of it. The reason is to be found in the fact that the only conjuncture in which it could be done or was possible, that in which the public voice was in its favor, was marred by the interference of Guise's own uncle. He laid himself down "before the garden of the Hesperides, in order to prevent his nephew from gathering the golden fruit." The last combination which would at least have made possible the attempt to establish an exclusive Catholic monarchy, founded on Estates, did not take place.

Mayenne, had he now undertaken the establishment of the legitimate monarchy, might have preceded Monk in the renown which he acquired at a later period. But for this he possessed neither sufficient comprehension of the world, nor control over himself; he had been too long habituated to the actual possession of supreme authority, to renounce it at once; while he rejected his nephew, he cherished hopes for himself, and failed to observe that, under his very eyes, things were assuming an aspect completely hostile to his expectations.

* "Que en materia de estado no ay que hazer caso de juramentos; recordandose lo que avia prometido dezia que variando el tiempo si variaban las obligaciones."—Parescer de Feria, 1594.

CHAPTER XXX.

RELIGIOUS CHANGE OF HENRY IV.

WITH the household gods of a monarchic state, that is to say with its life, which is unaffected by the succession of generations, those of the ruling family are united from the very commencement in the closest manner. Their separation has often been attempted, and sometimes with success, but never without the greatest danger and the most violent commotions; for legitimacy is not merely an hereditary right, but in an unrevolutionized state it is the first of its laws, the key-stone as it were of the rest. It can not be departed from except when the reigning family resists the demands of the country for independence, and an irreconcilable antagonism arises between the principles of the state and the interests of the reigning house.

The reverse of this was rather the case now in France.

At the first glance it is evident that if the schemes of the Spaniards and the League were carried out, the French kingdom could no longer exist in its political individuality. Not merely the elevation of the Archduke to the throne, but even the reign of so weak a prince as young Guise, by the side of a woman of talent, who had been well instructed in the management of affairs by her father, and who lived in the Spanish Catholic ideas alone, would have cost the French their independence; France would have become a portion of the great Catholic empire which Philip II. and his statesmen contemplated.

Thoughts like these might have passed through the minds of many, and awakened a feeling of opposition to the Spanish design; but they were first clearly expressed by the great judicial corporation, the Parliament of Paris.

The Parliament set itself in opposition to the exclusive hierarchical efforts, as well as to those of a democratic tendency, even while it stood under the influence of the League. It contended openly against the instructions of a Papal Legate which ran counter to the ancient immunities of France, and also against the intention of the Estates to introduce the Tridentine decrees; nor would the Parliament allow the Salic law to be transgressed, any more than the other fundamental laws of the kingdom. There could be no mistake as to its views: it at once limited the right of the Estates to proceed to the election of a new king, by the proviso contained in its declaration that the election must take place according to the laws of the kingdom. When Inigo Mendoza wished to make his statement concerning the invalidity of the Salic law, the Attorney-General Molé refused to attend, though his presence was particularly desired, for without it the Parliament was excluded from the consultations of the Estates; but it was thought better that he should be absent.* This speech however, instead of bringing conviction, awakened in general opposite ideas and remembrances. It was remarked that the maxim of natural hereditary succession, which Mendoza sought to recommend, would have confirmed the claims which the English kings had formerly made upon the French crown, and which their successors might very well renew once more. The condition of the state for centuries past would be thereby made out to be illegal. It was impossible that the Parliament could allow such views to prevail; while the Estates proceeded with their consultations respecting the elevation of the Infanta to the French throne, a resolution was formed, especially among the younger members of the *Chambre des Enquêtes*, to oppose that proposal with earnestness, and with a certain degree of solemnity. The merit of having taken the initiative in this course was ascribed to a man who afterward became celebrated, Michel de Marillac,† nephew to the Archbishop of Vienne already mentioned. The First President, Le Maistre, and the *Grande Chambre*, agreed to the proceed-

* *Registre du Clergé*, in Bernard, 483.

† Le Beau, "Vie de Marillac," Maier, xv. 615, with excellent additions by Bernard, 736.

ing. They had probably no understanding with Mayenne, but they knew that he did not concur in the views of the Spaniards, nor in those of the majority in the Estates. It was a moment in which they could venture to attempt something; their opinions were announced with all possible reserve, and almost with an expression of hesitancy, but they were decisive.

On the 28th of June the Parliament drew up a solemn admonition to Mayenne, to prevent the crown from falling into the hands of a foreigner under the pretext of religion; and in which it was declared that all which had been done or could be done toward raising a foreign prince or princess to the throne was and would remain null and void; for it was in opposition to the Salic law, and to other fundamental laws of the kingdom of France. In the afternoon the President, with twenty councilors of the Palace of Justice, were seen proceeding along the Quai toward the residence of the Lieutenant-General, in order to present this resolution. Le Maistre, in a copious speech, explained the motives which had actuated the Parliament. He reminded Mayenne of the resistance made to the interference of the Papal See in political affairs by the ancient kings—Philip Augustus, Philip the Fair, and Louis XII.—and also of his own oath.* Mayenne showed some displeasure that so important a resolution should have been agreed to without previous consultation with himself; for the moment, however, it was not dissatisfactory to him;† but in France the feeling of the moment usually decides the result, and Mayenne yielded to the remonstrances of the President.

If we strip this event of all accidental circumstances, its sum and essence is this: the supreme tribunal had, from an early period, renounced the severity of the ecclesiastical decrees and laws; since then, meanwhile, it had again partially consented to them; now, however, when it was sought to apply them to the Crown itself, and apparently with earnest-

* Extract from the Speech, in Thuanus, cvi. 545.

† Tassis, July 10: "No falta quien dice que la (the declaration of the Parliament) procuraron la madre, hermana, y muger del de Umena; mas puede dexarse de sospechar que aun el mismo Duque convino en ello, si ben dio despues alguna reprehension."

ness, the Parliament stepped forth to oppose them with all its might. The ecclesiastical law, and previous excommunications, had excluded the hereditary king and all his posterity from the throne. Instead of acknowledging this, and consenting to the election of a new king, as it was proposed, the Parliament insisted upon the fundamental laws of the kingdom, in accordance with which the Prince, excluded by the ecclesiastical decrees, must have been called to the throne. The order of the Church, and of the Catholic system generally had taken a position of antagonism to the order and necessities of the State. The aspect of affairs was nearly identical with that which had previously taken place in Germany, when the Ecclesiastical Princes, postponing their obligations to the Pope, resolved to acknowledge the religious peace, without which the nation could not exist. An ecclesiastical doctrinary manifestation came at the same time in aid of the political movement.

During the sittings of the Diet, a conference took place, with the approval of Mayenne, between the Royalist bishops and the bishops attached to the League, chiefly at Suresne; but as yet it could not be said that any approximation had taken place between their several convictions. As it generally happens in discussions of the kind, the principles maintained by each party were more remarkable than what either gained from the other. The Royalists, who had come from the camp of Henry IV., placed the natural right of the hereditary King in the foreground. The Leaguers, who had been delegated by the city, declared that to acknowledge these rights in a non-Catholic prince was incompatible with their ecclesiastical duty. The latter in support of their position, adduced examples from the Old Testament and from the hierarchical ages; the former appealed to the simple announcements of the Gospel, which assigned limits to the Protestants also. The Royalist bishops produced a profound impression however by asserting one day that their King would come over to Catholicism. It may perhaps be regarded as a recession from the extreme severity of the opinions and resolutions previously formed, that the chief of the Leaguers, Archbishop Espinac, declared that in that case it was not altogether im-

possible Henry might be acknowledged as King, always providing that the Papal absolution must precede such recognition; for even were the Crown independent in temporal things, it was not so in matters of faith and religion. The Royalist theologians were very far from agreeing to this statement; their leader, Renaud de Beaune, Archbishop of Bourges, proposed the question, what was to be done in case the Pope should happen to refuse absolution to the King? * Were the rights of the Crown to be made dependent upon foreigners? He maintained that it would be perfectly satisfactory if the French hierarchy absolved the King, and that the consent and blessing of the Pope might be requested afterward.

On the next Sunday the preachers of the city assailed Henry of Béarn in the fiercest and most stormy manner: they called him an excommunicate, a relapsed heretic; they declared they could not believe that the Pope, whom they regarded as only the expression of the strictest ecclesiastical principles, could ever absolve him; he might become Catholic, their king he never should be; they would not even hear of any further truce with him.

The preachers in this instance, however, were no longer so completely encouraged by the applause of the multitude; the people wanted not merely opinions, but palpable effects.

The greatest detriment suffered by the cause of the League arose from the weakness and distance of the Spanish military force.† The pretensions of the ambassadors became ridiculous the moment the force was removed, which alone could have made them impressive. On the other hand, the brave Béarnais was in the neighborhood of the capital with his army; his enterprises followed one another rapidly: men began to feel that they were not quite free from damage, nay that they were even in danger in the city.

It has often been remarked, and justly, that Henry's gen-

* Detailed report of the sittings, in Cayet's Chronol. Novenn. Mich. xii. 447.

† Inigo Mendoza, May 30, 1593: "No ay quien ne nos eche en rostro nostra desmidez en armas y dineros; otros nos predican por impotentes, y disconfian de lo que prometimos."

eralship was cast into the shade by the talent of Alexander Farnese, who knew much better how to make his military movements conduce to the accomplishment of one object. There is, however, another kind of strategy, which has regard to great geographical relations, and of this Henry IV. possessed, I will by no means say the philosophy, but a practical feeling. At his first approach to Paris his principal care was to obtain possession of the positions which commanded the rivers; their recovery was also the first object which occupied him after the retreat of Farnese. In the same manner he conducted all his operations in the north of France, the subjugation of which was his problem, and on this occasion, the north was coerced by the south. His greatest anxiety was to preserve the middle and lower Loire in his own hands. As he could not take either Rouen or Havre, it was of the greater importance to him either to maintain or to regain Quillebeuf and Caudebec, and nothing caused bitterer complaints among the Leaguers of Normandy. He also kept the ports on the northern coast for the most part in obedience.

Henry has been ridiculed for having suspended important campaigns for the purpose of negotiating the marriage of Turenne with the heiress of Buillon; but the fact, that by this means so important a place on the Meuse as Sedan came into the possession of a friend who could be relied on during the war, shows that this marriage was not without consequence to his entire scheme. The possession of St. Valéry on the Somme by the Duke of Nevers, as already mentioned, was of still greater importance. Henry said that if Nevers had not succeeded, he would himself have marched upon the town.* The mastery of the havens, and the command of the streams and passages of the rivers, gave him the dominion of the district, and occasioned a powerful reaction upon the great communes, which had been his most formidable enemies. The power of Paris, Rouen, and Orléans, was al-

* "Mémoire pour les Affaires de la France," 1592, MS. de Simancas: "Les villes Catholiques sont réduites en extrême langueur pour ne jouir de revenu quelconque, pour être privées de leur trafic ordinaire, et pour ne pouvoir vivre de leurs métiers."

ready exhausted, and in a state of manifest decay. The towns of Picardy were in a somewhat better condition, but, as they had shared in the prosperity of the others, they were also affected by their decline. Henry's capture of Dreux, in July, 1593, was severely felt in the capital, where all had by degrees become weary of the war. During the conference at Suresne, and the truce which had been agreed to, and extended from time to time, on account of it, the Parisians enjoyed a foretaste of peace. A vast number had taken the opportunity of visiting their estates once more, and they were terrified at the idea of the truce being terminated; the Papal Legate, who was looked upon as an enemy to it, was even threatened with violence.

Considering the military superiority which the King at this conjuncture undoubtedly possessed, and the necessity felt on the other side for peace, it may appear, that had he held his creed firmly, he might have reckoned upon a complete triumph. It was represented to him by zealous Huguenots that he might allow the Catholics to elect a man of straw to be their King; and if they did so, all the venom of the enemy would be collected in one head, that he would then know with whom he had to contend; it might be the more difficult way, but it was the way to make himself an absolute king. He was reminded of the personal danger he would incur by venturing into the midst of his enemies, where it would be impossible to defend him, and told that it would be better for him, should things come to the worst, to maintain himself independently in a corner of France, and surrounded with such persons only as he could place confidence in.

There was not a Protestant heart in the world which did not beat more rapidly at the thought of King Henry's succeeding in taking full possession of the French crown without passing over to another creed.

He was no longer, however, in a condition to form a free determination for himself. He was bound by the promise he had made immediately after the death of Henry III. He might have postponed the fulfillment of it as long as he was combating for his existence; he might have rejected, as contrary to his honor, the admonitions coupled with threats which

he had received from a party, designated emphatically as the third party, which had long existed, and now renewed its efforts. Could he, however, redeem his word without blushing for himself, that was the course which fully accorded with all his remaining interests.

Among the manifold requisitions to this effect which reached him even from the part of his friends, I find one which is particularly worthy of notice, and in which the religious change is represented as a duty of the royal office. The kingdom of France, it states, was regarded by every one who mixed in public affairs as a species of prey for himself, that robbery and murder traversed the land without control, and that atheism was springing up amid the confusion of religious strife. For all this infamy and violence, for the oppression of the weak, the profanation of all that was holy, and every degree of insubordination, the sole pretext was that the King was not a Catholic. If he were Duke of Vendôme only, he would be at liberty to act according to his own pleasure, but as King of France it was his supremely imperative duty to care for the kingdom. All the constituted authorities of the kingdom were Catholic, the exceptions being so few as to make no essential difference. And was not the Catholic Church after all, in reference to doctrine, order, and usage, the same ancient Church which it had ever been? No one could deny the corruption of morals and the abuses of discipline which prevailed among the clergy; these, however, it was not for the Huguenots to reform, but for him, the King, the temporal head of the Church. Perhaps God had raised him up to re-establish the general unity once more; but before he could interfere with the Church, he must again stand forth as the eldest son of the Church.

To these general reasons were added the special circumstances of the moment. To found his State upon the attachment of the nobility alone, he was told, would be impossible, for no one could tell how long it would endure; at present he had the opportunity of winning over to his side the towns, which only waited for the occasion to exclude him; would he only recant, the wonted support of the clergy would not fail him; he would be master of the three Estates, but if not,

it was to be apprehended that another king might be set up in opposition to him.*

In fact, the adherents of young Guise and the Spaniards were now occupied most zealously with such a project, and certainly it behoved Henry not to allow matters to proceed to that point. An Anti-King, once named, might in process of time become the nucleus of all the antagonistic elements. There was a spell in the royal title; and how easily might the reflux of the Spanish tide bring to the League an amount of support and power far greater than what it now possessed! An intestine war without end would be the consequence.

But would it not be an advantage to the Protestants themselves, should a prince ascend the throne who had belonged to them, who had risen by their aid, and was united to them by many ties? Their cause would succeed by that means in a manner totally different from what would have been otherwise possible; thus closely connected with the political power it could never again, as all believed, assume a persecuting character toward them. With Henry IV. the principle of toleration, which had been maintained in a few provinces, would appear to take possession of the French throne. In his person would lie the mediation of that opposition which could not otherwise be brought to an arbitration. This would be, however, a decision affecting not France alone, but all Europe.

Although antagonistic doctrines and unfettered energies ceaselessly struggled with one another for the ascendancy in Europe, yet the final decision of the contest seldom depended upon them alone. At critical conjunctures a universal conviction was felt which confined the struggle within certain limits, and exercised over it, as it were, a superior and moderating power.

Henry IV. had always hitherto appeared as the champion of the Protestant interests, and, notwithstanding his declaration of 1589, his most essential support had been constantly derived from the Protestants; it had been looked upon there-

* Supplication et avis au Roi de se faire Catholique : MSS. in the Library of the Arsenal, Paris, No. 176.

fore, as the common interest of the Catholic world to oppose him. From this, however, had arisen various relations, which by degrees had become intolerable to the national feeling of the several states on the Catholic side. The King of Spain, the champion of the principle contended for, being in close alliance with the Papal See, obtained by means of the struggle against Henry, a predominant power which was oppressive to all the other Catholic states. It became, for the Italian states in particular, an absolute condition of political existence that France should be independent.

The Venetians were the first to give utterance to this conviction. They were of opinion that the head of the Church, the Pope, might have political enemies, but that that was not the affair of a single State. The hatred which had arisen on account of religious differences, and which had broken up every other relation, must have a period at some time. The younger nobility, among whom these principles prevailed, took at that time a large share in the administration of public affairs, and the proposition to send an embassy to Queen Elizabeth was rejected by but a few voices. How much more completely then did these ideas and observations apply to a prince who had already declared that he was willing to return to Catholicism! The Venetians were the first among the Catholics who acknowledged Henry IV.; they granted him supplies of money, and wished for nothing more ardently than for his triumph.*

The relative position of the Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany was still more peculiar, who was aroused not only through apprehension of Spain, but also and chiefly by jealousy of Savoy. Had Philip II. yielded to his request, and placed him in possession of Marseilles, Ferdinand might probably have united himself with the League; but Philip answered him that the times of Charles V., in which Tuscany was favored, were gone by. From that moment Ferdinand took up the cause of Henry IV., sustained him with money for the enlistment of Swiss and the payment of other troops, mediated a better understanding between him and his own brother-in-law, the Duke of Lorraine, and, what was more

* *Relatione di Venetia*, 1590 : MS. Bibl. Barberini.

than all, obtained for him, through the Cardinal of Toledo, an undefined but at the same time highly promising access even to Rome itself. In return, however, as men had begun on account of these proceedings to regard Ferdinand as a schismatic, he earnestly desired Henry's transition to Catholicism. He not only advised this step, but urged Henry to take it within an appointed time, after the lapse of which he would otherwise be compelled to renounce his connection.

It thus happened that the political relations of Europe generally concurred to render the change of religion advisable in Henry. It appears that it was attempted to induce the Protestant German princes to give their consent beforehand; this, however, as we may easily conceive, was not to be effected. What were the King's own views meanwhile? He was determined first either to conquer the League or to come to a reconciliation with it, and then to make his recantation;* but considering the danger of the period in France and also in Italy, he could not place much expectation upon such uncertain consequences. The recantation must be at the same time a means of victory and of reconciliation.

The declaration of Henry IV. that he sacrificed his convictions to his duty, though not altogether true, contains some truth. He regarded the pacification of France and the re-establishment of the balance of political power in Europe as his duty. As regarded the doctrinal questions involved, there was not much to be said: the whole difficulty consisted in making the retraction morally possible to the prince.

No one had exercised a greater influence in this matter than Jacques Davy du Perron, who had himself seceded from the Protestant faith, in which he had been educated by his zealous parents. He was a man of universal literary accomplishments; he had succeeded well even in poetical attempts; his philosophy was of a diversified character, and his conversation agreeable. His letters exhibit a changeable appearance

* "Egli avrebbe voluto prima vincere o pacificarsi con i Catholici, e poi abbracciar la loro religione."—Galluzzi, Storia di Toscana, v. 156. An authentic account of the communications from France to the Grand Duke, and of the most important official reports, is greatly to be desired for the history of those times. Rommel has a notice of the mission to Germany: N. Hess. Gesch. i.

of flattery, which yet has nothing obtrusive in it; it was through a letter in which there was a happily-turned phrase that he made the nearer acquaintance of the King. Sully afterward adopted his interests, and raised him from one degree of favor to another.

One of the chief arguments with which the King was solicited was that the Romish Church, notwithstanding all its abuses, still remained the Church, and offered the means of salvation.* Even Protestant clergymen who had come from Geneva confirmed this view; others, who were restricted by the political state of affairs, preferred keeping silence. They were acquainted with the King's inclination, and saw the unavoidableness of the step. A formal disputation they evaded, for even though they should be victorious they would appear as if conquered.

Henry IV. was terrified when the denial was suggested to him of a whole series of doctrines which he had hitherto confessed, and declined to subscribe a confession of faith so extensive.†

The intention appears clearly from the letter, so often printed, which he wrote on the 23d of June to Gabriel d'Estrées. He had arrived at St. Denis the evening before. "To day," said he, "I begin to converse with the bishops; on Sunday I am to take the dangerous leap."

On the 25th of June, in the church of St. Denis, at the feet of the Archbishop of Bourges, Henry declared that he was willing to live and die in the Roman Apostolical Catholic Church, and to protect and defend it. Upon this the Archbishop gave him absolution, and received him into the bosom of the Church.

It was not to the Church persecuting with fire and sword that Henry went over; that Church would have rejected him. It was the doctrines of the Royalist clergy to which he ac-

* Aubigné, Hist. Univ. iii. 291.

† "Il dit à M^r du Plessis, que luy étant présentée à signer une profession de foy, en laquelle il abjurait par le menu tous les points controversés avec les Papistes et juroit les contraires, il en eut horreur et le refusa, les priant de se contenter qu'il rentroit en l'Eglise, en espérance de la balaier un jour puisqu'il seroit dedans."—Vie de Duplessis-Mornay, 186.

ceded, and it was that party which accepted him. They consented to the toleration of the Huguenots, which was the essence of the event.

Even the great Catholic nobles who surrounded the King promised to the Huguenots the re-establishment of the Edict of Pacification, which had been suspended by the League. The King summoned the deputies of the Reformed Churches, and hinted to them that they had not made such good use of the favorable moment as they might have done. When they came together in September, at Nantes, he made no opposition to their renewing the oath to live and die in their religion, and at the same time a commencement, at least, was made toward reviving the Edict of Pacification.

Had Henry's adoption of Catholicism taken place earlier, it would have been productive of feebler effect. The faction which held him under all circumstances to be disqualified, and which had declared him incapable of ecclesiastical absolution, had been much too strong up to the present moment; and the opinion prevailed even among the so-called third party, that the King must be a person who had never belonged to the Huguenots. The general bias of men's minds was then in favor of the union between exclusive Catholicism and civic liberty under the protection of the Spaniards, whose arms and money still held all in dependency and expectation. The campaigns against Alexander Farnese would not, in fact, have had a more successful issue had Henry been a Catholic.

Now, however, that great general was no more. The pecuniary assistance yielded by the Spaniards was sparing; their troops were removed; their previous pretensions, which had been encouraged by the French themselves, were now felt by them to be intolerable. They began to regard Henry IV. as the champion of the national independency, and at the same time as their rescuer from the fearful disorders and desolations of war. All felt once more the necessity for a strong hereditary authority, and were they then to stumble at the non-fulfillment of all that was required by the strict doctrine? To the majority of men, the great characteristics of doctrine are all that is perceptible, and the essential desideratum consisted in the religious change considered in the abstract.

The League felt from the first moment the difficulty of the position in which this step on the part of the King would place it, and its members assembled together once more. Under the guidance of the Legate, Mayenne, Guise, Aumale, Elbœuf, La Chastre, Rosne, St. Paul, the Archbishop Espinac, and the representatives of Mercœur, bound themselves to preserve their union, to conclude no peace with "Navarre," but, on the other hand, to renew the war against him as soon as the Spanish assistance should arrive, and they should have come to a common understanding regarding the form to be given to the monarchy. But this was now no longer possible. Feria and the Spaniards remained firm in the intention to call Guise to the throne. Mayenne could not be induced to approve of that course. Sometimes he made objections to the person of his nephew; and sometimes he advanced claims of his own which never could be fulfilled; at last he declared plainly that while the conflicting claims were French against French, he would give place to no one.

Feria endeavored to raise a party against him, between Guise and Aumale, who were joined by Espinac also, but this only effected the entire dissolution of the confederacy.

Nemours endeavored to take possession of Lyons on his own account. Mercœur pursued his peculiar policy in Brittany. Tassis remarks that every governor of a district and every commandant of a castle conducted himself as if he were king, and appropriated the public money, and that the same was done by the towns. There was so little trace of consistency or common order in the kingdom, that the deputies of the States in Paris had no other means of support but the pecuniary supplies of the Spaniards.*

Under these circumstances, Henry IV. refused to prolong the truce. If we call to mind that Mayenne assigned it as his motive for the conclusion of the truce, the fact that without it the union could no longer be preserved, we may estimate the effect which this step must have had.

The war broke out afresh. Henry was by far the more powerful in the field. The League, in complete ruin, could make no defense against him. What further remained for

* "Los consejeros han de comer de allí."—Papers of Simancas.

those endangered by his progress, or to the ambitious who wished to ascend higher, except to unite themselves with the King, against whom they had hitherto contended?

The first consequence of the religious change was that it enabled many who desired to go over to Henry to do so now without shame.

Though the Protestantism of Henry had been frequently but a mere pretext for resistance, yet it was of the greatest advantage to him that that pretext was now removed. Let us not, however, contemplate the personal aspects of the question alone, however effective they may have been. There were many who regarded submission to the hereditary and now Catholic King as the only means of putting a period to the confusion of the country.

The first distinguished military leader who resolved to go over from the League to the King, was a man who had left him on his accession, because, as he said, he could not serve a Huguenot. He now declared that since the King had become a Catholic, there was no longer any lawful reason to refuse him obedience, and that to make war against him would be not a religious movement, but an act of ambition and usurpation.* This was Vitry, the governor of Meaux. The town, whose keys he delivered up, followed his example voluntarily. The Spaniards were doubly sensitive to the loss of this place, because it was the key to the connection between Paris and the Netherlands.

The next to follow Vitry's example was one of the most trusted adherents of the Guises, La Chastre, who delivered Orleans and Bourges into the hands of Henry IV. He assigned it as his reason for this step, that the inhabitants were apprehensive of falling under foreign dominion, and that the maintenance of religion was now secured.† He admonished Guise, at the same time, no longer to allow himself to be betrayed by foreigners.

Feria lays the blame of both these secessions upon May-

* Le Manifeste de M. de Vitry, Gouverneur de Meaux, 1594. In the preface it states that "ce scrupule (de religion) cessant, celui est misérable, vayne, exécration, qui se targue de ce faux prétexte.

† Compare the declaration in Bouillé, iv. 266.

enne, who had been warned in vain, and who, he says, might have easily come to the assistance of the Catholics of Orleans, had he wished, but instead of that he made the Béarnais King.*

Lyons, through the disunion of the Leaguers, soon fell into the hands of Henry IV. The Parliament of Aix began again to deliver legal judgments in his name. The Romish court had once more rejected Henry's declaration of obedience, not without official harshness: this did not prevent the French, however, from gathering round their King. His coronation, which took place at Chartres on the 27th of February, 1594, was performed in a spirit of opposition to Rome; for, it was said, it would be an admission which would render the rights of the Crown doubtful, were this ceremony postponed because the absolution of the Pope had not been granted. Perhaps the Pope himself was not altogether so displeased with this contempt of his authority as he appeared; but of this no one in the country had any suspicion, and, without the approval of Rome, the provinces made known their consent with joy.†

Meanwhile every thing was prepared in the capital for a great alteration. There were appointed houses in the different quarters, where the adherents of the King assembled, and concerted the measures they should take, and even the manner in which they should express themselves. They now found a hearing even among the people, who were tired of the declamation of the preachers, and could not live longer without peace. But that peace, it was said, they could not have without acknowledging the King, whose power prevailed all over the land. In the beginning Henry had been regarded almost as a foreigner, but since then he had made himself the

* In contradiction to what has been narrated by others, Feria states that the secession of Vitry was but little felt by Mayenne. "Quedó tan poco disgustado da Vitri, avendo hecho tan grande traicion, que despues della embió certas joyas."

† Henry describes the coronation as an "action sainte, où le peuple constitue beaucoup d'efficace. Toute l'église (a été) pleine de peuple, qui a montré, par trois signes d'allégresse, toute l'affection qui se peut témoigner envers son prince."—Lettre à M. de Beauvoir, 1594, dern. Févr.: Lettres Missives, iv. 101.

general subject of conversation by his gallant actions in war. The reputation of his personal qualities was widely circulated. "He was good and wise, and people must throw themselves into his arms." Fanatical opinions, whether political or religious, resembled mists, which, rising suddenly, conceal things for the moment from the eye, but a time comes when they are dissipated. Mayenne superseded the governor of the city, who had associated with the moderate party,* and appointed in his place a man of unsuspected reputation among the Leaguers—the same Count de Brissac who had taken the lead at the barricades; he was, however, no longer so completely to be relied upon: as he had formerly felt himself neglected by Henry III., so did he now by the Guises.† Instead of resisting the general movement, he yielded to it; and when Henry IV. offered to create him a marshal of France, he did not hesitate to withdraw from that party to the formation and effectiveness of which, he asserted, he had contributed most, nor to unite with the King. The civic authorities had an understanding with him, and on the 22d of March, 1594, Henry was able to enter Paris without any opposition. He proceeded through the streets in complete armor, his helmet adorned with the white plumes which had become so renowned in his battles, at the head of a numerous body of the nobility, and surrounded by the marksmen of his guard. When he arrived at Notre Dame, the populace crowded round him, and greeted him with acclamations a thousand times repeated. It sometimes appeared to him almost like a dream, that this long wished-for return to the capital, which he had so often sought to effect by force of arms, should at length be accomplished so easily, and without effort; but things had gradually become ripe for it. He made it known to the Spaniards that he was come to take posses-

* Ibarra adds, that Mayenne had been requested by the members of the States who were still present, "que echasse fuera los enemigos, y meter mas gente de S. Md." (namely Spaniards); but he was afraid in that case that he would cease to be master.

† "Pieno di occulto dolore," Davila, xiv. 909. *Commentarii*: "In Poitou la maggior parte de' gentilhuomini si misero col Duca d'Elbœuf, havendo lui preso con consenso di cittadini il governo di Poitiers, et esclusone Brissac."

sion of that which belonged to him, that the people had recalled their King. Feria's answer was not without dignity: he said he had been sent to protect the people, but since the people had submitted, he would leave the city with his soldiers, which he did without delay.


One of Henry's first visits was to the Duchess of Montpensier, who was looked upon as his bitterest enemy. She was astonished at finding so much favor from him, but Henry's principal object was at present to reconcile the Guises, as well as the house of Lorraine, to himself. A multitude of the fiercest preachers, Boucher among the rest, left the city in company with the Spaniards; others followed them voluntarily, and some were compelled to take the same course. In all the quarters there were some citizens who were also obliged to abandon the capital, but to all the rest a full amnesty was granted. Instead of the priestly and popular doctrines, the Royalist opinions were now expounded and enforced once more. In St. Germain l'Auxerrois a Royalist preacher, named Bellanger, declared the former teachers to be seducers of the people; he spoke especially of the obedience due to the King, and designated it as heresy to maintain the contrary. The King himself was present, and sat directly opposite to the preacher.*

Villars, at Rouen, now no longer hesitated to make his peace, although he had at the same time with Brissac been implicated in the last renewal of the League; he also received considerable grants of money, and retained the dignity of an admiral, which had been transferred to him. In return he exerted himself so that Rouen, Havre, and a number of towns besides, acknowledged the King. Henry expressed his hopes that the pacification of the whole kingdom would result from his possession of the beautiful, extensive, and rich province.†

Paris, Orléans, and Rouen had always been regarded as the three chief cities of the League; they were all now in the hands of the King. The cities of Picardy soon followed them. It happened then as it always has happened in France: a

* L'Estoile, 220.

† Henri IV. à M. de Bourdeille, 31 Mars, 1594. *Lettres Miss.* iv. 130.



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